MIDTERMS 2026: DONALD TRUMP LOST, BUT IS TRUMPISM DEAD?

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Translation of the original French text, « Midterms 2026 : Donald Trump a perdu, mais le trumpisme est-il mort ? ». It may contain errors; the French version is the reference text. Maps and charts are reproduced in their original French version.



FOREWORD

The Democrats won a landslide victory in the midterm elections of 3 November, against a backdrop of anger at the 47th President of the United States of America, Donald Trump. In a true political earthquake, the Republicans lost control of the House of Representatives and of the Senate. As of 13 November 2026, the Democratic Party had won 55 Senate seats and 256 seats in the House of Representatives, exceeding the minimum of 51 and 218 seats required for a majority[1]. The *Dems* even won a majority of governorships, with 24 of the 36 seats that were up for election, for a total of 30 out of 50[2]. This victory is also historic because the Democrats had not held a majority of governorships since 2010.

This is an unprecedented electoral episode that marks a turning point in American political history, insofar as it ushers in a new era: the beginning of post-Trumpism. The defeat of the MAGA coalition, which had been on the rise since 2016, has forced it since 3 November to contemplate life after Trump. The aim of this report is to understand why the defeat of the Republican Party does not automatically mean the death of Trumpism as a political current. It also sets out to decipher the dynamics taking shape for the 2028 presidential election, on both the Republican and the Democratic side.

2 New York Times. (2026). Midterm Elections Live Updates: Democrats Build on Decisive Wins as Late Votes Trickle In. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2026/11/06/us/midterm-elections-trump Update: Yahoo News (Associated Press). (2026). Lots of 2026 midterm races haven't been called yet. Here's where things stand right now, 13 November 2026.

2 Ballotpedia. (2026). Gubernatorial elections, 2026. https://ballotpedia.org/Gubernatorial_elections,_2026 Update: CNN. (2026). Democrats pick up win in Alaska governor's race, 12 November 2026; Yahoo News (Associated Press), 13 November 2026, for Kansas.

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A DEFEAT OF HISTORIC PROPORTIONS

THE SENATE, THE HOUSE AND THE GOVERNORSHIPS LOST: UNSEEN SINCE 1974

The Republican Party had not suffered such a defeat since the 1974 elections, when, in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the Democratic Party made a net gain of 4 seats in the Senate, 49 seats in the House of Representatives and 4 governorships. With the results of 3 November, the GOP has just suffered its worst collapse in at least 50 years, as the table and maps of Le Millénaire's Elections Observatory illustrate below for the Senate elections.

Table 1. The eight Senate seats taken from the Republicans and the race still open

State	Winner	Defeated Republican	2026 result	2024 presidential
Texas	James Talarico	Ken Paxton	55.1% vs 43.0%	Trump +13.7
Ohio (special)	Sherrod Brown	Jon Husted (appointed incumbent)	50.0% vs 45.2%	Trump +11.2
Maine	Troy Jackson	Susan Collins (incumbent)	53.4% vs 46.5%	Harris +6.9
North Carolina	Roy Cooper	Michael Whatley	58.7% vs 39.1%	Trump +3.2
South Carolina	Annie Andrews	Darline Graham (appointed incumbent)	51.1% vs 46.7%	Trump +17.9
Iowa	Josh Turek	Ashley Hinson	50.5% vs 46.4%	Trump +13.3
Kansas	Adam Hamilton	Roger Marshall (incumbent)	51.0% vs 46.0%	Trump +16.1
Alaska (not called)	Mary Peltola leading	Dan Sullivan (incumbent)	49.8% vs 46.1%	Trump +13.1
Mississippi	Scott Colom	Cindy Hyde-Smith (incumbent)	about 4,600-vote lead	Trump +22.9

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg dataset); Le Millénaire calculations. Update as of 13 November 2026: Mississippi called for Scott Colom by the Associated Press on 11 November, after Cindy Hyde-Smith conceded; Alaska: 96% of the vote counted, ranked-choice tabulation scheduled for 18 November (Alaska Public Media).




Figure 1. Results of the 35 Senate elections of 2026 and swing in the margin since the 2024 presidential election, by state. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.

The scale of the Democratic victory in the Senate is very clear, with a swing of 26 points in Texas, 21 points in Kansas, 22 points in South Carolina and 17 points in Iowa, states that are normally not even competitive and that vote Republican. These are, moreover, states that Donald Trump carried by more than 10 points in the last presidential election in 2024.

Texas is the great victory of this election. This true Republican stronghold, reputed along with Florida (which withstood the blue wave) to be solidly Republican, had not elected a Democratic senator since 1988 nor a Democratic governor since 1990. Yet the balance of power has been reversed with the victory of Democrat James Talarico in the Senate race and of Gina Hinojosa in the governor's race, who becomes the first Hispanic woman to hold that office. Beyond these two offices, the Democrats control the state legislature and all the *down the ballot offices*: lieutenant governor, attorney general, agriculture commissioner, comptroller, land commissioner, railroad commissioner, as well as four seats on the state Supreme Court and three seats on the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Kansas and Iowa are the two *Midwest* states that the Democrats managed to win. In Kansas, Democrat Adam Hamilton prevailed and took a Senate seat that no Democrat had held since 1932, almost a century ago. In Iowa, Democrat Josh Turek carried the state.

South Carolina is the surprise of the *Sun Belt*, with Democrat Annie Andrews defeating Darline Graham, the sister of the famous Lindsey Graham, who held the seat from 2003 until his death in 2026.

Ohio is the *Rust Belt* state where Sherrod Brown managed to win back the Senate seat he lost in 2024. Jon Husted, the Republican candidate, was to hold the seat that JD Vance had won in 2022 and had to vacate to become Vice President of the United States of America. It is therefore a double Democratic victory. Symbolic first, because Ohio is JD Vance's state. Electoral next, because the Democratic Party also succeeded in electing Amy Acton against Vivek Ramaswamy as governor, in a state that voted for Donald Trump in the 2016, 2020 and 2024 presidential elections.

Finally, although Michigan is not a state the Democrats flipped, since the outgoing senator was himself a Democrat, it is the American state that elected the first Muslim senator in the history of the United States of America: Abdul El-Sayed. Beyond his Muslim faith, he is a candidate backed by the left wing of the Democratic Party, the *Democratic Socialists of America*, who won in a state that voted for Donald Trump in 2016 and 2024.

Beyond the Senate, a total of 6 states saw the governorship flip from Republican to Democrat: Alaska (Jonathan Kreiss-Tomkins), Nevada (Aaron Ford), Iowa (Rob Sand), Ohio (Amy Acton), Texas (Gina Hinojosa) and Georgia (Keisha Lance Bottoms). For the first time since 2010, the Democrats hold a majority of governorships across the country.




Figure 2. Gubernatorial elections of 3 November 2026: margin of the winner or of the leading candidate, by state. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

A GENERAL SWING SINCE 2024

These 2026 *midterms* show a general swing since Donald Trump's election in 2024, hence the label "blue wave". Texas saw the largest swing, 25.8 points compared with the margin by which Trump had beaten Harris in the state at the last presidential election.

Table 2. Senate 2026: margin of the challenger over the Republican candidate, compared with the 2024 presidential election, in the 35 races

State	Challenger	Republican	Harris 2024 margin	2026 margin	Swing
Texas	James Talarico	Ken Paxton	-13.7	+12.1	+25.8
Rhode Island	Jack Reed	Raymond McKay	+13.9	+37.5	+23.6
Mississippi	Scott Colom	Cindy Hyde-Smith	-22.9	+0.1	+23.0
North Carolina	Roy Cooper	Michael Whatley	-3.2	+19.6	+22.8
South Carolina	Annie Andrews	Darline Graham	-17.9	+4.5	+22.3
West Virginia	Rachel Anderson	Shelley Moore Capito	-41.9	-20.4	+21.5
Alabama	Everett Wess	Barry Moore	-30.6	-9.4	+21.2
Kansas	Adam Hamilton	Roger Marshall	-16.1	+5.0	+21.1
New Jersey *	Cory Booker	Justin Murphy	+5.9	+26.8	+20.9
New Mexico	Ben Ray Luján	Larry Marker	+6.0	+26.3	+20.3
Georgia	Jon Ossoff	Mike Collins	-2.2	+18.1	+20.3
Louisiana	Jamie Davis	Julia Letlow	-22.0	-1.8	+20.2
Arkansas	Hallie Shoffner	Tom Cotton	-30.6	-11.9	+18.8
Kentucky	Charles Booker	Andy Barr	-30.6	-12.1	+18.5
Tennessee	Marquita Bradshaw	Bill Hagerty	-29.7	-12.2	+17.6
Iowa	Josh Turek	Ashley Hinson	-13.3	+4.1	+17.4
Virginia	Mark Warner	Bert Mizusawa	+5.8	+22.6	+16.8
Oklahoma	N'Kiyla Thomas	Kevin Hern	-34.3	-17.9	+16.3
Ohio (special)	Sherrod Brown	Jon Husted	-11.2	+4.9	+16.1
Wyoming	James Byrd	Harriet Hageman	-46.2	-30.5	+15.7
Alaska *	Mary Peltola	Dan Sullivan	-13.1	+0.3	+13.4
Nebraska *	Dan Osborn (ind.)	Pete Ricketts	-20.6	-6.8	+13.7
Idaho	Todd Achilles (ind.)	Jim Risch	-36.5	-23.0	+13.5
Colorado *	John Hickenlooper	Mark Baisley	+11.0	+24.0	+13.0
Delaware	Chris Coons	Michael Katz	+14.7	+27.1	+12.4
Illinois *	Juliana Stratton	Don Tracy	+11.0	+23.3	+12.3
New Hampshire *	Chris Pappas	John Sununu	+2.8	+13.8	+11.0
Florida (special)	Angie Nixon	Ashley Moody	-13.1	-2.9	+10.2
Montana *	Seth Bodnar (ind.)	Kurt Alme	-19.9	-11.1	+8.9
Michigan	Abdul El-Sayed	Mike Rogers	-1.4	+7.0	+8.4
South Dakota	Brian Bengs (ind.)	Mike Rounds	-29.2	-21.0	+8.2
Minnesota	Peggy Flanagan	Michele Tafoya	+4.3	+10.1	+5.9
Massachusetts	Ed Markey	John Deaton	+25.3	+31.0	+5.6
Oregon *	Jeff Merkley	David Smith	+14.4	+16.5	+2.1
Maine *	Troy Jackson	Susan Collins	+6.9	+6.9	-0.1

*Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), results as of 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg dataset); Le Millénaire calculations. Margins in points, positive when the challenger leads the Republican; "ind.": independent candidate (in Montana, Seth Bodnar alone: with Democrat Alani Bankhead, 12.1% of the vote, the anti-Republican margin is +1.0 and the swing +20.9); *: less than 95% of the expected vote counted.*

The map below illustrates the swing by county; it is largest in the states of Nevada and Texas, notably because of their large Hispanic populations.




Figure 3. Swing in the margin between the 2024 presidential election and the 2026 Senate election, by county, in the 25 states covered. Sources: Fox News (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.

This swing is also explained by the under-mobilisation of the MAGA electorate that had turned out in 2024. The Republicans lose 1/3 of Trump's votes, while the Democrats keep Harris's. The largest drop-off is in Rhode Island and West Virginia.




Figure 4. Votes for Senate candidates in 2026 relative to the votes for Kamala Harris and Donald Trump in the 2024 presidential election, in the 23 states where at least 97% of the expected vote has been counted. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.

THE HOUSE: FORTY TRUMP DISTRICTS WON BY THE DEMOCRATS

In the House of Representatives, the Democrats are on track to win their largest majority since 2008, when they won 257 seats. This year, 314 of the 315 contested districts voted more Democratic than in 2024. Moreover, the Democrats won 11 of the 15 constituencies redrawn to the Republicans' advantage during the *mid-decade redistricting* in Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Ohio, Tennessee, North Carolina and Florida[3]. As the map below shows, it is in metropolitan districts that the Democrats performed best.

3 O'Kruk, A. Cohen, E. (2026). Republican redistricting efforts collapse under blue wave. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/politics/redistricting-midterms-republicans-congressional-maps-vis




Figure 5. Margin in the 2026 House elections in the 435 districts and in twelve metropolitan areas; thick outline: seats changing hands. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.




Figure 6. 2024 presidential margin and 2026 House margin in the 315 contested districts where more than 90% of the vote has been counted. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data); Le Millénaire forecast; Le Millénaire calculations.

Let us take the example of three of these districts redrawn by the Republicans and won by the Democrats to understand the dynamics at local level. The Republican Party redrew Texas's 35th district, on the outskirts of San Antonio (a city that traditionally votes Democratic), hoping to win it. The GOP assumed that Hispanic voters, who had supported Donald Trump in 2024, would do the same in 2026. The bet proved overambitious, since Democratic candidate Johnny Garcia won the district by a margin of 11 points[4]. It was the lack of support from Hispanic voters that explains the GOP's defeat in a district it had hoped to flip. In Florida, the Republicans failed to win the 9th district despite the redistricting and the fact that it had voted for Trump by a margin of 18 points in 2024. The Democratic incumbent, Darren Soto, held his seat thanks to Democratic turnout. Across Florida, 68% of registered Democrats went to the polls, against only 63% of Republicans. As a result, in Florida's 9th congressional district, the balance of power shifted by 18.46 points towards the Democrats compared with the 2024 presidential election. The support of the Hispanic population for the Democratic candidate was also a decisive factor[5]. Finally, in Ohio's 1st district, carried by Trump by 3 points in 2024, redistricting did not prevent Democrat Greg Landsman from being re-elected[6]. The Democratic wave that swept Ohio did not allow the Republicans to flip this district, which they have lost since 2022. Hamilton County, which includes the city of Cincinnati, gave Landsman the benefit of the urban and suburban vote, at 64%[7].

7 NBC News. (2026). Texas House District 35 General Election Results 2026. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-elections/texas-us-house-district-35-results

7 Rohrer, G. (2026). Florida Democrats hold their own in redrawn U.S. House seats. WUSF. https://wusf.org/text/politics-issues/2026-11-05/florida-democrats-hold-their-own-redrawn-us-house-seats Perry, M. (2026). Once again, the Democratic blue wave misses Florida. Florida Phoenix. https://floridaphoenix.com/2026/11/04/once-again-the-democratic-blue-wave-misses-florida/ NBC News. (2026). Florida House District 9 General Election Results 2026. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-elections/florida-us-house-district-9-results Mesa, J. (2026). The Districts That Reveal Latinos' Rebellion Against Donald Trump. Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/the-districts-that-reveal-latinos-rebellion-against-donald-trump-12667592

7 McIntire, M-E. (2026). How redrawn House districts voted in the midterms. Roll Call. https://rollcall.com/2026/11/04/redistrcting-republican-house-seats-midterm-elections/

7 NBC News. (2026). Ohio House District 1 General Election Results 2026. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-elections/ohio-us-house-district-1-results Bhakta, M. (2026). Landsman fends off GOP challenge in purple Ohio House district. The Hill. https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/6134718-landsman-defeats-conroy-ohio/ Costello, B. et al. (2026). Democratic Rep. Greg Landsman wins third term in Ohio's 1st District. https://www.wvxu.org/politics/2026-11-03/democratic-representative-greg-landsman-wins-third-term-ohio-first-district-congress-midterms

THE POLLS UNDERESTIMATED THE WAVE

As the chart below shows, in the Senate races the polls underestimated the Democrats almost everywhere in the country, from New England to the Sun Belt by way of the Rust Belt, in what Ron DeSantis has called a "blue tsunami".




Figure 7. Polling average, Le Millénaire central forecast and result in the 30 Senate elections with polling (two-candidate margins). Sources: Le Millénaire forecast of 3 November 2026; Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

THE SENATE, RACE BY RACE

THE EIGHT SEATS LOST

For the first time since 1988, the Republican stronghold of Texas has flipped Democratic in the Senate. James Talarico beat Ken Paxton by a margin of 12.1 points, a candidate whom Trump admitted regretting having endorsed after the midterm elections.

Beyond the fact that Talarico's profile appealed to Texans (he is a 37-year-old pastor who ran on a centre-left populist platform to win over both Hispanic and blue-collar voters), it was Ken Paxton's profile that was the problem, given the many scandals trailing him, from accusations of adultery to corruption. It was therefore difficult for this candidate, whom 67% of the public considered to lack the moral standing to be a senator, to withstand a blue wave that flipped Texas to the Democrats, not only in the Senate race but also for governor. The dynamics were entirely against Paxton, with 11% of Trump voters, 68% of Hispanics and 79% of under-30s voting for Talarico.

TEXAS




Figure 8. Texas: James Talarico's margin over Ken Paxton by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 gubernatorial election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 gubernatorial election (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 3. Texas in figures

Indicator	Value
James Talarico (Democrat)	5,445,121 votes, 55.1%
Ken Paxton (Republican)	4,249,752 votes, 43.0%
2026 margin	+12.1
2024 presidential	-13.7
Swing since 2024	+25.8
2022 governor (O'Rourke vs Abbott)	-10.9
Polling average on the eve, two-candidate	+4.7
Le Millénaire central forecast	+1.0
Two-candidate result (gap with the polls)	+12.3 (+7.6)
Paxton's votes relative to Trump's in 2024	66%
Talarico's votes relative to Harris's in 2024	113%
Voters who voted Trump in 2024 (Trump's actual score)	47% (56.2%)
Trump voters who voted Talarico	11%
Trump approval	40%
Paxton lacks the moral standing to be a senator	67%
Hispanics: share of voters and Talarico vote	24%, 68%
Under-30s: Talarico vote	79%

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 results (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire forecast of 3 November 2026; SSRS 2026 voter survey (5,145 interviews); Le Millénaire calculations. Margins in points, positive when the Democrat leads the Republican.

OHIO

Ohio is the *Rust Belt* state where Sherrod Brown managed to win back the Senate seat he lost in 2024, with a margin of 4.9 points. Jon Husted, the Republican candidate, was unable to hold a state that had voted for Donald Trump in the 2016, 2020 and 2024 presidential elections. Husted won only 65% of Trump's 2024 vote total in 2026, a drop-off in the electorate that allowed Sherrod Brown to prevail in a state that broadly disapproves of Donald Trump's tariff policy: 63% consider tariffs harmful to the country.




Figure 9. Ohio: Sherrod Brown's margin over Jon Husted by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 Senate election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 Senate (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 4. Ohio in figures

Indicator	Value
Sherrod Brown (Democrat)	2,301,042 votes, 50.0%
Jon Husted (Republican, appointed incumbent)	2,077,748 votes, 45.2%
2026 margin	+4.9
2024 presidential	-11.2
Swing since 2024	+16.1
2022 Senate (Ryan vs Vance)	-6.1
Polling average on the eve, two-candidate	+1.4
Le Millénaire central forecast	-5.1
Two-candidate result (gap with the polls)	+5.1 (+3.7)
Husted's votes relative to Trump's in 2024	65%
Brown's votes relative to Harris's in 2024	91%
Voters who voted Trump in 2024 (Trump's actual score)	49% (55.2%)
Trump voters who voted Brown	8%
Trump approval	41%
Husted seen as too close to Trump	58%
Favourable opinion of Brown and of Husted	48% and 39%
Tariffs seen as harmful to the country's economy	63%

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 results (MIT Election Lab, FEC); Le Millénaire forecast of 3 November 2026; SSRS 2026 voter survey (4,748 interviews); Le Millénaire calculations. Margins in points, positive when the Democrat leads the Republican.

MAINE

In Maine, Susan Collins lost to Democrat Troy Jackson. The outgoing Republican senator had represented Maine since 1996, so this defeat ends a 30-year political reign. She campaigned by trying to distance herself from Donald Trump's war in Iran and the price rises that followed it, highlighting her profile as a Republican not affiliated with the MAGA movement but with the party's traditional line. It was not enough, as Troy Jackson won by a margin of 6.9 points. The Graham Platner scandal of this summer had no effect on the Democratic victory. Rather, the 4% of 2024 Trump voters who voted for Jackson helped widen the gap.




Figure 10. Maine: Troy Jackson's margin over Susan Collins by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 gubernatorial election (91% of the expected vote counted). Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 gubernatorial election (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 5. Maine in figures

Indicator	Value
Troy Jackson (Democrat)	368,429 votes, 53.4%
Susan Collins (Republican, incumbent)	320,926 votes, 46.5%
2026 margin	+6.9
2024 presidential	+6.9
Swing since 2024	-0.1
2022 governor (Mills vs LePage)	+13.2
Polling average on the eve, two-candidate	+3.5
Le Millénaire central forecast	+0.3
Two-candidate result (gap with the polls)	+6.9 (+3.4)
Collins's votes relative to Trump's in 2024	85%
Jackson's votes relative to Harris's in 2024	85%
Voters who voted Trump in 2024 (Trump's actual score)	40% (45.5%)
Trump voters who voted Jackson	4%
Harris voters who voted Collins	9%
Trump approval	34%
Collins seen as too close to Trump	59%
Jackson lacks a senator's temperament	56%

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026, 91% of the expected vote counted; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 results (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire forecast of 3 November 2026; SSRS 2026 voter survey (4,237 interviews); Le Millénaire calculations. Margins in points, positive when the Democrat leads the Republican.

NORTH CAROLINA

Democrat Roy Cooper won the Senate seat in North Carolina, a state that has voted Republican since 2000 with the exception of Barack Obama in 2008. Cooper's victory can first be explained by the candidate's profile: he is well known locally, having been the state's 75th governor. The 60% of respondents who approve of his record illustrate this. Rejection of Donald Trump was another factor in his victory, with 59% of respondents judging Michael Whatley too close to Donald Trump. In electoral terms, Cooper's victory can be explained by the under-mobilisation of the Republican electorate: only 57% of the 2024 Trump vote total turned out for Whatley this year. The 10% of Trump voters who voted for Cooper also help explain the 19.6-point margin by which Roy Cooper won.




Figure 11. North Carolina: Roy Cooper's margin over Michael Whatley by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 Senate election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 Senate (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 6. North Carolina in figures

Indicator	Value
Roy Cooper (Democrat)	2,467,963 votes, 58.7%
Michael Whatley (Republican)	1,643,088 votes, 39.1%
2026 margin	+19.6
2024 presidential	-3.2
Swing since 2024	+22.8
2022 Senate (Beasley vs Budd)	-3.2
Polling average on the eve, two-candidate	+11.7
Le Millénaire central forecast	+8.6
Two-candidate result (gap with the polls)	+20.1 (+8.4)
Whatley's votes relative to Trump's in 2024	57%
Cooper's votes relative to Harris's in 2024	91%
Voters who voted Trump in 2024 (Trump's actual score)	43% (51.0%)
Trump voters who voted Cooper	10%
Trump approval	37%
Whatley seen as too close to Trump	59%
Approval of Cooper's record as governor	60%
Voters not knowing Whatley well enough to judge	13%

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 results (MIT Election Lab, FEC); Le Millénaire forecast of 3 November 2026; SSRS 2026 voter survey (4,850 interviews); Le Millénaire calculations. Margins in points, positive when the Democrat leads the Republican.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Democrat Annie Andrews won South Carolina's Senate seat against Republican Darline Graham by a margin of 4.5 points. It is a double defeat for the Republican Party. First in terms of legitimacy: Darline Graham was the sister of Lindsey Graham, senator for South Carolina from 2003 until his death in 2026, and it was Donald Trump personally who wanted Darline Graham to run for the seat left vacant by her brother's death. Second, it is an electoral defeat in a state Trump had carried by 17.9 points in 2024, a swing of 22.3 points. This electoral defeat can be explained by a 10-point transfer of voters who voted for Donald Trump in 2024 and for Annie Andrews in 2026, but also by non-MAGA Republicans, 26% of whom voted for the Democrat. The strong support of the African-American electorate, 85% of whom voted for the Democratic candidate, together with the fact that 64% of voters felt Darline Graham lacked the experience required to be a senator, explains her defeat. Darline Graham ran a poor campaign, appearing ill at ease at rallies, far from her brother's natural charisma, and she also made the mistake of saying she was not interested in the national security policy (*national security*) of the United States, which stunned her supporters given that it had been her brother's field of predilection.




Figure 12. South Carolina: Annie Andrews's margin over Darline Graham by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 Senate election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 Senate (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 7. South Carolina in figures

Indicator	Value
Annie Andrews (Democrat)	1,042,362 votes, 51.1%
Darline Graham (Republican, appointed incumbent)	951,165 votes, 46.7%
2026 margin	+4.5
2024 presidential	-17.9
Swing since 2024	+22.3
2022 Senate (Matthews vs Scott)	-25.9
Polling average on the eve, two-candidate	+1.6
Le Millénaire central forecast	-6.4
Two-candidate result (gap with the polls)	+4.6 (+2.9)
Graham's votes relative to Trump's in 2024	64%
Andrews's votes relative to Harris's in 2024	101%
Voters who voted Trump in 2024 (Trump's actual score)	52% (58.2%)
Trump voters who voted Andrews	10%
Trump approval	44%
Darline Graham lacks the required experience	64%
Non-MAGA Republicans who voted Andrews	26%
Black voters: share of voters and Andrews vote	18%, 85%

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 results (MIT Election Lab, FEC); Le Millénaire forecast of 3 November 2026; SSRS 2026 voter survey (972 interviews); Le Millénaire calculations. Margins in points, positive when the Democrat leads the Republican.

IOWA

Ashley Hinson lost to Josh Turek in a state that voted for Trump three times, in 2016, 2020 and 2024. This defeat is explained by disenchantment with Donald Trump's second term, linked to the Iran war, which pushed up the price of fuel in an agricultural state where diesel runs the tractors. 59% of Iowa farmers say their situation is worse than two years ago. Trade wars and tariffs have also hit exports of soybeans and beef to China. Democratic candidate Josh Turek also benefits from a personal aura as a Paralympic medallist. In electoral terms, his victory is explained by turnout: Turek won 97% of Harris's 2024 vote total, against only 68% of Trump's 2024 total for Hinson. The 9% of Trump voters who voted for Josh Turek also explain the Democrat's victory.




Figure 13. Iowa: Josh Turek's margin over Ashley Hinson by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 Senate election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 Senate (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 8. Iowa in figures

Indicator	Value
Josh Turek (Democrat)	686,487 votes, 50.5%
Ashley Hinson (Republican)	630,615 votes, 46.4%
Thomas Laehn (Libertarian)	42,086 votes, 3.1%
2026 margin	+4.1
2024 presidential	-13.3
Swing since 2024	+17.4
2022 Senate (Franken vs Grassley)	-12.2
Polling average on the eve, two-candidate	+0.5
Le Millénaire central forecast	-3.1
Two-candidate result (gap with the polls)	+4.2 (+3.7)
Hinson's votes relative to Trump's in 2024	68%
Turek's votes relative to Harris's in 2024	97%
Voters who voted Trump in 2024 (Trump's actual score)	49% (56.0%)
Trump voters who voted Turek	9%
Trump approval	41%
Iowa farmers worse off than two years ago	59%
Hinson seen as too close to Trump	56%

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 results (MIT Election Lab, FEC); Le Millénaire forecast of 3 November 2026; SSRS 2026 voter survey (4,591 interviews); Le Millénaire calculations. Margins in points, positive when the Democrat leads the Republican.

KANSAS

In a historic result, Democrat Adam Hamilton won by a margin of 5 points against Republican Roger Marshall, in a state that had not elected a Democratic senator since 1932. As in Iowa, this victory is explained by rejection of the record of Donald Trump's second term, linked to the Iran war, the rise in fuel prices and the difficulty of exporting agricultural products. Hamilton's victory is also explained by the profile of the Democratic candidate, a pastor of a *megachurch* with 25,000 worshippers, who therefore had the advantage of already being known in the state. Moreover, he is white and religious, which fits the rural Midwestern voter. Facing him, Roger Marshall did not have the same advantage, since 55% of respondents believe he lacks the moral standing to be a senator. In electoral terms, Hamilton's victory is explained by the 82% of under-30s who voted for him. This almost Soviet-style score illustrates young people's break with Donald Trump, disappointed by the economic performance of the MAGA administration in power. Hamilton also benefited from a shift in votes: 9% of 2024 Trump voters voted for Hamilton.




Figure 14. Kansas: Adam Hamilton's margin over Roger Marshall by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 Senate election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 Senate (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 9. Kansas in figures

Indicator	Value
Adam Hamilton (Democrat)	559,853 votes, 51.0%
Roger Marshall (Republican, incumbent)	504,950 votes, 46.0%
2026 margin	+5.0
2024 presidential	-16.1
Swing since 2024	+21.1
2022 Senate (Holland vs Moran)	-23.0
Polling average on the eve, two-candidate	+4.7
Le Millénaire central forecast	-3.8
Two-candidate result (gap with the polls)	+5.2 (+0.5)
Marshall's votes relative to Trump's in 2024	67%
Hamilton's votes relative to Harris's in 2024	103%
Voters who voted Trump in 2024 (Trump's actual score)	52% (57.2%)
Trump voters who voted Hamilton	9%
Trump approval	43%
Marshall lacks the moral standing to be a senator	55%
Non-MAGA Republicans who voted Hamilton	31%
Under-30s: Hamilton vote	82%

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 results (MIT Election Lab, FEC); Le Millénaire forecast of 3 November 2026; SSRS 2026 voter survey (1,021 interviews); Le Millénaire calculations. Margins in points, positive when the Democrat leads the Republican.

MISSISSIPPI

The Senate race in Mississippi was won by Democrat Scott Colom against Republican Cindy Hyde-Smith. The election came down to a few thousand votes: Colom won by less than 1 point. Scott Colom is the first Democrat to win Mississippi's Senate seat since 1982. According to the New York Times, Scott Colom's victory was made possible by the mobilisation of the African-American electorate, of white voters disappointed by Donald Trump's second term and of part of the conservative electorate uncomfortable with Hyde-Smith's loyalty to Donald Trump[8].

8 Cochrane, E. (2026). Scott Colom, a Democrat, Wins Mississippi Senate Seat in Historic Upset. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/11/us/elections/mississippi-senate-colom-hyde-smith.html




Figure 15. Mississippi: Scott Colom's margin over Cindy Hyde-Smith by county in 2026 and swing since the 2024 presidential election (96% of the expected vote counted). Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.

FOUR REPUBLICAN SEATS HELD DESPITE THE SWING

Despite the Republican debacle, 4 Republican seats were held: Florida, Louisiana, Nebraska and Montana. These are states Donald Trump carried by more than 10 points in the 2024 presidential election.

Table 10. Four seats held by the Republicans despite the swing

State	2026 margin	Trump 2024	Gap with the polls	Republican votes over Trump votes	Challenger votes over Harris vot
Florida	-2.9	+13.1	+3.7	69%	8
Louisiana	-1.8	+22.0	-2.9	62%	9
Nebraska	-6.8	+20.6	-3.7	66%	8
Montana	-11.1	+19.9	-1.9	65%	7

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire forecast of 3 November 2026; Le Millénaire calculations. In points: 2026 margin and gap with the polls positive when the challenger does better than the Republican (gap: result minus the polling average on the eve, two-candidate); Trump 2024: Trump's lead over Harris. Nebraska and Montana: 94 and 95% of the expected vote counted. In Montana, the challenger considered is independent Seth Bodnar.

FLORIDA

The *Sunshine State* embodies the last conservative stronghold now that the Democrats have won Texas. Florida is the state that enabled Donald Trump to win the 2016 presidential election, and it has been his ever since. Republican Ashley Moody won Florida's Senate seat and Republican Byron Donalds was elected Florida's first African-American governor. The question is why the blue wave did not reach Florida. We see several reasons. First, Florida holds a special place in the MAGA imagination: it is the state where Trump has his second home, Mar-a-Lago. The outgoing governor, Ron DeSantis, after 8 years in office, is also still very popular in the state. Next, it is a state with reserves of conservative votes, with many white retirees from the East Coast moving there for the tax advantages and a peaceful retirement. In addition, Florida has a fiercely anti-socialist Cuban electorate, more inclined to vote for the Republican Party. On 3 November there was also a referendum on a property tax reform, which mobilised conservative voters to go to the polls. Finally, the Republican senator's opponent, Democrat Angie Nixon, a DSA member, was perhaps too far to the left for a very right-wing state.




Figure 16. Florida: Angie Nixon's margin over Ashley Moody by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 Senate election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 Senate (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

LOUISIANA

Louisiana withstood the blue wave because it is a solidly Republican state: since 2000, Louisiana has voted for the GOP in every presidential election. Although the blue wave did not sweep over Louisiana, it came close. Donald Trump carried Louisiana with 60% of the vote in 2024, yet Republican senator-elect Julia Letlow won by a gap of only 25,000 votes, closer than usual.




Figure 17. Louisiana: Jamie Davis's margin over Julia Letlow by parish in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 Senate election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 Senate (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

NEBRASKA

Republican Pete Ricketts held Nebraska with a 6-point lead over independent Dan Osborn. Despite this resistance, Nebraska did not escape the Republican Party's decline: since 2024 the Democrats gained 19 points in Lancaster County, 21 points in Douglas County and 4 points in Sarpy County.




Figure 18. Nebraska: independent Dan Osborn's margin over Pete Ricketts by county in 2026 and swing since the 2024 presidential election (94% of the expected vote counted). Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.

MONTANA

In Montana, Republican Kurt Alme beat independent Seth Bodnar. This Republican victory is explained first by the fact that Montana is a very red state that has voted Republican in presidential elections since 2000. Second, the left was divided: Democratic candidate Alani Bankhead received only 12% of the vote because independent Seth Bodnar competed with her.




Figure 19. Montana: independent Seth Bodnar's margin over Kurt Alme by county in 2026 and swing since the 2024 presidential election (95% of the expected vote counted). Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.

THE STRONGHOLDS THAT SWUNG

KENTUCKY

In Kentucky, Republican Andy Barr succeeds Republican Mitch McConnell, aged 83, the longest-serving party leader in the history of the Senate. Although the state remains Republican, there is a swing towards the Democrats in Fayette and Jefferson counties.




Figure 20. Kentucky: Charles Booker's margin over Andy Barr by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 Senate election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 Senate (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

TENNESSEE

In Tennessee, Republican Bill Hagerty was re-elected. The former ambassador to Japan (2017 to 2019) has held Tennessee's Senate seat since 2021. Although Tennessee remains red, there is a swing towards the Democrats in Davidson and Shelby counties.




Figure 21. Tennessee: Marquita Bradshaw's margin over Bill Hagerty by county in 2026 and swing since the 2024 presidential election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.

ALABAMA

In Alabama, Republican Barry Moore was elected senator. Despite his victory, there is a swing towards the Democrats in Madison and Montgomery counties.




Figure 22. Alabama: Everett Wess's margin over Barry Moore by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 Senate election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 Senate (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

THE DEMOCRATIC SEATS DEFENDED

GEORGIA

In Georgia, Democratic senator Jon Ossoff was re-elected against Republican Mike Collins. A true *swing state*, Georgia voted for Trump in 2024, for Biden in 2020 and for Trump in 2016. It was a difficult race for the Republican Party to win: Jon Ossoff is the rising star of the Democratic Party, highly visible in the media and nicknamed the new Barack Obama.




Figure 23. Georgia: Jon Ossoff's margin over Mike Collins by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 Senate election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 Senate (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

MICHIGAN

Michigan is also a *swing state*, won by Donald Trump in 2024 and by Joe Biden in 2020. The Democratic candidate backed by the DSA, Abdul El-Sayed, successfully defended this seat and is the first Muslim senator to be elected. During his campaign he was supported by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Barack Obama. Mike Rogers failed to distance himself from the cost-of-living crisis weighing on Michigan families, as the average price of gasoline climbed to 4.89 dollars. El-Sayed's victory will very likely shape Ocasio-Cortez's candidacy for the 2028 presidential election, insofar as his victory legitimises the hard-left line she embodies.




Figure 24. Michigan: Abdul El-Sayed's margin over Mike Rogers by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 gubernatorial election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 gubernatorial election (MIT Election Lab and OpenElections); Le Millénaire calculations.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

In New Hampshire, Democrat Chris Pappas beat Republican John Sununu. This is far from insignificant in a New England region massively won over to the Democrats.




Figure 25. New Hampshire: Chris Pappas's margin over John E. Sununu by county in 2026, swing since the 2024 presidential election and since the 2022 Senate election (94% of the expected vote counted). Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); 2022 Senate (MIT Election Lab); Le Millénaire calculations.

MINNESOTA

In Minnesota, Democrat Peggy Flanagan beat Michele Tafoya. Although the election was close at times, the Democrats held their seat. The Republican momentum can be explained by the recent corruption scandals involving the Somali minority, publicised by the Trump administration. The fight against welfare fraud is one of the Trump administration's priorities, and JD Vance leads an anti-fraud *task force*.




Figure 26. Minnesota: Peggy Flanagan's margin over Michele Tafoya by county in 2026 and swing since the 2024 presidential election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.

VIRGINIA

In Virginia, Democrat Mark Warner was re-elected. There is nevertheless a swing towards the Republicans in Dickenson and Buchanan counties.




Figure 27. Virginia: Mark Warner's margin over Bert Mizusawa by county and independent city in 2026 and swing since the 2024 presidential election. Sources: Fox News, county results (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.

THE HOUSE, DISTRICT BY DISTRICT

THE DISTRICT TALLY

There is a clear swing, more or less pronounced, of districts towards the Democratic Party, with only one district taken from the Democrats, in Texas. Elsewhere, Republican districts flipped to the Democrats in California, Nevada, Texas, Ohio, Georgia and other states.




Figure 28. Swing in the margin between the 2024 presidential election and the 2026 House election, in the 435 districts and in twelve metropolitan areas. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

We find that 411 of the 415 contested districts swung towards the Democrats, some by as much as 30 points, as in Texas.




Figure 29. Swing of each district since the 2024 presidential election, in proportional arrows. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.




Figure 30. Distribution of the 415 contested districts by swing since the 2024 presidential election. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.




Figure 31. 2024 presidential margin and 2026 House margin in the 48 districts that change hands or elect a Democrat although Trump had won them. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 11. The 32 seats changing hands, ranked by swing since the 2024 presidential election

District: winner and loser	2026 House margin	2024 presidential	Swing since the presidential	Main factor identified
TX-15 : Bobby Pulido (D) defeats Monica De La Cruz (R, incumbent)	D +24.6	Trump +18.0	+42.7	Voters new to the incumbent; star candidate; Latino vote
CA-22 : Randy Villegas (D) defeats David Valadao (R, incumbent)	D +32.8	Trump +1.9	+34.7	Medicaid (62% enrolled); ICE raids; new map
NC-11 : Jamie Ager (D) defeats Jennifer Balkcom (R)	D +15.8	Trump +9.6	+25.5	Edwards's withdrawal (censure recommended); money gap
KY-6 : Zach Dembo (D) defeats Ralph Alvarado (R)	D +9.4	Trump +15.3	+24.7	Open seat; prosecutor who resigned in protest at Trump
TX-23 : Katy Padilla Stout (D) defeats Brandon Herrera (R)	D +8.2	Trump +15.0	+23.1	Gonzales's resignation; Herrera's remarks
UT-1 : Ben McAdams (D) defeats Riley Owen (R)	D +47.0	Harris +24.3	+22.7	Court-imposed map
OH-7 : Brian Poindexter (D) defeats Max Miller (R, incumbent)	D +9.9	Trump +11.2	+21.0	Abuse allegations against the incumbent
IN-5 : J.D. Ford (D) defeats Victoria Spartz (R, incumbent)	D +3.3	Trump +17.1	+20.5	Unpopular incumbent; redistricting rejected
NV-2 : Teresa Benitez-Thompson (D) defeats David Flippo (R)	D +5.9	Trump +14.3	+20.2	Parachuted candidate, disowned by Amodei
IA-1 : Christina Bohannan (D) defeats Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R, incumbent)	D +9.2	Trump +8.6	+17.8	Rematch after a 799-vote gap in 2024
PA-8 : Paige Cognetti (D) defeats Rob Bresnahan (R, incumbent)	D +8.7	Trump +8.6	+17.3	Stock trading; Medicaid; Iran
NJ-7 : Rebecca Bennett (D) defeats Tom Kean Jr. (R, incumbent)	D +15.7	Trump +1.2	+16.9	Kean's absence; CLF funds withdrawn
OH-15 : Don Leonard (D) defeats Mike Carey (R, incumbent)	D +6.6	Trump +10.1	+16.7	General wave, no local factor identified
CA-41 : Linda Sánchez (D, incumbent from another district) defeats Mitch Clemmons (R)	D +31.0	Harris +14.6	+16.4	New map (Proposition 50)
CA-48 : Marni von Wilpert (D) defeats Jim Desmond (R)	D +19.0	Harris +3.5	+15.5	New map (Proposition 50)
PA-7 : Bob Brooks (D) defeats Ryan Mackenzie (R, incumbent)	D +12.2	Trump +3.2	+15.4	Union firefighter; 42% registered Democrats
PA-10 : Janelle Stelson (D) defeats Scott Perry (R, incumbent)	D +10.1	Trump +5.3	+15.4	Perry and the post-2020 period; Medicaid; Iran
TX-32 : Jace Yarbrough (R) defeats Dan Barrios (D)	R +2.9	Trump +18.1	+15.2	Underfunded Democrat (160,000 dollars)
CO-8 : Manny Rutinel (D) defeats Gabe Evans (R, incumbent)	D +12.9	Trump +1.9	+14.8	Balanced seat, nearly 40% Latino
WI-3 : Rebecca Cooke (D) defeats Derrick Van Orden (R, incumbent)	D +6.6	Trump +7.5	+14.2	Cooke's third campaign; health care; gasoline
IA-2 : Lindsay James (D) defeats Joe Mitchell (R)	D +4.0	Trump +10.1	+14.1	Pro-Trump candidate; tariffs; Iran
MI-10 : Christina Hines (D) defeats Michael Bouchard (R)	D +7.2	Trump +6.7	+13.9	Tariffs; open seat
MO-2 : Fred Wellman (D) defeats Ann Wagner (R, incumbent)	D +4.9	Trump +8.0	+13.0	2022 map restored; St. Louis County
IA-3 : Sarah Trone Garriott (D) defeats Zach Nunn (R, incumbent)	D +7.3	Trump +4.5	+11.8	Medicaid (19% of residents); Iran; fertiliser
NE-2 : Denise Powell (D) defeats Brinker Harding (R)	D +15.4	Harris +4.7	+10.7	Bacon's departure; district won by Harris
VA-2 : Elaine Luria (D) defeats Jen Kiggans (R, incumbent)	D +8.5	Trump +0.3	+8.8	Military electorate; Iran war
WI-1 : Mitchell Berman (D) defeats Bryan Steil (R, incumbent)	D +3.9	Trump +4.6	+8.5	Tariffs; cost of living
MI-4 : Sean McCann (D) defeats Bill Huizenga (R, incumbent)	D +1.8	Trump +5.6	+7.4	Incumbent tied to Trump by his opponent
PA-1 : Bob Harvie (D) defeats Brian Fitzpatrick (R, incumbent)	D +5.5	Harris +0.3	+5.2	Rejection of Trump despite an independent-minded incumbent
MI-7 : William Lawrence (D) defeats Tom Barrett (R, incumbent)	D +3.3	Trump +1.3	+4.6	Prices; Iran; data centres
CA-3 : Ami Bera (D, incumbent from another district) defeats Robb Tucker (R)	D +14.1	Harris +10.5	+3.6	New map; Democratic incumbent transferred
CA-1 : Mike McGuire (D) defeats James Gallagher (R, incumbent)	D +14.0	Harris +12.6	+1.4	New map (Santa Rosa)

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026, 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election by district on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); Le Millénaire calculations; factors: sources cited in the text. Margins in points. Swing: 2026 margin minus 2024 presidential margin, positive when the district votes more Democratic. In California and Utah, 49 to 73% of the vote had been counted. Update as of 13 November 2026: according to the Associated Press, the Democrats have won 256 seats, including 45 taken from the Republicans, and eleven seats remain uncalled. The table, compiled on 5 November, has not been completed.

Table 12. The 36 uncalled districts where the gap is under 3 points

District: leading candidate and runner-up	Gap in votes	Gap in points	Vote counted	2024 presidential
NC-5 : Chuck Hubbard (D) ahead of Virginia Foxx (R, incumbent)	99	0.03	99%	Trump +17.9
NC-3 : Greg Murphy (R, incumbent) ahead of Raymond Smith (D)	233	0.10	98.8%	Trump +13.8
MN-1 : Jake Johnson (D) ahead of Brad Finstad (R, incumbent)	323	0.10	98.8%	Trump +12.2
TN-4 : Victoria Broderick (D) ahead of Scott DesJarlais (R, incumbent)	280	0.14	99%	Trump +24.3
FL-27 : María Elvira Salazar (R, incumbent) ahead of Eliott Rodriguez (D)	1,116	0.45	99%	Trump +14.7
FL-9 : Darren Soto (D, incumbent) ahead of Dan Green (R)	1,477	0.52	99%	Trump +17.9
FL-7 : Ryan Elijah (R) ahead of Bale Dalton (D)	1,701	0.52	99%	Trump +12.6
ME-2 : Paul LePage (R) ahead of Matthew Dunlap (D)	1,830	0.58	91.8%	Trump +9.2
CO-4 : Eileen Laubacher (D) ahead of Lauren Boebert (R, incumbent)	2,513	0.70	92.8%	Trump +18.7
NC-7 : David Rouzer (R, incumbent) ahead of Kimberly Hardy (D)	2,425	0.76	99%	Trump +14.0
FL-26 : Mario Diaz-Balart (R, incumbent) ahead of Nicole Locklin (D)	1,765	0.77	99%	Trump +18.5
AZ-2 : Eli Crane (R, incumbent) ahead of Jonathan Nez (D)	2,235	0.77	86.4%	Trump +15.1
FL-13 : Anna Paulina Luna (R, incumbent) ahead of Leela Gray (D)	2,517	0.80	99%	Trump +13.5
SC-1 : Nancy Lacore (D) ahead of Jenny Costa Honeycutt (R)	3,308	1.01	98.9%	Trump +13.2
SC-2 : Joe Wilson (R, incumbent) ahead of Zyon Khalifa (D)	3,027	1.02	99%	Trump +14.1
NC-10 : Pat Harrigan (R, incumbent) ahead of Ashley Bell (D)	3,029	1.03	99%	Trump +17.9
TN-9 : Brent Taylor (R) ahead of Justin Pearson (D)	2,539	1.13	99%	Trump +21.4
WA-5 : Michael Baumgartner (R, incumbent) ahead of Carmela Conroy (D)	2,641	1.28	62.5%	Trump +11.1
OH-10 : Kristina Knickerbocker (D) ahead of Mike Turner (R, incumbent)	4,938	1.64	97.8%	Trump +7.9
CO-3 : Jeff Hurd (R, incumbent) ahead of Dwayne Romero (D)	5,396	1.66	95.6%	Trump +10.0
AR-2 : French Hill (R, incumbent) ahead of Chris Jones (D)	4,405	1.76	99%	Trump +15.9
NC-8 : Mark Harris (R, incumbent) ahead of Colby Watson (D)	5,179	1.77	99%	Trump +19.6
NY-21 : Anthony Constantino (R) ahead of Blake Gendebien (D)	5,729	2.08	95.6%	Trump +20.8
TN-7 : Matt Van Epps (R, incumbent) ahead of Darden Copeland (D)	5,233	2.17	99%	Trump +22.7
VA-5 : John McGuire (R, incumbent) ahead of Tom Perriello (D)	7,873	2.18	97.8%	Trump +12.4
NC-9 : Richard Ojeda (D) ahead of Richard Hudson (R, incumbent)	6,015	2.22	99%	Trump +16.0
NC-14 : Lakesha Womack (D) ahead of Tim Moore (R, incumbent)	6,415	2.22	99%	Trump +15.2
NY-1 : Nick LaLota (R, incumbent) ahead of Christopher Gallant (D)	6,677	2.24	97%	Trump +10.2
NC-6 : Cyril Jefferson (D) ahead of Addison McDowell (R, incumbent)	6,264	2.29	99%	Trump +17.4
AZ-5 : Mark Lamb (R) ahead of Elizabeth Lee (D)	6,412	2.32	86.1%	Trump +20.2
VA-1 : Shannon Taylor (D) ahead of Rob Wittman (R, incumbent)	9,460	2.32	98.5%	Trump +5.0
NC-13 : Paul Barringer (D) ahead of Brad Knott (R, incumbent)	7,652	2.42	99%	Trump +16.7
NJ-2 : Zack Mullock (D) ahead of Jeff Van Drew (R, incumbent)	7,083	2.63	95.5%	Trump +12.7
CA-23 : Jay Obernolte (R, incumbent) ahead of Tessa Hodge (D)	3,585	2.72	57.4%	Trump +19.9
AZ-8 : Abraham Hamadeh (R, incumbent) ahead of Bernadette Greene-Placentia (D)	7,150	2.77	86.4%	Trump +16.5
MT-1 : Sam Forstag (D) ahead of Aaron Flint (R)	7,155	2.81	94.5%	Trump +11.9

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026, 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election by district on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); Le Millénaire calculations. Ranked by increasing gap. The two Louisiana districts still open, where several candidates from each party were running, are not included in the table. Update as of 13 November 2026 (Associated Press): called for the Republicans, FL-26 (Mario Diaz-Balart), WA-5 (Michael Baumgartner), FL-7 (Ryan Elijah), FL-27 (María Elvira Salazar, after a recount), SC-2 (Joe Wilson) and ME-2 (Paul LePage, after ranked-choice tabulation); called for the Democrats, FL-9 (Darren Soto) and CO-4 (Eileen Laubacher). Still uncalled: TN-4, MN-1, NC-3 and NC-5 (Democrat leading), NC-7, NC-10 and CA-23 (Republican leading).

THE ATLAS OF THE 32 FLIPS

Despite redistricting, the Republicans were unable to tip the outcome of the vote in their favour. In total, 32 districts changed hands across the country.




Figure 32. Atlas of the seats changing hands (1/2): boundaries, 2026 margin, 2024 result and sociological profile of each district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.




Figure 33. Atlas of the seats changing hands (2/2). Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

These 32 flips can be explained by the sociological profile of voters, which varies from state to state. The table below shows this profile district by district. The two largest swings, in TX-15 (+42.7) and CA-22 (+34.7), are in districts where the Hispanic population is predominant, at 81% and 74%, which illustrates this electorate's break with the MAGA coalition.

Table 13. Sociological profile of the 32 seats changing hands, ranked by swing

District and winner	Type	Hispanics	Non-Hispanic Black	University graduates	Median income	Rural population	Swing
TX-15 : Pulido (D)	Hispanic	81%	1%	19%	57	23%	+42.7
CA-22 : Villegas (D)	Hispanic	74%	5%	11%	60	16%	+34.7
NC-11 : Ager (D)	Rural	8%	3%	36%	66	56%	+25.5
KY-6 : Dembo (D)	Working-class	6%	8%	37%	69	35%	+24.7
TX-23 : Stout (D)	Hispanic	60%	4%	36%	85	26%	+23.1
UT-1 : McAdams (D)	Working-class	25%	2%	37%	90	3%	+22.7
OH-7 : Poindexter (D)	Working-class	4%	3%	38%	86	18%	+21.0
IN-5 : Ford (D)	Graduate	5%	5%	41%	82	24%	+20.5
NV-2 : Benitez-Thompson (D)	Working-class	24%	2%	29%	86	26%	+20.2
IA-1 : Bohannan (D)	Working-class	6%	4%	33%	74	42%	+17.8
PA-8 : Cognetti (D)	Working-class	15%	6%	27%	69	35%	+17.3
NJ-7 : Bennett (D)	Graduate	13%	5%	55%	136	23%	+16.9
OH-15 : Leonard (D)	Working-class	7%	12%	33%	78	24%	+16.7
CA-41 : Sánchez (D)	Hispanic	61%	3%	29%	100	0%	+16.4
CA-48 : Wilpert (D)	Working-class	42%	4%	32%	96	11%	+15.5
PA-7 : Brooks (D)	Working-class	21%	5%	33%	83	21%	+15.4
PA-10 : Stelson (D)	Working-class	10%	10%	35%	83	19%	+15.4
TX-32 : Yarbrough (R)	Working-class	25%	14%	39%	84	17%	+15.2
CO-8 : Rutinel (D)	Working-class	40%	2%	30%	95	10%	+14.8
WI-3 : Cooke (D)	Rural	4%	1%	28%	73	56%	+14.2
IA-2 : James (D)	Rural	4%	4%	29%	74	47%	+14.1
MI-10 : Hines (D)	Working-class	3%	14%	30%	76	0%	+13.9
MO-2 : Wellman (D)	Graduate	3%	3%	50%	102	17%	+13.0
IA-3 : Garriott (D)	Working-class	9%	5%	37%	81	28%	+11.8
NE-2 : Powell (D)	Graduate	13%	9%	42%	84	8%	+10.7
VA-2 : Luria (D)	Working-class	8%	22%	38%	94	17%	+8.8
WI-1 : Berman (D)	Working-class	13%	6%	31%	80	22%	+8.5
MI-4 : McCann (D)	Working-class	9%	8%	33%	75	36%	+7.4
PA-1 : Harvie (D)	Graduate	7%	4%	45%	115	8%	+5.2
MI-7 : Lawrence (D)	Working-class	6%	5%	38%	81	34%	+4.6
CA-3 : Bera (D)	Working-class	19%	5%	39%	94	16%	+3.6
CA-1 : McGuire (D)	Working-class	27%	2%	29%	78	40%	+1.4

Sources: Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2020-2024, census tracts aggregated to 2026 districts; Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026, 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); Le Millénaire calculations. Shares in % of the population (graduates: among those aged 25 and over; rural: population of tracts with fewer than 150 inhabitants per km²). Median household income in thousands of dollars. Types: Hispanic (Hispanic majority), working-class (working-class suburb or mid-sized town), graduate (suburb where 40% or more of those aged 25 and over hold a university degree), rural (more than 45% of the population in tracts with fewer than 150 inhabitants per km²).

THE REGIONS, FROM THE MEXICAN BORDER TO THE GREAT LAKES

In Texas, there is a clear difference in voting between the border area and the metropolitan areas, which vote mostly Democratic, and the rural area won over to the Republican Party.

TEXAS: THE 2025 MAP BACKFIRES ON ITS AUTHORS




Figure 34. Texas: 2026 House election margin and swing since the 2024 presidential election, by district; thick outline on seats changing hands. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by district (Le Millénaire forecast); Le Millénaire calculations.

In the Rio Grande Valley and Laredo, which have Hispanic majorities, there is a very clear swing towards the Democrats: TX-28 (+36), TX-15 (+25), TX-27 (+2) and TX-34 (+16).




Figure 35. The Rio Grande Valley and Laredo: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

The same applies to the metropolitan areas, where the shift is very strong. In the district covering the city of Austin, TX-37, the shift is 68 points.




Figure 36. San Antonio and Austin: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

The same is true of Houston, where TX-29 shifts by 60 points and TX-18 by 72 points.




Figure 37. Houston: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

There is the same double-digit shift in Dallas and Fort Worth, where TX-30 shifts by 60 points and TX-33 by 57 points.




Figure 38. Dallas and Fort Worth: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

FLORIDA: THE REDRAWN DISTRICTS HOLD, MIAMI WAVERS

In the Republican stronghold of Florida, the same trend can be seen, with the Miami metropolitan district won by the Democrats. Miami has also been run since 2025 by Democratic mayor Eileen Higgins. She is the first woman mayor, the first non-Hispanic mayor since 1996 and the first member of the Florida Democratic Party to be elected mayor of Miami since 1997. Although no district flipped Democratic, several are neck and neck, such as FL-9 and FL-7.




Figure 39. Florida: 2026 House election margin and swing since the 2024 presidential election, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by district (Le Millénaire forecast); Le Millénaire calculations.




Figure 40. Miami: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

OHIO, INDIANA AND KENTUCKY: SCANDALS AND OPEN SEATS

We also see a swing in the Democrats' favour in the 3 states won by the Republicans since 2024: Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky. In Ohio, the Republican candidate for governor, Vivek Ramaswamy, caused a scandal by releasing a campaign advertisement featuring the mother of his rival Amy Acton testifying against her daughter and thus supporting Vivek Ramaswamy. It turned out that Amy Acton's mother had not been in contact with her daughter for years, as the latter accuses her of having allowed, and turned a blind eye to, abuse committed against her by her stepfather when she was a child. In Indiana, it was accusations of local corruption that cost the Republicans the districts. One of the key campaign themes pushed by the Democrats in these midterm elections was precisely the alleged corruption of the Trump administration, and in particular the President's personal enrichment, estimated at more than 2 billion dollars according to the New York Times.




Figure 41. Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky: 2026 House election margin and swing since the 2024 presidential election, by district; thick outline on seats changing hands. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by district (Le Millénaire forecast); Le Millénaire calculations.

NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA, VIRGINIA AND ALABAMA

There is also a swing in the Democrats' favour in North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and Alabama. In North Carolina, the NC-11 district swung 16 points towards the Democrats; it is a traditionally competitive district that includes the city of Asheville, which is Democratic. The 9-point swing towards the Democrats in VA-2 is not surprising either, since it is historically competitive.




Figure 42. North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia: 2026 House election margin and swing since the 2024 presidential election, by district; thick outline on seats changing hands. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by district (Le Millénaire forecast); Le Millénaire calculations.

PENNSYLVANIA, NEW JERSEY, NEW YORK AND MAINE

We also see a shift towards the Democrats in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York and Maine. In Pennsylvania this is not surprising, as it is one of the key states in presidential elections: Pennsylvania voted for Trump in 2024, for Joe Biden in 2020 and for Trump in 2016. Nor is New Jersey a surprise, as it is a state that leans Democratic in national elections. The *Dems* recently won local elections there, including the governorship, to which Democrat Mikie Sherrill was elected in 2025. Maine was a special case. The state voted Democratic in presidential elections but had elected Republican senator Susan Collins since 1996; she has just lost her seat to Troy Jackson. It was a third of independent voters who tipped the whole of Maine into the Democratic camp.




Figure 43. Pennsylvania and New Jersey: 2026 House election margin and swing since the 2024 presidential election, by district; thick outline on seats changing hands. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by district (Le Millénaire forecast); Le Millénaire calculations.




Figure 44. Eastern Pennsylvania: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

The blue wave did not spare New York and New Jersey, yet a few Republican districts held out, including NY-11 and NJ-4, NJ-4 being the last New Jersey district held by a Republican and NY-11 the last New York City district held by a Republican.




Figure 45. New York, Long Island, the Hudson Valley and New Jersey: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

THE MIDWEST, FROM IOWA TO NEBRASKA

The Midwest was not spared either. Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan and Minnesota swung, as the maps below show. The Iran war, high pump prices, trade wars and tariffs put the Republicans in difficulty in rural states whose economies are centred on agriculture.




Figure 46. Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan and Minnesota: 2026 House election margin and swing since the 2024 presidential election, by district; thick outline on seats changing hands. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by district (Le Millénaire forecast); Le Millénaire calculations.

In Michigan, the Democrats flipped MI-4, MI-7 and MI-10. The first two districts are mostly rural with some urban areas; MI-10 is rather an urban district. All three have a population that is 70 to 80% white.




Figure 47. Southern Michigan: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

THE WEST, FROM NEVADA TO CALIFORNIA

Nevada and California are two interesting states. Both have Hispanic populations, but their political dynamics differ. California is a Democratic stronghold and is considered the most socialist state in the country, whereas Nevada is a swing state that voted for Donald Trump for the first time in 2024. In both states, it is the urban areas that vote Democratic. Yet in Nevada it was the 2nd district, a rather rural one, that flipped, and in California it was inland districts that flipped.




Figure 48. California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona and Colorado: 2026 House election margin and swing since the 2024 presidential election, by district; thick outline on seats changing hands. In California, 48 to 76% of the vote had been counted depending on the district, in Utah 60 to 82%. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by district (Le Millénaire forecast); Le Millénaire calculations.

That Colorado's 8th seat flipped, in a state that votes Democratic in presidential elections, is not unusual given the scale of the blue wave in these 2026 *midterms*. Democrat Manny Rutinel won the district. He relied on a progressive image, campaigning on purchasing power, denouncing ICE violence and calling for an expansion of food assistance. The district is nearly 40% Hispanic, a key demographic group that had drifted slightly away from the Democrats in 2024. Rutinel, himself from a Dominican immigrant family, was strongly backed by major Latino political action committees, a strategy that paid off.




Figure 49. Denver and the Front Range: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

The swing of 2 seats in Arizona is not surprising either, since it is a swing state: Arizona voted for Trump in 2016, Biden in 2020 and Trump in 2024. It also has a large Hispanic population of 2.3 million, or 32% of the population.




Figure 50. Phoenix and Tucson: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

California is a special state. Overall it is a Democratic stronghold, but a closer look at its electoral map shows that the coast and the metropolitan areas, such as Los Angeles and San Diego, are strongly Democratic while rural areas lean Republican, notably the Central Valley, made up of rural districts with large Hispanic populations. The cost of living, the price of gasoline and disapproval of Donald Trump's immigration policy, seen as violent, explain the swing in the CA-22 district, whose population is heavily Hispanic.




Figure 51. California's Central Valley: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.




Figure 52. Southern California: 2026 margin and swing since 2024, by district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE SWING

The charts below corroborate our explanation of the swing in districts with large Hispanic populations. The swing was stronger among Hispanics but weaker among graduates, the well-off and older people. Hispanics were therefore the fuel of the Democratic blue wave in the 2026 *midterms*, as illustrated by the swing in districts such as TX-28, TX-15, CA-22, TX-34 and TX-23.




Figure 53. Swing in the 415 contested districts by share of Hispanics, share of university graduates, median income and share of people aged 65 and over. Sociology: American Community Survey 2020-2024. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 14. District swing by sociology: effect of a 10-point increase in each variable

Variable	Effect within state (swing points)	95% interval	Effect not controlling for state
Hispanics	+2.0	+1.4 to +2.5	+1.0
Non-Hispanic Black	-0.8	-1.4 to -0.1	-0.5
Non-Hispanic Asian	+2.3	+1.2 to +3.4	+1.4
University graduates	-2.1	-3.0 to -1.2	-1.2
Median household income (10,000 dollars)	-0.3	-0.8 to +0.1	-1.0
Aged 65 and over	-2.3	-4.2 to -0.3	-5.2
Population of dense tracts (over 2,000 inhabitants per km²)	-0.2	-0.5 to +0.1	-0.5
Population of rural tracts (under 150 inhabitants per km²)	-0.6	-1.0 to -0.2	-0.6

Sources: Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2020-2024; Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); Le Millénaire calculations. Linear regression on the 415 contested districts. Income: effect of an increase of 10,000 dollars. 95% confidence interval. R^2: 0.69 with state fixed effects, 0.33 without.

The table below confirms what we explained earlier: the Hispanic majority was the fuel of the shift, with an average swing of 23 points since 2024 in Hispanic-majority districts. By comparison, the average swing in working-class suburbs and mid-sized towns is 14 points, in districts with a Black population of 40% or more it is 14 points, in rural districts 13 points, in dense urban districts 12 points and in graduate suburbs 12.3 points. Hispanics are thus part of this blue-wave dynamic, since we see a swing in several key electorates, a swing in which they were the majority.




Figure 54. Average swing and share of districts won by the Democrats, by type of district. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

ABSTENTION OR CONVERSION, DISTRICT BY DISTRICT

Beyond the swing in the electorate, the Republican Party's defeat in the 2026 midterms is explained by under-mobilisation: in 78 of 112 districts, the Republican Party kept less than 70% of the votes Trump had won in 2024. Several factors may explain this under-mobilisation. The first is that Donald Trump was not on the ballot. In 2016, Donald Trump had succeeded in mobilising the white evangelical electorate, which had stopped voting. If he is not on the ballot, they are mechanically less inclined to turn out. The second explanation lies in the nature of midterm elections, in which voters traditionally turn out less: turnout averages 40%, compared with 60% in presidential elections. A third explanation is disappointment with Donald Trump's second term: Republicans disgusted by the high cost of living, the Iran war, the Epstein affair and immigration policy decided to stay at home to show their discontent. Finally, the under-mobilisation is also explained by the fact that the Republican Party is in power, and in general it is the party out of power that is better able to mobilise its voters, because they are unhappy with the White House's policies and therefore more motivated to vote in order to express their discontent and impose a counterweight to the executive in Congress.




Figure 55. Votes for the Democrat in 2026 relative to Harris's votes in 2024, and votes for the Republican relative to Trump's votes, in the 112 districts made up mainly of whole counties. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

REDISTRICTING, STATE BY STATE




Figure 56. Republican seats won in 2024, districts won by Trump on the 2026 maps and Republican seats in 2026, in the ten states whose map changed. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

INCUMBENTS WHO ALIGNED AND INCUMBENTS WHO DISTANCED THEMSELVES

Table 15. Swing in the districts of 17 defeated or threatened Republican incumbents whose relationship with Trump is documented by our sources

Incumbent (district) and relationship with Trump	2024 presi-dential	2024 House margin	2026 House margin	Swing since the presidential	Gap with 2024 House
Distanced themselves from Trump					
Mike Lawler (NY-17), campaigned as a moderate ready to break with Trump	Harris +0.6	R +6.5	D +4.3	+3.8	+10.9
Tom Barrett (MI-7), voted to end the Iran war	Trump +1.3	R +3.8	D +3.3	+4.6	+7.1
Brian Fitzpatrick (PA-1), without Trump's endorsement, against the final budget law	Harris +0.3	R +12.8	D +5.5	+5.2	+18.3
Jeff Hurd (CO-3), called a "RINO" by Trump, disagreement over tariffs	Trump +10.0	R +5.2	R +1.7	+8.3	+3.5
Mike Turner (OH-10), removed from intelligence at the administration's request	Trump +7.9	n.c.	D +1.6	+9.5	n.c.
Lauren Boebert (CO-4), in conflict with Trump (Epstein, water veto), then endorsed again	Trump +18.7	R +12.1	D +0.7	+19.4	+12.8
Followed Trump (budget law, Iran war or claimed closeness)					
Jen Kiggans (VA-2), voted with Trump 95% of the time, for the Iran war	Trump +0.3	R +3.9	D +8.5	+8.8	+12.4
Juan Ciscomani (AZ-6), voted for the budget law	Trump +0.8	R +2.6	D +8.1	+8.9	+10.7
Zach Nunn (IA-3), voted for the budget law	Trump +4.5	R +3.8	D +7.3	+11.8	+11.1
Brad Finstad (MN-1), Medicaid votes, support for the Iran war	Trump +12.2	R +17.1	D +0.1	+12.3	+17.2
Eli Crane (AZ-2), close Trump ally, Freedom Caucus	Trump +15.1	R +9.0	R +0.8	+14.3	+8.2
Scott Perry (PA-10), budget law, post-2020 investigation	Trump +5.3	R +1.2	D +10.1	+15.4	+11.3
Ryan Mackenzie (PA-7), voted for the budget law	Trump +3.2	R +1.0	D +12.2	+15.4	+13.2
Jeff Van Drew (NJ-2), "unwavering support" for Trump, budget law	Trump +12.7	R +17.0	D +2.6	+15.4	+19.7
Rob Bresnahan (PA-8), budget law, for the Iran war	Trump +8.6	R +1.6	D +8.7	+17.3	+10.3
Max Miller (OH-7), former Trump aide	Trump +11.2	n.c.	D +9.9	+21.0	n.c.
David Valadao (CA-22), voted for the budget law (voted to impeach Trump in 2021)	Trump +1.9	n.c.	D +32.8	+34.7	n.c.

Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026, 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential and House: Le Millénaire forecast; Le Millénaire calculations; relationship with Trump: sources cited in the text. Margins in points. n.c.: redrawn district, 2024 result not comparable. Incomplete count in NY-17, AZ-2 and AZ-6 (84 to 86%) and in CA-22 (57%).

THE DISTRICTS OF 2028




Figure 57. The 67 districts decided by less than 5 points on 5 November 2026, with the result of the 2024 presidential election. Sources: Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), district results as of 5 November 2026 at 12:32 UTC; 2024 presidential election on 2026 boundaries (Le Millénaire forecast); boundaries: Census Bureau, TIGER/Line 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

WHAT THE EXIT POLLS SAY

AN ELECTORATE MORE DEMOCRATIC THAN IN 2024

The table below illustrates what we explained earlier. There was under-mobilisation among Donald Trump's 2024 voters: only 44% turned out. The Democrats also managed to capture 70% of the vote of 2024 non-voters and 58% of the independent vote.

Table 16. Who voted in 2026: 2024 presidential vote and party affiliation of voters

Group	Share of voters	Democratic vote (House 2026)	Republican vote (House 2026)
Kamala Harris voters in 2024	49	97	2
Donald Trump voters in 2024	44	7	91
Voters for another candidate in 2024	2	57	30
2024 non-voters	4	70	25
Democrats and leaners (2018 / 2022 / 2024 / 2026)	46 / 44 / 44 / 49	98	2
Republicans and leaners (2018 / 2022 / 2024 / 2026)	43 / 49 / 50 / 43	7	92
Independents (2018 / 2022 / 2024 / 2026)	12 / 8 / 6 / 8	58	32
MAGA Republicans (2022 / 2024 / 2026)	32 / 36 / 23	1	99

Source: SSRS 2026 voter survey, 79,541 interviews; Fox News Voter Analysis 2018, 2022 and 2024 (with AP VoteCast); methods differ from one year to another. As % of voters.

The chart below illustrates the abstention of Donald Trump's 2024 voters in the 2026 *midterms*, this time by state. This explains a blue wave that reached solidly Republican states such as Texas, North Carolina, Kentucky, Iowa, South Carolina and Kansas.




Figure 58. Donald Trump's actual 2024 score and share of 2026 voters saying they voted for him, in the sixteen states covered. Sources: SSRS 2026 voter survey (Fox News Voter Poll); 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 17. Trump voters in 2026, state by state: presence among voters and loyalty

State (race)	Trump's actual 2024 score	2026 voters saying they voted Trump	Gap	Trump voters voting for the challenger	Trump approval	Iran v
Texas (Senate, Talarico)	56.2	47	-9.2	11	40	
Ohio (Senate, Brown)	55.2	49	-6.2	8	41	
Maine (Senate, Jackson)	45.5	40	-5.5	4	34	
North Carolina (Senate, Cooper)	51.0	43	-8.0	10	37	
South Carolina (Senate, Andrews)	58.2	52	-6.2	10	44	
Iowa (Senate, Turek)	56.0	49	-7.0	9	41	
Kansas (Senate, Hamilton)	57.2	52	-5.2	9	43	
Florida (Senate, Nixon)	56.1	51	-5.1	6	44	
Georgia (Senate, Ossoff)	50.7	45	-5.7	13	38	
Michigan (Senate, El-Sayed)	49.7	44	-5.7	6	37	
Nebraska (Senate, Osborn)	59.6	55	-4.6	8	47	
Louisiana (Senate, Davis)	60.2	55	-5.2	11	47	
Kentucky (Senate, Booker)	64.5	57	-7.5	7	46	
Montana (Senate, Bodnar)	58.4	54	-4.4	11	48	
New Hampshire (Senate, Pappas)	48.1	42	-6.1	7	36	
Minnesota (Senate, Flanagan)	46.9	41	-5.9	4	37	
Pennsylvania (governor, Shapiro)	50.4	44	-6.4	18	36	
Arizona (governor, Hobbs)	52.2	47	-5.2	9	41	
Nevada (governor, Ford)	50.6	43	-7.6	5	39	
Wisconsin (governor, Crowley)	49.7	45	-4.7	7	37	

Source: SSRS 2026 voter survey (Fox News Voter Poll), reported presidential vote and Senate vote (governor's race for Pennsylvania, Arizona, Nevada and Wisconsin); Trump's actual score: 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations. In %, except the gap, in points.

EVERY GROUP SWUNG

The chart below illustrates the swing among the different electorates. Among all voters, we find a swing of 15 points in the Democrats' favour. The largest swings are among young people aged 18 to 29, who swung 42 points towards the Democrats.




Figure 59. Democratic margin in the House vote, by group, in 2024 and 2026. Sources: SSRS 2026 voter survey; Fox News Voter Analysis 2024 (with AP VoteCast); Le Millénaire calculations. The two surveys do not use the same method.

A first explanation for this swing is the failure of the Trumpist strategy in these *midterms*, which did not have the expected mobilising effect. First, the nationalisation of the election around the person of Donald Trump did not work. The 47th President of the United States of America had built the whole campaign around himself, organising the first Republican convention ever held for *midterms*, in Dallas, Texas, and instructing his voters to vote as if Trump's name were on the ballot. Elon Musk's strategy of investing massively in the campaign, which had worked in 2024, did not bear fruit this time either. The billionaire went as far as investing 445 million dollars[9] in the hope of limiting the damage in a midterm election that the party in power has always lost since the Second World War, except in 1998 and 2002.

9 PBS News. (2026). Elon Musk gambled $445 million to boost Republicans in the midterms. It came up short. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/elon-musk-gambled-445-million-to-boost-republicans-in-the-midterms-it-came-up-short

A second explanation is the weakness of the candidates personally chosen by Donald Trump and his staff. In Texas, the Senate candidate Ken Paxton was controversial from the outset. In 2023, as Texas *attorney general*, he was impeached by the House of Representatives before being acquitted by the Senate; in 2015 he was charged with financial fraud; and he was accused of infidelity by his ex-wife. In South Carolina, it was candidate Darline Graham who proved not to be up to the task when, during a televised debate, she said she was not interested in national security issues and was not very competent in the area.

Finally, Trump was disadvantaged in these elections by the fact that conservative podcasters such as Joe Rogan, Tucker Carlson, Nick Fuentes and Candace Owens distanced themselves from Donald Trump or did not actively support him, which contributed to the drop in the vote of young white men under 30: only 39% voted for the Republican Party in this election, whereas 54% had voted for Donald Trump in 2024[10]. These young white men, who had been an important electorate for President Trump in 2024, have therefore partly turned away from the GOP. More generally, the Democratic wave is also explained by Republican under-mobilisation. It is estimated that 81% of Kamala Harris's voters turned out, against 71% of those who had voted for Trump in 2024[11]. This explains a large part of the 14-point gap in the *congressional ballot*: 56% of voters voted Democratic against 43% Republican[12].

12 NBC News. (2026). 2026 Exit Polls. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026- elections/exit-polls Circle. (2025). The Youth Vote in 2024. https://circle.tufts.edu/2024-election#youth-vote-+4- for-harris,-major-differences-by-race-and-gender

12 Le Millénaire. Elections Observatory.

12 New York Times. (2026). How Americans Voted in 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/elections/voter-trends-national.html

THE MOTIVES BEHIND THE VOTE

As for the motives behind the vote, we find here in quantitative form the explanations developed above. First, the midterm elections were played out around the person of Donald Trump: 63% of voters disapproved of his performance, 44% voted to express their opposition to Trump and only 16% to express their support. The cost of living was also crucial to the vote for 49% of voters, as was corruption for 55%, a theme the Democrats pushed during the campaign by denouncing alleged corruption in the Trump administration at the White House. The Iran war also loomed large: for 63%, the intervention was a bad decision. The country's economic situation also worried 75% of voters, and 66% believed Trump had damaged the country's economy. The polls also confirm disapproval of ICE's handling of immigration policy: 60% disapprove of its actions.

Table 18. Motives behind the vote in 2026

Response	Share of voters	Democratic vote	Republican vote
Disapproves of Trump's performance	63	86	12
Voted to express opposition to Trump	44	97	2
Voted to express support for Trump	16	2	98
Cost of living "crucial" to their vote	49	66	32
Corruption "crucial" to their vote	55	63	35
Iran war "crucial" to their vote	34	72	26
Intervention in Iran: bad decision	63	83	15
Country's economic situation poor	75	70	28
Household finances worse than two years ago	44	75	23
Trump's policies have hurt the economy	66	82	16
Tariffs have hurt the country's economy	66	81	18
Immigration policy has gone too far	58	90	8
Disapproves of ICE (immigration police)	60	87	11
Trump's policies have raised health-care costs	55	83	15
Top issue: the economy	39	52	46
Top issue: the state of democracy	33	79	20
Top issue: immigration	14	10	89

Source: SSRS 2026 voter survey (79,541 interviews; some questions asked of about 39,000 voters). Share of voters and House vote of each group, in %.

OVER-MOBILISATION OF THE OPPOSITION, A CONSTANT OF MIDTERM ELECTIONS

AN ALMOST UNBROKEN RULE

To put Donald Trump's defeat in historical perspective, the defeat of the president's party in midterm elections is a constant in American political history. In 1938 Roosevelt lost the *midterms*, as did Truman in 1946 and Obama in 2010. The second chart shows turnout in midterm elections, which averages around 40%. This means that the winning party is the one that manages to mobilise its electorate, and, as we have seen, Donald Trump suffered from the under-mobilisation of the Republican electorate, which partly explains his defeat and contradicts the idea that America has suddenly become a country favourable to a Democratic ideological project.




Figure 60. Seats won or lost by the president's party in the House and Senate, Gallup approval before the vote and turnout, in the main midterm elections since 1938. Sources: American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara), 13 July 2026; Michael McDonald (US Elections Project, UF Election Lab); Yahoo News, 4 November 2026.

Table 19. The president's party's heaviest midterm defeats, and two counter-examples

Year (president)	Gallup before the vote	House seats	Senate seats	House margin	Turnout	Enthusiasm gap
1938 (Roosevelt, D)	60%	-72	-7	+1.2	46.6%	n.a.
1946 (Truman, D)	27%	-56	-12	-8.5	38.8%	n.a.
1958 (Eisenhower, R)	57%	-48	-13	-12.4	45.0%	n.a.
1966 (Johnson, D)	44%	-47	-4	+2.7	48.7%	n.a.
1974 (Ford, R)	53%	-48	-5	-16.8	39.1%	n.a.
1994 (Clinton, D)	48%	-54	-8	-6.8	41.1%	+9
2002 (G. W. Bush, R)	67%	+8	+2	+4.8	39.5%	-4
2006 (G. W. Bush, R)	37%	-30	-6	-8.0	40.4%	+9
2010 (Obama, D)	45%	-63	-6	-6.8	41.0%	+19
2014 (Obama, D)	41%	-13	-9	-5.7	36.7%	+12
2018 (Trump, R)	44%	-41	+2	-8.6	50.0%	-1
2022 (Biden, D)	40%	-9	+1	-2.7	46.0%	-5
2026 (Trump, R)	33% (late August)	-40 or more (projection)	at least -7	about -11 to -13	48.8% (estimate)	+10

Sources: American Presidency Project (Gallup approval and seats), table updated 13 July 2026; national House vote: figures from the Clerk of the House; turnout: Michael McDonald; enthusiasm: Gallup; for 2026, projections and estimates as of 5 November. Margin: national vote of the president's party minus that of the opposition, in points. Enthusiasm: share of opposition supporters "more enthusiastic than usual" minus that of the president's supporters.

CONVERSION OR ABSTENTION: WHAT THE COUNTIES SAY

HARRIS VOTERS CAME BACK, TRUMP VOTERS FAR LESS

The chart below quantifies this under-mobilisation of the Trumpist electorate, three in ten of whom did not vote. In Texas, 87% of Harris voters turned out against only 73% of Donald Trump voters. In North Carolina it was 77% of Harris voters against 64% of Trump voters, and in South Carolina 85% of Harris voters against 71% of Trump voters. This explains the large margins by which the Democratic camp won: 25.8 points in Texas, 22.8 points in North Carolina and 22.3 points in South Carolina. Overall, we find a national swing of 13.5 points.




Figure 61. Breakdown of the swing between the 2024 presidential election and the 2026 Senate election: vote switching and composition of the electorate, in the sixteen states covered. Sources: SSRS 2026 voter survey; Fox News (AP data), 5 November 2026; tonmcg; Le Millénaire calculations.




Figure 62. Breakdown of the national swing between the 2024 presidential election and the 2026 House vote: differential turnout of 2024 voters, vote switching and new voters. Sources: SSRS 2026 voter survey; tonmcg; UF Election Lab; Le Millénaire calculations.





Figure 63. What became of Trump's 2024 voters: abstention, loyalty and defection, nationally and in sixteen states. Sources: SSRS 2026 voter survey; Fox News (AP data), 5 November 2026; tonmcg; UF Election Lab; Le Millénaire calculations.



Taux de retour : part déclarée des électeurs de Harris et de Trump parmi les votants de 2026 (sondage SSRS, électeurs de l'élection sénatoriale ou de gouverneur), multipliée par le nombre de bulletins de 2026, rapportée aux voix de 2024. Glissement : marge de 2026 moins marge de la présidentielle 2024 dans l'État. Droits de douane : question « Les droits de douane de Trump ont-ils aidé ou nui à l'économie de votre région ? ». Sources : sondage des votants SSRS 2026 ; Fox News (données AP), 5 novembre 2026 ; tonmcg. Calculs Le Millénaire.

Figure 64. Return rate of Harris and Trump voters by state, and link between views on tariffs and the swing. Sources: SSRS 2026 voter survey; Fox News (AP data), 5 November 2026; tonmcg; Le Millénaire calculations.

Beyond the under-mobilisation of the Republican electorate, it is important to note that the Democrats managed to win back electorates that had moved to the Republicans in 2024. First, young people: 47% of them voted for Donald Trump in 2024[13], whereas in the midterms only 31% voted for the Republican Party[14]. Next, the Democrats managed to win back part of the Hispanic, African-American and Asian electorate that had voted for Donald Trump in 2024. The *Dems* gained 29 points among the first, 10 among the second and 18 among the third compared with 2024. The unprecedented feature of these elections concerns white voters without a degree, the core of the MAGA movement, among whom the Democrats gained 14 points compared with 2024[15].

15 CIRCLE. (2024). The Youth Vote in 2024. https://circle.tufts.edu/2024-election#youth-vote-+4-for-harris,-major-differences-by-race-and-gender

15 CIRCLE. (2026). Historic +35 Youth Vote Choice for Democrats in the 2026 Midterm Election. https://circle.tufts.edu/national-youth-vote-choice-2026-midterms

15 New York Times. (2026). How Americans Voted in 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/elections/voter-trends-national.html

THE STATES WHERE THE DEMOCRATS GAINED VOTES

Geographically, the GOP's defeat can be explained by different electoral movements. In Texas, an emblematic Sun Belt state, the Democrats progressed among every category of voters. The categories with the biggest shift are Hispanics, who voted for the Democrats in 2026 by 42 points more than in 2024. There is an even bigger shift among young people aged 18-29, who voted 49 points more for the Democrats than in 2024[16]. Compare this with a state that did not flip Democratic, Florida, where the Republican electorate turned out: white voters voted Republican by a margin of 23 points, 45-64-year-olds by 9 points, those aged 65 and over by 12 points, white graduates by 7 points and white non-graduates by 35 points[17]. In the *Midwest*, taking the example of Iowa, the Democratic shift was marked by a swing among non-white voters, who voted for the Democrats by a margin 30 points larger than in 2024, likewise young people aged 18-29 by 36 points and 30-44-year-olds by 22 points[18]. In the Rust Belt, looking at the break-down of the vote in Michigan, men voted 12 points more for the Democrats than in 2024, 18-29-year-olds 33 points more, 30-44-year-olds 15 points and non-graduates 12 points[19].

This genuine shift in favour of the Democrats can be explained by a rejection of ICE policy and of the high cost of living in the Sun Belt; in the Midwest and the Rust Belt, which are agricultural and industrial heartlands, by criticism of tariffs and unkept promises; and, among young people, by an Iran war they did not understand.

19 New York Times. (2026). How Texas Voted in 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/elections/voter-trends-texas.html
19 The New York Times. (2026). How Florida Voted in 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/elections/voter-trends-florida.html
19 The New York Times. (2026). How Iowa Voted in 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/elections/voter-trends-iowa.html
19 The New York Times. (2026). How Michigan Voted in 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/elections/voter-trends-michigan.html




Figure 65. Texas: James Talarico's votes relative to Kamala Harris's votes in 2024, and Ken Paxton's votes relative to Donald Trump's votes, by county. Sources: Fox News (AP data), 5 November 2026; tonmcg; Le Millénaire calculations.




Figure 66. Swing of each county minus the state's average swing, by Hispanic share of the population, in Texas, Kansas, Florida and Georgia. In blue, counties that swing more than their state; in red, those that swing less. Sources: Fox News (AP data), 5 November 2026; tonmcg; Census Bureau, 2024 population estimates; Le Millénaire calculations.

THE RETURN OF THE HISPANIC COUNTIES




Figure 67. Democratic margin in nine counties with large Hispanic populations, from the 2016 presidential election to the 2026 Senate election. Sources: 2016, 2020 and 2024 presidential elections by county (tonmcg); Fox News (AP data), 5 November 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

WHAT PARTY REGISTRATION SAYS

Table 20. Party registration and 2026 votes in five states

State	Republican registration lead in 2020	In 2026	2026 Democratic votes, as % of registered Democrats	2026 Republ
Kansas	+364,600	+380,153	107%	
Iowa	+10,547	+165,863	110%	
North Carolina	-392,655	-16,024	105%	
Florida	-134,242	+1,540,860	96%	
Louisiana	-237,778	+5,732	68%	

Sources: Florida Division of Elections (registration closing dates of 6 October 2020 and 5 October 2026); North Carolina State Board of Elections (registration statistics on election day); Louisiana Secretary of State (1 November); Iowa state data portal (1 November); Kansas Secretary of State (monthly series; 2020: 1 January 2021); votes: Fox News (AP data), 5 November 2026; Le Millénaire calculations. Republican lead: registered Republicans minus registered Democrats.

EARLY VOTING BY PARTY, STATE BY STATE

The Democrats voted early far more than in 2022, which is not surprising, since the Democratic Party generally votes early more and the Republicans vote more on election day. Democratic early voting increased in 13 states in this election.





Figure 68. Early votes by registered Democrats and Republicans, as % of each party's registered voters, in 2022 and 2026, in ten states. Sources: UF Election Lab; NCSBE; Louisiana Secretary of State; official state sources; Le Millénaire calculations.



* Comparaison fragile (voir la figure précédente ; Maine et Pennsylvanie : correspondance seulement). Hors Californie, Connecticut, Idaho et Virginie-Occidentale, non comparables entre 2022 et 2026. Les votants sans parti ne sont pas représentés. Sources : UF Election Lab (Michael McDonald), vote anticipé 2026 par État et par parti, https://election.lab.ufl.edu/data-downloads/earlyvote/2026/US.csv (5 novembre 2026), et rapports de 2022 (https://rpubs.com/ElectProject/early_vote_2022) ; Caroline du Nord : NCSBE ; Louisiane : Secretary of State ; inscriptions par parti : sources officielles des États ; calculs Le Millénaire.

Figure 69. Gap between the share of registered Democrats and that of registered Republicans among early voters, in 2022 and 2026, in twenty states. Sources: UF Election Lab; Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 21. Early voting by party in twenty states, 2022 and 2026

State	2026 Democratic early votes	2026 Republican early votes	D-R gap 2022	D-R gap 2026	Democratic rate 2022 → 2026	Republican rate 2022 → 2026
Utah	115,065 (+47.5%)	306,601 (-7.6%)	-47.3	-32.8	n.a.	n.a.
Kansas	202,784 (+44.1%)	221,086 (+23.9%)	-10.3	-3.6	26.9 → 38.9%	20.2 → 24.5%
Oklahoma	90,337 (+19.9%)	109,672 (+4.7%)	-14.6	-8.4	11.0 → 14.4%	8.9 → 8.4%
Nevada	300,466 (+13.6%)	259,548 (-2.7%)	-0.3	+5.3	44.2 → 52.2%	48.7 → 45.5%
Kentucky *	212,561 (+80.8%)	194,767 (+60.6%)	-1.5	+4.0	7.3 → 15.4%	7.4 → 12.0%
North Carolina	1,085,329 (+31.1%)	738,750 (+9.2%)	+7.0	+12.2	33.0 → 46.2%	30.4 → 31.7%
Louisiana	228,776 (+46.2%)	210,036 (+31.0%)	-1.1	+3.5	13.2 → 21.5%	15.9 → 19.6%
Florida	2,084,519 (+15.2%)	2,213,519 (+4.1%)	-6.4	-2.3	36.4 → 50.3%	40.3 → 38.9%
New Mexico	237,259 (+3.4%)	142,380 (-7.4%)	+17.0	+20.6	n.a.	n.a.
Nebraska *	97,684 (+11.3%)	118,216 (+4.0%)	-10.9	-7.8	25.4 → 29.5%	18.7 → 19.1%
Colorado	775,845 (+42.8%)	646,066 (+29.4%)	+2.5	+4.8	n.a.	n.a.
Maryland	654,431 (+30.9%)	211,580 (+18.4%)	+41.1	+43.3	n.a.	n.a.
Oregon	720,033 (+61.4%)	539,073 (+51.6%)	+8.4	+10.0	n.a.	n.a.
Arkansas	37,238 (+25.1%)	55,699 (+37.9%)	-2.1	-3.0	n.a.	n.a.
South Dakota	23,476 (-1.4%)	43,754 (+2.3%)	-23.4	-24.9	n.a.	n.a.
Maine *	143,814 (+30.7%)	70,773 (+31.4%)	+25.3	+23.6	n.a.	n.a.
Arizona *	613,185 (+6.0%)	625,143 (+11.7%)	+1.3	-0.7	n.a.	n.a.
New Jersey	703,548 (+64.7%)	293,062 (+77.4%)	+36.1	+33.1	n.a.	n.a.
Iowa *	224,625 (+28.1%)	171,130 (+53.4%)	+18.7	+10.7	25.0 → 35.8%	14.6 → 21.6%
Pennsylvania *	719,554 (-12.2%)	280,632 (+11.3%)	+47.9	+39.3	20.2 → 18.5%	7.2 → 7.7%

*Sources: UF Election Lab (Michael McDonald), 2026 early vote by state and party (5 November 2026) and 2022 reports; registration by party: official state sources; Le Millénaire calculations. Early votes: in-person early and mail votes by each party's registered voters, change since 2022. Gap: share of registered Democrats minus share of registered Republicans among early voters, in points. Rate: party's early votes relative to its registered voters (n.a.: registration by party not collected). * Fragile comparison (Iowa, Nebraska: mail only in 2022; Kentucky: data as of 2 November; Maine, Pennsylvania: mail only; Arizona: different providers and dates). Ranked by change in the gap.*




Figure 70. Growth of the Democratic early vote relative to the Republican early vote between 2022 and 2026, and swing since the 2024 presidential election, by county in North Carolina and by parish in Louisiana. Sources: NCSBE; Louisiana Secretary of State; Fox News (AP data); tonmcg; Le Millénaire calculations.

THE REASONS FOR THE DEFEAT

A REFERENDUM ON DONALD TRUMP

It was not so much a referendum against Donald Trump as a person as on the record of his second term. The discontent with Donald Trump's second term boils down to disappointment at an *America First* promise that was not kept. The 2024 coalition reproaches him for turning away from the domestic agenda in favour of an overly adventurous foreign policy, whereas it was precisely for the opposite that they elected him in 2016 and 2024. The Iran war, threats against Europe, the wish to make Greenland a 51st state, the trade war against Canada, the trade war against China and an aggressive American policy in South America have punctuated Donald Trump's second term. While Americans understand that maintaining the country's position as the world's leading power requires an active foreign policy, they did not understand its aggressiveness and intensity. The polls show it: the day after the midterm elections, 36% of Americans supported the Iran war[20]. In March 2025, only one in five Americans favoured President Trump annexing Canada or Greenland[21].

21 Silver, N. (2026). How popular is the Iran War?. https://www.natesilver.net/p/iran-war-polls-popularity-approval
21 The Hill. (2026). Less than 1 in 5 favor US annexing Canada, Greenland: Survey. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5214199-less-than-1-in-5-favor-us-annexing-canada-greenland-survey/



Moyenne des sondages d'approbation de Donald Trump calculée par Silver Bulletin (Nate Silver), données du graphique publié le 5 novembre 2026 (https://www.natesilver.net/p/trump-approval-ratings-nate-silver-bulletin). Zone grise : shutdown du 1er octobre au 12 novembre 2025 ; zone rose : depuis le début de la guerre contre l'Iran, le 28 février 2026. Repères : AP (2 avril 2025), Washington Times (4 juillet 2025), CBS News et Ballotpedia (shutdown), Wikipedia, chronologie de la guerre d'Iran de 2026. Calculs Le Millénaire.

Figure 71. Approval and disapproval of Donald Trump from January 2025 to 5 November 2026, with the key periods of the term. Sources: Silver Bulletin; AP; The Washington Times; Ballotpedia; Wikipedia; Le Millénaire calculations.

As the polls show, part of this active foreign policy was not only unpopular but also diverted the President's attention from domestic issues. The Trump administration misjudged the importance of releasing the Epstein files for the MAGA base. In 2024 he had been elected promising full transparency on the affair, yet his administration was reluctant to publish the files. In the end, after a pressure campaign led by dissident MAGA congressman Thomas Massie and Democrat Ro Khanna, who passed the *Epstein Files Transparency Act* (EFTA), the Trump administration was forced to publish 3.5 million (out of 6 million) documents, partly redacted. The pill did not go down well, and Trump himself is suspected of wanting to protect ties he may have had with Jeffrey Epstein[22]. According to Maggie Haberman and Jonathan Swan, at the height of the Epstein crisis Vice President JD Vance reportedly convened a meeting in the White House *situation room* to discuss the political and media response to the controversy[23].

23 US Department of Justice. (2025). Department of Justice Publishes 3.5 Million Responsive Pages in Compliance with the Epstein Files Transparency Act. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-publishes-35-million-responsive-pages-compliance-epstein-files

23 Haberman, M. Swan, J. (2026). Regime Change: inside Trumps imperial presidency.

Trump's immigration policy was also a double disappointment. First, disappointment at the violence of the deportation policy, which cost the lives of 5 American citizens. This aggressive remigration policy particularly offended Hispanic public opinion, which certainly favoured tighter border controls and strict management of migration flows, but not manhunts for undocumented fathers, neighbours or workers. According to UnidosUS, 90% of Latino voters favour a balanced immigration system, including an earned path to citizenship for long-term residents, responsible enforcement within the country, legal immigration pathways and border security[24]. Yet according to the NBC News and Telemundo poll, two thirds of Latino voters believe Trump's crackdown has gone too far[25]. Paradoxically, the movement's *America First* wing believes the opposite: that Donald Trump did not go far enough in cracking down on illegal and even legal immigration, by not revoking H-1B visas or the 14th Amendment on birthright citizenship.

The economy was Donald Trump's number one priority for this second term and also the theme that brought him to power in 2016 and 2024. Here too we face a paradox. At the macroeconomic level, America is doing well: unemployment is at 4%[26], the stock market has risen 39% since Trump's return to the White House[27] and growth is estimated at 3.4% in the third quarter of 2026. Donald Trump's problem is the same one Joe Biden had in 2024: these positive macroeconomic results are not trickling down. Growth is certainly good, but it is largely driven by AI and the development of data centres, which are unpopular in the country: two thirds of Americans oppose the construction of data centres in their community[28]. Nor has the cost of living improved, with inflation at 3.7% in November 2026, compared with 3% when Donald Trump returned to power. On top of that, a gallon of gasoline averages more than 4 dollars nationally, whereas he promised to bring it below 2 dollars. Not to mention the national debt, which has passed 40 trillion dollars, although here too Donald Trump had sworn to reduce it.

28 Unidos US. In a Historic Night for Hispanic Candidates and Voters, Anger Over The Economy and Immigration Overreach Fuel Record Latino Turnout. https://unidosus.org/press-releases/in-a-historic-night-for-hispanic-candidates-and-voters-anger-over-the-economy-and-immigration-overreach-fuel-record-latino-turnout/

28 NBC News. (2026). Poll: Latino voters reject Trump's immigration policies, and detail the personal impact. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/poll-latino-voters-reject-trumps-immigration-policies-detail-personal-rcna602061

28 United States Unemployment Rate. (2026). https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/unemployment-rate

28 US Bank. (2026). Stocks under the Trump administration: What is driving markets in 2026?. https://www.usbank.com/investing/financial-perspectives/market-news/stock-market-under-trump.html

28 Hayes Rossell, A. (2026). Nearly two-thirds of Americans oppose data center construction in their community. YouGov. https://yougov.com/en-us/articles/55479-nearly-two-thirds-americans-oppose-data-center-construction-in-their-community-august-28-31-2026-economist-yougov-poll

Consequently, the blue wave cannot be reduced to a single explanation; it is a combination of factors that led the Republican Party to its worst midterm defeat in 50 years.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY LOST, BUT NOT TRUMP'S IDEAS

The 2026 midterm elections were aimed at sanctioning Trump. They did not reflect a sudden attachment of voters to the Democratic Party and its policies, since it was the themes championed by Donald Trump in 2024 that dominated the *midterms* campaign. Debates on the cost of living and criticism of military interventionism abroad set the pace of the campaign, not the Democrats' favourite subjects such as ecology or woke ideology. In Texas, Democrat James Talarico campaigned on a populist line to attract blue-collar and Hispanic voters. While criticising ICE's aggressiveness, he said he wanted to work with the Trump administration to secure the border and fight illegal immigration. He calls himself a "*border security democrat*"[29]. On the cost of living, he criticised the price of gasoline and wants to lower costs for working families by cutting taxes and capping credit card interest rates. On Iran, he criticised the war and, like Donald Trump in 2016, does not favour *forever wars*[30].

By voting for the Democrats, voters thus signalled that they wanted to save the America First line by sanctioning Donald Trump and the MAGA administration. Within the MAGA movement, two ideological lines must be distinguished: the America First line, which is the nationalist line, and the MAGA line, to which former neoconservatives have rallied and whose agenda tends to be more interventionist abroad. America First is the original slogan on which Donald Trump was elected in 2016. It was the slogan of a forgotten America suffering from a neoliberal globalisation that had served the interests of a financial elite rather than those of blue-collar workers. It is also an America tired of wars abroad, in the Middle East, that felt no stake in a doctrine of *nation building* for Afghan or Iraqi democracy. Finally, in terms of values, it is an America that rejected the tyranny of minorities over the majority of the population: Americans who no longer recognised themselves in a society shaped by mass immigration, political correctness or *DEI* policies. It was this *America First* line that mobilised the hard core of Trumpism in 2016 (workers, young white men, rural voters), but also the 2024 coalition, which voted for Trump because it wanted leaders who would look after Americans' living conditions first, before any foreign-policy consideration. Yet after his return to the White House in 2024, Donald Trump's coalition broadened to include a whole neoconservative intelligentsia able to influence President Trump, notably in favour of military intervention in Iran: Marco Rubio, Stephen Miller, Ted Cruz, Laura Loomer, Mark Levin and Mike Huckabee, to name a few. Given that the Iran war is the least popular since the Second World War, the Democratic victory in the *midterms* must be understood as an electorate wanting policies that pursue an America First line focused on improving Americans' daily lives.

30 CNN. (2026). I am a border security democrat. https://edition.cnn.com/2026/11/04/politics/video/border-security-democrat-james-talarico-erin-burnett-vrtc-digvid

30 Talarico for Texas. (2026). https://jamestalarico.com/issue/foreign-policy/

CAN THE DEMOCRATS WIN THE SOUTH FOR GOOD?

WHAT IS DUE TO CONVERSIONS, WHAT IS DUE TO TURNOUT

The question after these *midterms* is whether the Democrats will be able to win back the Sun Belt. We have identified several *Sun Belt* states that flipped Democratic, of which Texas, a Republican stronghold, is the prime example. We have identified two trends. The first is the under-mobilisation of Donald Trump's voters, who did not go to the polls. In Georgia, 71% of Trump voters voted in 2026 against 78% of Harris voters. In North Carolina it was 64% against 77% of Harris voters; in Texas 73% against 87%; in South Carolina 71% against 85%; in Florida 69% against 74%; in Louisiana 67% against 78%; and in Kentucky 61% against 76%. Across the whole *Sun Belt*, therefore, there was under-mobilisation of the Republican electorate. This is a first explanation for the Democrats' overperformance in these states. Second, we identify vote switching: 13.1 points in Georgia, 11.6 points in North Carolina, 13.5 points in Texas, 12.2 points in South Carolina, 5.2 points in Florida, 12.5 points in Louisiana and 8.6 points in Kentucky. It is worth stressing that the low rate of switching in Florida partly explains why the state did not flip. In all the other states except Kentucky, switching exceeds 10 points, explained by the electoral sociology of these states, which include Hispanic voters who voted massively for Donald Trump in 2024 but, as we have seen, turned to the Democrats in the 2026 *midterms*. Non-MAGA Republican voters and 18- to 29-year-olds who did not renew their Republican vote should not be underestimated in these states either.

Table 22. The South in 2026: vote switching, composition of the electorate and return of 2024 voters

State	2024 margin	2026 margin	Vote switching	Composition	Margin with the 2024 electorate	Return of Harris voters
Georgia	-2.2	+18.1	+13.1	+7.1	+10.9	78%
North Carolina	-3.2	+19.6	+11.6	+11.3	+8.3	77%
Texas	-13.7	+12.1	+13.5	+12.2	-0.2	87%
South Carolina	-17.9	+4.5	+12.2	+10.2	-5.7	85%
Florida	-13.1	-2.9	+5.2	+5.0	-7.9	74%
Louisiana	-22.0	-1.8	+12.5	+7.8	-9.5	78%
Kentucky	-30.6	-12.1	+8.6	+9.9	-22.0	76%

Sources: SSRS 2026 voter survey; Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations. Margins in points, positive when the Democrat leads the Republican. Vote switching: effect of the 2026 votes of each group of 2024 voters, applied to the 2024 electorate. Composition: effect of differential abstention and new voters. Margin with the 2024 electorate: 2024 margin plus the effect of vote switching. Return: share of each candidate's 2024 voters who voted in 2026 (order of magnitude). Rounded.

THE PRECEDENTS: THE SURGE OF 2006-2008, THE COLLAPSE OF 2010-2014

As the table below shows, the South is not impervious to the Democratic vote. In Georgia and North Carolina, for example, Trump won in 2024 by 2.2 and 3.2 points, far from Trump's double-digit scores in Iowa or Kansas. Nothing is therefore impossible for the Democrats in the Sun Belt; their challenge now is to retain the voters who supported them in 2026, and that is far from a foregone conclusion.

Table 23. Democratic advances and setbacks in the South since 2006

Year	Election	Result
2006	Senate, Virginia	Jim Webb defeats Republican incumbent George Allen
2008	Presidential, Virginia	Obama 52.6%, McCain 46.3%
2008	Presidential and Senate, North Carolina	Obama wins by 14,177 votes; Kay Hagan defeats incumbent Elizabeth Dole
2010	House, South	At least 19 Southern Democratic seats lost; at most 16 white Democrats out of 105 seats in eleven states, excluding Texas
2014	Senate, South	Landrieu, Pryor and Hagan defeated; no Democratic senator or governor left in nine states
2018	Senate, Texas; governor, Georgia	O'Rourke loses by 2.6 points, Abrams by 1.4 points
2020-2021	Presidential and Senate, Georgia	Biden wins by 11,779 votes; Ossoff and Warnock win the run-offs
2024	Presidential, Georgia and North Carolina	Trump wins by 2.2 and 3.2 points

Sources: Wikipedia (official state results), accessed 5 November 2026; Associated Press, 5 November 2010 and 7 December 2014; Ballotpedia, 7 January 2021; 2024 presidential election by county (tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.

The result of the *midterms* must be read as a vote against Donald Trump and not in favour of the Democratic Party. It is Donald Trump who disappointed, not the Democratic Party that necessarily convinced voters with a project for America. In 2016, Trump won because he was an anti-establishment candidate: the billionaire of the poor, a *self-made man* from New York, not a career politician from Washington DC. The reason for supporting him was simple: he would improve Americans' daily lives. Yet in his second term, Donald Trump came to embody the very elite he denounced, first through the political disappointment described above, but also through misplaced priorities. Unlike in his first term, Donald Trump is now 80 and cannot run again, which is why he is obsessed with his political and historical legacy. Building a new ballroom at the White House and a triumphal arch in Washington DC are projects voters did not understand, as they expected political rather than architectural projects from the 47th president.

As analysed above, it was young men aged 18-29 who helped carry candidates across the country in these 2026 *midterms*. They swung 39 points towards the Democrats compared with 2024[31]. This reversal reveals three things. First, partisan divides matter less: Gen Z does not hesitate to vote right or left as long as concrete political solutions are not offered on *kitchen table issues*, the everyday concerns relating to the cost of living. Second, this electorate no longer hesitates to bring anti-establishment candidates to power, such as Donald Trump in 2024 or Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan in 2026. Third, this youth vote illustrates the generational divide running through American society, and the world more generally, between young people and baby boomers. They accuse Donald Trump and the Republican Party leadership of being out of touch with the country's political and economic reality, and prefer to elect younger candidates such as James Talarico (27) and Gina Hinojosa (52) in Texas, or Abdul El-Sayed (42) in Michigan, who care about the price of gasoline, the cost of living, a fair health-care system and so on. According to Santiago Mayer, executive director of *Voters of Tomorrow*, the net worth of baby boomers has risen by nearly 30% since 2022, while that of under-30s had fallen by 20%[32]. This discontent with the baby boomers was expressed against one man. Trump has become the system he denounced, and voters elected a Democratic Congress to establish a counterweight. According to NBC, 43% of voters said they went to the polls to express their disapproval of Donald Trump.

32 Tavernise, S. Igielnik, R. (2026). Fed Up With Politics and Struggle, Young Voters Rose Up. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/06/us/politics/young-voters-democratic-wave-midterms.html

32 Choi, J. (2026). Midterm results deliver ‘youth quake’ to American politics. The Hill. https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/6205511-younger-candidates-win-midterm-wave/

EVERYTHING REMAINS TO BE BUILT FOR THE DEMOCRATS

The Democratic blue wave in the 2026 *midterms* is certainly historic, but it does not mean victory in the 2028 presidential election. History shows that midterm elections do not guarantee presidential victory: in 1994 the Democrats lost more than 50 seats in the House of Representatives, yet Bill Clinton was re-elected in 1996[33]. The hardest part is still to come: the *Dems* will have to form a coalition able to unite around a candidate.

A first observation from these *midterms* is the rise of the DSA, the left wing of the Democratic Party, whose figureheads are Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. The disastrous climate within the Republican Party allowed the House candidates it backed to win in traditionally Democratic states (California, Colorado, New Jersey) and in swing states (Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin). The "Squad", the radical group in the House of Representatives, has doubled in size. The hard left will use these victories to assert itself against the centre in the 2028 presidential primaries. Tensions are already palpable between the left and the party's old guard. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez refuses to support the centrist New York senator Chuck Schumer as Democratic leader in the Senate[34]. Yet it is one thing for the hard left to win a Democratic primary, and quite another to convince people of the merits of its line in a general election, where non-Democratic voters must be won over.

34 Kamarck, E. Galston, W. (2026). How Democrats won big, and why 2028 remains an open question. The Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-democrats-won-big-and-why-2028-remains-an-open-question/

34 McCracken, F. (2026). Ocasio-Cortez doesn't back Schumer in Senate leadership vote. The Hill. https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/6210724-ocasio-cortez-declines-schumer-support/

Besides Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, three other candidates are emerging for 2028. The well-known outgoing governor of California, Gavin Newsom, who made his name as a fierce opponent of Donald Trump, advocates a broad-tent Democratic Party that includes the hard-left line. His difficulty in 2028 will be to convince beyond the Democratic Party, which is not easy for a Californian politician: with the exception of Ronald Reagan, they are perceived by the rest of the American population as very left-wing[35]. Kamala Harris would have the same problem, as a former California attorney general and senator, in addition to having been Joe Biden's vice president and the unsuccessful candidate in the 2024 presidential election. Jon Ossoff, re-elected senator for Georgia in 2026 and compared to Obama and Kennedy, would be a credible alternative. A hypothetical candidacy would have a triple advantage: he is a centrist, so could reach more broadly than a hard-left candidate; he is Jewish and could therefore, if necessary, stand up to Israel without being accused of antisemitism; and he is white and elected in a Southern state, which would allow him to appeal to white voters in both the *Sun Belt* and the *Rust Belt*.

35 Pinedo, P. (2026). Newsom admits democratic socialist ideas 'mainstream' in Democrat party: 'Pretty aligned'. Fox News. https://www.foxnews.com/politics/newsom-admits-democratic-socialist-ideas-mainstream-democrat-party-pretty-aligned

CAN THE REPUBLICANS RECOVER IN 2028?

AFTER A MIDTERM DEFEAT, THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

As the table below shows, it is not unusual for the party in power to lose the midterm elections. In 2006, George W. Bush lost the midterms, losing 30 seats in the House of Representatives and 6 in the Senate. In 2014, Obama lost the midterms, losing 13 seats in the House and 9 in the Senate. In 2018, Donald Trump lost 41 seats in the House of Representatives and gained 2 in the Senate. Finally, in 2022, Joe Biden lost 9 seats in the House of Representatives and gained one in the Senate. The question the losing party asks itself each time is whether it can win the next election, and in the case at hand, what will become of the MAGA movement?

Table 24. Midterm elections lost by the president's party since 1982, and the next presidential election

Midterm (president)	Seats, House / Senate	President's party candidate	Next presidential election	White House
1982 (Reagan, R)	-26 / +1	Reagan, incumbent	Reagan 525 electors, 58.8%; Mondale 13, 40.6%	held
1986 (Reagan, R)	-5 / -8	Bush, vice president	Bush 426, 53.4%; Dukakis 111, 45.6%	held
1990 (Bush, R)	-8 / -1	Bush, incumbent	Clinton 370, 43.0%; Bush 168, 37.4%; Perot 18.9%	lost
1994 (Clinton, D)	-54 / -8	Clinton, incumbent	Clinton 379, 49.2%; Dole 159, 40.7%	held
2006 (G. W. Bush, R)	-30 / -6	McCain	Obama 365, 52.9%; McCain 173, 45.7%	lost
2010 (Obama, D)	-63 / -6	Obama, incumbent	Obama 332, 51.1%; Romney 206, 47.2%	held
2014 (Obama, D)	-13 / -9	Hillary Clinton	Trump 306, 46.2%; Clinton 232, 48.2%	lost
2018 (Trump, R)	-41 / +2	Trump, incumbent	Biden 306, 51.3%; Trump 232, 46.9%	lost
2022 (Biden, D)	-9 / +1	Harris, vice president	Trump 312, 49.8%; Harris 226, 48.3%	lost
2026 (Trump, R)	majority lost / at least -7	Trump cannot run again	2028	to come

Sources: American Presidency Project (UC Santa Barbara), seats won or lost by the president's party (table updated 13 July 2026) and presidential results; Fox News Decision Desk (AP data), 5 November 2026, for 2026. Electors won state by state and share of the popular vote.

First, the Trump administration will have to adapt to a new balance of power for its remaining two years in office. The replacement of Susie Wiles by Stephen Miller, a dyed-in-the-wool Trumpist loyal to the President since 2016, illustrates this. Trump is surrounding himself with a team of loyalists to better withstand the power struggle with the Democrats in Congress for the rest of his term. The Democrats will certainly be able to launch impeachment proceedings, open committees of inquiry, block funding and oppose nominations, but Trump remains the sole master of the executive branch and still has cards to play to continue his second conservative revolution. Despite this counterweight, Donald Trump remains commander-in-chief and can order military operations. In foreign policy, he also has the power to conclude international agreements and grant diplomatic recognition. In addition, Trump will still be able to govern by executive order and block legislation with a presidential veto. Finally, the American president holds the judicial power of pardon.

As for the MAGA movement, it will have to change in order to rebuild a coalition similar to the one that brought Trump back to power in 2024. Stephen Miller has already told Axios that his aim is to bring back into the Republican fold the 18-29-year-olds who voted Democratic in the 2026 *midterms*. The aim will also be to remobilise the Hispanic electorate, hence Trump's admission on *60 Minutes* on 8 November 2026 that his remigration policy had been too violent.

Ideologically, the MAGA movement has left its mark on American politics and is not about to disappear. Trumpism has shifted the Overton window of American politics to the right. A Democrat like James Talarico opposes illegal immigration and openly supports the need for a strong and secure border. Even Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez says the Democratic Party needs to distance itself from *woke* policies if it hopes to win elections[36].

Moreover, MAGA is more than a political movement: it is a community and a cultural ecosystem with its own rules, codes, values and idol, Donald Trump. The movement even has an anthem, Lee Greenwood's *God Bless the USA*, which rings out at Donald Trump's rallies. The difficulty it will face is the departure of Donald Trump, who will have been the keystone of the movement and the person able to unite the two major ideological currents within it that we discussed earlier: the nationalist MAGA and the imperialist MAGA. The former accuse the latter of having hijacked Donald Trump's agenda during this second term; they include in particular the 18-29-year-olds who turned away from the Republican Party. They believe the movement simply needs to return to its original path: *America First*. In concrete terms, this means defending America's interests and focusing on *kitchen table issues*, Americans' everyday concerns, even at the expense of the "American empire". The nationalist MAGA reproach Donald Trump for forgetting his *America First* promise by focusing too much on foreign rather than domestic policy, with the Iran war at the heart of this criticism. They want a sincere America First policy: a pragmatic economic policy, a foreign policy based on common sense and the interests of the United States, an assertive social conservatism rooted in Christian conservatism, and recognition of the working and middle classes as a component of American culture[37]. Figures in this nationalist line include JD Vance, Donald Trump Jr., Tulsi Gabbard, Joe Kent, Thomas Massie, Tucker Carlson, Marjorie Taylor Greene, Nick Fuentes and Steve Bannon. The imperialist MAGA, for their part, are often recycled neoconservatives or traditional Republicans who have embraced Trumpism over time. They also advocate an America First agenda, but not at the expense of American interests abroad. They advocate a militaristic policy on the model of the Iran war, at the expense, if need be, of the American population's everyday interests if national security requires it. This line is embodied by figures such as Marco Rubio, Pete Hegseth, Lindsey Graham (who died in 2026), Mark Levin and Laura Loomer. What the 2026 *midterms* have shown is that the Republican Party cannot win elections without the *America First* faction, because it brings together 18-29-year-olds. The candidate who prevails will therefore be the one able to bring them back into the GOP fold.

37 Parnes, A. (2026). Ocasio-Cortez signals Democratic intention to move on from woke era. The Hill. https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/6026317-aoc-reflects-on-woke-era/

37 Cody, K. (2026). TN HOUSE REP-ELECT KENNY CODY: Vance is still MAGA's guy for 2028. Human Events. https://humanevents.com/opinion/tn-house-rep-elect-kenny-cody-vance-is-still-maga-s-guy-for-2028?utm_campaign=64466

For now, three candidate profiles are emerging for 2028. The first is JD Vance. The day after the *midterms* defeat, he posted a tweet setting out what he saw as the four reasons for the defeat: the Iran war, the cost of living and inflation, the need to put America first more, and the need to redefine relations with Israel[38]. This tweet is significant because it appeals to the America First line, the one that shunned the GOP in the midterm elections. The Vice President has several advantages in the race: his executive experience, his closeness to Republican Party donors and the bosses of Silicon Valley (Musk, Thiel), his rejection of the Iran war and his blue-collar roots in Ohio. However, his difficulty may be having to own his closeness to Donald Trump and the record of an administration with which he is not always aligned, as well as his closeness to libertarian tech giants, at a time when public opinion rejects the techno-futurism of *data centres*.

38 JD Vance. (2026). GOP. https://x.com/JDVance/status/2118004988433641835?a=3GLY475L24OLfnpIxf8&s=20

Marco Rubio is a second hypothetical candidate; he already ran in 2016, when he lost the Republican primary to Donald Trump. Rubio embodies the imperialist MAGA line, so he appeals to a rather neoconservative, traditional and establishment-friendly Republican electorate. However, the America First movement criticises Rubio as a traitor to the cause, since he supports the Iran war and American interventionism in general. For now, Rubio denies rumours of a 2028 candidacy and says he would support Vance if he ran[39].

A third candidate who emerged after the *midterms* is the former governor of Florida, Ron DeSantis. Like Marco Rubio, he ran in the last presidential election but withdrew to support Donald Trump. DeSantis has the advantage of not having been part of the Trump administration, which allows him to stand apart from the Washington Republican establishment. He is also very popular for the conservative policies he pursued in Florida, which made him known nationally. His advantage lies notably in the fact that Florida did not succumb to the blue wave of the 2026 *midterms*[40].

40 Wegmann, P. Andrews, N. (2026). Election Drubbing Complicates Vance's Calculation on Whether to Run in 2028. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/politics/elections/jd-vance-midterm-elections-9efc589e?mod=author_content_page_1_pos_1

40 Pacenti, J. (2026). The six significant reasons why Democrats couldn't turn Florida blue. Tallahassee. https://eu.tallahassee.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/11/05/florida-stayed-republicans-red-despite-democratic-blue-wave-swept-nation/92611902007/

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we have analysed why the 2026 *midterms* represent a defeat of historic proportions, with Democratic victories in the Senate, House and gubernatorial races. The general swing towards the Democrats was underestimated by the polls, which had not anticipated the undermobilisation of the Republican electorate or the swing of the Hispanic vote and of 18-29-year-olds towards the Democrats. We have also deciphered the reasons for this defeat, which reflects a rejection of the record of Donald Trump's second term rather than a sudden enthusiasm for a Democratic ideological project. We concluded this report by analysing how the result of the *midterms* reshuffles the cards for the 2028 presidential election and the different scenarios taking shape.

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Photo credit: Donald Trump in front of the White House, public domain

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