| AfD | 39.3% | 33.4 to 44.8 | |
| CDU | 24.4% | 19.1 to 30.1 | |
| Die Linke | 13.2% | 10.0 to 16.7 | |
| SPD | 7.9% | 6.0 to 10.1 | |
| Greens | 4.8% | 3.7 to 6.1 | |
| BSW | 3.8% | 2.9 to 4.8 | |
| FDP | 2.6% | 1.5 to 4.4 |
Values from the engine, block prior, lambda 0.20. Verified by an actual run and reproducible bit for bit.
Voters in Saxony-Anhalt cast two ballots on the same day. The first vote, the Erststimme (constituency vote), picks a candidate in their constituency: there are 41 of them, and each sends whoever finishes first to the Landtag, by simple plurality in a single round. The second vote, the Zweitstimme (list vote), goes to a party list at the state level.
The two votes do not carry equal weight. It is the second that sets the overall allocation: the total number of seats due to each party is calculated from it alone, proportionally. Direct mandates won on the first vote are then deducted from that total. A party that wins ten constituencies and is entitled to thirty seats overall will receive twenty from its list. This is why a model that predicted the constituencies well but the second vote poorly would get the essential part wrong.
A party that falls short of 5% of the list vote gets no list seat, whatever its score. Its votes do not simply vanish: they drop out of the calculation, and the allocation runs among the qualifying parties only, which mechanically inflates each of their shares. This is why the story of this election is not the winner but the 5% bar, and why a party polling at 4.8% shifts dozens of seats depending on whether it clears that bar or not.
Saxony-Anhalt has no direct-mandate override clause. In Berlin, by contrast, winning just one direct mandate waives the threshold and opens access to the proportional allocation: the same national rule has variants from one Land to another.
The Landtag has a base size of 83 seats. It almost always ends up with more, and that is the least intuitive part of the system.
When a party wins more constituencies than its proportional entitlement allows, it keeps the surplus: these are the overhang seats (Überhangmandate). To restore the balance, the law then allocates the other parties levelling seats (Ausgleichsmandate), until overall proportionality is restored. Parliament therefore grows as a party dominates the constituencies without dominating the list vote.
This is exactly the situation forecast here: AfD is projected to win in 39 of the 41 constituencies with 39% of the list vote. The Landtag grows from 83 seats to a median of 87, and up to 99 in one case out of twenty. The absolute-majority threshold rises with it, from 42 to 44 seats. The allocation follows the Hare-Niemeyer method, also known as the largest-remainder method.
The Landtag then elects the head of government. Article 65 of the state constitution provides for two rounds requiring an absolute majority of members, then, if no candidate reaches it, a fourteen-day window during which the assembly can vote to dissolve itself. If it does not, a third round is held in which a majority of votes actually cast is enough: abstentions are removed from the count.
This rule is decisive in a parliament without a majority. It allows a state premier (Ministerpräsident) to be elected whom part of the assembly refuses to support, provided that part abstains rather than votes against. The two other Länder voting on September 20 each have their own variant: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern holds unlimited rounds over four weeks before reaching this point, while Berlin attaches no dissolution procedure to failure.
| Direct | List | Total | 90% | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AfD | 38.6 | 0.6 | 39 | 36-43 | |
| CDU | 1.3 | 23.3 | 24 | 19-31 | |
| Die Linke | 0.9 | 12.4 | 13 | 10-17 | |
| SPD | 0.0 | 7.9 | 8 | 6-11 | |
| Greens | 0.1 | 1.9 | 0 | 0-6 | |
| BSW | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0 | 0-0 | |
| FDP | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0 | 0-0 |
AfD wins 39 of the 41 direct mandates but less than one list seat. This is the overhang-seat mechanism: with 39.3% of the vote it would be entitled to about 34 seats in an 87-seat Landtag, yet it wins 39 directly. AfD keeps these five extra seats, and the law compensates the other parties with levelling seats to restore proportionality, which inflates the Landtag from a base of 83 seats to a median of 87, and up to 99 in one case out of twenty. CDU, by contrast, draws 23 of its 24 seats from the list vote, and Die Linke 12 of its 13.
The Greens win seats only in the 37% of draws where they clear 5%: five seats when they enter, zero otherwise. Direct and List columns are averaged over 20,000 draws, Total is the median.
In nine draws out of ten, no combination is both majority and politically workable. That is not a deadlock: it is a minority government, dependent on shifting majorities in the Landtag.
Two neighbouring states already work this way. Michael Kretschmer (CDU) governs Saxony with a minority government whose coalition occasionally assembles majorities with Die Linke's votes. In Thuringia, Mario Voigt's coalition likewise has no majority of its own in the state parliament. Asked about Saxony-Anhalt on ZDF's Morgenmagazin on September 1st, Kretschmer repeated that a government with Die Linke was, for him, out of the question, the underlying differences being too great. His own practice nonetheless shows the distinction: excluding Die Linke from government does not prevent assembling majorities with its votes in parliament. As in Saxony, Sven Schulze may well cooperate with Die Linke to secure majorities on specific measures. Part of Saxony-Anhalt's CDU, however, might prefer shifting majorities that include AfD, which would push Die Linke away.
Why 39% of the vote is not a majority. Seats are allocated only among parties that clear 5%. The votes of the others, and those in the residual seat, are excluded from the calculation. What matters for AfD is therefore not its statewide score, but its share among the votes that count.
Today, AfD stands at 39.3% and the combined qualifying parties at about 88.6%. Its useful share is therefore 44.3%, and it needs to pass 50% of that total to win a majority of seats. It is roughly five points short.
| Parties in the Landtag | Proportional threshold | Actual threshold | Gap to central estimate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Four: AfD, CDU, Linke, SPD | 42.8% | 50.0% | +10.7 pts |
| Five, with the Greens | 45.3% | 47.5% | +8.3 pts |
| Five, with the BSW | 44.8% | 49.2% | +9.9 pts |
| Six, Greens and BSW | 47.1% | 45.2% | +5.9 pts |
The “proportional” column: the score AfD would need if seats were allocated by strict proportionality among qualifying parties only. The “actual” column: the score measured by the engine, direct mandates and compensation included. The gap between the two, up to seven points in a four-party Landtag, is the cost of compensation: the more overhang seats AfD accumulates, the more the law inflates parliament in favour of the others, and the further the bar moves. Caveat: the six-party row assumes the Greens at 4.98%, i.e. below the very threshold it presupposes; L4 itself flags this as inconsistent, and it is shown for reference only.
Two effects move this threshold in opposite directions. The more parties fall short, the more votes are excluded, so the higher AfD's useful share climbs at an equal score: a four-party Landtag is arithmetically more favourable to it than a six-party one. But it also wins 39 of the 41 direct mandates, far beyond its proportional entitlement. It keeps these overhang seats, the law compensates the other parties to restore proportionality, and parliament inflates: from a base of 83 seats to a median of 87, up to 99 in one case out of twenty. The majority threshold rises with it, from 42 to 44 seats on average.
It is this double mechanism that explains why a party with close to 40% of the vote, finishing first in 98% of simulations and sweeping almost every constituency, wins an absolute majority only once in ten.
Bounded by the probability that BSW enters the Landtag, 3.5%. No seats, no coalition.
Requires two simultaneous conditions: that the Greens clear 5%, which happens in 37% of draws, and that the three parties hold a majority, which almost never happens.
Who forms the government is not a model output. AfD finishes strictly first in 97.9% of draws, but no workable combination includes it besides itself and AfD + BSW. The formateur criterion therefore does not discriminate, and the selection rule falls back on size and surplus among the CDU, SPD, Linke and Greens combinations. Naming CDU as the formateur of a minority government is a political reading, as in Thuringia, not an output of the calculation.
This is the most open and best-documented scenario.
Why Die Linke would vote in favour without joining government. Three reasons combine. First, the firewall: it has taken this path in other Länder to keep AfD from the premiership, and said on 13 August in the MDR Wahlarena that it was ready to defend democracy alongside CDU. Second, the constraint: Schulze has ruled out Linke ministers, not a parliamentary agreement, so entering government is closed to it regardless. Third, its own interest: with 13 seats in a state it nearly left in 2023, it has more to gain by remaining the left-wing opposition than by co-signing a CDU government's austerity. Voting for investiture without joining the cabinet lets it block AfD without owning the record.
Arithmetically open in almost every configuration, and this is the model's most counter-intuitive point. SPD, Die Linke, the Greens and FDP have all ruled out AfD in a sourced statement, but their combined votes are not enough to block it as soon as one significant group sits out the vote.
CDU abstains. Votes cast fall to 60, AfD has 39, it passes comfortably. This is the most direct path, and the one CDU has committed not to take.
Die Linke abstains. This is the path nobody sees coming. If Die Linke sits out the vote and CDU votes against, the votes cast are AfD at 39 versus CDU + SPD at 35: AfD wins. A Die Linke abstention meant to withhold support from CDU therefore mechanically installs AfD. This is the exact mirror of scenario 1, and it is what makes its choice decisive.
BSW enters the Landtag and sits out the vote. This case is marginal, as BSW enters in only a small minority of draws, but it is the least documented pivot: its only statement rules out electing Sven Schulze, and says nothing about an AfD candidate. If it abstains alongside Die Linke, it removes six more votes from the count and the gap widens further.
The only case where investiture is not decided in a third round, because an absolute majority exists. Only two combinations.
CDU + SPD + Die Linke is arithmetically a majority in the large majority of draws, with 48 seats against 44 required. But it presupposes Die Linke's participation in government, which Schulze has explicitly ruled out by refusing any Linke minister. It is thus arithmetically comfortable and politically closed, which is exactly why scenario 1 exists: the same arithmetic, without the ministers.
CDU + SPD + Greens almost never reaches a majority, and further requires the Greens to clear 5%, which happens only in one draw out of three. This was the natural continuation coalition: it is out of reach.
The other combinations are marginal. CDU alone, without SPD, being elected depends entirely on the smaller parties' behaviour and only matters if SPD refuses to govern. AfD + BSW as a majority coalition remains anecdotal, bounded by the probability that BSW enters the Landtag.
Why no figure is shown here. Each scenario is arithmetically achievable under a different voting assumption, and these assumptions are not comparable with one another. Placing a percentage next to each would suggest a ranking that does not exist. What decides is political behaviour, and that cannot be modelled. The ranking above is a judgment of plausibility.
The overall reading fits in one sentence. Everything depends on Die Linke. If it votes in favour, Schulze is elected. If it abstains, it is Siegmund. A party with 13 seats decides who leads a state where AfD has 39.
| No. | 2021 | % | Runner-up | Gap | 2026 | Prob. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | CDU | 36.4 | AfD 17.7 | 18.7 | AfD | 94.5% |
| 02 | CDU | 36.3 | AfD 19.8 | 16.5 | AfD | 97.7% |
| 03 | CDU | 26.7 | FW 25.0 | 1.6 | AfD | 99.7% |
| 04 | CDU | 29.7 | AfD 22.3 | 7.4 | AfD | 99.6% |
| 05 | CDU | 31.3 | AfD 26.6 | 4.6 | AfD | 99.8% |
| 06 | CDU | 38.5 | AfD 20.6 | 17.9 | AfD | 97.5% |
| 07 | CDU | 37.0 | AfD 23.6 | 13.4 | AfD | 99.2% |
| 08 | CDU | 40.4 | AfD 20.6 | 19.8 | AfD | 96.5% |
| 09 | CDU | 32.8 | AfD 24.5 | 8.2 | AfD | 99.6% |
| 10 | CDU | 29.2 | AfD 19.9 | 9.3 | AfD | 99.4% |
| 11 | CDU | 28.1 | GREENS 15.9 | 12.2 | AfD | 70.2% |
| 12 | CDU | 32.6 | AfD 16.5 | 16.2 | AfD | 96.1% |
| 13 | CDU | 33.2 | AfD 17.5 | 15.7 | AfD | 97.2% |
| 14 | CDU | 30.4 | LINKE 22.3 | 8.1 | AfD | 97.1% |
| 15 | CDU | 33.6 | AfD 20.2 | 13.4 | AfD | 98.7% |
| 16 | CDU | 30.4 | SPD 24.4 | 6.0 | AfD | 96.7% |
| 17 | CDU | 33.5 | AfD 20.9 | 12.6 | AfD | 99.1% |
| 18 | CDU | 33.8 | AfD 22.7 | 11.1 | AfD | 99.4% |
| 19 | CDU | 32.7 | AfD 28.7 | 4.0 | AfD | 99.8% |
| 20 | CDU | 34.5 | AfD 22.6 | 12.0 | AfD | 99.3% |
| 21 | CDU | 34.7 | AfD 24.8 | 9.9 | AfD | 99.6% |
| 22 | CDU | 37.4 | AfD 25.1 | 12.3 | AfD | 99.4% |
| 23 | CDU | 36.5 | AfD 23.1 | 13.4 | AfD | 99.2% |
| 24 | CDU | 53.9 | AfD 18.2 | 35.7 | CDU | 56.9% |
| 25 | CDU | 39.2 | AfD 25.7 | 13.5 | AfD | 99.3% |
| 26 | CDU | 37.1 | AfD 19.1 | 18.0 | AfD | 96.6% |
| 27 | CDU | 35.6 | AfD 22.3 | 13.3 | AfD | 99.1% |
| 28 | CDU | 35.3 | AfD 26.7 | 8.6 | AfD | 99.7% |
| 29 | CDU | 35.2 | AfD 24.6 | 10.6 | AfD | 99.5% |
| 30 | CDU | 32.3 | AfD 28.6 | 3.7 | AfD | 99.8% |
| 31 | CDU | 35.0 | AfD 26.9 | 8.1 | AfD | 99.7% |
| 32 | CDU | 34.9 | AfD 28.5 | 6.4 | AfD | 99.7% |
| 33 | CDU | 41.2 | AfD 28.9 | 12.3 | AfD | 99.5% |
| 34 | CDU | 34.7 | AfD 24.7 | 10.0 | AfD | 99.6% |
| 35 | CDU | 31.4 | AfD 24.2 | 7.2 | AfD | 99.7% |
| 36 | CDU | 27.0 | SPD 15.8 | 11.2 | AfD | 90.4% |
| 37 | CDU | 23.0 | GREENS 21.2 | 1.8 | LINKE | 73.3% |
| 38 | CDU | 38.5 | AfD 21.1 | 17.4 | AfD | 97.8% |
| 39 | CDU | 27.7 | AfD 24.9 | 2.8 | AfD | 99.7% |
| 40 | CDU | 42.1 | AfD 24.0 | 18.1 | AfD | 98.3% |
| 41 | AfD | 27.1 | CDU 26.1 | 1.0 | AfD | 99.9% |
In 2021 CDU won 40 of the 41 constituencies, AfD just one, the 41st, with 27.1% against 26.1%. The model now makes AfD the favourite in 39 of the 41 constituencies: only 24, a CDU stronghold at 56.9%, and 37, the only constituency where Die Linke moves ahead, at 73.3%, are left outside that column. Only three constituencies have a favourite below 90% probability: 11, 24 and 37.
Methodological caveat: the boundaries used are those of 2021; an amendment to the Wahlgesetz (electoral law) of 7 February 2025 could not be verified.
AfD starts at 20.8% in the 2021 election and reaches 41.3%: it doubles. CDU makes the opposite journey, from 37.1% to 23.4%, and the two curves cross in spring 2025. Die Linke, written off in 2023 under 6%, climbs back to 12.8%. BSW appears in 2024, peaks at 15% in the autumn, then falls back below the threshold.
The smoothing is a Gaussian kernel applied directly to the published polls, without going through the engine's aggregate: this is what gives a continuous curve where the aggregate broke off. 154 observations from 23 waves, from February 2022 to August 2026.
Not to be confused with the election table. This curve carries neither the pollster bias correction, nor the block prior, nor the weighting by sample size and reliability. It describes what the institutes publish; the table describes what the model concludes from it. The gap shows up on BSW, 4.2% in raw average against 3.8% central estimate. The Wahlkreisprognose wave of 27 August is removed: it republishes the same day's figures from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen.
As of 1st September: Die Linke 100% · CDU 100% · AfD 100% · SPD 99% · Greens 43% · FDP 4% · BSW 3%
How it is built. At each date, the aggregate of polls available that day is corrected for the measured bias, then the block prior is applied at a weight of 20%, exactly as in the published model. Each party's volatility is the one that reproduces the verified run of 1st September. This is therefore not a Monte Carlo replay at each date, but the same calculation chain solved analytically.
The check passes: as of 1st September the curve gives BSW at 3% and the Greens at 43%, against 3.5% and 37% for the full model. The residual gap comes from the absence of simulation, which smooths the tails of the distribution. A full replay of the twenty thousand draws at each date would tighten these values without changing the shape of the curves.
The two curves cross on 8 March 2025. Before that date, CDU was seen as the near-certain winner; after it, AfD was, and the gap has only widened since. As of 1st September it leads in more than 99% of cases. This is the one question about the election that no longer arises.
Probability derived from the spread of published polls around the moving average, not from a replay of the full model.
| CDU | 37.1% | |
| AfD | 20.8% | |
| Die Linke | 11.0% | |
| SPD | 8.4% | |
| FDP | 6.4% | |
| Greens | 5.9% | |
| Others | 10.4% |
A predictive model is not just another poll. A poll surveys a sample and describes opinion at a given moment. A model surveys no one. It gathers what is measurable, published surveys and past election results, and derives from them a distribution of possible outcomes, with their probability.
AfD is projected first in 98% of simulations, and wins on average 38.65 of the 41 direct mandates. That is not the story. The story is the 5% threshold: a party that clears it enters the Landtag, a party that misses it gets no seats at all. The Greens are projected at 4.8% and enter in 37% of simulations. This single uncertainty shifts five seats and decides the third majority scenario.
In 87% of draws, no coalition is both majority and politically workable. Article 65(2) of the state constitution allows a state premier to be elected by a majority of votes cast in a third round. The most likely alternative is an AfD absolute majority alone, once in ten.
The model does not rely on polls alone. It anchors them in the vote actually cast: the previous state election, the 2024 European election, the 2025 federal election. This prior offsets the polls that got it wrong at the last Saxony-Anhalt state election, where AfD was shown neck and neck with CDU, a race CDU ultimately won.
Our model uses a calculation method based on past results that precisely refines the winner of the election, along with the constituency-level results, to estimate: the seats won in the single-round, single-member constituency vote and the number of seats won through the list vote.
A single forecast would give a false sense of certainty. The model therefore replays the election twenty thousand times, varying what is genuinely uncertain: each institute's own error, each party's volatility, and the correlation between them. It then converts each draw into seats under Saxony-Anhalt's electoral law, the Hare-Niemeyer method, with overhang and levelling seats. The Landtag therefore has no fixed size: 87 seats at the median, from 83 to 99 in nine cases out of ten, and the majority threshold is recalculated for every draw.
All parameters are public, including those we set by judgment. No probability is shown at 0% or 100%: uncertainty is this model's product, never its flaw.
Voting intentions: institutes polling on Saxony-Anhalt, aggregated and corrected for bias measured on past elections. Election results: Landeswahlleiter (state returning officer) of Saxony-Anhalt and the Bundeswahlleiterin (federal returning officer), open data under the dl-de/by-2-0 licence. Coalition exclusions: sourced and dated public statements, register available on request. The engine has a reproducible seed, two runs give the same result bit for bit, and it exactly reproduces the 97 seats allocated in 2021. Its 90% interval coverage is measured at 93% across six past elections.
All rights belong to Le Millénaire SAS, registered at 47 rue de Vivienne, 75002 Paris.
Model designed by
Project director: William Thay
Deputy project director: Pierre Clairé
Political and data analysis: Matthieu Hocque
Data analysis, mathematics and validation: Florian Gérard-Mercier