WHY JEAN-LUC MÉLENCHON COULD BECOME PRESIDENT

SCENARIOS FOR A MÉLENCHON VICTORY IN 2027

By **William Thay**, President of Le Millénaire
Matthieu Hocque, Director General of Le Millénaire



This is a translation of the original French text: « Pourquoi Jean-Luc Mélenchon peut devenir président ? », Le Millénaire, 26 November 2026.

FOREWORD

In April 2022, Jean-Luc Mélenchon fell 421,308 votes short of reaching the second round of the presidential election. Yet he had just won 7,712,520 votes (21.95% of votes cast), compared with 7,059,951 in 2017 and 3,984,822 in 2012. It was his third defeat in three bids, even though he finished only 1.7 points short of the second round in 2017 and 1.2 points short in 2022.

Five months before the first round of 2027, Le Millénaire's Forecast of 25 November 2026 gives him 77.8 chances in 100 of reaching the second round, against 28.5 for Édouard Philippe in the scenario where the former Prime Minister is the only candidate of the central bloc[1] (53.7 and 52.4 in the weekly edition of 4 November). Since the beginning of November, the most likely run-off of the presidential election has therefore been Marine Le Pen against Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

In this scenario, and despite very unfavourable second-round polls, one question arises: can Jean-Luc Mélenchon become President of the Republic? For many observers, he remains a first-round candidate trapped under a “glass ceiling”, so the question would not even arise. We believe, on the contrary, that it must be taken seriously, since a candidate who reaches the second round always has a path to victory, however narrow. To answer it, we have used the tools available to Le Millénaire (our forecasting model, the electoral and analytical maps of our Cardinal software, the 327 poll scenarios published since 2025, the major electoral surveys of the Cevipof and Fractures françaises, and several French and foreign precedents).

First, we focus on the candidate, his strategy and his electorate, examining its sociology, its territorial roots and its solidity. Next, we measure the reserves available to him, whether in the non-LFI

[1] Le Millénaire's Forecast, daily edition of 25 November 2026, “Philippe alone” scenario, 20,000 simulations. The figures of the public weekly edition date from 4 November 2026; they are flagged as such in the report.

left, among abstainers or in the generation that will vote for the first time in 2027. Finally, we study qualification and then the second round against Marine Le Pen, before comparing his situation with that of candidates who closed a gap deemed impossible (Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012, Lula in Brazil in 2026).

The results of the Ministry of the Interior, the polls and the outputs of the Forecast are reported as they are. Our own calculations are marked “Le Millénaire calculations” and do not replace the Forecast, which remains our reference figure.

KEY FINDINGS

- **77.8 chances in 100 of reaching the second round for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the Forecast of 25 November (against 28.5 for Édouard Philippe), whereas he had only 51 in 100 in October 2025; depending on the field of candidates, his chances range from 56 to 82 in 100.**
- **18.1% on average in the eight November polls and 24.3% in the Forecast projection, which takes into account the concentration of the left-wing vote observed at the end of campaigns (in 2022, the final polls gave him 17.8% and he won 21.95%).**
- **1.7 points: this is the average gap between his best and worst score within the same survey, whatever the field tested (2.4 for Marine Le Pen, 3.0 for Raphaël Glucksmann).**
- **42% of 18-24 year-olds say they will vote for him, against 31% in 2022. The under-35s make up 54% of his electorate, whereas nearly half (according to Ipsos; a quarter according to Toluna Harris Interactive) of his 2022 voters have left him.**
- **1,323 communes form an LFI core that has been stable since 2012, accounting for 10.7% of voters and 19.3% of his 2022 votes. Between 2012 and 2022, he gained 18 points in communes with more than 50,000 registered voters, against 5 points in villages.**
- **31.9% for the left bloc and 32.3% for the national bloc in 2022: the two blocs were neck and neck. The left bloc now trails by 2 to 4 points, in the polls as in the Forecast.**
- **82% of his 2022 voters intended to vote for him again in early November according to Toluna Harris Interactive, and 74% on 18 and 19 November, against 53% in March.**
- **65% of French people consider La France insoumise dangerous for democracy, against 53% for the Rassemblement national (Fractures françaises 2026). This relationship has reversed: the figures were 51% against 61% in 2020.**
- **3 to 7 points: this is what the candidate facing the FN, and then the RN, gained between the final polls and the result in every second round since 2002. However, Ensemble voters, 43% of whom voted for an LFI candidate against the RN in 2024, now declare only 8% for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in 2026, against 43% for Marine Le Pen.**
- **He would win 44.9% of the vote against Marine Le Pen in the Forecast's central calculation (and 23.1 chances in 100 of winning when this run-off takes place), against 32.7% in the polls; with the vote transfers measured in the 2024 legislative elections, he would reach 49.4%, and he would exceed 50% if the left came together and the centre refused to choose Marine Le Pen (his scenario for reaching the Élysée).**
- **Nicolas Sarkozy stood at 38% against François Hollande in October 2011 and finished on 48.4%, while Lula, 2.2 million votes behind in the first round in October 2026, won the second round three weeks later with a lead of 4.4 million votes. A second round can therefore be turned around, but neither of these two candidates started from as low a level in the polls as Jean-Luc Mélenchon.**
- **Our conclusion is that Jean-Luc Mélenchon is today the best placed to face Marine Le Pen in the second round and that his victory, while not the central scenario, can no longer be ruled out; it depends on conditions that we set out in detail in this report.**

Foreword 2

An established candidate *6*

Continuous progress since 2012 6

A strategy and a machine geared towards abstainers 8

A polling breakthrough in 2026 despite a damaged image 12

The drivers of the vote in 2027 19

A young, urban and angry electorate *22*

An electorate renewed since 2022 22

The generational shift 24

Unprecedented dominance among the young 27

A protest vote in the big cities 38

A geography concentrated on the large cities 46

Like for like: income, immigration, education 54

How high can he go, and can he qualify? *66*

A stable base under a high ceiling 66

A reserve of 3 to 5 points in the non-LFI left 69

Tactical voting less certain than in 2022 72

A limited reserve among abstainers 75

A million votes from the renewal of the electorate 78

The Forecast's favourite to qualify 85

Polls that underestimate him 91

A threshold of 21 to 24% to reach 95

Can Jean-Luc Mélenchon beat Marine Le Pen? *102*

A gap of 10 to 35 points depending on the measure 102

A national bloc ahead and a rejection that has reversed 110

Vote transfers that will decide the second round: can they be anticipated? 119

Precedents showing that a gap can be closed 137

Conclusion: can he become president? *142*

Annex 1: data and method *146*

Annex 2: status of the main figures *149*

Annex 3: the autumn 2026 polls *150*

Annex 4: the second-round scenarios *152*

AN ESTABLISHED CANDIDATE

CONTINUOUS PROGRESS SINCE 2012

Three presidential elections, continuous progress

Jean-Luc Mélenchon is standing in the presidential election for the fourth time, and he has improved on each of his bids.

In 2012, under the Front de gauche banner, he won **3,984,822 votes** (11.10%). In 2017, with La France insoumise, he rose to **7,059,951 votes** (19.58%) and missed the second round by 618,540 votes, or 1.7 points behind Marine Le Pen. Finally, in 2022, he gained a further 652,569 votes and reached **7,712,520 votes** (21.95%), even though turnout fell by 4 points.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon au premier tour de la présidentielle, 2012-2022



Source : Conseil constitutionnel, résultats officiels ; calculs Le Millénaire.

Figure 1. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round of the presidential election, in votes and as a percentage of votes cast, 2012-2022.*

It should be stressed that this progress in votes cast came about while turnout kept falling, from 83.77% in the first round of 2007 to 79.48% in 2012, 77.77% in 2017 and 73.69% in 2022. With 50.6 million registered voters expected in 2027, one point of turnout represents around 500,000 voters.

From the break with the Parti socialiste to La France insoumise

Jean-Luc Mélenchon built his strategy outside the Parti socialiste, which he left in November 2008 after the Reims congress. A Socialist senator for Essonne and Minister Delegate for Vocational Education in Lionel Jospin's government from 2000 to 2002, he led the left wing of the party and campaigned for a “no” vote in the 2005 referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty, against the Socialist leadership. He then founded the Parti de gauche, followed by the Front de gauche with the Communist Party for the 2009 European elections.

The Front de gauche enabled him to unify a fragmented political space. In 2007, the candidates to the left of the Parti socialiste won a combined 9.0% of votes cast (Olivier Besancenot 4.08%, Marie-George Buffet 1.93%, Arlette Laguiller 1.33%, José Bové 1.32%, Gérard Schivardi 0.34%), whereas in 2012 they won 12.8%, including 11.10% for Jean-Luc Mélenchon. However, he finished fourth, 6.8 points behind Marine Le Pen (17.90%), which showed that uniting the left of the Parti socialiste is not enough to qualify. He therefore launched La France insoumise in February 2016, outside any alliance of parties.

Gradually, **La France insoumise established itself not only as the driving force of the radical left, but above all as the force that draws the others together.** As proof, the Nouveau parti anticapitaliste did not field a candidate in 2022, and the French Communist Party is now split, since part of the PCF group in the National Assembly left to support Jean-Luc Mélenchon's candidacy from the first round of 2027.

A STRATEGY AND A MACHINE GEARED TOWARDS ABSTAINERS

A strategy that targets abstainers before the centre

Jean-Luc Mélenchon has applied the same strategy since 2017. It consists of getting those who vote little or who have stopped voting (young people, the working-class neighbourhoods of the large conurbations, left-wing abstainers) to turn out, rather than conquering the centre of the electorate (which was notably his point of disagreement with the leadership of the Parti socialiste when he left in 2008). He therefore embraces conflict in the name of a "New France" that he describes as young, urban and mixed, and he treats the social-democratic left as an opponent. His aim is to appear, in the final weeks, as the only left-wing candidate capable of qualifying.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon is looking for a "mousehole": qualifying by a whisker, then winning a second round against an opponent considered even more off-putting. This gamble gives him the most stable electorate of the campaign and thus a substantial hard core (a 1.7-point gap between his scores depending on the field tested, against 2.4 for Marine Le Pen), but it also earns him the highest level of rejection, since 69% of registered voters rule out voting for him according to Cluster17. Indeed, the consolidation of the LFI base, which makes him the leading political force on the left, takes him further from the centre of gravity of French political life.

A machine without equal in the campaign

La France insoumise has an activist machine without equal in this campaign, with the exception of that of the Rassemblement national (door-to-door canvassing, caravans in working-class neighbourhoods, rallies, daily posts on social media).

Its public meetings provide a first measure of it. In 2017, its Toulouse rally drew around 70,000 people, and on 18 April he held a rally in Dijon while appearing by hologram in six other cities, including Le Port on Réunion (New Statesman, 21 April 2017; Public Sénat).

The campaign launch rally in Saint-Denis on 7 June 2026 drew more than 20,000 people according to RTS.

This mobilisation rests on an unusual organisation. La France insoumise was launched in February 2016 as a movement with no membership or dues, where one becomes an “insoumis” by signing up on an online platform. In 2018, Manuel Bompard, then in charge of the movement's campaigns, explained that this platform enabled activists to do for themselves what parties traditionally did, and claimed around 500,000 sign-ups (Brave New Europe, 1 March 2018). The movement claimed nearly 450,000 in November 2024, organised in local “action groups” that create their own events on the Action populaire app (more than 60,000 events in 2024, or around 1,400 a week).

Table 1. *The LFI machine in figures, 2021-2026*

Indicator	November 2021	May 2023	November 2024	May 2026
Action groups	2,500	More than 4,100	Nearly 5,000	More than 4,700
Action group members	32,000	Nearly 72,000	100,000	Nearly 7,000 new in a few weeks
Citizen sponsorships of the candidacy	260,000	n/a	n/a	More than 278,000
Leaflets distributed	6.1 million	n/a	n/a	2.5 million before the 7 June rally
Events created on Action populaire	n/a	More than 23,500 in six months	More than 60,000 over the year	n/a

Sources: Jean-Luc Mélenchon, blog, 19 November 2021; La France insoumise activity reports (June 2023 and November 2024); L'Insoumission, 21 May 2026. Figures declared by the movement, not verified. n/a: not available.

The speed at which citizen sponsorships were collected gives another measure of this mobilisation. According to the movement, it took 244 days to gather 150,000 sponsorships in 2017, then 4 days in 2022, and less than 24 hours in May 2026. Moreover, 160,000 of the first 270,000 sponsors in 2026, or around 60%, were not yet signed up on the LFI platform (L'Insoumission, 21 May 2026).

Door-to-door canvassing plays a central role in this set-up, with two tools built into Action populaire, TokTok and Canvass, which record every visit. According to data from a leak reported by Clubic on 24 October 2026, which La France insoumise has not confirmed, around 200 activists had knocked on 158,040 doors, 54,838 of which were opened (35%), and 2,462 visits already concerned the 2027 presidential election. The popular caravans have complemented this work every summer since 2016. From 18 to 29 July 2026, they made 48 stops in 11 regions to encourage abstainers to register on the electoral rolls, according to the Journal du Net. For the 2024 European elections, the movement had already organised 6 national caravans (72 stops in 61 départements) and 30 departmental caravans (250 stops), and its registration campaign had led more than 30,000 people to check their electoral status.

These efforts focus on the areas where he is already strongest, since in 2022 he won 41% on average in polling stations with high abstention, against 19% in the stations with the highest turnout (Journal du Net, 8 October 2026).

Table 2. *The claimed inspirations of the LFI method*

Source	What the movement takes from it	Reference
Podemos (Spain)	The codes of popular media and the construction of a "people" against a "caste"	Manuel Bompard, 2018; "Comment faire ?", 2026
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe	Left-wing populism: a camp is built through discourse against a designated opponent	Manuel Bompard himself says he is most inspired by Laclau
French popular education	"Porteurs de parole" (street conversation stands), "consciousness-raising surveys", caravans in working-class neighbourhoods	Workshops of the citizens' cooperative, summer 2017
The "citizens' revolutions" of Latin America	Mobilising those who no longer vote, outside the traditional parties	"Comment faire ?", 2026

Sources: Brave New Europe (1 March 2018); Public Sénat (25 August 2017); "Comment faire ?", melenchon.fr, February 2026. We found no source in which LFI leaders claim the campaigns of Barack Obama or Bernie Sanders as a model.

Finally, the movement trains its cadres. The Institut La Boétie, co-chaired by Jean-Luc Mélenchon and the MP Clémence Guetté, opened a training school in December 2022 which had trained 280 activists by November 2024, in cohorts of 70 people attending ten weekends of classes a year. The fourth cohort had received 1,313 applications, and nine regional courses had brought together 450 people, according to the movement's report (La France insoumise, “Bilan des espaces”, November 2024).

The candidate's age is the other factor in this campaign. Jean-Luc Mélenchon will be 75 at the time of the election, the age of General de Gaulle at his re-election in 1965, and this is very probably his last bid. This political longevity gives Jean-Luc Mélenchon an advantage in name recognition: he is known by nearly 9 in 10 French people according to popularity rankings. Only Emmanuel Macron, Édouard Philippe, Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, Éric Zemmour and Marion Maréchal reach this level of recognition.

A POLLING BREAKTHROUGH IN 2026 DESPITE A DAMAGED IMAGE

Jean-Luc Mélenchon has gained more than 6 points in the polls since the beginning of the year: 11.9% on average in February (behind Édouard Philippe and level with Raphaël Glucksmann), 14.3% in May, the month he was designated, 15.5% in July, 16.8% in September and 17.0% in October. Finally, the eight November surveys give him 18.1% on average (Toluna Harris Interactive between 18% and 19% on 3-5 and 18-19 November, Cluster17 between 19% and 20.5% on 9-10 November, OpinionWay between 16% and 17% on 9-10 and 10-12 November, Elabe between 17% and 18.5% on 12-13 November, Ifop between 17% and 19.5% on 13-16 November, YouGov between 17% and 22% on 12-17 November)[2].

De 12 % à 18 % en 2026 : les intentions de vote pour Jean-Luc Mélenchon



Source : notices des instituts et listes de sondages de Wikipédia au 25 novembre 2026 ; un point par enquête (moyenne de ses hypothèses), moyennes mensuelles. Calculs Le Millénaire.

Figure 2. *First-round voting intentions for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Raphaël Glucksmann and Édouard Philippe, February 2025-November 2026, and the main events of the campaign.*

None of the campaign's events has dented his curve (his designation on 3 May, Marine Le Pen's candidacy on 7 July after her ineligibility sentence was reduced on appeal, the first seven-candidate televised debate on 27 August, Raphaël Glucksmann's victory in the Socialist primary on 11 October).

[2] Toluna Harris Interactive for M6 and RTL, 3-5 November 2026, 2,101 registered voters; Cluster17 for Politico, 9-10 November 2026, 1,164 registered voters. Notices filed with the Commission des sondages (polling commission).

The same goes for the news (the murder of the far-right political activist Quentin, the Lyhanna case, the heatwaves and fires in Gironde, the urban riots following 17 October), while over the same period Édouard Philippe fell from 20.4% in March to 14.6% in October, and then to 11.6% in November.

Table 3. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon's trajectory in the 2026 polls*

Month	Polls	Average	Minimum	Maximum	Glucksmann (average)	Philippe (average)
February	2	11.9%	10.0%	13.0%	10.0%	14.7%
March	4	12.2%	10.5%	14.0%	12.3%	20.4%
April	2	12.1%	12.0%	13.0%	11.5%	19.0%
May	4	14.3%	12.5%	16.0%	10.1%	16.8%
June	2	13.4%	12.0%	16.0%	12.0%	18.5%
July	6	15.5%	13.0%	18.0%	9.9%	18.1%
August	3	16.2%	14.0%	19.0%	11.2%	17.6%
September	13	16.8%	15.0%	20.0%	9.4%	16.8%
October	13	17.0%	13.0%	20.5%	12.6%	14.6%
November (to 25th)	8	18.1%	16.0%	22.0%	11.2%	11.6%

Source: pollsters' notices, as listed in Wikipedia's list of polls; each poll counts as the average of its scenarios. Minimum and maximum: all scenarios combined. List closed on 25 November 2026, excluding the Ifop-Fiducial survey for Sud Radio of 2-4 November, which tests only one centre and right-wing candidate per scenario. Le Millénaire calculations.

The autumn 2026 landscape

From 1 October to 13 November, 18 polls published 75 first-round scenarios. Jean-Luc Mélenchon ranges between 13% and 20.5% in them (17.2% on average per poll), while Marine Le Pen stands between 27% and 38%. Three candidates are therefore competing for second place: Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Édouard Philippe (13.8% on average when tested) and Raphaël Glucksmann (12.6%).

Table 4. First-round voting intentions, 1 October-13 November 2026 (75 scenarios, 18 polls)

Candidate	Minimum	Maximum	Average of scenarios
Marine Le Pen	27%	38%	34.4%
Jean-Luc Mélenchon	13%	20.5%	17.1%
Édouard Philippe (scenarios where he is tested)	8%	20%	13.8%
Raphaël Glucksmann (scenarios where he is tested)	6.5%	16.5%	12.6%
David Lisnard (scenarios where he is tested)	4%	17%	8.2%
Gabriel Attal (scenarios where he is tested)	3%	17%	7.8%
Bruno Retailleau	4%	17.5%	6.9%
Éric Zemmour	2%	6%	3.9%
Marine Tondelier	1%	6%	2.9%
Fabien Roussel	1%	3%	2.0%

Source: pollsters' notices; Le Millénaire calculations. The candidates of the central bloc and of the left vary according to the scenarios tested, which explains the width of the ranges.



Source : notices des instituts recensées par Wikipédia (17 novembre 2026) ; Cluster17 du 9-10 novembre d'après la notice de l'institut. Date : fin du terrain.

***Figure 3.** Jean-Luc Mélenchon in each of the eighteen polls published between 1 October and 13 November 2026: range across scenarios and average.*

The 2021-2022 precedent

Jean-Luc Mélenchon has one particularity: his level shifts over the course of the campaign. A candidate's level five months before the election therefore says little about the final result, as the precedents of 2017 and 2022 show. In November 2021, the average of five polls conducted between 5 and 17 November put Jean-Luc Mélenchon at 9.1%, and he was still only at 9.3%

in mid-January 2022. Yet the last four polls published before the election gave him 17.8% on average, and he finally won 21.95%.



Figure 4. *Voting intentions and results of the left-wing candidates, November 2021-April 2022.*

Table 5. *The concentration of the left in 2022*

Candidate	November 2021	Mid-January 2022	Final polls	Result
Jean-Luc Mélenchon	9.1%	9.3%	17.8%	21.95%
Yannick Jadot	7.3%	5.9%	4.4%	4.63%
Anne Hidalgo	5.2%	3.1%	2.0%	1.75%
Fabien Roussel	2.0%	2.4%	2.6%	2.28%
Total of the four	23.6%	20.7%	26.8%	30.61%

Sources: simple averages of five polls (5-17 November 2021), four polls (13-17 January 2022) and four polls (6-8 April 2022); Constitutional Council. Le Millénaire calculations.

This 12.8-point rise in five months has two explanations: the concentration of the left-wing vote and the mobilisation of abstainers. On the one hand, the left-wing vote became concentrated, since between November and April Yannick Jadot lost more than a third of his voting intentions and Anne Hidalgo two thirds. According to the Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Jean-Luc Mélenchon won over, in the last two weeks, 27% of Yannick Jadot's electorate, 27% of Fabien Roussel's, 20% of Anne Hidalgo's and 43%

of Philippe Poutou's[3]. On the other hand, mobilisation came late, since among voters who planned at the end of March to abstain and who finally voted, 30% chose Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

Five months before the first round, Jean-Luc Mélenchon has never been so high in the polls. He polled 12.7% on average in November 2016 and 9.1% in November 2021 (average of all polls that month). For this election, he reaches 18.1% in November 2026 in the average of the eight surveys published by 25 November.



Sources : listes de sondages de Wikipédia (2017, 2022 : version anglaise ; 2027 : versions française et anglaise au 20 novembre 2026, toutes enquêtes), moyennes par mois, un point par enquête (moyenne de ses hypothèses) ; ministère de l'Intérieur (étoiles : résultat).

Figure 5. *Voting intentions for Jean-Luc Mélenchon by number of months before the first round, 2017, 2022 and 2027.*

This chart also shows how voting intentions for Jean-Luc Mélenchon develop over the different campaigns. The same mechanism can be seen, at different intensities, in 2017 and in 2022: his curve stagnates for months before taking off in the last ten weeks, with a gain of 6.9 points between November and the election the first time and 12.8 points the second.

This time, voting intentions have already risen by more than six points since February. However, the mechanism is different, since we observe a continuous and almost linear rise since

[3] Antoine Bristielle, *« Comprendre la dynamique Mélenchon au premier tour de la présidentielle »* (Understanding the Mélenchon dynamic in the first round of the presidential election), Fondation Jean-Jaurès, 2022, based on the survey waves of 28 March and 20 April 2022.

he entered the campaign, which raises the question of his first-round ceiling.

A more damaged image than in 2021

This campaign presents a paradox: Jean-Luc Mélenchon is polling almost twice as high as at the same point in 2021, yet his image is worse. According to Elabe's Observatoire politique for Les Échos, 17% of French people had a good image of him in September 2026, against 20% in November 2021 and 21% in October 2021. Moreover, 60% had a very bad image of him, against 45% in November 2021. This gap is a reminder that popularity must always be distinguished from voting intentions.



Figure 6. *Share of French people with a good image of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, 2022 and 2027 campaigns.*

Nevertheless, his image is slowly improving, even though it starts from a lower level than in 2021: he has gained 5 points since November 2025. Among left-wing voters, 45% have a good image of him in September 2026, against 48% in November 2021 and 59% in March 2022. In the Fractures françaises survey published on 13 November, 12% of French people name him first as the best possible president and 15% in total, behind Marine Le Pen (18% and 27%), and only 9% do so among Parti socialiste sympathisers.

Weakened as he is, Jean-Luc Mélenchon nonetheless dominates the left, which explains his voting intentions. While his image is damaged among the French as a whole, it is much less so among the left-wing electorate, which still exists despite a continuous decline in its results since the Hollande presidency. According to Cluster17 for Le Point (27 and 28 July 2026, 1,601 people), 24% of French people consider him the best placed to represent the left in 2027, ahead of Raphaël Glucksmann (14%), Bernard Cazeneuve (10%) and François Hollande (8%), while Marine Tondelier and Olivier Faure reach only 1%. In the same survey, 16% want him to win in the end, behind Marine Le Pen (22%) but ahead of Édouard Philippe (11%), and 25% believe he has the qualities needed to be president, against 31% for Bernard Cazeneuve.

However, there are warning signs: 58% of French people reject the idea that the Parti socialiste and La France insoumise belong to the same camp, including 74% of LFI voters and 67% of Socialist voters in 2024, and 70% consider his candidacy a handicap for the left according to Ipsos BVA for La Tribune Dimanche (9 May 2026).

Jean-Luc Mélenchon is therefore rising in voting intentions without rising significantly in public opinion. When you are the best-placed candidate in your camp, you benefit from “tactical voting” in the first round, which improves your chances of reaching the second round, but there seems to be a ceiling to it. He still has to convince, in the second round, voters who did not choose him.

THE DRIVERS OF THE VOTE IN 2027



Source : Fractures françaises 2026 (Ipsos bva), « les deux enjeux qui vous préoccupent le plus à titre personnel », en %.

Figure 7. *The main concerns of French people in 2025 and 2026, and those of sympathisers of La France insoumise and the PCF.*

It is also worth looking at the concerns of French people to understand what motivates their vote. According to Fractures françaises 2026, 47% of French people cite purchasing power among their two main concerns, against 36% in 2025, far ahead of crime (20%), debt and deficits (20%), immigration (19%), the environment (19%) and social inequality (14%).

Looking more closely at the motivations of La France insoumise and Rassemblement national voters, we find one similarity and several differences. In the same survey, those close to La France insoumise and the PCF cite purchasing power (51%), inequality (41%), the environment (32%) and health (22%), while those close to the Rassemblement national cite purchasing power (50%), immigration (43%) and crime (33%). Purchasing power is therefore the top concern of both electorates. According to the theory of "issue ownership" formulated by the American political scientist John Petrocik in 1996, a candidate wins when the election is fought on the issues that voters consider him to own, which places purchasing power at the centre of the contest between Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le

Pen. The difference lies in the other concerns, in the sociology of the voters and in their past vote.

In the Cevipof electoral survey of September, the economy (30%) and social issues (29%) also come ahead of identity (16%), the environment (13%) and defence (5%). The violence of Saturday 17 October shows, however, that this agenda can shift. According to Fractures françaises, 43% of French people see it as the spread of crime and 34% as the expression of strong social anger, a sign that the left-right divide persists on several major issues. Indeed, this second reading is shared by 75% of those close to La France insoumise and the PCF.

Five months before the election, Jean-Luc Mélenchon has never been in such a favourable position. He is twice as high as in November 2021 and first on the left in almost every poll, and second place sits at a level unprecedented in autumn polls since 2002, when it usually took more than 20% of voting intentions to claim a place in the second round. However, part of the 2022 path has already been travelled, since the Greens and the Communists weighed more than 9 points at the end of 2021 and weigh only 5 today. Moreover, there are signs that these two parties are moving closer to La France insoumise than to the Parti socialiste. On 5 November, half of the MPs in the Communist group chose to support Jean-Luc Mélenchon rather than Fabien Roussel. On 18 November, Marine Tondelier, the candidate designated by Les Écologistes, opened the way to a coalition around Jean-Luc Mélenchon's candidacy.

It should be noted, however, that the reservoir of left-wing votes no longer has the same shape. In 2021, it was scattered among candidates who had no chance of qualifying. By contrast, in 2026 it is concentrated on a single candidate, Raphaël Glucksmann, who stands on average four points behind Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Thus, at a level close to qualification for the second round, nothing guarantees that the spectacular end of campaign of 2022 and the

tactical voting in Mélenchon's favour will recur if the candidate backed by the Parti socialiste appears capable of qualifying.

Conversely, if that candidate appears out of reach and the right and the centre choose a unifying candidate, we could see the same phenomenon as in 2022. That is to say, voters intending to vote for Raphaël Glucksmann who might ultimately vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon so that a left-wing candidate reaches the second round, which has not happened since 2012 and François Hollande.

A YOUNG, URBAN AND ANGRY ELECTORATE

AN ELECTORATE RENEWED SINCE 2022

What became of the 2022 voters

The 2026 recovery also conceals a transformation that averages do not reveal, since Jean-Luc Mélenchon's electorate is no longer that of 2022. The Ipsos bva-Cevipof Electoral Survey, conducted from 3 to 9 September 2026 among 13,060 registered voters, makes it possible to follow his 7.7 million voters. Among those expressing a voting intention, only 53% choose him again, while 18% turn to Raphaël Glucksmann, 7% to Marine Tondelier, 5% to Fabien Roussel and 9% to Marine Le Pen[4].



Sources : Ipsos bva-Cevipof, Enquête électorale 2026, vague 3 ; Toluna Harris Interactive pour M6 et RTL, vague 7 (détail partiel : Tondelier et Roussel non publiés, classés dans « Autres »).

Figure 8. *2027 voting intention of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's 2022 voters, according to two polling institutes.*

The institutes do not all measure the same loss, however. Toluna Harris Interactive, in its survey of 5 to 8 October, puts the share of his 2022 voters who remain loyal to him at 83% and the share of those who

[4] Ipsos bva, Cevipof, Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Le Monde, Institut Montaigne, *Enquête électorale française 2026* (French Electoral Survey 2026), wave 3, fieldwork from 3 to 9 September 2026, 13,060 registered voters, of whom 9,445 were certain to vote. Glucksmann, Attal, Philippe scenario.

switch to Raphaël Glucksmann at only 6%[5]. This considerable gap with Ipsos stems from sample size, fieldwork dates and the method used to reconstruct past votes. We take the Ipsos measure as our reference, because it rests on a sample six times larger and on a panel followed over time, and the Toluna measure as the lower bound of the loss.

What drove Jean-Luc Mélenchon's rise in 2026 was first and foremost the return of his 2022 voters, which can be tracked at Toluna Harris Interactive (same question since the spring). The leader of La France insoumise is recovering a large part of his 2022 electorate. In March, 53% of those expressing a voting intention planned to vote for him again and 19% were turning to Raphaël Glucksmann. The figure was 71% in August, 83% in October and 82% on 9 November, when Raphaël Glucksmann retained only 7%. The wave of 18 and 19 November puts them at 74%. Over the same period, Jean-Luc Mélenchon rose from 11% to 19% with this institute. Jean-Luc Mélenchon is therefore winning back voters who had voted for him in 2022 and who had scattered after the 2022 legislative elections, notably in the 2024 European elections and in the municipal elections.

Table 6. *What Jean-Luc Mélenchon's 2022 voters are doing in 2027*

Survey	Vote Mélenchon again	Raphaël Glucksmann	Marine Le Pen	Mélenchon's overall score
Toluna Harris Interactive, March 2026	53%	19%	n/a	11%
Toluna Harris Interactive, August 2026	71%	9%	3%	n/a
Ipsos bva-Cevipof, September 2026	53%	18%	9%	15.5%
OpinionWay, October 2026	66%	15%	12%	n/a
Toluna Harris Interactive, October 2026	83%	6%	3%	n/a
Toluna Harris Interactive, 9 November 2026	82%	7%	n/a	18.8%

Sources: Toluna Harris Interactive for M6 and RTL; Ipsos bva-Cevipof, Electoral Survey 2026, wave 3; OpinionWay for CNews, 21-22 October 2026. Base: 2022 voters expressing a voting intention. n/a: not available in the public document.

[5] Toluna Harris Interactive for M6 and RTL, barometer wave 7, fieldwork from 5 to 8 October 2026, 2,004 registered voters.

In both cases, his current score rests on an eroded 2022 base supplemented by new voters. According to our calculation based on the Ipsos survey, nearly 10 of his 15.5 points come from his 2022 voters. The rest, more than a third of his score (5.5 of his 15.5 points), comes from elsewhere (first from newly registered voters, then from former abstainers and, marginally, from voters of other candidates).

THE GENERATIONAL SHIFT



Figure 9. *Mélenchon vote by age: first round of 2022 and voting intentions in September 2026.*

The clearest change concerns age, since his electorate has grown younger. In 2022, Jean-Luc Mélenchon won 31% among 18-24 year-olds, 34% among 25-34 year-olds, 22% among 35-59 year-olds, 17% among 60-69 year-olds and 9% among those aged 70 and over[6].

His potential electorate is getting younger for this new contest. In September 2026, he stands at 42% among 18-24 year-olds and 32% among 25-34 year-olds, but falls to 16% among 35-49 year-olds, 8% among 50-59 year-olds, 7% among

[6] Ipsos-Sopra Steria, sociology of the electorates and profile of abstainers, first round of 10 April 2022.

60-69 year-olds and 4% among those aged 70 and over. He is thus gaining ground among the under-35s but losing it above that age.

To measure the weight of each change, we reconstructed the age pyramid of voters from the registered voters by age published by Insee and from turnout by age measured on the signed voting registers. 18-24 year-olds account for 11.4% of registered voters but only 9.9% of those who vote, while those aged 50 and over account for 54% of voters. As a result, Jean-Luc Mélenchon gains 1.1 points from 18-24 year-olds compared with 2022, but loses 6.5 among the over-35s, including 2.4 points among 50-59 year-olds alone.



Figure 10. *Contribution of each age group to the gap between the 2022 vote and voting intentions in September 2026.*

Table 7. *The Mélenchon vote by age: weight, levels and contributions*

Age	Share of voters	2022 vote	Intentions Sept. 2026	2022 votes (estimate)	2026 votes (estimate)	Contribution to the gap
18-24	9.9%	31%	42%	1.1 M	1.5 M	+1.1 points
25-34	12.7%	34%	32%	1.6 M	1.5 M	−0.3 points
35-49	23.3%	22%	16%	1.9 M	1.4 M	−1.4 points
50-59	17.2%	22%	8%	1.4 M	0.5 M	−2.4 points
60-69	16.8%	17%	7%	1.0 M	0.4 M	−1.7 points
70 and over	20.1%	9%	4%	0.7 M	0.3 M	−1.0 points

Sources: Insee (registered voters by age at 11 February 2026, turnout by age in 2022); Ipsos-Sopra Steria 2022; Ipsos bva-Cevipof, September 2026. Le Millénaire calculations.

We are thus witnessing a complete transformation of his electorate. The under-35s accounted for 35% of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's voters in 2022 and account for 54% in 2026, whereas they make up only 23% of all voters. Conversely, those aged 60 and over have fallen from 22% to 13% of his electorate, whereas they make up 37% of voters. No other candidate has such an unbalanced age pyramid.



Calcul Le Millénaire à partir des inscrits par âge (Insee), de la participation par âge (Insee) et du vote par âge (Ipsos).

Figure 11. *Age composition of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's electorate in 2022 and 2026, compared with that of all voters.*

Intentions de vote par âge, septembre 2026 (en %)

	Mélenchon	Roussel	Tondelier	Glucksmann	Attal	Philippe	Retailleau	Le Pen	Zemmour
18-24 ans	**42**	1	7	4	7	9	6	**21**	2
25-34 ans	**32**	2	6	7	5	10	4	**30**	3
35-49 ans	**16**	2	6	11	6	12	4	**37**	3
50-59 ans	**8**	2	4	13	5	13	5	**43**	4
60-69 ans	**7**	5	2	13	6	15	7	**37**	5
70+ ans	**4**	3	1	16	7	20	13	**28**	6

Source : Ipsos bva-Cevipof, Enquête électorale 2026, vague 3, hypothèse Glucksmann-Attal-Philippe, 9 445 inscrits certains d'aller voter. Arthaud et Dupont-Aignan non représentés.

Figure 12. *First-round voting intentions by age, September 2026.*

AN UNPRECEDENTED DOMINANCE AMONG THE YOUNG

A dominance that grows with each election

The vote of 18-24 year-olds for Jean-Luc Mélenchon is not new, but it has strengthened with each election. According to the Ipsos and BVA surveys cited by the Fondation Jean-Jaurès, he won 27% of the votes of 18-24 year-olds in the first round of 2017 and 31% in 2022, and the La France insoumise list took 33% in the 2024 European elections, ahead of the Rassemblement national list at 25%[7]. In September 2026, in the polling average, he reaches 42% in this population group, double Marine Le Pen's score (21%).



Sources : Ipsos et BVA, repris par la Fondation Jean-Jaurès (19 juin 2024) pour 2017-2024 ; Ipsos bva-Cevipof, vague 3, septembre 2026.

Figure 13. *Vote of 18-24 year-olds for Jean-Luc Mélenchon or La France insoumise and for Marine Le Pen or the Rassemblement national, 2017-2026.*

The measure is consistent from one institute to another. In nine polls published between July and October 2026 that give a breakdown by age, he wins between 36% and 45% among 18-24 year-olds. In the Ipsos survey, the other left-wing candidates are almost absent from this age group: Raphaël Glucksmann wins 4%, Fabien Roussel 1% and Marine Tondelier 7%.

[7] Christelle Craplet and Adélaïde Zulfikarpasic, « Les jeunes "emmerdent"-ils le Rassemblement national ? », Fondation Jean-Jaurès, 19 June 2024.

When 10 young people wish to turn to the left, 8 of them intend to turn to Mélenchon.

Table 8. *Voting intentions of 18-24 year-olds in nine 2026 surveys*

Institute	Fieldwork	Mélenchon	Le Pen	Gap
Verian	8-10 July	38%	32%	+6
Elabe	26-28 August	42%	14%	+28
Ipsos bva-Cevipof	3-9 September	42%	21%	+21
OpinionWay	9-10 September	44%	27%	+17
Odoxa	24 September-7 October	45%	24%	+21
OpinionWay (Les Échos)	13-14 October	43%	26%	+17
OpinionWay (CNews)	13-14 October	36%	34%	+2
OpinionWay (CNews)	21-22 October	45%	27%	+18
Cluster17	19-22 October	43%	14%	+29

Source: institute reports, compiled by sondage-presidentielle.fr; one scenario per survey. Sub-samples of a few hundred people.

A caveat must be added, however: these figures should be handled with caution, because the 18-24 sub-samples often number only a few hundred people (hence a margin of error of several points) and because they cover only young people certain to vote.

Two youths turning their backs on each other

It would not be appropriate to lump young people together in a single bloc. The available research describes two, which do not vote in the same way.

The first lives in cities and is graduate-level or still in education. In 2022, Jean-Luc Mélenchon scored 27% among those with three or four years of higher education and gained 8 points in the wealthiest households according to the Fondation Jean-Jaurès; yet 75% of 25-34 year-olds hold the baccalauréat or a higher-education degree, compared with 43% of 55-64 year-olds[8], and this youth systematically abstains three times less than young people without qualifications.

The second is working-class, less qualified and more often settled outside the major cities. It is among this group that the Rassemblement national is making progress. In the

[8] Maya Shaw, « Le Rassemblement national et la jeunesse : anatomie d'un mirage électoral » (The Rassemblement national and youth: anatomy of an electoral mirage), Terra Nova, La Grande Conversation, 24 August 2026.

2024 legislative elections, the RN vote among young people dominated among those with few or no qualifications and among holders of a baccalauréat or a two-year higher-education diploma. In September 2026, Marine Le Pen wins 30% among 25-34 year-olds, almost as much as Jean-Luc Mélenchon (32%). This youth also votes much less, which reduces its weight at the ballot box.

Between the two, a specific fraction of working-class youth votes massively for Jean-Luc Mélenchon: that of the social housing estates of the large urban areas. In 2022, he won 32% in households with incomes below 1,250 euros a month, up 12 points on 2017. The analysis by municipality, in the next part, gives the territorial measure of this.

The gender divide

A third divide has opened up in less than ten years between young women and young men. According to the Cepremap Well-being Observatory, based on the European Social Survey, roughly one young woman in two voted for the left-wing alliance in the most recent legislative elections covered by the survey, 12 points more than young men. Among the under-40s, 32% of women placed themselves on the far left in 2023, compared with 24% of men (who were at 29% in 2002). Conversely, 14% of young men placed themselves on the far right, up 7 points, compared with 7% of young women[9].

The same phenomenon can be seen in Germany, where a quarter of men under 25 voted for the AfD in the federal elections of February 2025, compared with 14% of women of the same age. The authors of the Cepremap note link this gap to young women's growing awareness of sexist violence and discrimination since 2017 and to rising distrust among some young men, which social media accentuates by exposing each group to different content. We cannot, however, conclude from this that his vote among 18-24 year-olds is

[9] Yann Algan and Eugénie de Laubier, « Un fossé idéologique grandissant » (A widening ideological gap), Cepremap Well-being Observatory, note no. 2025-07, 24 March 2025.

more female than male. No published survey cross-tabulates age and sex, and Ipsos finds no gap across his electorate as a whole (16% among men, 15% among women).

The religious factor and working-class neighbourhoods

Religion is another determinant of this vote. According to Ifop for La Croix, 69% of Muslim voters voted for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round of 2022, compared with 14% of Catholics[10]. Muslims make up 7% of the adult population in 2025 according to Ifop, and this population is younger than average[11]. This vote does not, however, sum up the youth of working-class neighbourhoods, where abstention remains higher than elsewhere (31.5% in 2022 in the municipalities where he exceeds 30%, compared with 24.7% on average).

In the municipal elections of March 2026, Ifop noted for the Fondation Jean-Jaurès that the best LFI scores were obtained in Saint-Denis and Roubaix, and that the results were linked to the proportion of social housing, the share of immigrants and, in university towns, the presence of young people. Nevertheless, with 12.4% on average in the 247 municipalities where it stood, the LFI list remained very far from the 31.6% won by Jean-Luc Mélenchon in those same municipalities in 2022[12].

The material condition of a generation

In September 2026, 21.9% of economically active under-25s are unemployed in France according to Eurostat, compared with 17.9% in April 2022 (15.5% in the European Union, 7.5% in Germany), while unemployment among the whole labour force rose from 7.6% to 8.5%[13]. Those who will vote for the first time

[10] Ifop for La Croix, published on 15 April 2022, 3,784 registered voters.

[11] Ifop for Écran de Veille, 1,005 people declaring themselves Muslim, fieldwork from 8 August to 2 September 2025, published on 18 November 2025.

[12] Noé Fridman and François Kraus, « La victoire LFI aux élections municipales : la grande illusion ? » (The LFI victory in the municipal elections: the great illusion?), Ifop and Fondation Jean-Jaurès, 19 March 2026.

[13] Eurostat, seasonally adjusted monthly unemployment rates, series une_rt_m, consulted on 12 November 2026.

in 2027 are thus entering the labour market in worse conditions than their elders of 2022.

Precarity and rising unemployment do not “benefit” Jean-Luc Mélenchon alone, since Marine Le Pen wins 30% among 25-34 year-olds in September 2026, against 32% for him. They nevertheless give weight to the themes on which he is campaigning (purchasing power, housing, autonomy for young people).

The themes: social issues, climate, Gaza, secondary schools

For the 2024 European elections, surveys document the motivations of young LFI voters. Among 18-24 year-olds, 43% cited protecting the environment, 27% social inequality and 22% the situation in Gaza, a theme chosen by only 6% of all voters, nearly four times fewer.

The priorities of his supporters in 2026 do not resemble those of the country. In the Ipsos bva-Cevipof survey, 85% of those close to La France insoumise cite social issues (53% of the whole population), 58% the environment (30%), 32% the economy (54%) and only 7% identity (29%). This is what separates them from the other youth, that of the Rassemblement national.

The mobilisation of secondary school pupils, then of students, marked the autumn campaign. It started in Mayotte on 31 August and reached mainland France on 18 September at the Lycée Saint-Exupéry in Créteil, before spreading across the whole country. The pupils denounce the shortage of teachers, the state of school buildings, class sizes and Parcoursup, whose main phase left 163,372 applicants without any of their choices in July 2026, 18% of those registered, compared with 11.9% in 2025[14].

[14] Summary of figures from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of National Education and the organisers as reported by the press, compiled in the article « Mouvement lycéen et étudiant de 2026 en France » (2026 secondary school and student movement in France), Wikipedia, version of 17 November 2026.

Table 9. The secondary school and student movement in figures

Date	Indicator	Ministries	Organisers
2 October	Secondary schools affected by the movement, out of about 3,700	1,027, of which more than 560 disrupted and 400 closed	n/a
6 October	Demonstrators in France	256,000, including 56,000 in Paris	450,000, including 100,000 in Paris
9 October	People arrested since the start	more than 6,800	n/a
13 October	Demonstrators in France	161,500, including 41,500 in Paris	480,000
13 October	Injured	more than 200 pupils, 147 staff, more than 800 police officers and gendarmes	n/a
2 November	Secondary schools blockaded on the return from the All Saints' holiday	41, about 1%	n/a
12 November	National Education staff injured since the start	245	n/a

Sources: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of National Education and secondary school and student organisations, figures reported by the press and compiled by Wikipedia (17 November 2026). n/a: not available.

The movement took on a political dimension from its very first days. The LFI deputy Louis Boyard went to the Créteil school on 21 September and called for the movement to spread. Jean-Luc Mélenchon then marched in Paris on 6 October, alongside Marine Tondelier and Olivier Faure, and called on young people to use “only non-violent methods of struggle”. For his part, Bruno Retailleau described La France insoumise on 1 October as an “utterly seditious party with a fascination for violence” and said that “the question of banning LFI arises”, while the government also accused La France insoumise of stoking the unrest. Raphaël Glucksmann supported the movement while condemning the violence, and Gabriel Attal announced a “pact for youth” on 10 October. Finally, secondary school organisations joined the mobilisation against the high cost of living on 17 October, which was marked by violence whose interpretation Fractures françaises measures. Public opinion supports the substance of the movement, since 62% of French people consider it justified according to an Odoxa poll for Backbone and Le Figaro, but it is divided on the form. The violence of 17 October

is read by 43% of French people as the spread of delinquency and by 34% as the expression of social anger.

This movement may encourage politicisation and strengthen Jean-Luc Mélenchon, since it leads every secondary school pupil or student to talk about it daily. When he wins 42% of voting intentions within a generation, the mass is so large that it gives him a considerable number of activists and committed actors capable of persuading others. If you do not necessarily have opinions, and nearly 50% of the people around you tell you that he is the one most likely to address your concerns, you are more inclined to follow him. There are, however, two limits: an effect on his progress that cannot yet be measured, and a repellent effect for the second round. His progress does exist during the secondary school movement, but it had begun as early as May, and no published data allows any share of it to be attributed to the pupils' mobilisation. Finally, the movement gave his opponents the argument they were waiting for, since the share of French people who believe that La France insoumise “stokes violence” rose from 59% in 2022 to 68% in 2026, which will weigh in the second round with centrist voters.

A separate information ecosystem

Young people also get their information differently from their elders. According to OpinionWay, 81% of 18-24 year-olds get their political information from social media (compared with 42% of the whole population) and 55% from TikTok (compared with 13%), while only 52% use traditional media, compared with 77% of the whole population.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon dominates this terrain. The Favikon index (reach, engagement, audience and regularity of posts of 26 candidates or contenders) ranks him first on 26 October 2026, ahead of Jordan Bardella and Marine Le Pen, with 3.2 million followers on TikTok, 2.7 million on X and 1.3 million on YouTube, while Raphaël Glucksmann is ninth and

Édouard Philippe eleventh[15]. Followers are admittedly not votes, but some young people see the campaign only through his videos and those of the Rassemblement national.

Table 10. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon on social media, 2021-2026*

Platform	Indicator	Value	Date and source
YouTube	Subscribers	600,000	November 2021, stated by Jean-Luc Mélenchon
YouTube	Subscribers	1.3 million	October 2026, Favikon
TikTok	Followers	500,000	November 2021, stated by Jean-Luc Mélenchon
TikTok	Followers	3.2 million	October 2026, Favikon
TikTok	Likes in September 2026	More than 2.1 million, against 790,130 for Marine Le Pen	Study cited by Sud Radio, 1 October 2026
X	Followers	2.7 million	October 2026, Favikon
Twitch	Followers	113,443 (peak of 22,773 viewers)	TwitchTracker, 18 November 2026
All networks	Posts mentioning him in September 2026	1.2 million, 60% more than Marine Le Pen	Study cited by Sud Radio, 1 October 2026
Movement outlets	Views in one week	More than 100 million	Claimed by La France insoumise at the end of September 2026, not verified
L'Insoumission	Views per week, all networks	2.4 million (record of 9 million during the 2024 legislative elections)	La France insoumise review, November 2024

Sources: melenchon.fr (19 November 2021); Favikon (26 October 2026); Sud Radio (1 October 2026); TwitchTracker; Public Sénat (6 October 2026); La France insoumise, « Bilan des espaces » (review of the spaces) (November 2024).

This lead rests on a strategy launched well before 2027. His blog was the most widely read of any French politician in 2012, and his YouTube channel, created in the summer of 2016, passed 22 million views in April 2017, with a five-hour programme devoted to costing his manifesto viewed more than half a million times (New Statesman, 21 April 2017). During the same campaign, his supporters ran a Discord server from which the video game “Fiscal Kombat” emerged. He then launched on Twitch, on 29 May 2020, the programme

[15] Favikon Index, data at 26 October 2026, reported by Les Gens d'Internet, 28 October 2026.

“Twitchons” (Let's Twitch), and the streamer Jean Massiet then judged that LFI activists had “really taken the hill” on the internet.

The strategy is openly embraced. Jean-Luc Mélenchon announced his candidacy on 3 May on the TF1 evening news, then in a long interview on Brut, and La France insoumise suspended its participation in BFMTV programmes in September. On 5 October, in front of HEC students, he promised to set foot “as little as possible” on the rolling news channels, and he wants “all insoumis to become broadcasters” through their WhatsApp groups and their social media accounts (Public Sénat, 6 October 2026). The document « Comment faire ? » (How to do it?), published on his website in February 2026, presents social media as “the main means of communication with the popular political continuum” and the building of an autonomous social network as a strategic necessity.

A youth less radical than its vote

The surveys reveal a paradox, since young people vote massively for the candidate seen as the most radical on the left without describing themselves as more radical than other generations. In the Ipsos bva-Cevipof survey, 18% of 18-24 year-olds wish to transform society radically, compared with 26% of the whole population, and 55% consider that there are too many radical ideas and behaviours in political life; in 2024, 63% of 18-24 year-olds felt that politicians prepare poorly for the future, compared with 78% of the whole population[16].

The youth vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon therefore owes less to support for radicalism than to the absence of any other offer. The social democratic left won only 5% of 18-24 year-olds in the 2024 European elections and 4% in September 2026, and the Greens, who won 25% of them in 2019, had only 10% in 2024 and 7% in 2026. La France insoumise has thus absorbed the left in this generation.

[16] Ipsos for Le Parisien, « Jeunesse et politique » (Youth and politics), fieldwork from 15 to 20 February 2024, 500 young people aged 18 to 24 and 1,000 French people.

What foreign precedents tell us

Other countries have experienced a dominance of the radical left in the youth vote, and their recent elections make it possible to measure what it has produced at the ballot box.

In Germany, Die Linke won 25% of the votes of 18-24 year-olds in the federal elections of 23 February 2025, 17 points more than in 2021 and first place in this age group ahead of the AfD (21%). This performance followed a campaign with a very strong presence on TikTok, which allowed it to exceed by a wide margin the level the polls gave it at the start of the campaign. Yet it finished at 8.8% across the electorate as a whole, even though turnout reached 83.5%, its highest level since reunification[17].

In the United Kingdom, the 9.6-point rise of Jeremy Corbyn's Labour Party in 2017 was attributed to a “youthquake”. Yet the British Election Study showed the following year that this quake had not taken place, since the relationship between age and turnout barely changed between 2015 and 2017 and Labour's progress occurred in every age group up to 70[18]. The youth vote had thus changed direction without their turnout increasing.

In the United States, Bernie Sanders had built his 2020 primary campaign on mobilising young people. On Super Tuesday, under-30s did not exceed 20% of voters in any of the fourteen states, and the candidate acknowledged that this mobilisation had fallen short of his expectations[19]. Conversely, the New York mayoral election of November 2025, in which three young voters in four voted for Zohran Mamdani according to Tufts University's CIRCLE centre, shows that a mobilisation of

[17] Infratest dimap for ARD, exit poll of 23 February 2025, cited by Al Jazeera, 25 February 2025.

[18] Chris Prosser, Ed Fieldhouse, Jane Green, Jonathan Mellon and Geoff Evans, “The myth of the 2017 youthquake election”, British Election Study, 29 January 2018.

[19] NPR, “Bernie Sanders' Call For Young Voters Isn't Working Out The Way He Planned”, 6 March 2020.

young people can decide an election, particularly in the major cities where Jean-Luc Mélenchon already exceeds 35%.



Figure 14. *Score among 18-24 year-olds and score across the electorate as a whole: four cases.*

Table 11. *Youth and the radical left: four precedents*

Election	Youth vote	Overall result	Lesson
Germany, 2025 (Die Linke)	25% of 18-24 year-olds, first party	8.8%	First among the young, fifth overall
United Kingdom, 2017 (Labour)	Sharp rise in the vote, not in turnout	40.0%, +9.6 points	The progress occurred at all ages
United States, 2020 primaries (Sanders)	Under 30s made up less than 20% of voters	Defeat	The announced mobilisation did not happen
New York, 2025 (Mamdani)	Three young voters in four	Victory	Possible in a young, highly educated city

Sources: Infratest dimap; British Election Study; NPR; CIRCLE (Tufts University). Le Millénaire synthesis.

AN ANGRY VOTE IN THE MAJOR CITIES

By age and social background: 2017, 2022 and 2026

The profile of his electorate has changed more than its level, as shown by a comparison between the first-round vote in 2017 and 2022 (Ifop, polling day) and voting intentions in September 2026 (Ipsos).

Table 12. *The Mélenchon vote by age and occupation, 2017, 2022 and 2026*

Category	2017 vote (Ifop)	2022 vote (Ifop)	Intention Sept. 2026 (Ipsos)
All voters	19.6%	22.0%	15.5%
18-24	29%	36%	42%
25-34	24%	30%	32%
35-49	21%	24%	16%
50-64	20%	21%	8% (50-59)
65 and over	12%	13%	7% (60-69); 4% (70 and over)
Manual workers	25%	27%	13%
Clerical and service workers	24%	25%	21%
Intermediate occupations	26%	22%	18%
Managers and professionals	16%	21%	20%
Retired	12%	15%	5%

Sources: Ifop, polling-day surveys of 23 April 2017 and 10 April 2022 (cited by Wikipedia); Ipsos bva-Cevipof, Electoral Survey 2026, wave 3, Glucksmann-Attal-Philippe scenario. The two institutes' age bands do not coincide above 50.

Among 18-24 year-olds, he progresses at every election and reaches a level that no candidate had ever recorded in this age group, while he is well below his 2017 and 2022 scores among 35-64 year-olds, even taking into account a lower overall level. The sharpest decline concerns manual workers, among whom he scored 27% in 2022 (above his average) and now scores only 13% in September 2026 (below his average). His electorate has thus shifted from a working-class vote spanning all generations to a young, urban and highly educated vote, as the map of municipalities confirms. This shift foreshadows his difficulty in the second round, since

the categories in which he is declining are also those that vote the most and where Marine Le Pen is strongest.

The social shift

His social profile has evolved in the same direction. In September 2026, Jean-Luc Mélenchon wins 21% among clerical and service workers, 20% among managers and professionals, 18% among intermediate occupations, 13% among manual workers and 5% among retirees. Marine Le Pen, for her part, obtains 58% among manual workers and 43% among clerical and service workers. The candidate who claims to speak for the working classes thus trails far behind her among rank-and-file employees, while he is ahead of Raphaël Glucksmann among managers and professionals.



Figure 15. *Voting intentions by occupation for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Raphaël Glucksmann and Marine Le Pen, September 2026.*

Age and place of residence therefore explain his vote better than social class. Jean-Luc Mélenchon wins 42% among 18-24 year-olds and 13% among manual workers.

A first explanation would point to inflation and the rising cost of living in the major cities, which would reduce the living standards of managers and professionals, and of young people hit by a tighter and changing world of work. Their anger would not turn towards the Rassemblement national, unlike that

of rural areas or of peripheral France, but towards the leader of La France insoumise. For these populations dissatisfied with the outgoing government's record, the natural outlet for anger can, for the time being, only be Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

The data first confirm the shock suffered by managers and professionals. According to Insee, consumer prices rose by 1.6% in 2021, 5.2% in 2022 and 4.9% in 2023, 12.1% over three years, and the average net salary of private-sector managers and professionals fell by 1.2% in constant euros in 2022 and then by 2.8% in 2023. This is the steepest fall of any category, since manual workers lost only 0.9% and then 0.3% over the same period. Managers and professionals thus lost about 4% of their wage purchasing power in two years, compared with 1.2% for manual workers.

This decline weighs more heavily in the large cities, where housing absorbs a larger share of income. In Paris, Insee and the Paris Region Rent Observatory (Observatoire des loyers de l'agglomération parisienne) note that in 2022 the average rent in the private sector reached 1,160 euros excluding service charges and that half of the tenants in this sector spent more than 34% of their income on it. Moreover, single people account for 58% of households there, ahead of couples without children (20%), which exposes young workers and students living alone first and foremost (Insee Analyses Île-de-France, 7 May 2026).

At the same time, young people face a harsher labour market. Unemployment among 15-24 year-olds reached 21.0% in the third quarter of 2026 according to Insee, up 1.6 points year on year, while that of the whole labour force stands at 8.2%. Likewise, Apec notes that managers' morale has been “low since 2024”, since only 21% said they were confident about France's economic situation in March 2026 (Apec barometer for the second quarter of 2026).

Yet this discontent does not take the same direction depending on the territory. The Odoxa survey conducted from 24 September to 7 October among 12,005 people distinguishes dense areas (cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants and

the Paris area) from sparsely populated areas (rural communes and towns of fewer than 20,000 inhabitants). In the former, Jean-Luc Mélenchon wins 29% among clerical and manual workers and 26% among managers and professionals, whereas in the latter he falls to 14% and 16%, and Marine Le Pen wins 57% of clerical and manual workers. Overall, he wins 27% in the Paris area and 23% in the large cities, against 13% in rural communes.

Table 13. *First-round vote by occupation and population density, October 2026*

Category	Mélenchon	Le Pen	Philippe	Glucksmann
Managers and professionals, dense areas	26%	17%	25%	11%
Managers and professionals, sparsely populated areas	16%	28%	23%	12%
Clerical and manual workers, dense areas	29%	38%	13%	6%
Clerical and manual workers, sparsely populated areas	14%	57%	10%	6%
Retired people, dense areas	8%	32%	24%	15%
Retired people, sparsely populated areas	8%	36%	21%	12%

Source: Odoxa-Backbone for the regional press, Public Sénat and Le Nouvel Obs, 24 September-7 October 2026, 12,005 respondents, Édouard Philippe scenario, as a % of votes cast. Dense areas: cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants and the Paris area. Sparsely populated areas: rural communes and towns of fewer than 20,000 inhabitants.

The vote of students and jobseekers points in the same direction: Jean-Luc Mélenchon wins 49% among school and university students and 33% among jobseekers, whereas he wins only 8% among retired people, in dense and sparsely populated areas alike.

The central bloc has lost the big cities and the managerial class

This anger is all the more directed towards Jean-Luc Mélenchon because the central bloc has lost its metropolitan base. In 2017, Emmanuel Macron won 34.8% in Paris and 29.5% in the ten largest cities, against 23.8% across all communes, and still 35.3% and 30.5% in 2022. However, as early as 2022, Jean-Luc Mélenchon was ahead of him in communes of more than

100,000 inhabitants (31.3% against 29.5%) and in the ten largest cities (31.5% against 30.5%). In the 2024 European elections, Valérie Hayer's list fell to 17.7% in Paris and to 14.9% in communes of more than 100,000 inhabitants, barely above its national average (14.5%), while Raphaël Glucksmann's list won 22.9% in Paris.

Table 14. *The central bloc and the left by size of commune, 2017-2024*

Area	Macron 2017	Macron 2022	Hayer 2024	Mélenchon 2022	Glucksmann 2024
Paris	34.8%	35.3%	17.7%	30.1%	22.9%
Ten largest cities	29.5%	30.5%	15.2%	31.5%	19.7%
Communes of 100,000 inhabitants and over	28.2%	29.5%	14.9%	31.3%	18.8%
20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants	25.4%	27.5%	14.5%	28.7%	14.4%
2,000 to 20,000 inhabitants	23.6%	28.2%	15.1%	19.4%	13.4%
Fewer than 2,000 inhabitants	20.8%	25.8%	13.4%	16.2%	11.6%
All communes	23.8%	27.6%	14.5%	22.0%	13.8%

Source: Ministry of the Interior, first-round results by commune (excluding French citizens abroad), as a % of votes cast; commune size based on Insee 2021 population. Ten largest cities: Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Toulouse, Nice, Nantes, Montpellier, Strasbourg, Bordeaux, Lille. Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 15. *First-round vote of managers and professionals, 2017-2026*

Political group	2017 (Ipsos)	2022 (Ipsos)	2024 European elections (Ipsos)	October 2026 (Odoxa)
Central bloc (Macron, Hayer, Philippe)	33%	34%	14%	24%
Mélenchon, La France insoumise	19%	27%	12%	22%
Socialists (Hamon, Hidalgo, Glucksmann)	8%	3%	20%	11%
Greens (Jadot, Toussaint, Tondelier)	n/a	6%	8%	3%
Right (Fillon, Pécresse, Bellamy, Retailleau)	20%	6%	9%	8%
Rassemblement national	14%	11%	20%	21%
Reconquête (Zemmour, Maréchal)	n/a	5%	5%	6%

Sources: Ipsos-Sopra Steria, sociology of the electorates (23 April 2017 and 11 April 2022); Ipsos, sociology of the electorates, European elections (10 June 2024); Odoxa-Backbone, 24 September-7 October 2026, Édouard Philippe scenario (Gabriel Attal not tested). In 2017, Benoît Hamon also represented the Greens. n/a: not available.

Managers and professionals have followed the same path. According to Ipsos, Emmanuel Macron won 33% among managers and professionals in 2017 and 34% in 2022, but Valérie Hayer's list won only 14% in the 2024 European elections, behind Raphaël Glucksmann (20%) and Jordan Bardella (20%). In October 2026, Édouard Philippe gathers 24% according to Odoxa, ten points less than Emmanuel Macron in 2022, ahead of Jean-Luc Mélenchon (22%), Marine Le Pen (21%) and Raphaël Glucksmann (11%).

The ten points lost by the central bloc among managers and professionals have therefore not gone to Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who has himself fallen from 27% to 22% in this category since 2022. They are split between Marine Le Pen, who rises from 11% to 21%, and Raphaël Glucksmann, who wins 11% against 3% for Anne Hidalgo in 2022. Thus, the anger of managers and professionals turns towards Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the big cities (26%), but towards Marine Le Pen in sparsely populated areas, where she wins 28% of managers and professionals against 16% for him.

The same shift can be seen in the Paris area, where Emmanuel Macron won 29% in 2017 according to Ipsos, against 19% for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, whereas in October 2026 Édouard Philippe wins

only 21% there according to Odoxa, behind Jean-Luc Mélenchon (27%). This movement breaks with the tripartition described by Julia Cagé and Thomas Piketty in Une histoire du conflit politique (Seuil, 2023), in which the central bloc had, since 2017, brought together the most affluent voters. Above all, it coincides with the weakening of the executive described in Part III, since confidence in Emmanuel Macron fell to 13% in November according to Elabe.

Metropolitan anger gets him through, but does not make him win

This reading nevertheless has two limits. On the one hand, the anger of the large cities may carry Jean-Luc Mélenchon through the first round but will not be enough to give him a majority in the second. In the Odoxa survey, he wins only 48% against Marine Le Pen in the Paris area, 39% in the large cities and 47% among managers and professionals in dense areas, whereas Édouard Philippe would win 62%, 53% and 69% respectively. Only school and university students (67%) and 18-24-year-olds (59%) give him a majority in this run-off. On the other hand, the main beneficiary of the central bloc's decline among managers and professionals is Marine Le Pen, who has gained ten points among them since 2022, while Jean-Luc Mélenchon has lost five.

Thus, the battle for second place is largely being fought in the large cities, between Jean-Luc Mélenchon and the central bloc candidate. Indeed, Jean-Luc Mélenchon is already six points ahead of Édouard Philippe in the Paris area and five points ahead in the large cities, while managers and professionals in dense areas are split almost evenly between them (26% against 25%). If the central bloc candidate wins these voters back, he recovers part of the ten points lost among managers and professionals since 2022. Conversely, if their anger at the outgoing government persists until the first round, it benefits Jean-Luc Mélenchon first, without however opening the second round to him, where these same voters prefer Édouard Philippe.

The evidence shows that the 2027 electorate is not the 2022 electorate plus first-time voters. Without the young, Jean-Luc Mélenchon would be at 12% and not at

17%, which means that the youth vote has already given most of what it can. His reserve therefore lies among the voters lost since 2022 who have remained on the left, far more than among young people who do not yet vote.

To sum up the elements of this chapter, the youth vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon rests on measurable facts. Indeed, he wins 42% among 18-24-year-olds, where Raphaël Glucksmann wins only 4% and Marine Tondelier 7%. Moreover, he combines the student youth of city centres with that of working-class neighbourhoods, in a country where 21.9% of young people in the labour force are unemployed. Finally, the Favikon index ranks him first on social media, where 81% of 18-24-year-olds get their political information.

Nevertheless, such dominance has not been enough elsewhere. Die Linke won 25% among 18-24-year-olds and 8.8% of the German electorate as a whole in 2025, and the under-30s did not exceed 20% of voters in any of the fourteen Super Tuesday states for Bernie Sanders in 2020. Yet the surveys show that Jean-Luc Mélenchon would lose ground among the over-35s compared with 2022 if the voting intentions were confirmed.

A GEOGRAPHY CONCENTRATED IN THE BIG CITIES

Five elections, the same geography

Across the 34,800 or so communes of metropolitan France, we compared the results of five national elections: the presidential elections of 2012 (Front de gauche), 2017 and 2022, and the European elections of 2019 and 2024, where the LFI list was led by Manon Aubry. The former measure the candidate's electorate, the latter the movement's base without him.



Figure 16. *Vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round of 2012, by commune.*

In 2012, with 11.10% of votes cast, the Mélenchon vote still reproduced the map of the communist and working-class left (Massif central, the Mediterranean rim, industrial valleys, Limousin, Allier), in a geography as rural as it was urban, inherited from the Communist Party.



Figure 17. *Vote for the La France insoumise list in the 2019 European elections, by commune.*



Figure 18. *Vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round of 2022, by commune.*

By 2022, the map had changed in nature: Jean-Luc Mélenchon exceeds 30% in communes with more than 50,000 registered voters and stays below 17% in those with fewer than 2,000. His progress since 2012 has been almost entirely in the cities (+18 points in large communes, against +5 points in villages). The European elections confirm this shift, since in 2019 the LFI list obtained the

same score, around 6%, whatever the size of the commune, whereas in 2024 it won 16.8% in communes with more than 50,000 registered voters and 4.8% in the smallest ones.



Figure 19. *Vote for the La France insoumise list in the 2024 European elections, by commune.*



Figure 20. *Mélenchon vote in the first round of 2012, 2017 and 2022, by size of commune.*

A typology of communes

We classified each commune according to its consistency. A commune is considered strong for La France insoumise when it gives the candidate or the list at least 1.25 times the national score. On this basis, five

profiles emerge. Stable strongholds are strong in at least four of the five elections. Recent conquests are strong in 2022 and 2024 but were not in 2012. Intermittent footholds are strong in 2022 or 2024 without consistency. Lost footholds were strong in 2012 or 2017 and no longer are. The remaining communes are classified as weak.



Figure 21. *Typology of communes by consistency of the LFI vote, 2012-2024.*

Table 16. *The five commune profiles*

Profile	Communes	Share of 2022 votes cast	Mélenchon's score in 2022	Share of his 2022 votes
Stable stronghold	1,323	10.7%	35.8%	19.3%
Recent conquest	219	10.0%	32.2%	14.6%
Intermittent foothold	1,085	6.2%	27.2%	7.4%
Lost foothold	5,629	9.4%	19.1%	9.0%
Weak	26,527	63.7%	14.2%	49.7%

Source: Ministry of the Interior, results by commune for 2012, 2017, 2019, 2022 and 2024; Le Millénaire calculations. Metropolitan France. Average score weighted by votes cast.

The LFI core fits into 1,323 communes. These account for one voter in ten but nearly one in five of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's votes in 2022, with an average score of 35.8%. They include big cities (Marseille, Toulouse, Montpellier, Lille, Grenoble, Le Havre, Montreuil) and hundreds of small communes in the South, in Ariège, Drôme, Ardèche, Aude, Hérault and Gard, heirs of the rural left. The 219 recent conquests weigh as much in terms of voters. They are the big cities that did not vote for the Front de gauche in 2012 and that La France insoumise has won since,

such as Paris, Lyon, Nantes, Bordeaux, Strasbourg and Rennes, as well as several towns in the outer Paris suburbs.

Conversely, 5,629 communes form a lost foothold, since they were strong for the Front de gauche in 2012 or for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in 2017 and no longer are. They are mostly rural communes in Puy-de-Dôme, Dordogne, Hautes-Pyrénées, Allier or Gers, as well as working-class or medium-sized towns (Calais, Bourges, Montluçon, Vierzon, Martigues, Sète, etc.). In several of them, the working-class vote has moved to the Rassemblement national.



Figure 22. *Share of votes cast and share of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's votes in 2022 by commune profile.*



Figure 23. *Typology of LFI footholds in the Paris area.*

Who votes Mélenchon: what 35,000 communes tell us

We brought together the results of the first rounds of 2017 and 2022 and of the 2024 European elections in every commune in France (and in every arrondissement of Paris, Lyon and Marseille for 2022), then cross-referenced them with the 2021 census and the 2021 localised tax income data published by Insee (age structure, school enrolment, qualifications, occupation, housing, share of immigrants, median income). The analysis covers 34,950 communes and arrondissements, representing 99.9% of votes cast excluding French citizens abroad and overseas collectivities.

Cities against villages



Sources : ministère de l'Intérieur (résultats par commune) ; Insee, recensement 2021. Arrondissements de Paris, Lyon et Marseille classés avec les communes de plus de 100 000 habitants. Calculs Le Millénaire.

Figure 24. *First-round vote in 2022 for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen by size of commune.*

The size of the commune is the first factor that emerges from our data. In 2022, the vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon doubles between the smallest and the largest communes, rising from 16.0% in communes of fewer than 1,000 inhabitants to 31.3% in those of more than 100,000. Conversely, Marine Le Pen's vote follows the opposite slope (from 30.0% to 12.3%), while Emmanuel Macron's remains almost flat, between 25% and 30%.

Table 17. The 2022 first round by size of commune

Population of the commune	Communes	Mélenchon	Le Pen	Macron	Abstention	Share of Mélenchon votes	Share of votes cast
Fewer than 1,000 inhabitants	24,956	16.0%	30.0%	24.9%	19.9%	11.5%	15.9%
1,000 to 3,500	6,766	16.8%	28.1%	27.5%	21.5%	15.7%	20.7%
3,500 to 10,000	2,169	19.0%	25.9%	28.2%	24.2%	17.0%	19.7%
10,000 to 30,000	735	23.8%	21.6%	28.3%	27.3%	18.4%	16.9%
30,000 to 100,000	240	29.9%	17.7%	27.0%	29.4%	19.5%	14.3%
More than 100,000	84	31.3%	12.3%	29.5%	26.5%	17.9%	12.6%

Sources: Ministry of the Interior, first-round results by commune, 2022; Insee, 2021 census. The 45 arrondissements of Paris, Lyon and Marseille are counted in the last category. Le Millénaire calculations.

The vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon is strongest where turnout is lowest. Communes of more than 30,000 inhabitants account for 27% of votes cast but 37% of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's votes. Conversely, communes of fewer than 3,500 inhabitants account for 37% of votes cast and 27% of his votes. The table also shows that abstention rises with the size of the commune, from 20% to nearly 30% in medium-sized and large towns.



***Figure 25.** Vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round of 2022, by commune.*

To go beyond size, we ranked the communes into ten groups of equal electoral weight according to each of their characteristics, from the 10% least affected to the 10% most affected. The Mélenchon vote varies by a factor of two according to five of them.



Figure 26. *Mélenchon vote in 2022 by six characteristics of communes, by decile.*

Table 18. *The 2022 Mélenchon vote by commune profile*

Characteristic of the commune	Lowest tenth	Highest tenth	Gap
Share of immigrants in the population	17.1%	38.0%	+20.9 points
Share of social housing (HLM)	15.5%	35.2%	+19.7 points
Poverty rate (communes where published)	17.4%	38.1%	+20.7 points
Share of 15-29-year-olds	17.0%	31.1%	+14.1 points
Share of students (18-24-year-olds in education)	16.7%	30.1%	+13.4 points
Share of higher education graduates	19.1%	24.7%	+5.6 points
Median income	32.2%	18.6%	−13.6 points
Share of people aged 60 and over	35.4%	16.9%	−18.5 points
Share of manual workers	20.2%	16.6%	−3.6 points

Communes ranked into ten groups of equal electoral weight for each variable. Sources: Ministry of the Interior; Insee, 2021 census and Filosofi 2021. Le Millénaire calculations.

The communes where he is strongest thus belong to two families: working-class communes in large urban areas, and young, student communes. In the former, he exceeds 35% in communes where the share of social housing and immigrants is high and incomes are low. In the latter, he exceeds 30%. By contrast, he remains below 17% in older communes and in working-class communes outside the large cities, and his vote even falls slightly as the share of manual workers rises.

ALL ELSE BEING EQUAL: INCOME, IMMIGRATION, QUALIFICATIONS

These characteristics overlap, since young communes are also more often urban, more highly qualified and more diverse. We ran a regression on 31,297 communes and arrondissements, weighted by votes cast. Eight variables are entered simultaneously, and they explain 73% of the differences in the Mélenchon vote between communes.



Figure 27. *Effect of each characteristic on a commune's vote, all else being equal, for Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen in 2022.*

Table 19. *What drives a commune's Mélenchon vote, all else being equal*

Variable	Effect on the Mélenchon vote	Effect of one standard deviation	Significance
Median income 10% higher	−3.8 points	−6.5 points	Very strong
Share of immigrants 10 points higher	+4.4 points	+3.3 points	Very strong
Share of higher education graduates 10 points higher	+2.4 points	+3.2 points	Very strong
Share of people aged 60 and over 10 points higher	−3.2 points	−2.5 points	Very strong
Share of social housing (HLM) 10 points higher	+1.2 points	+1.3 points	Strong
Share of manual workers 10 points higher	−2.4 points	−1.2 points	Strong
Share of 18-24-year-olds not in education 1 point higher	−1.0 point	−1.2 points	Strong
Share of students 10 points higher	−0.6 points	−0.2 points	Not significant

Weighted least squares regression (votes cast), 31,297 communes and arrondissements. Sources: Ministry of the Interior; Insee. Le Millénaire calculations. Details are given in the appendix.

All else being equal, income is the most powerful determinant. Indeed, a commune whose median income is 10% higher votes 3.8 points less for Jean-Luc Mélenchon. His vote also rises both with the share of immigrants and with the share of higher education graduates, two effects rarely seen together, which reflect a dual base, in working-class neighbourhoods as well as in highly educated city centres. Marine Le Pen shows the opposite profile on this point, with qualifications being by far the variable that weighs most, negatively, on her vote.

One last point bears directly on our subject. The Mélenchon vote depends less on how young a commune is than on the type of commune where young people live (highly educated university towns and working-class suburbs). Once income, qualifications, housing and immigration are taken into account, the share of students in the population no longer has any effect of its own, and the share of young people not in education even has a negative effect. In areas where young people are numerous without being either students or city dwellers, his vote is no higher than elsewhere.



Figure 28. *Median income, share of immigrants and Mélenchon vote in towns and arrondissements of more than 20,000 inhabitants.*

From 2017 to 2022: he progressed where he was already strong

Nationally, Jean-Luc Mélenchon gained 2.3 points between 2017 and 2022, but this average conceals two opposite trends. In the tenth of communes where the share of immigrants is highest, he rose from 25.9% to 37.4% (+11.5 points), whereas he stagnated in the tenth where it is lowest (from 17.4% to 17.1%). Likewise, he gained nearly 9 points in the youngest tenth of communes and fell back in the oldest tenth. Thus, he progressed in the communes with the highest share of immigrants and in the youngest communes.

Table 20. *The Mélenchon and La France insoumise vote from 2017 to 2024, by commune profile*

Group of communes (tenth)	Mélenchon 2017	Mélenchon 2022	LFI European elections 2024	Glucksmann European elections 2024
Lowest share of immigrants	17.4%	17.1%	5.1%	10.9%
Median share of immigrants	18.8%	19.1%	6.6%	13.6%
Highest share of immigrants	25.9%	37.4%	24.7%	16.2%
Lowest median income	25.4%	31.7%	18.2%	10.5%
Intermediate median income	19.4%	19.8%	7.8%	13.2%
Highest median income	15.7%	21.0%	10.6%	17.6%
Highest share of students	23.1%	31.1%	16.8%	20.3%
Highest share of people aged 60 and over	17.6%	16.9%	5.1%	13.9%

Communes ranked into ten groups of equal electoral weight. Sources: Ministry of the Interior; Insee. Le Millénaire calculations.

All else being equal, two variables explain most of the progress from 2017 to 2022. The first is the share of immigrants: ten points more in a commune translate into 3.3 points of additional progress. The second is Benoît Hamon's score in 2017: ten points more for the Socialist candidate translate into 4.4 points of progress for Jean-Luc Mélenchon five years later. His 2022 progress therefore came through the mobilisation of working-class neighbourhoods and through

the absorption of the Socialist electorate. Yet it is this second channel that has partly gone into reverse since.



Figure 29. *Change in the Mélenchon vote between the first round of 2017 and that of 2022, by commune.*



Figure 30. *Mélenchon vote in 2017 and 2022 and vote for the LFI list in the 2024 European elections, by share of immigrants in the commune's population.*

2024: retreat to the core

The European elections of June 2024 give a picture of what remains of the LFI vote when tactical voting disappears. The La France insoumise list won 9.9%, less than half its 2022 score. However, this decline was very uneven across territories, which reveals where the LFI vote is rooted.

Indeed, the list kept two thirds of its 2022 score in the tenth of communes with the highest share of immigrants (24.7%), against less than a third in the tenth with the lowest share (5.1%). All else being equal, ten more points of immigrant share were thus worth 6 additional points of vote in 2024, against 4.4 points in 2022.



Figure 31. *Vote for the La France insoumise list in the 2024 European elections, by commune.*

What remains in 2024, therefore, is a core made up of Seine-Saint-Denis, Val-de-Marne and Val-d'Oise, the working-class neighbourhoods of the Lyon, Lille, Marseille, Toulouse and Montpellier urban areas, and a few university towns. The LFI list won 50.4% in Saint-Denis, 58.1% in La Courneuve, 42.8% in Roubaix and 42.2% in Vénissieux. Conversely, the 2022 electorate largely switched to Raphaël Glucksmann's list in the university cities of the West (24.9% against 17.9% for the LFI list in Rennes, 23.8% against 15.4% in Nantes).

This electorate of highly educated cities, won in 2022 and lost in 2024, is now what the campaign is about. Raphaël Glucksmann's list rises sharply with the share of higher education graduates: 3.9 points more for every ten additional points of graduates, all else being equal.



Figure 32. *Vote for the PS-Place publique list led by Raphaël Glucksmann in the 2024 European elections, by commune.*

The big cities, the student cities, Paris



Figure 33. *Mélenchon vote in 2017 and 2022 in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants: the top twelve and the bottom eight.*

In the 40 cities of metropolitan France with more than 100,000 inhabitants, Jean-Luc Mélenchon came first in 20 of them in 2022, against 11 in 2017, and he progressed in all of them.

He exceeded 40% in Saint-Denis, Montreuil, Argenteuil, Montpellier and Lille, whereas he stayed below 22% in Nice, Annecy, Toulon and Boulogne-Billancourt.

Another way of reading Jean-Luc Mélenchon's vote by commune is to look at the victories of LFI mayors in the 2026 municipal elections: La Courneuve, Saint-Denis, Tourcoing, etc.

Table 21. The Mélenchon vote in twelve large cities

City	Mélenchon 2017	Mélenchon 2022	LFI 2024	Glucksmann 2024	Abstention 2022
Saint-Denis	43.4%	61.1%	50.4%	11.8%	33.9%
Montreuil	40.1%	55.2%	34.5%	20.9%	25.8%
Montpellier	31.5%	40.7%	24.2%	19.9%	27.5%
Lille	29.9%	40.5%	25.9%	17.5%	29.5%
Grenoble	28.9%	38.9%	21.9%	21.2%	26.1%
Toulouse	29.2%	37.0%	19.7%	21.4%	22.6%
Rennes	25.9%	36.3%	17.9%	24.9%	24.3%
Strasbourg	24.4%	35.5%	21.3%	18.2%	25.7%
Nantes	25.5%	33.1%	15.4%	23.8%	24.5%
Marseille	24.8%	31.1%	21.5%	11.5%	32.0%
Lyon	22.8%	31.1%	17.2%	18.8%	18.0%
Paris	19.6%	30.1%	16.8%	22.9%	21.7%

Source: Ministry of the Interior; Le Millénaire calculations.

The cities with the highest share of students confirm the result of the regression. Jean-Luc Mélenchon made strong gains there between 2017 and 2022, of 8 to 10 points in Rennes, Lille, Grenoble or Montpellier. However, this is the most volatile vote, since the LFI list lost between 35% and 50% of his score there in the 2024 European elections. Moreover, the level reached depends less on the student presence than on the social profile of the city. Nancy, for instance, the leading city of more than 50,000 inhabitants for its share of students, voted 29.8% for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, against 40.5% in Lille, which ranks third.

In Paris, the gap between arrondissements sums up all these results: he won 9.0% in the 16th and 9.7% in the 7th, against 46.5% in the 19th and 47.2% in the 20th. Across the Paris conurbation, his vote traces a continuous arc from north to south-east, from Argenteuil to Montreuil by way of Saint-Denis.



Source : ministère de l'Intérieur, premier tour 2022 ; calculs Le Millénaire.

Figure 34. *The Mélenchon vote in the first round of 2022 in the twenty arrondissements of Paris.*



Sources : ministère de l'Intérieur, résultats par commune ; fonds de carte france-geojson. Calculs Le Millénaire. Paris est représenté comme une seule commune.

Figure 35. *The Mélenchon vote in the first round of 2022 in the Paris conurbation, by commune.*

The geography of youth explains part of these results. 18-24 year-olds make up 11.0% of the population in Paris, 10.9% in Haute-Garonne, 10.8% in the Rhône, 10.2% in Meurthe-et-Moselle and 9.8% in the Nord, against less than 6% in most of the rural departments of the Centre and the South-West. They therefore live mainly where Jean-Luc Mélenchon already comes first. Conversely,

young people in rural and peri-urban departments, fewer in number but present everywhere, live in areas where Marine Le Pen comes out on top.



Figure 36. *Share of 18-24 year-olds in the population, by department.*

This geography has a consequence that the national totals conceal. Between 2017 and 2022, Jean-Luc Mélenchon gained 650,000 votes, but the number of communes where he came first fell (3,396 in 2017, 2,792 in 2022), whereas Marine Le Pen came first in more than 20,000 communes. On the other hand, he came first in 154 of the 318 towns and arrondissements of more than 30,000 inhabitants, ahead of Emmanuel Macron (126) and Marine Le Pen (38).

Fifty communes and arrondissements thus provide 15.3% of his votes for 9.9% of the votes cast, and two hundred provide 31%. No major candidate has such a concentrated electorate.

The overseas territories

The overseas territories are a case apart. In 2022, Jean-Luc Mélenchon won 56.2% there in Guadeloupe, 53.1% in Martinique, 50.6% in French Guiana and 40.3% in La Réunion. These four territories thus gave him nearly 300,000 votes, with abstention of between 46% and 64%. Yet, according to Insee, a third of registered voters there are systematic abstainers, which makes this both his largest theoretical reserve and the hardest one to mobilise. Jérôme Fourquet estimates for the Fondation Jean-Jaurès that higher turnout would bring him around 13,000 votes in French Guiana, 27,000 in Guadeloupe, 24,000 in Martinique and 31,000 in La Réunion, nearly 95,000 votes in total, on the assumption that new voters would behave like those of 2022 (Fondation Jean-Jaurès, 12 June 2026).

The Front de gauche electorate of 2012 was found in working-class France, in the countryside as well as in the cities, whereas that of La France insoumise in 2022 and 2024 is found in the large cities, their working-class suburbs and their student districts.

On the one hand, this shift is an asset, because these areas are young, growing and still under-mobilised. On the other hand, it comes at the price of losing peripheral France, which in 2012 gave him a broader and more heterogeneous base. Yet when you want to win a second round, you must win votes throughout the country, and therefore in an electorate that is necessarily more diverse than that of La France insoumise. Jean-Luc Mélenchon is today very strong in one third of the country and weak in the other two, and this situation currently prevents him from claiming a majority, and therefore the Élysée.

The analysis of the 35,000 communes therefore confirms the opinion surveys, while refining them. The vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon is that of the large cities, of low-income areas and of highly educated areas, and since 2017 it has grown only where it was already strong.

Take the example of first-time voters. Those in university towns and working-class suburbs live in communes where he already wins between 35% and 60%, whereas those in small towns and the countryside, just as numerous, live in communes where he peaks at 16%. Moreover, his two territorial reserves (abstainers in the working-class neighbourhoods and young people in the big cities) largely correspond to the same voters and together weigh around one point. As for the electorate of the highly educated big cities, which had taken him from 19.6% to 22% in 2022, it moved to Raphaël Glucksmann in 2024. It is therefore among this electorate that the rest of the campaign will be decided.

HOW HIGH CAN HE RISE AND CAN HE QUALIFY?

A STABLE BASE BENEATH A HIGH CEILING

A ceiling measured by four polling institutes

The rejection that Jean-Luc Mélenchon provokes is unmatched in scale. To measure it, Cluster17 asks registered voters to rate from 0 to 10 the likelihood that they will one day vote for each figure. In October 2026, 62.5% gave Jean-Luc Mélenchon a score of zero and 14.2% the maximum score. If we add those who say they rule out such a vote, 69% of registered voters exclude him, against 52% for Marine Le Pen and Raphaël Glucksmann[20]. His potential, measured by scores of 6 to 10, stands at 22.5%. That of Raphaël Glucksmann is at the same level (22.2%), but it is distributed differently, with few committed voters and many possible ones.



Figure 37. *Share of registered voters ruling out ever voting for each figure, October 2026.*

[20] Cluster17 for Politico, 19-22 October 2026, 2,817 registered voters, methodological notice of 26 October 2026.

The other polling institutes reach similar results. Toluna Harris Interactive measures a potential of 21% (scores of 7 to 10) against 72% of scores between 0 and 3, and Odoxa recorded 69% rejection in June 2026[21]. In the Ipsos bva-Cevipof survey, 71% of respondents rank his ideas among the most radical (7.6 out of 10).

This rejection carries over to the second round: in October 2026 Ifop measured him at 32% against Marine Le Pen, whereas Raphaël Glucksmann stood at 43% and Édouard Philippe at 44%[22]. Moreover, only 30% of Raphaël Glucksmann's voters would vote for him in this run-off according to Toluna Harris Interactive (9% for Marine Le Pen, 61% abstention or blank vote).



Figure 38. *Second-round voting intentions against Marine Le Pen, October 2026.*

[21] Odoxa-Mascaret, political barometer of June 2026, cited by Public Sénat on 30 June 2026.

[22] Ifop-Fiducial for LCI, Le Figaro and Sud Radio, presidential election barometer, wave 7, 17-19 October 2026, 1,928 registered voters.

A base that does not move when the field changes

The solidity of his electorate can be measured from a figure that the polling institutes publish without comment. Within a single survey, the same people answer the four or five candidacy scenarios. If a candidate's score varies little when competitors are added or removed, it means that his voters are not looking elsewhere.



Source : seize enquêtes d'intentions de vote à plusieurs hypothèses réalisées entre le 15 octobre et le 19 novembre 2026 ; calculs Le Millénaire.

Figure 39. *Average gap between a candidate's highest and lowest score within the same survey, sixteen multi-scenario surveys conducted between 15 October and 19 November 2026.*

Across the sixteen multi-scenario surveys conducted between mid-October and 19 November, the average gap between Jean-Luc Mélenchon's best and worst score is 1.7 points, against 2.4 points for Marine Le Pen and 3.0 points for Raphaël Glucksmann. His score thus ranges between 17% and 18.5% across the six scenarios of the Elabe survey of 12 and 13 November, and does not vary at all in Ipsos's October survey.

His score therefore depends little on the identity of his opponents: a reunited central bloc does not lower it, and the withdrawal of the other left-wing candidates brings him only 1.5 to 3.5 points according to Ifop.

A RESERVE OF 3 TO 5 POINTS IN THE NON-LFI LEFT

A pool of 17.5 points

In the polls published since 1 October, Raphaël Glucksmann has averaged 12.6%, Marine Tondelier 2.9% and Fabien Roussel 2.0%, giving 17.5 points for the non-LFI left. Yannick Jadot, Anne Hidalgo and Fabien Roussel totalled only 8.66% of the votes cast in April 2022. This total exceeded 19 points in the spring and stands at an average of 16.2 points across the eight November surveys, while Jean-Luc Mélenchon reaches 18.1%.

Le réservoir de la gauche non insoumise et la courbe de Jean-Luc Mélenchon, 2026



Moyennes mensuelles des hypothèses de premier tour testant Raphaël Glucksmann, une valeur par enquête. Sources : notices des instituts, listes de sondages de Wikipédia au 25 novembre 2026 ; calculs Le Millénaire.

Figure 40. *Combined voting intentions for Raphaël Glucksmann, Marine Tondelier and Fabien Roussel, and voting intentions for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, monthly averages for 2026.*

These voters live in the highly educated big cities and in the West. Yannick Jadot, Anne Hidalgo and Fabien Roussel exceeded 11% in 2022 in Loire-Atlantique, Ille-et-Vilaine, Paris and Finistère, and Raphaël Glucksmann's list came ahead of that of La France insoumise in 2024 in Paris, Rennes, Nantes, Bordeaux, Lyon and Toulouse, where Jean-Luc Mélenchon had gained 6 to 10 points between 2017 and 2022.

Part of this pool is made up of his own 2022 voters, since 30% of them now vote for another left-wing candidate in the Ipsos bva-Cevipof survey (see Part II). Applied to the 7.7 million votes of 2022, these 30% represent around 2.3 million voters, of whom just over 2 million would vote again in 2027, or 5.4 points of the votes cast.

According to our calculation, nearly 30% of Raphaël Glucksmann's voting intentions thus come from former Jean-Luc Mélenchon voters, or 3.3 points out of 11.5 in the September survey. These voters have already voted for him once, many of them tactically, since Yannick Jadot and Anne Hidalgo had no prospect of qualifying in 2022.

In addition, 9% of his former voters say they will vote for Marine Le Pen, around 600,000 votes and 1.6 points, just as 17% of his voters had voted for her in the second round of 2022.

Table 22. *Where the 2022 voters have gone: conversion into votes and points*

Destination in September 2026	Share of 2022 voters	Votes (estimate)	Points of votes cast (estimate)
Jean-Luc Mélenchon	53%	3.6 M	9.7
Raphaël Glucksmann	18%	1.2 M	3.3
Marine Le Pen	9%	0.6 M	1.6
Marine Tondelier	7%	0.5 M	1.3
Fabien Roussel	5%	0.3 M	0.9
Central bloc and others	8%	0.5 M	1.5

Source: Ipsos bva-Cevipof, Enquête électorale 2026, wave 3; Le Millénaire conversion based on 6.85 million 2022 voters voting again and 37.6 million votes cast. According to Toluna Harris Interactive, the share remaining loyal would be 83% and the share that has moved to Raphaël Glucksmann 6%.

Who are the left-wing voters who do not vote for him

The voters of the other left-wing candidates do not form a homogeneous bloc: they differ by age, by their opinion of Jean-Luc Mélenchon and by what they would do in the second round.

Raphaël Glucksmann's voters are, first of all, older. The social democratic candidate wins 4% among 18-24 year-olds, 7% among 25-34 year-olds, 13% among 50-69 year-olds and 16% among those aged 70 and over in the September Ipsos survey, the reverse of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's profile. They are also the voters most distant from the leader of La France insoumise. Only 9% of Parti socialiste sympathisers name him among the best possible presidents, and 8% would say they were satisfied with his election according to the April 2026 electoral survey. In the second round, 26% to 30% of Raphaël Glucksmann's voters would vote for him against Marine Le Pen, 9% to 14% for her, and 60% to 63% express no preference.

The voters of Marine Tondelier and Fabien Roussel are closer to him. Marine Tondelier achieves her best score among 18-24 year-olds (7%), and 34% of ecologist sympathisers name Jean-Luc Mélenchon among the best possible presidents, against 9% of Parti socialiste sympathisers. Together these two electorates weigh between 4 and 6 points. In 2022, Fabien Roussel won 802,422 votes, nearly double the 421,308 votes that Jean-Luc Mélenchon lacked to qualify.

Table 23. *The electorates of the non-LFI left*

Electorate	Level in November 2026	Age profile	Relationship to Jean-Luc Mélenchon	In the second round against Le Pen
Raphaël Glucksmann	11% to 13%	Older: 16% among those aged 70 and over, 4% among 18-24 year-olds	Distant: 9% of PS sympathisers name him among the best presidents	26% to 30% for him, 9% to 14% for Le Pen
Marine Tondelier	2% to 5%	Young: 7% among 18-24 year-olds	Close: 34% of ecologist sympathisers name him	n/a
Fabien Roussel	2% to 3%	Older	Divided	n/a

Sources: Ipsos bva-Cevipof, wave 3 (September 2026); Fractures françaises 2026; Toluna Harris Interactive (August and October 2026) and OpinionWay (October 2026) for the second round. n/a: not available.

Nouveau Front populaire voters: a reserve of 3 to 4 points

In the 2024 legislative elections, the Nouveau Front populaire candidates won 27.99% of the votes cast in the first round according to the Ministry of the Interior, nearly 9 million votes. According to OpinionWay in October, these voters are now divided between Jean-Luc Mélenchon (41%), Raphaël Glucksmann (35%), Marine Le Pen (7%), and Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal (3% each).

According to OpinionWay, 62% of these voters would vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon in a run-off against Marine Le Pen, 10% for her (just under a million votes) and 28% express no preference. If they all rallied to him, he would gain 3 to 4 points in the second round.

TACTICAL VOTING MORE UNCERTAIN THAN IN 2022

What happened in 2022

Tactical voting rests on a simple calculation, in which voters ask themselves whether their preferred candidate can qualify. In 2022, the answer was obvious for the voters of Yannick Jadot and Anne Hidalgo, who were below 5% in the final polls, whereas Jean-Luc Mélenchon was at 17% and within reach of the second round. The movement was therefore massive and late: according to the Fondation Jean-Jaurès, out of 100 eventual Jean-Luc Mélenchon voters, only 62 intended to vote for him two and a half weeks before the election, 19 were considering another left-wing candidate and 7 were thinking of abstaining.

The gap of 4.2 points between the last four surveys and the result (see Part I) shows that the concentration of the left-wing vote continued in the final days, after polling fieldwork had ended.

The two previous campaigns give an order of magnitude of what tactical voting can bring. Five months before the 2017 election, the other left-wing candidates totalled 13.7% in the polls and they ended at 8.1%.

Likewise, they totalled 19.1% in November 2021 and ended at 10.0% in 2022. In both cases, the non-LFI left therefore lost between 41% and 48% of its level in five months, or 5.6 to 9.1 points.



Figure 41. *Voting intentions for Jean-Luc Mélenchon and for the other left-wing candidates five months before the first round and at the result, 2017, 2022 and 2027.*

As we saw in Part I, Jean-Luc Mélenchon gained 12.8 points over the same period in 2022, so he captured more than the other left-wing candidates lost, the rest coming from abstainers and undecided voters. In November 2026, the other left-wing candidates total an average of 16.2 points in the eight published surveys, between 14 and 18 depending on the institute. If the 2017 and 2022 scenario were repeated, 7 to 8 points would be freed up. If he captured half of them, he would reach 21% to 22%; two thirds, 23%; all of them, 25% to 26%. The Forecast, at 24.3%, sits at the top of this range, and our scenarios C and D in its central part.

This margin, however, assumes that Raphaël Glucksmann falls away. In 2017 and 2022, the socialist and ecologist candidates were below 10% going into the final stretch, whereas Raphaël Glucksmann is now at 11-13%. The first tactical vote of the campaign will therefore turn on the question of which of the two candidates is better placed to reach the second round.

Why 2027 is not 2022

Raphaël Glucksmann averages 12.6%, where Yannick Jadot finished below 5%, and he won the socialist primary on 11 October. He is one point from third place and five points from second, so tactical voting may work for him as much as for Jean-Luc Mélenchon.

In 2022, the likely second round pitted Emmanuel Macron against Marine Le Pen, and voting for Jean-Luc Mélenchon meant trying to put the left into it. In 2027, Marine Le Pen is expected to top the first round, and second-round surveys give Jean-Luc Mélenchon 32% against 43% for Raphaël Glucksmann. Yet 41% of voters cite among their motivations their candidate's ability to beat her in the second round, according to Toluna Harris Interactive.

According to Cluster17, voters hesitate first between La France insoumise and the ecologists, then between the ecologists and the Parti socialiste, and rejection becomes massive beyond the border between the two lefts[23]. The social-ecologist left pool represents 17% of the electorate, with an exclusive core of only 3%, and Raphaël Glucksmann wins only around 41% of intentions within it. In the second round, 61% of his voters would abstain or vote blank rather than choose between Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen.

Finally, the non-LFI left has not yet settled the question of its candidacies. On 9 July 2026, socialist members chose by 55.5% to designate their candidate within the “pôle socialiste” (socialist pole) alone, against 44.5% for the open primary championed by Olivier Faure, and the ecologists announced that they would not support a candidate chosen by any process other than a primary (LCP, 10 July 2026). In the scenario tested by Ifop in October in which Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Raphaël Glucksmann would be the only left-wing candidates, the former wins 18% and the latter 16%, and he reaches 20% against François Hollande alone. The withdrawal of the ecologist and

[23] Jean-Yves Dormagen, « Les cinq électorats de la présidentielle » (The five electorates of the presidential election), Cluster17 and Terra Nova, La Grande Conversation, 4 September 2026.

communist candidacies would therefore benefit him by 1.5 to 3.5 points, but it would benefit his rival just as much.

We measured the effect of tactical voting in two ways. The first applies the rules of Le Millénaire's Forecast, calibrated on 2022. When a candidate trails qualification by more than three to five points, around 45% of their electorate transfers, of which 85% goes to the leading candidate of the left in the case of the social democratic electorate, and all of it in the case of the ecologist and communist electorates. Applied to current levels, this rule would bring Jean-Luc Mélenchon around 7 points if Raphaël Glucksmann fell away, which is not the case in the November polls.

The second, which we use for the scenarios, starts from the 30% of 2022 voters who have now moved to another left-wing candidate and estimates the share that would return to him, since these voters have already made that choice once.

A LIMITED ABSTENTION RESERVE

The abstention reserve: real, but limited

The thesis of a reserve of votes among abstainers in working-class neighbourhoods can be quantified. In 2022, 1,487 communes and arrondissements voted more than 30% for Jean-Luc Mélenchon. They had 8.5 million registered voters and abstention of 31.5%, against 24.7% across the whole area studied. If abstention there were brought down to the national average, and if new voters split like their neighbours, he would gain around 300,000 votes. If it fell to 15%, a level never observed in these areas, he would gain around 615,000.

Table 24. *The abstention reserve in the most favourable communes*

Communes	Number	Registered voters	Abstention 2022	Mélenchon votes 2022	Gain if abstention at the average	Gain if abstention at 15%
Mélenchon vote above 30%	1,487	8.50 M	31.5%	2.28 M	+300,000	+615,000
of which vote above 40%	475	3.70 M	37.2%	1.09 M	+242,000	+413,000

Le Millénaire calculation: additional abstainers vote like the voters of their commune. Sources: Ministry of the Interior.

This reserve is real and concentrated (the 475 communes where he exceeds 40% account for two thirds of it), but it is counted in hundreds of thousands of votes, less than one point, and it largely overlaps with the youth reserve, since these are the same areas.



Figure 42. *Abstention in the first round of 2022, by commune.*

Abstainers and the fear of Le Pen

The abstainers of 2024 are not a reserve for him at this stage: those who express a first-round voting intention choose Marine Le Pen (25%) ahead of Jean-Luc Mélenchon (15%), and 39% express no preference according to OpinionWay. In the second round, 18% would vote for him, 30% for her, and 52% express no preference.

The fear of seeing Marine Le Pen win may change this situation, but history shows that it mobilises only under certain conditions. In 2002, turnout rose from 71.6% in the first round to 79.7% in the second. In the 2015 regional elections, it gained 6.4 points in Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie, 8.4 points in Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur and 11.1 points in Alsace-Champagne-Ardenne-Lorraine, and it reached 66.7% in the 2024 legislative elections,

against 47.5% in 2022. Conversely, turnout fell between the two rounds of the 2017 and 2022 presidential elections, from 77.8% to 74.6% and then from 73.7% to 72.0%. Fear of the far right therefore mobilises when it appears able to win and when its opponent is judged acceptable by the voters it brings out.

In 2027, Marine Le Pen is the favourite, but Jean-Luc Mélenchon does not appear to the voters concerned as an acceptable opponent. According to Cluster17, 43% of French people have as their priority preventing a camp dominated by La France insoumise from winning, against 30% who above all want to stop the Rassemblement national and 14% the central camp, so the fear that mobilises most in 2027 is directed at La France insoumise. His abstention reserve therefore lies first and foremost in his own electorate, among young people and in working-class neighbourhoods, as we showed above, and not in an electorate that fear of the Rassemblement national would bring out to vote for him.

ONE MILLION VOTES FROM THE RENEWAL OF THE ELECTORATE

Four million new voters

The electorate is renewed every year with the arrival of young people turning 18 and the departure of deceased voters. According to Insee, France had 50,187,093 registered voters in February 2026 (excluding New Caledonia), against 48,803,175 at the 2022 presidential election[24]. Moreover, between May 2024 and February 2026, a period of twenty-one months, 1,476,369 young people were automatically registered on reaching voting age, while 974,029 voters were removed from the rolls owing to death.

Table 25. *Flows in the electorate between the two presidential elections*

Indicator	Value	Status
Registered voters at the 2022 presidential election	48,803,175	Published (Insee)
Registered voters in February 2026	50,187,093	Published (Insee)
Net increase between 2022 and 2026	+1,383,918	Calculated
Young people automatically registered, May 2024-February 2026	1,476,369	Published (Insee)
Removals owing to death, May 2024-February 2026	974,029	Published (Insee)
First-time voters in 2027 (rate of automatic registrations)	around 4.2 million	Extrapolated over five years
First-time voters in 2027 (cohorts born April 2004 to April 2009)	4.22 million residents	Calculated (Eurostat)
Voters deceased between the two elections (removals)	around 2.8 million	Extrapolated over five years
Deaths of people aged 18 and over, five years	around 3.2 million residents	Calculated (Eurostat)
Registered voters aged 18 to 24, February 2026	5,427,080	Published (Insee)

Sources: Insee, Focus no. 378; Eurostat, population by age on 1 January 2025 and deaths by age 2022-2024. Extrapolations and Le Millénaire calculations.

We estimated in two ways the number of first-time voters in 2027, that is, voters who were not yet 18 on 10 April 2022 and who will be by 18 April 2027. On the one hand, extending the rate

[24] Insee, « Corps électoral 2026 » (The 2026 electorate), Insee Focus no. 378, data as of 11 February 2026.

of automatic registrations over five years gives around 4.2 million. On the other hand, counting the cohorts concerned gives 4.22 million people born between April 2004 and April 2009 and resident in France on 1 January 2025 according to Eurostat. Not all of them are French, but the two methods converge, and the frequently cited figure of four million is therefore accurate.

The figure of 1.38 million, often presented as the balance of new voters “net of deaths and removals”, does not measure the same thing. It corresponds to the net increase in the number of registered voters between the 2022 presidential election and February 2026, all ages combined (automatic registrations, 4.1 million voluntary registrations, 85,000 acquisitions of nationality, minus deaths and administrative removals). This figure therefore counts additional voters and says nothing about how they vote.

Around 2.8 million voters will have been removed from the rolls owing to death between the two presidential elections. Of these, 79% of adult deaths concern people aged 70 and over and 12% people aged 60 to 69, according to Eurostat data. Yet these generations voted little for Jean-Luc Mélenchon: 9% among those aged 70 and over and 17% among 60-69 year-olds in 2022. By applying to each age group its 2022 turnout and vote, we estimate at around 270,000 the number of his 2022 voters who have died since. These are, moreover, the categories in which he was least able to retain his 2022 electoral base.

Generational replacement thus works doubly in his favour, since new entrants vote for him four to ten times more than those leaving. However, it remains to be seen what share of these new entrants will actually turn out to vote.

Youth turnout: lower than in 2007, higher than often claimed

Two measures of youth turnout are in circulation, and they do not say the same thing. Polls conducted on election day estimated abstention among 18-24 year-olds at 42% in the first round of 2022, a turnout of 58%. Insee, which works from the signed voting registers rather than from declarations,

measures a first-round turnout of 67.2% among registered voters aged 18 to 29, against 77.9% across its whole scope[25]. We use the Insee measure, which is more robust.

La participation au premier tour de la présidentielle selon l'âge, 2002-2022



Source : Insee, enquêtes sur la participation électorale (listes d'émargement), Insee Première n° 1929. Champ : inscrits résidant en France.

Figure 43. *Turnout in the first round of the presidential election by age, 2002-2022.*

The Insee series shows first of all that young people vote in the presidential election: three out of four registered 18-24 year-olds (74.8%) voted in at least one of the two rounds of 2022, against one in three in the legislative elections that followed[26]. It also shows that this turnout is declining, from 82.1% in 2007 to 73.8% in 2012, 71.4% in 2017 and 67.2% in 2022, and that the gap with 30-64 year-olds widened over the same period, from 7 points in 2007 to 14.5 points in 2022.

Above all, this is intermittent voting. Among 18-24 year-olds, only 16.4% voted in every round of 2022, 59.8% in some rounds and 23.8% in none. Nor are these young people homogeneous at the ballot box, since systematic abstention reaches 50.3% among 18-29 year-olds without qualifications in

[25] Insee, « Vingt ans de participation électorale : en 2022, les écarts selon l'âge et le diplôme continuent de se creuser » (Twenty years of electoral turnout: in 2022, gaps by age and qualification continue to widen), Insee Première no. 1929, November 2022. Scope: registered voters resident in France. Official turnout, calculated on all registered voters, is 73.69%.

[26] Kilian Bloch, « Élections présidentielle et législatives de 2022 : seul un tiers des électeurs a voté à tous les tours » (2022 presidential and legislative elections: only a third of voters voted in every round), Insee Première no. 1928, November 2022.

2022 (compared with 32.3% in 2002) and 17.0% among graduates of higher education of the same age, a gap that has grown by half in twenty years.



Figure 44. *Systematic abstention among 18-29 year-olds by educational attainment, 2002 and 2022.*

Moreover, 84% of 18-24 year-olds say they intend to vote in the presidential election according to OpinionWay, but 54% have not made up their minds and 25% say they are poorly informed to make an informed choice, compared with 14% of the population as a whole[27].

Counting the votes

The table below crosses four turnout hypotheses, from the lowest measurement up to a return to the 2007 level, with three voting hypotheses, from the 2022 level up to a majority vote in his favour.

[27] OpinionWay for the social network Epsilon, published on 20 October 2026, cited by The Media Leader and AFP. The fieldwork dates and sample size are not specified in the article; the commissioning party is a platform that uses the survey to promote itself.



Figure 45. *Votes brought to Jean-Luc Mélenchon by 4.2 million first-time voters, according to their turnout and the share of their vote.*

With the behaviour measured today, that is a turnout of 67% and a vote share of 42%, first-time voters bring him around 1.16 million votes. On the hypothesis of a turnout of 65% to 70% and a vote share of 50%, they would bring him 1.3 to 1.4 million, which matches a simple calculation (four million first-time voters, two in three of whom vote, one in two for him), which is therefore arithmetically correct. Conversely, the behaviour of 2022 would yield only 0.74 million votes. In every case, the roughly 270,000 voters of 2022 who have since died must be deducted. The net effect of electoral renewal therefore lies between 0.5 and 1.2 million votes, and around 0.9 million in the central hypothesis.

Table 26. *The net effect of electoral renewal for Jean-Luc Mélenchon*

Effect	Low hypothesis	Central hypothesis	High hypothesis
Turnout of first-time voters	58%	67%	70%
Mélenchon vote share	31%	42%	50%
Votes brought by first-time voters	0.74 M	1.16 M	1.44 M
Votes lost through deaths	−0.27 M	−0.27 M	−0.27 M
Net effect of renewal	+0.47 M	+0.89 M	+1.17 M

Le Millénaire calculation based on 4.2 million first-time voters and 2.3% blank and spoilt ballots. Sources: Insee, Eurostat, Ipsos-Sopra Steria 2022, Ipsos bva-Cevipof 2026.

Why this million is not automatically added to the 7.7 million of 2022

The renewal of the electorate therefore brings him in the order of one million votes. It would be tempting to add them to the 7.7 million of 2022 to reach 8.7 million, then to count on campaign momentum to reach 9 or 10 million, but this calculation does not hold, for two reasons.

First, this addition assumes that all his 2022 voters vote for him again, whereas we have seen that a large share of them, nearly half according to Ipsos, around a quarter according to Toluna Harris Interactive, has left his electorate. Second, it forgets that first-time voters are surveyed by the polling institutes like all other registered voters, so that Jean-Luc Mélenchon's current 18% already includes his 42% among 18-24 year-olds.

We have reconstructed the breakdown of his votes from the September Ipsos survey. For a turnout of 76%, his 15.5% represents around 5.8 million votes, which break down, in orders of magnitude, into 3.6 million 2022 voters who have remained loyal, 1.1 to 1.2 million first-time voters and around one million voters from elsewhere (mostly 2022 abstainers and young people already registered).

Table 27. *Where Jean-Luc Mélenchon's votes come from in September 2026 (orders of magnitude)*

Component	Calculation	Votes
2022 voters	7.71 M	
Deceased since 2022		−0.27 M
2022 voters who would vote in 2027	92% of survivors	6.85 M
of whom loyal to Jean-Luc Mélenchon	53% (Ipsos)	3.6 M
First-time voters	4.2 M × 67% × 42%	1.2 M
Other voters (2022 abstainers, other electorates)	by difference	1.0 M
Total corresponding to 15.5% of votes cast	turnout of 76%	5.8 M

Le Millénaire calculation based on Ipsos bva-Cevipof (September 2026), Insee and Eurostat. The share of 2022 voters who vote again (92%) is an assumption.

This breakdown makes it possible to locate his reserve, since first-time voters already account for more than one million votes in it, and what he lacks to recover his 2022 level lies with the 3.2 million 2022 voters who now vote for another candidate.

Our analysis

The calculation that adds first-time voters to his 2022 score therefore rests on sound premises, since there are indeed four million first-time voters and they vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon at 42% (and not 50%), which represents more than one million votes. It is wrong, however, about the addition, because this million votes offsets a loss instead of adding to an existing base. Indeed, without first-time voters, Jean-Luc Mélenchon would lose around three points and would today be closer to 15% than to 18%. Young people have already had their effect, and knowing whether they can have more requires understanding why they vote for him.

THE FORECAST'S FAVOURITE FOR QUALIFICATION

A shift in November

Le Millénaire's Forecast is a probabilistic model. It combines a weighted average of the polls, corrected for the errors observed in previous presidential elections, with the electoral history of the last three national elections. Our software then simulates the first and second rounds 20,000 times, incorporating uncertainty and tactical voting. It therefore does not say with certainty who will win, but it measures the probability that each candidate will win, given what is known today[28].

Le Forecast du Millénaire depuis octobre 2025 (hypothèse « Philippe seul »)



Source : Forecast du Millénaire, tirage quotidien du 25 novembre 2026 (20 000 simulations). Série recalculée par le modèle à chaque date de fin de terrain. Sur 100.

Figure 46. *Chances of reaching the second round and of being elected for Marine Le Pen, Édouard Philippe and Jean-Luc Mélenchon since October 2025, "Philippe alone" hypothesis.*

We launched the model in August 2025. In October 2025, Jean-Luc Mélenchon had, in the history recalculated by the model, 51 chances in 100 of reaching the second round and 9 in 100 of being elected, compared with 57 and 42 for Édouard Philippe, and this order remained the same, give or take a few days at the end of September and in mid-October, before reversing on 10 November 2026. In the weekly edition of 4 November, Jean-Luc Mélenchon had already overtaken Édouard Philippe for qualification (53.7 against 52.4), and the gap

[28] The full methodology is published at forecast.lemillenaire.org. Two of the four planned components, the structural component and the event component, are not yet active; their weight is transferred to the polls and the electoral history.

widened in the daily edition of 25 November (77.8 against 28.5), with Marine Le Pen remaining the favourite of the election with 93.8 chances in 100 of reaching the second round and 64.5 of being elected. However, in this hypothesis, the Elabe survey of 13 November alone carries 59% of the weight of the polls in the model's average.

Raphaël Glucksmann has lost part of the effect of his primary

Raphaël Glucksmann won the Socialist primary on 11 October and gained around four points in the polls in the following ten days. He was polling 9.4% on average in the fifteen surveys published between 1 September and 10 October, then 13.4% in the ten surveys conducted between 11 and 23 October. However, the nine surveys published since 24 October give him only 11.2% on average.

Table 28. *Raphaël Glucksmann before and after the primary, institute by institute*

Institute	Last survey before the primary	Best survey after the primary	Latest published survey	Share of the gain lost
Cluster17	11.2% (16 September)	13.7% (15 October)	11.2% (10 November)	100%
OpinionWay	6.3% (10 September)	14.2% (14 October)	10.5% (12 November)	47%
Elabe	9.8% (28 August)	15.8% (16 October)	13.1% (13 November)	45%
Ifop	6.3% (29 September)	13.8% (14 October)	10.0% (16 November)	51%
Toluna Harris Interactive	9.0% (8 October)	12.8% (21 October)	11.0% (19 November)	47%
All surveys	9.4%	13.4%	11.2%	54%

Sources: Wikipedia poll lists as of 25 November 2026; one value per survey (average of the hypotheses in which he is tested). The candidates tested vary from one survey to another. Le Millénaire calculations.

Raphaël Glucksmann has therefore lost, in one month, 54% of the gain from his primary on average, all of it at Cluster17 and 45% at Elabe. He nevertheless remains nearly two points above his September level. As for the gap with Jean-Luc Mélenchon, it has gone from 3.3 points just after the primary (16.7% against 13.4%) to 6.9 points in November (18.1% against 11.2%).

The centre and the right fragment while the executive weakens

The combined total of the centre and the governing right remains roughly stable in the polls, going from 27.8% in July to 26.3% in November, with a low point of 23.7% in October. However, this total is spread across more candidates, so that the leading one among them falls from 17.0% to 11.6% over the same period. Édouard Philippe, who polled 20.4% in March and 18.2% in July, obtains only 11.6% in November, and his share of the bloc's total falls from 74% in March to 45% in November.

Table 29. *The centre and the governing right in the polls, March-November 2026*

Month	Bloc total	Effective number of candidates	Édouard Philippe	Gabriel Attal	Bruno Retailleau	David Lisnard	Édouard Philippe's share of the bloc
March	26.8%	1.8	20.4%	12.2%	9.4%	Not tested	74%
July	27.8%	2.0	18.2%	12.3%	8.7%	Not tested	64%
September	27.1%	2.2	16.8%	10.5%	8.1%	Not tested	60%
October	23.7%	2.3	14.6%	8.8%	7.5%	6.7%	59%
November	26.3%	2.9	11.6%	6.7%	5.4%	9.9%	45%

Sources: Wikipedia poll lists as of 25 November 2026; monthly averages, one value per survey, each candidate being measured in the hypotheses in which he is tested. Le Millénaire calculations.

We are therefore witnessing a twofold movement. On the one hand, the candidate who was supposed to take second place faces competition within his own bloc, since David Lisnard, tested since October, reaches 9.9% on average in November and is half a point behind Édouard Philippe in the OpinionWay survey of 10 November (11% against 11.5%), then ahead of him in the Toluna Harris Interactive survey of 18-19 November (11% against 9.5%). On the other hand, the effective number of candidates in the bloc rises from 2.0 in July to 2.9 in November, which means that its voters are now spread as if they had almost three candidates of equal weight. Thus,

fragmentation costs the bloc's leading candidate 5.4 points between July and November, whereas the fall in the total accounts for only 1.6.

According to the Elabe barometer for Les Échos, confidence in Emmanuel Macron fell from 24% in August to 17% in October, then to 13% in November, the lowest level ever measured by this institute. The Prime Minister is also losing ground, since 19% of French people rate Sébastien Lecornu's performance favourably in November according to Ipsos BVA for La Tribune Dimanche, compared with 22% in October, whereas Odoxa measured 35% saying he was a “good Prime Minister” in March and 31% in May.

Table 30. *The popularity of the executive in 2026*

Barometer	Question	Emmanuel Macron	Sébastien Lecornu
Odoxa-Mascaret (Public Sénat)	“Good president”, “good Prime Minister”	25% in March, 23% in May	35% in March, 31% in May
Elabe (Les Échos)	Confidence	24% in August, 17% in October, 13% in November	n/a
Ifop-Endrix (L'Opinion)	Satisfied	17% in September and in October	24% in September, 25% in October
Ipsos BVA (La Tribune Dimanche)	Favourable opinion of performance	15% in October, 14% in November	22% in October, 19% in November

Sources: Public Sénat (28 April and 26 May 2026); Ifop (19 October 2026); Quartz, based on Elabe and Ipsos BVA (15 November 2026). The questions differ from one institute to another and the levels are not comparable with each other. n/a: not available.

The Forecast records the same movement, since Édouard Philippe's chances of qualification fell from 52.4 in 100 on 4 November to 28.5 on 25 November. Yet, as we pointed out on Franceinfo on 1 July, the primary motivation of right-wing and centrist voters is their candidate's ability to prevent a second round between the two extremes. When the executive weakens and the candidate who carries its legacy falls in the polls, this argument turns against him, and his voters scatter towards David Lisnard and Bruno Retailleau.

His chances depending on the field of candidates

The Forecast calculates his probabilities for each of the ten candidacy hypotheses selected on 25 November. Jean-Luc Mélenchon has better than an even chance of qualifying in all ten.



Figure 47. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon's chances of reaching the second round according to the candidacy hypothesis, with his projected first-round score and his chances of being elected.*

Table 31. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the Forecast depending on the field of candidates*

Hypothesis	Projected first-round score	Chances of reaching the second round	Chances of being elected
Lagarde alone	26.0%	82.0	21.6
Attal alone	24.3%	81.8	14.7
Attal and Philippe	23.5%	79.1	17.6
Philippe alone	24.3%	77.8	17.2
Lisnard, sole candidate	25.7%	72.9	15.2
Retailleau, sole candidate	25.9%	72.7	14.5
Attal, sole candidate	25.6%	69.7	15.0
Attal, Retailleau and Lisnard, without Tondelier	21.4%	68.8	11.2
Broad field (Attal, Philippe, Villepin, Lisnard, Ruffin)	19.7%	56.0	9.4
Philippe, sole candidate	25.3%	55.9	11.3

Source: Le Millénaire's Forecast, daily edition of 25 November 2026, 20,000 simulations. Chances in 100.

His lowest chances of qualification, around 56 in 100, correspond to a broad field (Gabriel Attal, Édouard Philippe, Dominique de Villepin, David Lisnard and François Ruffin) and to a single candidacy by Édouard Philippe for the centre and the right, who then himself obtains 52.9 chances in 100 of qualifying. In the edition of 4 November, his chances fell to around 30 in 100 in the event of a single candidacy of the non-LFI left behind Raphaël Glucksmann, and to 42 in 100 with a candidacy by Dominique de Villepin against Édouard Philippe. However, these two hypotheses are no longer among those calculated by the Forecast, the last survey testing a left united behind Raphaël Glucksmann being the Ifop survey of 19 October.

Five months before the first round, the political field has not settled. The central bloc still has several declared or expected candidates, and on the left Marine Tondelier and Fabien Roussel have not confirmed that they will stay in the race to the end. Yet the withdrawal of the Green and Communist candidacies would bring Jean-Luc Mélenchon 1.5 to 3.5 points according to Ifop, and his chances of qualification range from 56 to 82 in 100 depending on the field of candidates in the Forecast.

The executive's popularity weighs on the central bloc, and we have not yet established whether it recovers at the end of a presidential term (the Forecast will test this in its structural component). The dominant theme of the campaign may also change in the wake of a social, security or international crisis, which the Forecast does not yet incorporate.

POLLS THAT UNDERESTIMATE HIM

Declared turnout always underestimates actual turnout

First-round polls are based on registered voters who say they are certain to vote, or give them greater weight. The Cevipof electoral survey has asked the same question for three elections (a score from 0 to 10 on the intention to vote), and declared turnout in the autumn has always been lower than actual turnout.



Sources : Ipsos-Cevipof, Enquêtes électorales 2017 (vague 6), 2022 (vague 2) et 2026 (vague 3) ; ministère de l'Intérieur. 2027 : écart observé en 2017 et 2022 appliqué au niveau de 2026, calcul Le Millénaire.

Figure 48. *Share of registered voters certain to vote seven months before the first round, and actual turnout, 2017, 2022 and 2027.*

In September 2016, 67% of registered voters said they were certain to vote and turnout eventually reached 77.8%. In October 2021, the figure was 59% and turnout was 73.7%. Yet it stands at 67% in September 2026, the 2016 level and eight points higher than in 2021. The gap between the autumn measurement and the election has therefore been 11 to 15 points, which would give a turnout of 78 to 82% in 2027. Ipsos nevertheless points out that voting intention several months ahead is not predictive.

Table 32. *Declared turnout and actual turnout*

Election	Certain to vote (Cevipof, in the autumn)	Actual first-round turnout	Gap
2017	67% (September 2016)	77.8%	+10.8 points
2022	59% (October 2021)	73.7%	+14.7 points
2027	67% (September 2026)	78 to 82% if the gap recurs	+11 to +15 points

Sources: Ipsos-Cevipof, Enquêtes électorales 2017 (wave 6), 2022 (wave 2) and 2026 (wave 3); Ministry of the Interior; Le Millénaire calculation for 2027.

The other institutes do not ask the same question. In November, Ifop counts 96.7% of registered voters who are considering voting, of whom 78% are “absolutely certain”, while Toluna Harris Interactive measures 70% “absolutely certain” and Cluster17, which asks for a probability, finds only 56.6% at 100%. Yet only 16.4% of 18-24 year-olds vote in every round according to Insee, compared with 36.4% of all registered voters, and 7% of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's eventual voters were still thinking of abstaining two and a half weeks before the 2022 election according to the Fondation Jean-Jaurès.

Samples that contain few abstainers

The online panels used by the polling institutes also contain far fewer abstainers than reality. In the October Cluster17 survey, only 8.8% of respondents say they abstained or cast a blank or spoilt ballot in the first round of 2022, whereas abstention exceeded a quarter of registered voters. The institutes correct this bias by weighting their results on past votes, and these corrections carry considerable weight. In the same survey, voters for the LFI list in the 2024 European elections represent 15.9% of the raw sample and 10% after weighting. In the November Ifop survey, Nouveau Front populaire voters in the 2024 legislative elections represent 23.3% of the raw sample and 28.7% after weighting.

These corrections are legitimate, but they vary from one institute to another. They partly explain why the share of 2022 voters who have remained loyal to Jean-Luc Mélenchon varies from 53% at Ipsos to 83% at Toluna. They

also explain why, over the past month alone, the institutes place him between 15% and 22% depending on the hypotheses. Le Millénaire's Forecast smooths out these differences by combining all published surveys in a weighted average.

The real level: whom did the polls miss in 2017 and 2022?

On the eve of the election, first-round polls are generally accurate to within one or two points. However, their errors are not randomly distributed.



Sources : moyenne des sondages publiés la dernière semaine (21 en 2017, 29 en 2022, Wikipédia) ; ministère de l'Intérieur. Une valeur positive signifie que le candidat a été sous-estimé.

Figure 49. *Gap between the first-round result and the average of the polls of the final week, by candidate, 2017 and 2022.*

In 2017, the average of the 21 polls of the final week put Jean-Luc Mélenchon at 18.8% and he obtained 19.6%, while Marine Le Pen was overestimated by one point and Benoît Hamon by slightly more. The error was much larger in 2022, since the average of the 29 polls of the final week put him at 16.6% and the last four at 17.8%, whereas he obtained 21.95%, a gap of more than five points. In addition, Valérie Pécresse was overestimated by 3.8 points and Éric Zemmour by 2.4 points. Conversely, Marine Le Pen was measured to within less than one point.

The rule that emerges is that polls overestimate candidates who fall away in the final days and underestimate the one who benefits from the final consolidation of his camp. That candidate was Jean-Luc Mélenchon in

2022, but the institutes have since changed their weighting methods, and there is no guarantee that the error will recur in the same direction. That is why the Forecast does not add it to voting intentions and corrects the error at the level of the left bloc, as explained above, so as not to count the same phenomenon twice.

The institutes' turnout estimates call for the same caution. In 2017, those that published an estimate of abstention put it at 31% on average over the final month, whereas it was 22.2%.

A THRESHOLD OF 21 TO 24% TO REACH

The qualification threshold: 17% in the polls, 21 to 24% at the ballot box

In the autumn polls, the second-placed candidate obtains around 17% and the third around 14%. One has to go back to 2002 to find such a low threshold, when 16.86% was enough for Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Le seuil de qualification pour le second tour, 2002-2026



Sources : Conseil constitutionnel ; pour 2026, moyenne des sondages (Mélenchon deuxième, Philippe troisième dans les hypothèses où il est testé). Calculs Le Millénaire.

Figure 50. *Scores of the second- and third-placed candidates in the first round of the presidential election, 2002-2022, and in the autumn 2026 polls.*

However, the November polls measure a field that is not yet settled. It took 21.30% to qualify in 2017 and 23.15% in 2022, and the Forecast puts the second-placed candidate at 24.3% and the third at 19.6% in the “Philippe alone” hypothesis. The real threshold will therefore more likely lie between 21% and 24%.

The number of votes cast depends on turnout: 36.6 million at 74% (the 2022 level), 39.6 million at 80% and 41.6 million at 84% (the 2007 level), for 50.6 million registered voters and 2.2% blank and spoilt ballots.

Combien de voix pour quel score : la table de conversion (en millions de voix)



Hypothèses : 50,6 millions d'inscrits, 2,2 % de blancs et nuls. En gras : 9 millions de voix et plus. Rappel 2022 : 73,7 % de participation, 21,95 %, 7,71 millions de voix. Calcul Le Millénaire.

Figure 51. *Number of votes corresponding to each score, according to turnout.*

Nine million votes therefore represent 24.6% of votes cast with a turnout of 74%, 23.3% with 78% and 22.2% with 82%. Ten million represent 27.3%, 25.9% and 24.6% respectively. A high turnout thus helps to reach a number of votes, not a percentage, since a turnout of 80% would bring Jean-Luc Mélenchon to 8.7 million votes with an unchanged score of 21.95%.

Four first-round scenarios

To understand where any progression would come from, we have built four scenarios by successively adding the levers studied in this report. Scenario A extends the autumn polls. Scenario B adds an exceptional mobilisation of young people: turnout among 18-34 year-olds exceeds by 15 points the level assumed by the polls, which corresponds to a return to the 2007 level. Scenario C adds the return of half of his former voters who have now gone over to Raphaël Glucksmann, Marine Tondelier or Fabien Roussel. Scenario D assumes the return of all of these voters.

Table 33. Four scenarios for Jean-Luc Mélenchon's first round

Scenario	Hypothesis	Share of votes cast	Votes (74% turnout)	Votes (80% turnout)
A. Autumn polls	October-November 2026 average	17.3%	6.3 M	6.9 M
B. Young people at the 2007 level	A, plus 15 points of turnout among 18-34 year-olds	18.2%	7.0 M	7.5 M
C. Partial return	B, plus half of the former voters who left for the left	20.8%	8.0 M	8.5 M
D. Full return	B, plus all of the former voters who left for the left	23.3%	9.1 M	9.6 M
Forecast	Projection of 25 November, “Philippe alone” hypothesis	24.3%	8.9 M	9.6 M

Le Millénaire calculations; Le Millénaire's Forecast. Shares of votes cast for a baseline turnout of 77%. In scenarios B to D, the mobilisation of young people adds around 1.8 million voters, and the return of former voters concerns 2.05 million votes. These scenarios are exercises in electoral arithmetic, not forecasts.



***Figure 52.** The four first-round scenarios, in votes and as a percentage of votes cast.*

The Forecast's projection (24.3%) exceeds scenario D in share of votes cast, with 8.9 to 9.6 million votes, compared with 7.7 million in 2022. Yet scenario D already assumes the return of all the 2022 voters who left for the non-LFI left.

Scenario D puts him between 9.1 and 9.6 million votes, and up to 9.8 million with an overall turnout of 83%. Ten million votes would require a score above 25%, whereas his electoral potential is measured at 22.5% by Cluster17 and 21% by Toluna Harris Interactive. This is the upper bound of our calculations.

Can he finish ahead of Marine Le Pen in the first round?

It is also worth asking whether Jean-Luc Mélenchon can come first in the first round. At this stage, the polls say no. In the 74 hypotheses published between 1 October and 13 November, Marine Le Pen leads him by 10.5 to 22 points, with a median of 17.5 points. The smallest gap is measured by Cluster17 (13.3 points on average) and the largest by YouGov (21.4 points). Likewise, the Forecast of 25 November puts Marine Le Pen at 30.5% and Jean-Luc Mélenchon at 24.3%, a gap of 6.2 points.

It should be noted, however, that this gap has already closed once. In 2022, Marine Le Pen finished on 23.15% and Jean-Luc Mélenchon on 21.95%, a gap of 1.2 points. For him to overtake her in 2027, two conditions must be met. On the one hand, he must reach our highest scenario, that is 9.1 to 9.6 million votes. On the other hand, Marine Le Pen must fall back in the final months of the campaign, as she did in 2017 (see Part IV).



Figure 53. *First-round score according to the share of former voters who return and the additional mobilisation of 18-34 year-olds.*

Our scenarios rule out three forms of double counting.

Table 34. *What the scenarios do not add together*

What we do not add	Reason
First-time voters to voting intentions	They are already included in the polls (42% among 18-24 year-olds)
The abstention reserve of working-class neighbourhoods to the mobilisation of young people	These are largely the same voters and the same areas
A correction for the 2022 polling error to tactical voting	That error reflected the late consolidation of the left, already counted in tactical voting

Rules applied to scenarios A to D. The Forecast applies the third in its bias correction.

The precedent of Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002

Jean-Marie Le Pen qualified in 2002 on his fourth candidacy, with 16.86% of votes cast and a lead of 194,600 votes over Lionel Jospin (16.18%). The left then fielded eight candidates who together gathered 42.89% of the vote, and abstention reached a record 28.4%. In the second round, he gained only 720,319 votes and finished on 17.79%, then the Front national fell back to 11.3% in the June legislative elections.

Table 35. *Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002 and Jean-Luc Mélenchon in 2022*

Indicator	Jean-Marie Le Pen (2002)	Jean-Luc Mélenchon (2022)
Candidacy number	Fourth (after 1974, 1988 and 1995)	Third (fourth in 2027)
Previous scores	14.38% in 1988, 15.00% in 1995	11.10% in 2012, 19.58% in 2017
First-round score	16.86%	21.95%
Gap with qualification	194,600 votes ahead	421,308 votes short
Total for the opposing camp or his own	Left: 42.89% (eight candidates)	Left: 31.94% (six candidates)
First-round abstention	28.4%	26.3%
Second round	17.79% (720,319 votes more than in the first round)	Did not qualify

Sources: Constitutional Council; Ministry of the Interior. Le Millénaire calculations.

In 2002, the fragmentation of the left qualified a candidate who was not progressing, whereas in 2022 Jean-Luc Mélenchon missed qualification while single-handedly gathering more than two thirds of a left reduced to 31.94%. In 2027, it is the fragmentation of the centre and the right, described in this part, that may work in his favour.

The polls are rarely wrong about the winner, but they are often wrong on two points that matter for Jean-Luc Mélenchon: turnout, and the candidate who benefits from the final consolidation of a camp. They underestimate both. In 2022, both errors worked in his favour. In 2027, the first will probably play again, since declared turnout is already higher than in 2021, while the second will depend on the outcome of his rivalry with Raphaël Glucksmann.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon is today the favourite to face Marine Le Pen in the second round, with 77.8 chances in 100 of qualifying in the Forecast of 25 November. He is the favourite in all ten configurations calculated, and this is explained by a base that varies by only 1.7 points when his competitors change. In the edition of 4 November, the only serious threat to his qualification came from the rallying of the non-LFI left behind Raphaël Glucksmann, which brought his chances down to around 30 in 100, or from a candidacy by Dominique de Villepin (42 in 100). Thus, his path to the

second round runs through the return of the 2022 voters who left for the other left-wing candidates (5.4 points of votes cast), far more than through young people, who already feature in his voting intentions.

The possible errors of the polls and of our model tend to favour Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the first round, as in 2022, when the last polls gave him 17.8% for a result of 21.95%. In the second round, they can work in either direction, since the mobilisation of his camp may exceed expectations, while the rejection he provokes among 69% of registered voters may trigger a mobilisation against him.

CAN JEAN-LUC MÉLENCHON BEAT MARINE LE PEN?

A GAP OF 10 TO 35 POINTS DEPENDING ON THE MEASURE



Sources : sondages de novembre 2026 (notices des instituts) ; Forecast du Millénaire, 25 novembre 2026 ; Conseil constitutionnel (2012) ; calculs Le Millénaire, hypothèses en annexe 4.

Figure 54. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon's score against Marine Le Pen depending on the measure used: polls, Forecast and vote transfer scenarios.*

What the polls say: a 35-point gap

Every second-round poll shows Jean-Luc Mélenchon heavily beaten by Marine Le Pen. Since May, 26 surveys have tested this duel and give him 32.7% on average, between 30% and 39%, with only three placing him above 35% (Cluster17 in July with 39%, YouGov in November with 37% and in September with 36%)[29]. The level varies little from one month to the next, with an average of 33.6% in July, 33.4% in September, 31.6% in October (eight surveys) and 33.5% in the five November surveys (Toluna Harris Interactive 32% then 35%, OpinionWay 32%, YouGov 37% and Elabe 31.5%).

[29] List of polls compiled by Wikipedia as of 17 November 2026, based on the pollsters' published notices; see also L'Essentiel de l'Éco, « Mélenchon peut-il gagner ? Ce que disent vraiment les sondages » (“Can Mélenchon win? What the polls really say”), 29 October 2026.

Table 36. Jean-Luc Mélenchon against Marine Le Pen in second-round polls, May-November 2026

Month	Surveys	Average	Minimum	Maximum
May	1	33.0%	33%	33%
July	4	33.6%	30%	39%
August	3	31.8%	30.5%	33%
September	5	33.4%	31%	36%
October	8	31.6%	30%	33%
November (to the 25th)	5	33.5%	31.5%	37%
Overall	26	32.7%	30%	39%

Sources: pollsters' notices, compiled in Wikipedia's list of polls; YouGov for Le HuffPost, 12-17 November 2026; Toluna Harris Interactive for M6, RTL and L'Express, 18-19 November 2026. Score as a share of the two finalists' total. Le Millénaire calculations.



***Figure 55.** Jean-Luc Mélenchon's score against Marine Le Pen in second-round polls, May-November 2026.*

These figures reflect massive rejection: according to Cluster17, 69% of respondents rule out ever voting for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, compared with 52% for Marine Le Pen, the highest level of rejection of any candidate. This rejection explains the gap with his rivals. Since September, Édouard Philippe has averaged 44.9% against Marine Le Pen across sixteen surveys, Gabriel Attal 43.8% and Raphaël Glucksmann

43.2%, and while they too are beaten, they are beaten with more than ten points more than him.

The start of a recovery in November after the October dip

It is also worth looking at how these second-round polls are evolving, pollster by pollster. First, there was a dip in October, when Jean-Luc Mélenchon fell to an average of 31.6% across 8 surveys, compared with 33.4% in September. However, it should be noted that the trend reversed in November. Four pollsters measured this duel in October and then in November, and all 4 put him higher the second time: 30% then 32% and 35% for Toluna Harris Interactive, 31% then 32% for OpinionWay, 31% then 31.5% for Elabe and 32% then 37% for YouGov.

One qualification must nonetheless be made. Two of these four increases remain within a poll's margin of error, whereas YouGov and Toluna Harris Interactive record a clear rise of 5 points. Jean-Luc Mélenchon is therefore beginning to make progress in the second round, but the next surveys will be needed to see whether this is confirmed.

Table 37. *The Mélenchon-Le Pen duel pollster by pollster (Jean-Luc Mélenchon's score)*

Pollster	May-August	September	October	November	Change Oct.-Nov.
Toluna Harris Interactive	33%, 33%, 32%	33%, 31%	33%, 30%	32%, 35%	+5
OpinionWay	not tested	34%, 33%	32%, 31%	32%	+1
Elabe	32.5%, 30.5%	not tested	31%	31.5%	+0.5
YouGov	not tested	36%	32%	37%	+5
Ifop	30%, 33%	not tested	32%	not tested	n/a
Odoxa	not tested	not tested	32%	not tested	n/a

Pollster	May-August	September	October	November	Change Oct.-Nov.
Cluster17	39%	not tested	not tested	not tested	n/a

Sources: pollsters' notices, compiled in Wikipedia's list of polls; YouGov for Le HuffPost, 12-15 October and 12-17 November 2026. Change between the last October survey and the last November survey. n/a: not available.

At the same time, his rivals are slipping against Marine Le Pen. Édouard Philippe went from an average of 45.2% in October (8 surveys) to 44.3% in November (4 surveys), and Raphaël Glucksmann from 43.9% (6 surveys) to 42.3%. The gap between Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Édouard Philippe in a duel against Marine Le Pen thus narrowed from 13.6 points in October to 11.1 points in November. Similarly, when YouGov tests a second round between the two men, Jean-Luc Mélenchon obtains 39% in November, compared with 34% a month earlier.

These polls must nevertheless be read for what they are. Five months before the first round, the voters of eliminated candidates have not yet experienced their candidate's defeat, heard the voting recommendations or watched the debate between the two rounds. The rest of this chapter shows that the opponent of the Front national, then of the Rassemblement national, obtained 3 to 7 points more than the final polls in every second round since 2002.

Polls and reality against Le Pen: a gap always in the same direction

The first argument for a cautious reading of current polls is historical: the opponent of the Front national, then of the Rassemblement national, has done better than the polls predicted in every second round of a major election since 2002.



Figure 56. *Score of the candidate facing the FN or the RN, and of Marine Le Pen, in the polls and in the result, 2002-2022.*

Table 38. *Polls and results of second rounds against the FN, then the RN*

Election	Candidate facing the FN/RN	Polls before the first round	Final polls	Result	Gap with final polls
2002 presidential election	Jacques Chirac	not tested	79.2%	82.2%	+3.0
2015 regional elections, Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie	Xavier Bertrand	49.8%	52.7%	57.8%	+5.1
2015 regional elections, PACA	Christian Estrosi	51.0%	52.0%	54.8%	+2.8
2017 presidential election	Emmanuel Macron	62.1%	61.7%	66.1%	+4.4
2021 regional elections, PACA	Renaud Muselier	48.8%	50.5%	57.3%	+6.8
2022 presidential election	Emmanuel Macron	55.5%	55.7%	58.6%	+2.9
2024 legislative elections	Seat projection for the RN and allies	n/a	170 to 230 seats	142 seats	60 to 90 fewer seats

Sources: polls compiled by Wikipedia (averages: month preceding the first round for the "before the first round" column, last days of the campaign for the final polls); Ministry of the Interior.

The gap lies between 3 and 7 points, and it is even larger if one starts from the polls conducted before the first round. Thierry Mariani, for instance, was forecast to win in Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur in six of the eight polls published before the first round in 2021, and he lost with 42.7%. Likewise, all the projections published on the eve of the second round of the

2024 legislative elections gave the Rassemblement national and its allies between 170 and 230 seats, whereas they won 142.

Applied to the 33.5% measured in November, a gap of 3 to 7 points would put Jean-Luc Mélenchon between 36.5% and 40.5%, and up to 42% if one starts from the polls taken before the first round, as in 2021. That would still be a defeat.

However, the candidate facing the Front national or the Rassemblement national was a right-wing or centrist candidate in all of these precedents but one. The 2024 legislative elections are the only case in which LFI candidates benefited from it, constituency by constituency and without Jean-Luc Mélenchon himself.

Marine Le Pen falls back between the polls and the vote

It should be stressed that this gap between the polls and the ballot box can also be seen on Marine Le Pen's side. She finished below her polls in each of her second rounds. In 2017, polls conducted before the first round gave her 37.9% against Emmanuel Macron and those between the two rounds 39.3%, whereas she obtained 33.9%. Similarly, in 2022, she was measured at 44.3% before the first round and 45.4% between the two rounds, for a result of 41.45%. She therefore lost 5.4 points in 2017 and 4 points in 2022 between the final polls and the vote.

The same phenomenon can be seen in the first round of 2017. Marine Le Pen averaged 25.7% in November 2016 and still 25.9% in March 2017, but 22.3% in the polls of the final week and 21.30% at the ballot box. One qualification must nonetheless be made: this decline was not repeated in the first round of 2022, when she rose from 18.5% in March to 22.6% in the final week, for a result of 23.15%.

Table 39. *Marine Le Pen in the polls and at the ballot box*

Election	Earlier polls	Final polls	Result	Gap with final polls
First round of 2017	25.7% (November 2016)	22.3%	21.30%	−1.0
First round of 2022	18.5% (March 2022)	22.6%	23.15%	+0.5
Second round of 2017	37.9% (before the first round)	39.3%	33.9%	−5.4
Second round of 2022	44.3% (before the first round)	45.4%	41.45%	−4.0
2015 regional elections, Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie	50.2% (before the first round)	47.3%	42.2%	−5.1

Sources: polls compiled by Wikipedia (Le Millénaire averages; final polls: last week for the first round, between the two rounds for the second); Ministry of the Interior.

This pattern is a decisive condition for Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Marine Le Pen has never reached 50% of the vote in a second round. She obtained 33.9% in 2017 and 41.45% in 2022 in the presidential election, and 42.2% in the 2015 regional elections in Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie, where she had nonetheless gathered 40.6% in the first round. Yet current polls give her 63% to 68% against Jean-Luc Mélenchon, more than 20 points above her best result. To win, she must therefore cross a threshold she has always remained more than 8 points away from.

If Jean-Luc Mélenchon came first in the first round, this difficulty would weigh even more heavily. When you are behind in the first round, you have to find reserves of votes among voters who did not choose you, and Marine Le Pen has never managed to do so. In 2015, she gained only 1.6 points between the two rounds in Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie (from 40.6% to 42.2%).

What the Forecast says: 44.9% and 23.1 chances in 100

The Forecast does not take second-round polls as they stand: it adds to them the vote transfers observed in recent elections, to which it gives more weight while the election is still distant.



Figure 57. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon's score against Marine Le Pen in the Forecast simulations in which this duel takes place.*

The Forecast of 25 November gives Jean-Luc Mélenchon 44.9% against Marine Le Pen in its central calculation (between 35.8% and 54.3% depending on the simulations), and he wins in 23.1% of cases when this duel takes place. That is twelve points more than the polls, but it is still a defeat. By way of comparison, Édouard Philippe would beat Marine Le Pen with 51.2% in the central calculation and 57.2 chances in 100.

This is exactly the comparison we have just made, and it is why the Forecast places Jean-Luc Mélenchon much higher than the second-round polls. When you question a centrist voter five months before the election, they answer without having experienced their candidate's defeat and, more often than not, they express no preference. The Forecast therefore starts from its projected first round and applies to each eliminated electorate transfer rates that combine what that electorate says in the 2026 polls and what it did at the ballot box (second round of 2022, 2024 legislative elections).

Jean-Luc Mélenchon's deficit against Marine Le Pen is therefore 10 points in the Forecast, against 35 points in the polls.

Table 40. *Four measures of the Mélenchon-Le Pen duel*

Measure	Mélenchon's score	What it takes into account
Second-round polls (26 surveys since May)	32.7%	What voters say five months before the election
November polls corrected for the gap observed since 2002	36.5% to 40.5%	What voters say, plus the 3 to 7 points gained by the opponent of the FN, then the RN
Forecast, central calculation (25 November)	44.9%	What voters say in 2026 and the transfers observed in 2022 and 2024
Transfers from the 2024 legislative elections applied as they stand	49.4%	Only the behaviour observed in 2024

Sources: polls compiled by Wikipedia; Le Millénaire's Forecast, 25 November 2026; Ipsos-Talan, 7 July 2024; Le Millénaire calculations.

A NATIONAL BLOC IN THE LEAD AND A REJECTION THAT HAS REVERSED

The left-wing bloc against the national bloc

A three-bloc presidential election can also be read in terms of broad groupings. In the first round of 2022, the six left-wing candidates (Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Yannick Jadot, Fabien Roussel, Anne Hidalgo, Philippe Poutou and Nathalie Arthaud) gathered 31.9% of votes cast. For their part, the three candidates of the nationalist right (Marine Le Pen, Éric Zemmour and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan) gathered 32.3%, so that the two blocs were neck and neck. This level for the left remains low compared with previous elections: left-wing candidates gathered 42.89% of votes cast in 2002, 36.44% in 2007 and 43.75% in 2012, before falling to 27.67% in 2017.

It should be stressed that this balance of power has reversed over twenty years. In 2002, 2007 and 2012, the total of the left-wing candidates exceeded the Front national candidate by around 26 points. This gap fell to 6.4 points in 2017, then to 3.2 points in the 2027 Forecast. If Éric Zemmour and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan are added, the national bloc is even 2.4 points ahead of the left-wing bloc. Jean-Luc Mélenchon therefore approaches the second round without the first-round lead the left enjoyed against Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Table 41. *The left and the Front national, then the Rassemblement national, in the first round, 2002-2027*

Election	Total of left-wing candidates	FN, then RN, candidate	Gap
2002	42.89%	16.86%	+26.0
2007	36.44%	10.44%	+26.0
2012	43.75%	17.90%	+25.9
2017	27.67%	21.30%	+6.4
2022	31.9%	23.15% (32.3% for the national bloc)	+8.8 (−0.4 for the bloc)
2027, Forecast of 25 November	33.7%	30.7% (36.3% for the national bloc)	+2.5 (−3.1 for the bloc)

Sources: Ministry of the Interior and Constitutional Council; Le Millénaire's Forecast, 25 November 2026. National bloc: Marine Le Pen, Éric Zemmour and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan. Le Millénaire calculations.



Figure 58. *Gap between the left-wing bloc and the national bloc in the first round of 2022, by municipality.*

The 2022 map shows a France cut in two. The left-wing bloc is ahead of the national bloc in 6,921 municipalities, which account for 46.4% of votes cast: the big cities, their suburbs, the West, part of the Massif central and the South-West. The national bloc dominates the rest of the country, in particular the North, the East, the Mediterranean rim and the outer Paris suburbs.



Figure 59. *Size of the left-wing bloc and the national bloc, from the 2022 presidential election to the November 2026 surveys.*



Figure 60. *Score of the centre and the right (Hayer and Bellamy lists) and gap between the national bloc and the left-wing bloc in the 2024 European elections, by département.*

Since 2022, the national bloc has taken the lead: it was around six points ahead of the left-wing bloc in the 2024 European elections. The gap is 2.4 points in the Forecast of 25 November (33.7% for the left, 36.2% for the national bloc) and 3.6 points in the average of the eight November polls (34.4% against 38.0%). The remaining votes, around 30.1% in the Forecast, are shared between Édouard Philippe (19.6%), David Lisnard (6.8%) and Bruno Retailleau (3.7%).

Even if the left rallied entirely behind him, Jean-Luc Mélenchon would start almost 3 points behind Marine Le Pen before counting a single centre or right-wing voter. He must therefore obtain a net lead among these voters, that is, more votes for him than for her. Our calculation puts this lead at different levels depending on how the left behaves: 10 points if it rallies completely, 15 points if it behaves as in 2022 and 31 points if it behaves as its voters say today.

Conversely, and logically, if the left-wing bloc finishes ahead of the nationalist right bloc, Marine Le Pen must win more votes than Jean-Luc Mélenchon among these voters. It should be noted, however, that this equation assumes that Jean-Luc Mélenchon must also secure the full vote of the left-wing bloc, including among social democrats. While this may seem intuitive, given how strong the wish to block the Rassemblement national is in this electorate, it should not be forgotten that this electorate has hardened its view of La France insoumise and of Jean-Luc Mélenchon in particular.

However, despite growing rejection of Jean-Luc Mélenchon personally within the social-democratic electorate, the level of rejection of the Rassemblement national is in a different league. The fact remains that the leader of La France insoumise will need extremely high transfer rates, above 90%. For her part, Marine Le Pen can rely on a more homogeneous nationalist right bloc: transfers from Éric Zemmour's voters in 2022 were very high, nearly 90% against Emmanuel Macron, a less repellent figure than Jean-Luc Mélenchon for these voters.

Table 42. The sub-blocs of the centre and the right: what they did and what they say

Sub-bloc	Weight in the first round (Forecast)	Behaviour measured in 2024 against an LFI candidate	Stated intention in 2026 against Mélenchon	Net lead for Mélenchon
Édouard Philippe's voters	19.6%	43% LFI, 19% RN (Ensemble voters)	12% Mélenchon, 25% Le Pen (Toluna); 5% and 38% (OpinionWay)	+24 in 2024; −13 to −33 in 2026
Gabriel Attal's voters	included above	43% LFI, 19% RN (Ensemble voters)	20% Mélenchon, 28% Le Pen (Toluna)	+24 in 2024; −8 in 2026
Bruno Retailleau's voters	3.7%	26% LFI, 38% RN (LR and miscellaneous right voters)	5% Mélenchon, 63% Le Pen (Toluna); 0% and 75% (OpinionWay)	−12 in 2024; −58 to −75 in 2026
David Lisnard's voters	6.8%	26% LFI, 38% RN (LR and miscellaneous right voters)	5% Mélenchon, 75% Le Pen (OpinionWay)	−12 in 2024; −70 in 2026
Net lead required	30.1%	Left united: +10; left as in 2022: +15	Left as stated in 2026: +31	

Sources: Le Millénaire's Forecast, 25 November 2026; Ipsos-Talan, 7 July 2024; Toluna Harris Interactive for M6 and RTL, August 2026; OpinionWay for CNews, 21-22 October 2026; Le Millénaire calculations. Net lead: share voting Mélenchon minus share voting Le Pen.

This table shows in detail that **the election is not simply decided in the space between the nationalist right bloc and the left-wing bloc.**

More precisely, **it is decided in the sub-bloc of Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal, which accounts for two thirds of the centre and the right (19.6% out of 30.1% in the Forecast).** The remaining third of this bloc is the Les Républicains electorate, whose second-round behaviour differs markedly from that of the centre and centre-right electorate. In 2024, voters in the Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal sub-bloc gave LFI candidates a net lead of 24 points over the Rassemblement national, more than the 10 to 15 points required. Yet they say the opposite in 2026, with a lead of 8 to 33 points for Marine Le Pen. For its part, the mainstream

right, which is smaller, was already leaning towards the Rassemblement national in 2024 and today leans massively in that direction.

Raisonner en blocs : le second tour selon le comportement de la gauche et du centre



Calculs Le Millénaire sur le premier tour du Forecast (25 novembre 2026, « Philippe seul »). Reports « déclarés » : Toluna Harris Interactive (août 2026) et OpinionWay (octobre 2026) ; « 2022 » : Ipsos ; « 2024 » : Ipsos-Talan (duels LFI-RN).

Figure 61. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon's score in the second round depending on the behaviour of the non-LFI left and that of the centre and the right.*

Table 43. *The second round depending on the behaviour of the blocs*

Behaviour of the non-LFI left	Centre and right as they say in 2026	Split evenly	As in 2024	Barrage
As its voters say in 2026	37.8%	42.0%	46.4%	49.7%
As in 2022	41.3%	45.3%	49.4%	52.5%
United	42.4%	46.3%	50.3%	53.4%

Le Millénaire calculations based on the Forecast's first round (25 November 2026, "Philippe alone" scenario). Mélenchon's voters: 95% for him; national bloc: 96% of Le Pen's voters, 85% of Zemmour's and 70% of Dupont-Aignan's for Le Pen. Detailed assumptions in the appendix.

If the centre and the right vote as they say today, Jean-Luc Mélenchon therefore loses whatever the left does and peaks at 42%; if they split evenly, he still loses, with 42% to 46%. He only crosses 50% if the left unites and the centre behaves as in 2024, or if the centre mounts a genuine barrage and the left votes at least as in 2022. The second round is thus decided in the centre, but it can only be won if the left has first rallied in full.



Calculs Le Millénaire sur le premier tour du Forecast (25/11/2026, hypothèse « Philippe seul ») et les reports mesurés par Ipsos (2022) et Ipsos-Talan (législatives 2024). Hypothèses détaillées en annexe 4.

Figure 62. *Effect of each lever on Jean-Luc Mélenchon's second-round score against Marine Le Pen, in points, from a starting point of 49.4%.*



Calculs Le Millénaire sur le premier tour du Forecast (25/11/2026, « Philippe seul »). Abstention des électeurs de Philippe fixée à 38 % ; autres reports au niveau des législatives de 2024 (Ipsos-Talan). « Déclarations actuelles » : 26 à 30 % des électeurs de Glucksmann ; Ensemble 2024 : 8 % Mélenchon, 43 % Le Pen (OpinionWay).

Figure 63. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon's second-round score depending on the share of the non-LFI left and of Édouard Philippe's voters who vote for him, with 38% abstention among Édouard Philippe's voters.*

La France insoumise and the Rassemblement national have swapped places



Source : Ipsos bva pour Le Monde, la Fondation Jean-Jaurès, le Cevipof et l'Institut Montaigne, Fractures françaises, vagues 2020 à 2026 (3 000 personnes, 30 octobre-3 novembre 2026). En % de « correspond ».

Figure 64. *La France insoumise and the Rassemblement national in the Fractures françaises survey, 2020-2026.*

The annual Fractures françaises survey, conducted by Ipsos bva for Le Monde, the Fondation Jean-Jaurès, the Cevipof and the Institut Montaigne, has measured since 2020 how the French perceive the parties. Its 2026 wave, carried out from 30 October to 3 November among 3,000 people, shows a complete reversal between La France insoumise and the Rassemblement national.

In 2020, 51% of French people considered La France insoumise dangerous for democracy, compared with 61% for the Rassemblement national. In 2026, the trend has reversed: 65% of French people describe La France insoumise as dangerous for democracy, against 53% for the Rassemblement national. Moreover, the share who believe that La France insoumise “stirs up violence” rose from 57% in 2021 to 68%, compared with 52% for the Rassemblement national. Meanwhile, 43% consider Marine Le Pen's party capable of governing the country, against 24% for La France insoumise, a level that has not moved in five years.

This reversal is the main obstacle to Jean-Luc Mélenchon's ambition of reaching the Élysée. The republican front worked from 2002 to 2024 because a majority of voters considered the Front national, then the Rassemblement national, more dangerous than its opponent. Yet 65% of French people today describe La France insoumise

as a danger to democracy, twelve points more than for Marine Le Pen's party.

TRANSFERS THAT WILL DECIDE THE SECOND ROUND: CAN THEY BE ANTICIPATED?

What his voters did in 2022

The barrage also has its limits on the left: only 42% of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's voters voted for Emmanuel Macron in the second round of 2022 against Marine Le Pen, while 17% voted for her and 41% abstained or cast a blank or spoilt ballot. The same survey shows that Yannick Jadot's voters transferred 65% to Emmanuel Macron and Valérie Pécresse's 53%. In 2027, the question arises the other way round, since he would be asking centrist voters for a barrage that only 42% of his own voters practised in 2022.



Figure 65. *Second-round behaviour in 2022 of the voters of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Yannick Jadot and Valérie Pécresse.*

What centre and right-wing voters say today

Let us take these electorates one by one. Ensemble voters in the 2024 legislative elections transferred to the LFI candidate, whereas they say 8% for Jean-Luc Mélenchon and 43% for Marine Le Pen when OpinionWay surveys them in October 2026. In the same way, Emmanuel Macron's 2022 voters say 9% for him and 44% for her. Les Républicains voters of 2024, for their part, go from 26% for the LFI candidate to 5%, and from 38% for the Rassemblement national to 72%. In

the Toluna survey, Gabriel Attal's voters split between 20% for him and 28% for her, and Édouard Philippe's between 12% and 25%. In every case, more than half of centrist voters express no preference.



Sources : Ipsos-Talan, 7 juillet 2024 (duels LFI-RN) ; OpinionWay pour CNews, 21-22 octobre 2026 ; Toluna Harris Interactive pour M6 et RTL, août 2026.

Figure 66. *Behaviour of presidential camp and right-wing voters facing an LFI candidate: 2024 legislative elections and 2026 intentions.*

These figures can be read in two ways, which are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, Jean-Luc Mélenchon's own candidacy may produce a rejection that local LFI candidates did not, and the reversal in the hierarchy of dangers measured by Fractures françaises would then be very real. Since 2024, a number of controversies have damaged Jean-Luc Mélenchon's image among these voters: the deliberate disruption of the Assemblée nationale (the so-called “bordélisation”), “antisemitic” allusions, the first measures taken by LFI officials after the 2026 municipal elections (such as Bally Bakayoko, mayor of Saint-Denis, who began disarming his municipal police), and of course a certain indulgence towards the urban riots of 17 October.

On the other hand, it is possible that these intentions, measured five months before the first round, without voting recommendations and without a campaign between the two rounds, overestimate the Le Pen vote in the centre, just as the polls of 2015, 2021 and 2024 had overestimated it.

Consequently, **the second round of 2027 will most likely fall between the 2026 intentions and the 2024 behaviour. In our**

grid, this intermediate point (a centre split evenly) gives Jean-Luc Mélenchon between 42% and 46%. On the basis of our model, we can therefore already rule out, even before the first round, the hypothesis of a large victory for Marine Le Pen over Jean-Luc Mélenchon. In other words, “the 70-30” appears impossible.

Second-round mobilisation: a central factor, to the detriment of the RN

When the Rassemblement national reaches the second round of an election for an executive office, we historically observe a rise in electoral mobilisation. These are voters who did not vote in the first round of the election and who turn out in the second round, very often against the Rassemblement national.

Consequently, the bloc calculation we have presented needs to be refined. If we keep the estimated bloc gaps of 2.4 points in the Forecast of 25 November (33.7% for the left, 36.2% for the national bloc) and of 3.6 points in the average of the eight November polls (34.4% against 38.0%), then we can correct this actual second-round gap. It is necessarily smaller. With the second-round over-mobilisation to be expected, the gap is no more than 0.4 point in Marine Le Pen's favour if we take the estimate of our Forecast of 25 November, or 1.6 points if we take the average of the eight November polls. This factor therefore upends the balance of power at the start of the period between the two rounds.

However, we must hasten to qualify this analysis. It is also possible that this unprecedented duel format could be summed up as a “contest of the worst”, forcing many voters into abstention. We must therefore be cautious in reading the second round and not faithfully reproduce the results observed in 2015, 2017 and 2022, or even in the last legislative elections in 2024.

Vote transfers to the two finalists

If we look more closely at vote transfers, we find the same difficulty for both finalists. On one side, Jean-Luc Mélenchon wins only 26

to 30% of Raphaël Glucksmann's voters in the polls, whereas 65% of Yannick Jadot's voters had voted for Emmanuel Macron against Marine Le Pen in 2022. On the other side, Marine Le Pen wins 43% of Ensemble voters in the polls, whereas only 19% had voted for the Rassemblement national against an LFI candidate in 2024, and 18% of Valérie Pécresse's voters had voted for her in 2022.

Table 44. *Vote transfers to Jean-Luc Mélenchon and to Marine Le Pen: declared, observed, adopted*

Electorate	Declared in 2026 (Mélenchon / Le Pen)	Observed at the ballot box	Central hypothesis of our calculations (Mélenchon / Le Pen / abstention)
Raphaël Glucksmann	26 to 30% / 9 to 14%	Yannick Jadot voters in 2022: 65% Macron, 6% Le Pen	65 / 8 / 27
Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal	Ensemble voters: 8% / 43%. Philippe voters: 12% / 25%. Attal voters: 20% / 28%	Ensemble in 2024, LFI-RN duel: 43% / 19%	43 / 19 / 38
Bruno Retailleau and David Lisnard	Les Républicains voters: 5% / 72%	LR and miscellaneous right in 2024: 26% / 38%	26 / 38 / 36
Éric Zemmour	n/a	Zemmour voters in 2022: 73% Le Pen	3 / 85 / 12
Nouveau Front populaire voters	62% / 10%	n/a	n/a
2024 abstainers	18% / 30%	n/a	n/a

Sources: OpinionWay (October 2026), Toluna Harris Interactive (August and October 2026); Ipsos (second round of 2022), Ipsos-Talan (7 July 2024); Le Millénaire calculations, central hypothesis detailed in Appendix 4. n/a: not available.

Both candidates therefore need vote transfers that no election has yet produced. Jean-Luc Mélenchon must find on the left the level of transfers that Emmanuel Macron enjoyed in 2022. For her part, Marine Le Pen must obtain from the centre more than double what she received in 2024. Yet more than half of centrist voters express no preference today, and it is their abstention or blank vote that will decide the gap.



Sources : OpinionWay (octobre 2026), Toluna Harris Interactive (août et octobre 2026) ; Ipsos (second tour 2022) ; Ipsos-Talan (7 juillet 2024, duels insoumis-RN) ; calculs Le Millénaire.
¹ Milieu des fourchettes déclarées (26 à 30 % et 9 à 14 %). ² Vote Macron face à Le Pen. Hypothèse centrale détaillée en annexe 4.

Figure 67. *Vote transfers of each electorate to Jean-Luc Mélenchon and to Marine Le Pen: declared in 2026, observed at the ballot box and adopted in our calculations.*

Where his second-round votes would come from

It is also worth counting the votes, electorate by electorate. If we apply the transfers observed in 2022 and in 2024 to the Forecast's first round, Jean-Luc Mélenchon would gather 41.4 points out of 100 and Marine Le Pen 42.4, i.e. 49.4% against 50.6% of votes cast. He would therefore be 1 point short, or about 380,000 votes.



Figure 68. *Votes Jean-Luc Mélenchon is short of with the 2024 transfers, compared with the 2012 gap and with the Édouard Philippe voters who would vote for Marine Le Pen or abstain.*

Table 45. *The second-round vote count with the observed transfers (in first-round points)*

First-round electorate	Weight	To Mélenchon	To Le Pen	Abstention or blank
Jean-Luc Mélenchon	24.3	23.1	0.2	1.0
Marine Le Pen	30.5	0.3	29.3	0.9
Édouard Philippe	19.6	8.4	3.7	7.5
Raphaël Glucksmann	6.7	4.3	0.5	1.8
Bruno Retailleau and David Lisnard	10.5	2.7	4.0	3.8
Other left-wing candidates	2.8	2.2	0.1	0.4
Éric Zemmour	3.3	0.1	2.8	0.4
Nicolas Dupont-Aignan	2.4	0.2	1.7	0.5
Total	100.1	41.4	42.4	16.3

Sources: Le Millénaire's Forecast, 25 November 2026, "Philippe alone" hypothesis; transfer rates of the central hypothesis (Appendix 4). Le Millénaire calculations. The total exceeds 100 due to rounding.



Figure 69. *Origin of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's and Marine Le Pen's second-round votes according to the observed transfers, in first-round points.*

This table shows where the reserve that decides the second round lies. Indeed, 7.5 points' worth of Édouard Philippe voters would abstain or vote blank in this calculation, more than seven times what Jean-Luc Mélenchon is short of. Likewise, in 2017, in a second round with no candidate from either the left or the right, abstention reached 25.4% and more than four million voters cast a blank or spoilt ballot. The second round would therefore be decided less by centrist voters who choose Marine Le Pen than by those who refuse to choose.

The barrages, one by one

Four recent elections make it possible to measure the real effects of a barrage.



Source : ministère de l'Intérieur, élections régionales de 2015 et 2021.

Figure 70. *Scores of the right-wing candidate and of the FN or RN candidate in the first and second rounds, 2015 and 2021 regional elections.*

Table 46. *Four barrages and a counter-example*

Election	First round	Decision of the left or the centre	Second round	Turnout
Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie, 2015	Le Pen 40.6%; Bertrand 25.0%; Saintignon (PS) 18.1%	Socialist list withdrawn	Bertrand 57.8%; Le Pen 42.2%	54.8% then 61.2%
PACA, 2015	Maréchal-Le Pen 40.6%; Estrosi 26.5%; Castaner (PS) 16.6%	Socialist list withdrawn	Estrosi 54.8%; Maréchal-Le Pen 45.2%	51.9% then 60.3%
Alsace-Champagne-Ardenne-Lorraine, 2015	Philippot 36.1%; Richert 25.8%; Masseret (PS) 16.1%	Socialist list maintained	Richert 48.4%; Philippot 36.1%; Masseret 15.5%	47.9% then 59.0%
PACA, 2021	Mariani 36.4%; Muselier 31.9%; Félizia (left) 16.9%	Left-wing list withdrawn	Muselier 57.3%; Mariani 42.7%	33.7% then 36.8%
Legislative elections, 2024	306 possible three-way contests	More than 220 withdrawals, including 131 on the left and 82 in the presidential camp	89 three-way contests; RN and allies 142 seats	66.7% then 66.6%

Source: Ministry of the Interior; counts of 2024 withdrawals reported in the press.

The 2015 regional elections. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais-Picardie and in Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, where Marine Le Pen and Marion Maréchal-Le Pen exceeded 40% in the first round, the Parti socialiste withdrew its lists. Xavier Bertrand

then gained 33 points between the two rounds and Christian Estrosi 28 points, while the Front national candidates gained only 1.6 and 4.7, and turnout rose by 6 to 8 points. Left-wing voters therefore followed their camp's instruction, but this precedent does not tell us whether centrist voters would do the same in the opposite direction.

The 2015 counter-example. In Alsace-Champagne-Ardenne-Lorraine, Jean-Pierre Masseret maintained his list against his party's wishes, and Philippe Richert nevertheless won with 48.4%, while Florian Philippot remained exactly at his first-round level (36.1%), the Front national having no reserves even without the left withdrawing. Yet the Rassemblement national today has reserves that the Front national did not have (Éric Zemmour's 3.5% in the Forecast, 72% of 2024 Les Républicains voters in the second round).

Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, 2021. Thierry Mariani, backed by the Rassemblement national, led Renaud Muselier by 4.5 points in the first round and was predicted to win the second in most polls; after the left-wing list withdrew, Renaud Muselier won with 57.3%, almost seven points more than the final polls. The beneficiary of this barrage was, however, an incumbent right-wing regional president backed by the presidential camp.

The 2024 legislative elections. This is the only barrage from which LFI candidates have benefited. More than 220 candidates withdrew, including 82 from the presidential camp out of 91 who had come third. In duels between an LFI candidate and a Rassemblement national candidate, Ipsos measured that Ensemble voters transferred 43% to the LFI candidate and 19% to the Rassemblement national, and 38% abstained (i.e. 69% against 31% of votes cast), while those of Les Républicains and the miscellaneous right transferred 26% to the LFI candidate and 38% to the Rassemblement national[30]. The context was, however, unique (a dissolution, an absolute

[30] Ipsos-Talan, survey of 7 July 2024 on the second round of the legislative elections.

majority for the Rassemblement national considered imminent, withdrawal instructions coming from the Prime Minister himself).

The 2024 republican front: what was said, then what was done

It is also worth taking a close look at the 2024 legislative elections, because they show the gap between stated positions and behaviour. Before the first round, the presidential camp's line was to reject both. On 21 June on TF1, Gabriel Attal declared: “Voting Nupes means voting for Jean-Luc Mélenchon and ending up with Jordan Bardella.” The same day on BFMTV, the government spokesperson, Prisca Thévenot, announced: “We will form a barrage against the representatives of this new Nupes.” Likewise, Gérald Darmanin indicated that he would vote neither for a Rassemblement national candidate nor for an LFI candidate. On 25 June, after a meeting of the majority's leaders around Emmanuel Macron, one participant summed up the line to Le Parisien: “a rejection of the extremes, RN and LFI”. On the right, Gérard Larcher defended the neither-nor position as early as 12 June, and François-Xavier Bellamy announced on 13 June that he would vote “of course for a Rassemblement national candidate, to form a barrage against a Front populaire candidate”.

The day after the first round, on 1 July, the presidential camp was divided. Édouard Philippe called on candidates who had come third to withdraw, but without voting for the Rassemblement national “nor for those of La France insoumise”. Bruno Le Maire called for a vote for a candidate “from the social-democratic camp”, which excluded LFI candidates. For his part, Gabriel Attal called for withdrawal where the finalist “shares the values of the Republic”, and François Bayrou spoke of withdrawals “on a case-by-case basis”.

Yet three days later, according to the Ministry of the Interior's count, 229 qualified candidates had withdrawn, including 134 from the Nouveau Front populaire and 82 from Ensemble, and the number of three-way contests fell from 306 to 89. Gabriel Attal then specified that “withdrawal does not mean rallying”. Nevertheless, voters followed.

The polls had not seen this movement coming. 48 hours before the vote, Ipsos-Talan was still giving 175 to 205 seats to the Rassemblement national and its allies, who won 142. In one week, then, the republican front went from a hesitant position of principle to massive behaviour at the ballot box.

Table 47. *The 2024 republican front in five dates*

Date	What is said or measured	Source
30 June	306 possible three-way contests on the evening of the first round	Ministry of the Interior
1 July	Divided positions in the presidential camp: conditional withdrawal (Attal), neither Rassemblement national nor France insoumise (Philippe), vote only for the "social-democratic camp" (Le Maire)	Public Sénat
3 July	229 withdrawals, including 134 from the Nouveau Front populaire, 82 from Ensemble and 2 from Les Républicains; 89 three-way contests	LCP
3-4 July	175 to 205 seats projected for the Rassemblement national and its allies	Ipsos-Talan, 10,101 people
7 July	142 seats; Ensemble voters in LFI-RN duels: 43% for the LFI candidate, 19% for the RN, 38% abstention, blank or spoilt	Ministry of the Interior; Ipsos-Talan

Sources: Public Sénat, 1 July 2024; Public Sénat, 25 June and 3 July 2024; LCP, 3 July 2024; Ipsos-Talan for Le Monde, France Télévisions and Radio France, 3-4 July and 7 July 2024; Ministry of the Interior.



Figure 71. *The republican front in the 2024 legislative elections, from the first round to the second round.*

One clarification must, however, be made. This precedent concerns 577 local contests, where centrist voters were voting for an LFI candidate in their constituency and not for Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Moreover, no centrist leader has so far announced that they would vote for him. Gérald Darmanin did state on 17 November 2026 on LCI that Jean-Luc Mélenchon would win the election against Marine Le Pen, but in order to ask Bruno Retailleau and Gabriel Attal to stand down in favour of Édouard Philippe. For her part, Élisabeth Borne declared on 10 June 2026 that in the event of a duel between the Rassemblement national and La France insoumise, she would vote "for neither one nor the other".

Political leaders: who will actually call for a Le Pen vote?

No candidate of the centre or of the mainstream right eliminated in the first round of a presidential election has called for a vote for the Front national or the Rassemblement national since 2002. All the parties of government called for a vote for Jacques Chirac in 2002, François Fillon called for a vote for Emmanuel Macron in 2017 (with Jean-Luc Mélenchon refusing to give an instruction and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan allying with Marine Le Pen), and Valérie Pécresse announced she would vote for Emmanuel Macron in 2022, while Éric Zemmour called for a vote for Marine Le Pen. The line shifted in the 2024 legislative elections, when Éric Ciotti, then president of Les Républicains, allied with the Rassemblement national and several centrist leaders refused to support LFI candidates, as the following table details.

Table 48. *Known positions of centre and right-wing leaders*

Leader	Known position	Date	Reading for a Mélenchon-Le Pen duel
Édouard Philippe (Horizons)	No vote "for the Rassemblement national candidates, nor for those of La France insoumise"	July 2024	Declared neither-nor, blank vote (LCI, 24 November 2026)
Gabriel Attal (Renaissance)	Withdrawal in favour of candidates who "share the values of the Republic"; "neither the NFP nor LFI can have an absolute majority"	July 2024	Uncertain

Leader	Known position	Date	Reading for a Mélenchon-Le Pen duel
Aurore Bergé (Renaissance)	“I will never call for a vote for La France insoumise”	June 2024	Neither-nor or blank vote
Clément Beaune, Sacha Houlié (presidential camp in 2024)	Barrage against the Rassemblement national “everywhere”, rejection of neither-nor	June-July 2024	Call to defeat Le Pen possible
Les Républicains	No instruction, vote “according to conscience”; Michel Barnier: barrage “against both LFI and the RN”	June 2024	Neither-nor likely
François-Xavier Bellamy (LR)	Names the far left as the main danger	June 2024	Le Pen vote possible
Éric Ciotti	Alliance with the Rassemblement national	Since June 2024	Call to vote Le Pen
Éric Zemmour (Reconquête)	Call to vote Le Pen in the second round of 2022	April 2022	Call to vote Le Pen
Thibault de Montbrial (Concorde)	“Without any hesitation, I will vote for Marine Le Pen” against Mélenchon	15 November 2026	Declared Le Pen vote
Marie-Hélène Thoraval (mayor of Romans-sur-Isère)	Would “very probably” vote Le Pen against Mélenchon	November 2026	Declared Le Pen vote

Sources: Public Sénat (1 July 2024); Le Grand Continent (30 June 2024); Europe 1 (15 November 2026); Le Journal du dimanche (November 2026); BFMTV-RMC (30 June 2026); LCP (25 November 2026). The last column is Le Millénaire's reading, not a statement by those concerned.

As of 25 November 2026, neither Gabriel Attal, nor Bruno Retailleau, nor Dominique de Villepin had said publicly what he would do in a duel between Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen, according to our research. On the other hand, Édouard Philippe declared on 24 November on LCI that he would not choose between La France insoumise and the Rassemblement national, giving no voting instruction and casting a blank vote personally, as did François Bayrou on Franceinfo the same day and Jean-Noël Barrot on TF1 on 25 November. For his part, David Lisnard declared on 30 June on BFMTV that he would vote “for any candidate: RN, even a Macronist” against Jean-Luc Mélenchon, and he repeated this on 22 November. The first stances came in November from right-wing figures announcing that they would vote for Marine Le Pen.

The question is therefore who will actually call for a vote for Marine Le Pen.

Table 49. *Who will call for a Le Pen vote: our deduction, family by family*

Political family	Most likely position	Basis
Reconquête and Éric Ciotti's allies	Call to vote for Marine Le Pen	This is already their line
Right wing of Les Républicains (François-Xavier Bellamy's line), civil society figures	Le Pen vote announced in a personal capacity	Thibault de Montbrial has already announced it
Leadership of Les Républicains, Horizons	“Neither-nor”	2024 line
Renaissance	Split between a left wing that calls for Marine Le Pen's defeat and another part that refuses any call in favour of La France insoumise	Divergent instructions in 2024

Le Millénaire's deduction from past positions; this is not an established fact.

In all likelihood, therefore, none of the main candidates of the central bloc would call for a vote for Marine Le Pen, but none would call for an unconditional vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon either.

In 2002, 2017 and 2022, the candidate facing the far right received explicit calls from his opponents. In 2027, Jean-Luc Mélenchon would at best have the centre's “neither-nor”, already announced by Édouard Philippe, François Bayrou and Jean-Noël Barrot, while part of the right is announcing that it will vote against him. Yet Ensemble voters voted 43% for LFI candidates in 2024, even though Édouard Philippe had asked them not to, which shows that instructions are not everything. However, 43% of French people want first and foremost to prevent the victory of a camp dominated by La France insoumise, against 30% for the Rassemblement national.



Figure 72. *Positions announced by political leaders in the event of a duel between Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen.*

On the left, refusals that turn into endorsements

In June 2024, Raphaël Glucksmann first said he would not join the alliance on the terms set by La France insoumise, before supporting “a union of the left” so that the Rassemblement national “does not win these legislative elections”. Likewise, François Hollande, who opposed Jean-Luc Mélenchon going to Matignon, stood in the 1st constituency of Corrèze. Conversely, Jérôme Guedj refused the Nouveau Front populaire label so as not to “associate himself with LFI's endorsement”. In the second round, 134 Nouveau Front populaire candidates withdrew.

For this election, endorsements of Jean-Luc Mélenchon began before the first round. On 2 October, the Alternative communiste current called for a vote for him from the first round. On 14 October, the communist mayor of Gennevilliers, Patrice Leclerc, announced that 1,500 communists were rallying to him. On 5 November, half of the deputies of the communist

group chose to support him, and on 18 November, Marine Tondelier opened the way to a coalition around his candidacy.

It should be noted, however, that the Socialists are divided. On one side, François Hollande declared on 11 January 2026 on France Inter, when asked about a duel between Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Jordan Bardella: “I always vote against the Rassemblement national.” Likewise, Philippe Brun, a candidate in the Socialist primary, declared on 23 July on CNews: “If there were a second round between the RN and LFI, I would vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon.” On the other side, former first secretary Jean-Christophe Cambadélis indicated on 14 November on RCF that he would lean towards a blank vote, according to PolitiqueMatin, and Yannick Jadot left Les Écologistes on 19 November after Marine Tondelier's outstretched hand. In between, Jérôme Guedj dismisses the hypothesis (“If we get there, it is already lost”, on 30 August on BFMTV) and Raphaël Glucksmann declared on 17 November that Jean-Luc Mélenchon “will lose in the second round to Marine Le Pen”, without saying what he himself would do. We found no public statement by Olivier Faure or Bernard Cazeneuve indicating what he would do in a duel between Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen. Yet only 26 to 30% of Raphaël Glucksmann's voters say today that they would vote for him in this duel. The 2024 precedent shows that these positions can change within a few days when the Rassemblement national is in a position to win, but it does not guarantee that they will change.

Eight readings of the second round

We calculated Jean-Luc Mélenchon's score against Marine Le Pen by applying different sets of vote transfers to the first round projected by the Forecast under the “Philippe alone” hypothesis, without these calculations constituting forecasts.



Figure 73. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon's score against Marine Le Pen according to eight readings of the second round.*

Table 50. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon's score against Marine Le Pen according to the vote transfer hypotheses*

Reading	Hypothesis	Mélenchon's score
Second-round polls	Average of the 26 surveys since May 2026	32.7%
Forecast, central calculation	Edition of 25 November	44.9%
F. Unfavourable	Divided left, centre and right more favourable to Marine Le Pen than in 2024	43.9%
A. 2024 legislative transfers	Centre and right as in 2024, moderate left like Jadot's voters in 2022	49.4%
B. United left	A, with 80% of Glucksmann's voters and 88% of the small left for Mélenchon	50.3%
C. Centrist barrage	B, with 55% of centrist voters for Mélenchon	52.4%
D. Right that does not choose	C, with the mainstream right split evenly	53.4%
E. Mobilisation	D, with 10% additional LFI voters	54.6%

Le Millénaire calculations based on the Forecast's first round (25 November 2026, "Philippe alone" hypothesis) and the transfers measured by Ipsos (second round of 2022) and Ipsos-Talan (2024 legislative elections). Hypotheses detailed in the appendix.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon obtains 49% against Marine Le Pen with the transfers observed in the 2024 legislative elections, 50% if the non-LFI left rallies behind him as it did behind Emmanuel Macron in 2017 and 2022, more than 52% if the centre organises a barrage and nearly 55%

in the best-case scenario. All these readings use the centre's 2024 transfers (43% for the LFI candidate), whereas its voters today declare only 8%.



Calculs Le Millénaire sur le premier tour du Forecast (25/11/2026, hypothèse « Philippe seul ») et les reports mesurés par Ipsos (2022) et Ipsos-Talan (législatives 2024). Hypothèses détaillées en annexe 4. Scénario F (gauche divisée, centre vers Le Pen) : 43,9 %.

Figure 74. *Jean-Luc Mélenchon's score against Marine Le Pen, lever by lever, starting from the transfers observed in the 2024 legislative elections.*

The last variable: the weight of the second-round debate

No model measures the effect of the debate between the two rounds. Marine Le Pen has already taken part in two against Emmanuel Macron, in 2017 and in 2022, whereas it would be Jean-Luc Mélenchon's first.

If we look back at the history of head-to-head debates between Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, they were often very aggressive, but they did not take place in the context of a presidential campaign. It should also be noted that these were not recent debates, since the last one dates back to 23 February 2012. Marine Le Pen had refused to debate Jean-Luc Mélenchon, considering that he had been outrageous towards her.

Another interesting point we can note: **the behaviour of the two candidates during the first-round debates held in 2026**. At this stage, the two candidates do not seem to be targeting each other as their main

opponents and are saving their blows for the representatives of the central bloc. At first sight, this may seem hard to understand, given how much both candidates need to establish this contest.

But it can be explained on both sides. On one side, Jean-Luc Mélenchon needs to weaken the central bloc to prevent the emergence of a candidate who would block his path to the second round, but also to persuade centre-left voters to join the left bloc from the first round, in order to restore parity between the blocs with the national right bloc, as we saw earlier. On the other side, Marine Le Pen has been capitalising on anti-Macronism since 2022, also being the leading political force in opposition to the head of state since 2017. There is also another logic that may underlie this strategic choice by Marine Le Pen: the view that some of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's voters could be useful to her in the second round against a candidate who is an “heir to Macronism”. It should be remembered that in 2017 and in 2022 she reached out to them each time. This is explained by her reading of the dominant cleavage in the French political landscape. According to Marine Le Pen, the dominant cleavage is not a left-right cleavage, but a cleavage between a popular bloc and an elite bloc, to borrow the work of her electoral strategist, the political scientist Jérôme Sainte-Marie. Since she intends to embody the popular bloc against the elite bloc, it is understandable why Marine Le Pen sometimes seems to reach out more to Jean-Luc Mélenchon's voters than to Les Républicains voters.

PRECEDENTS SHOWING THAT A GAP CAN BE CLOSED

Nicolas Sarkozy: six points regained in six months

The closest French precedent to a second round considered lost in advance is that of 2012. In autumn 2011, Nicolas Sarkozy, the unpopular incumbent president, was predicted to be heavily beaten by François Hollande. He polled an average of 38.4% in second-round polls in October 2011, then 42% in November. He then climbed back slowly, with 43.2% in

January, 44.6% in March and 45.1% in April, and the last published poll, BVA's of 2 May, gave him 46.5%. On 6 May, he finally obtained 48.36%, against 51.64% for François Hollande.



Figure 75. *Nicolas Sarkozy's score against François Hollande in second-round polls, 2011-2012, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon's position against Marine Le Pen in November 2026.*

Nicolas Sarkozy therefore regained six points between November and the vote, nearly two of them between the last poll and the result, and yet he was still 1,139,983 votes short. Moreover, the recovery did not come from the centre, where François Bayrou had announced he would vote for Hollande, but from the national right. According to the average of post-election surveys, 51% of Marine Le Pen's first-round voters voted for Nicolas Sarkozy and 23% for François Hollande, despite the “neither-nor” voting instruction given by Marine Le Pen.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon starts from further back than the former President of the Republic, since he stands at 33.5% in the November 2026 polls, where Nicolas Sarkozy was at 42%. He would therefore need a recovery almost three times as strong. On the other hand, he stands at 44.9% in the Forecast, the level of Nicolas Sarkozy in March and April 2012 (44.6% then 45.1%). If we rely on our model rather than the polls, he is therefore in the

position of a candidate who can finish at 48% and must find the last two points elsewhere.



Figure 76. *Pace of recovery Jean-Luc Mélenchon needs between now and the second round, compared with that of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012.*

Lula: behind in the first round, winner in the second

The second precedent is that of Brazil, where Lula finished second in the first round of the presidential election of 4 October 2026 with 45.16% of the vote, against 47.03% for Flávio Bolsonaro, a deficit of 2.22 million votes. Between the two rounds, no survey showed him winning: the last Datafolha poll gave 51% to his opponent, and our own forecast gave him only 49.1% of the vote and 34% chances. Yet he won on 25 October with 51.79% and a lead of 4.43 million votes[31].

In our note on this election, we explain this victory by two factors: voters who had abstained in the first round went to vote in the second, particularly in the Nordeste, and the instructions of the eliminated candidates were not followed. Lula thus went from 2.22 million

[31] Le Millénaire, “Comment Lula a transformé l'impossible en réalité ?” (How Lula turned the impossible into reality), November 2026.

votes behind to 4.43 million ahead in three weeks, something neither the polls nor our model had anticipated.

The Brazilian case cannot be transposed as it stands, since voting there is compulsory and Lula was the incumbent president. It nevertheless reminds us that a mobilised electorate can confound second-round voting intentions, and that instructions carry less weight than is thought, as in 2024 when Ensemble voters voted 43% for LFI candidates.

The radical left abroad

The foreign precedents presented in Part II (Jeremy Corbyn, Bernie Sanders, Die Linke) show that dominance among young people did not translate into victory, for lack of progress among their elders. Conversely, the radical lefts that won a national election (Syriza in Greece in 2015, Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico in 2018, Gustavo Petro in Colombia in 2022) did so against parties of government worn down by power. Jean-Luc Mélenchon today combines both, with 42% among 18-24 year-olds and a central bloc worn down by ten years in power. However, his second-round opponent would not be this central bloc but Marine Le Pen.

The second round remains Jean-Luc Mélenchon's weak point. The national bloc stands at 38.0% in the November polls and the left bloc at 34.4%. This 3.6-point deficit can only be made up in the centre. Several facts work in his favour: the opponent of the Front national and then of the Rassemblement national has always obtained 3 to 7 points more than the final surveys, the barrages of 2015 and 2021 overturned polling gaps, and 43% of Ensemble voters voted for an LFI candidate against the Rassemblement national in 2024. Conversely, 65% of French people consider La France insoumise dangerous for democracy, against 53% for the Rassemblement national, no centrist leader has said they would call for a vote for him, and Ensemble voters today declare 43% for Marine Le Pen and 8% for him. The result will therefore depend on the question these voters ask themselves in May 2027: which of the two candidates is the more dangerous. Thus,

as long as they answer Jean-Luc Mélenchon, as they do today, the leader of La France insoumise will not be able to win.

Electoral history does not allow us to assert that Jean-Luc Mélenchon will win. It does show, however, that a second-round gap measured five months before the vote can narrow: Nicolas Sarkozy went from 42% in November 2011 to 48.36% on polling day, and Lula won with 51.79% when the last Datafolha poll gave his opponent 51%. In both cases, the recovery came from the mobilisation of the candidate's own camp and from unexpected vote transfers from a neighbouring electorate (51% of Marine Le Pen's voters backed Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012).

CONCLUSION: CAN HE BECOME PRESIDENT?

At the end of this long analysis, we can state **that it is possible that Jean-Luc Mélenchon will become the next President of the Republic in 2027**. It is not the most likely scenario, but **our Forecast of 25 November gives him 77.8 chances in 100 of qualifying for the second round and 17.2 chances in 100 of being elected, against 93.8 and 64.5 for Marine Le Pen and 28.5 and 18.3 for Édouard Philippe in the "Philippe alone" hypothesis.**

The 2027 presidential election is decided by direct universal suffrage in two rounds. Jean-Luc Mélenchon's strength lies in the first round. Indeed, **he polls 24.3% in the Forecast and 18.1% on average in the eight November polls, far ahead of Raphaël Glucksmann (11.2%) and Édouard Philippe (11.6%)**, owing to the likelihood of multiple candidacies on the right and in the centre.

The second round remains Jean-Luc Mélenchon's weak point: he is shown losing in every second-round configuration. However, our analysis goes beyond a reading of second-round polls. In the event of a second round against Marine Le Pen, the election will be decided in the centre and on the right. For the many reasons set out in this report (the difference between blocs in the first round, the rise in turnout between the two rounds, the capacity to mobilise abstainers, the behaviour of right-wing and centrist voters in similar configurations in 2024), the election looks set to be extremely close.

Today, in our model, with the vote transfers observed in the 2024 legislative elections, Jean-Luc Mélenchon would obtain 49.4% of the vote, a shortfall of around 380,000 votes, while 7.5 points' worth of Édouard Philippe's voters would abstain or cast a blank ballot. He therefore needs a net lead of 10

points among centrist and right-wing voters if the left unites behind him, and of 31 points if it votes as it says it will today, whereas 2024 Ensemble voters currently declare 43% for Marine Le Pen and 8% for him (OpinionWay, October).

His victory therefore requires three conditions to be met together: **a non-LFI left that unites behind him from the first round (1), a central bloc that refuses to choose Marine Le Pen** (2), and **turnout among young people and in working-class neighbourhoods higher than in 2022** (3). As we noted, such a combination of factors, together with an electoral comeback, is possible even in France: in 2012, Nicolas Sarkozy regained six points between November 2011 and the vote. However, Jean-Luc Mélenchon starts from further behind in the polls (33.5% against 42%) and would need a comeback almost three times as large, but we cannot rule it out at the end of November 2026.

Table 51. *His strengths, his weaknesses and the conditions for his victory*

Type	Finding	Measure
Strength	A base that does not move, whatever the field of candidates	1.7-point gap between his scores within the same survey
Strength	Unprecedented dominance in the generation entering the electorate	42% among 18-24 year-olds
Strength	An urban foothold consolidated over ten years	+18 points in municipalities with more than 50,000 registered voters
Strength	An activist machine that no competitor can match, with the exception of the Rassemblement national	Not quantified
Weakness	The highest rejection rate of the campaign	69% of registered voters rule out voting for him
Weakness	A geography that has shrunk	5,629 rural and working-class municipalities where he is no longer strong
Condition	The non-LFI left unites behind him from the first round, then without reservation in the second	16.2 points in the November polls
Condition	The central bloc refuses to choose Marine Le Pen and some of its leaders call for a vote against her	Ensemble voters: 43% for her, 8% for him
Condition	His electorate turns out more than in 2022, among young people and in working-class neighbourhoods	67.2% turnout among 18-29 year-olds in 2022

Source: previous chapters; Le Millénaire calculations.

Table 52. *The six indicators to watch until 18 April 2027*

Indicator	Level at 25 November 2026
Gap between Raphaël Glucksmann and second place	11.2% against 18.1% for Jean-Luc Mélenchon (averages of the eight November polls)
Share of 2022 voters who say they will vote for him again	53% (Ipsos, September), 82% (Toluna Harris Interactive, early November), then 74% (Toluna Harris Interactive, 18-19 November)
Size of the left bloc and the national bloc	34.4% against 38.0% (eight November polls)
Split of centrist voters between him and Marine Le Pen	8% against 43% among 2024 Ensemble voters (OpinionWay, October)
Share of French people who consider each party dangerous for democracy	La France insoumise 65%, Rassemblement national 53% (Fractures françaises 2026)
Statements by central bloc leaders on the second round	"Neither-nor" from Édouard Philippe (blank vote), François Bayrou and Jean-Noël Barrot; vote against Mélenchon, including for the RN, from David Lisnard; nothing from Gabriel Attal, Bruno Retailleau or Dominique de Villepin

Sources: pollsters' notices, Fractures françaises 2026; Le Millénaire calculations.

Report produced by:

William Thay, President of Le Millénaire

Matthieu Hocque, Director General of Le Millénaire

Photo credit: Jean-Luc Mélenchon via Wikimedia, under licence CC BY 4.0

APPENDIX 1: DATA AND METHOD

Electoral data

The results by municipality for the first round of 2017, the first round of 2022 and the 2024 European elections are those published by the Ministry of the Interior on data.gouv.fr. For 2022, these are the results centralised on 13 April 2022, whose differences from the results proclaimed by the Constitutional Council are negligible at municipal level; the national totals cited in the report are those of the Constitutional Council. The arrondissements of Paris, Lyon and Marseille are treated as municipalities for the 2022 analysis, and the three cities as whole municipalities for the comparisons with 2017 and 2024. Municipalities merged between two elections are not matched, which removes less than 2% of municipalities from the comparisons.

Social data

The characteristics of municipalities come from the 2021 population census (age and occupational structure, qualifications and school enrolment, housing, immigration) and from the 2021 Filosofi file (median disposable income per consumption unit, poverty rate). The poverty rate is published for only 4,395 municipalities; median income is published for 31,303. The share of immigrants is calculated from the detailed Insee table on population by age and immigration status.

Regressions

The regressions are estimated by weighted least squares, each municipality being weighted by its votes cast, with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. The eight variables are entered simultaneously. These models describe associations between the profile of territories and their vote. They do not allow conclusions to be drawn about the behaviour of individuals.

Table 53. *Regressions by municipality: effect of one standard deviation of each variable (in voting points)*

Variable	Mélenchon 2022	Le Pen 2022	Change in Mélenchon 2017-2022	LFI European elections 2024	Glucksmann European elections 2024
Median income (logarithm)	−6.5	+1.8	−1.2	−3.0	−1.6
Share of immigrants	+3.3	−2.3	+2.4	+4.3	−1.0
Share of higher-education graduates	+3.2	−8.0	+1.0	+0.3	+5.1
Share of people aged 60 and over	−2.5	−1.8	−0.9	−2.2	+1.4
Share of social housing (HLM)	+1.3	−1.1	+0.2	+1.2	+0.4
Share of manual workers	−1.2	−0.1	−0.5	−0.8	+0.3
18-24 year-olds not in education	−1.2	+0.3	−0.2	−1.1	+0.2
Students	−0.2	−0.5	0.0	+0.1	+0.6
Benoît Hamon's score in 2017			+1.1		
R^2	0.73	0.69	0.60	0.81	0.49

31,249 to 31,297 municipalities and arrondissements depending on the model. Sources: Ministry of the Interior; Insee. Le Millénaire calculations.

The age model

The age pyramid of voters is reconstructed in three steps. Registered voters by age are those published by Insee on 11 February 2026 in broad age bands, distributed by detailed age according to Eurostat's population by age. Turnout by age is that measured by Insee from the 2022 signed electoral rolls, adjusted to first-round levels by broad age group (67.2% for 18-29 year-olds, 81.7% for 30-64 year-olds, 77.0% for those aged 65 and over). Vote by age is taken from the Ipsos surveys of 2022 and September 2026. Applied to the September 2026 voting intentions, the model returns 15.3% for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, against 15.5% published by the pollster.

The scenarios

The scenarios start from the average of the fifteen polls published between 1 October and 10 November 2026, each poll counting as the average of its hypotheses. With the eighteen polls up to 13 November, this average rises to 17.2%, which does not change the scenarios. Youth mobilisation adds voters aged 18 to 34 who vote

for Jean-Luc Mélenchon at 36%, the weighted average of his voting intentions among 18-24 and 25-34 year-olds. The return of former voters concerns the 30% of 2022 voters who moved to Raphaël Glucksmann, Marine Tondelier or Fabien Roussel according to Ipsos, i.e. 2.05 million votes and 5.4 points of votes cast after accounting for deaths (0.27 million) and a turnout of 92% among 2022 voters. The number of registered voters in 2027 is estimated at 50.6 million and the share of blank and spoilt ballots at 2.2%.

APPENDIX 2: STATUS OF THE MAIN FIGURES

Table 54. Sources and status of the report's main figures

Figure	Source	Status
7,712,520 votes and 21.95% in 2022	Constitutional Council	Published
17.3% on average (October-November 2026)	Fifteen polls, 64 hypotheses	Calculated
42% among 18-24 year-olds	Ipsos bva-Cevipof, September 2026	Published
53% of 2022 voters loyal; 18% to Glucksmann	Ipsos bva-Cevipof, September 2026	Published
83% of 2022 voters loyal	Toluna Harris Interactive, October 2026	Published
+1.1 points among 18-24 year-olds, −6.5 points among those over 35	Age model	Calculated
4.2 million first-time voters	Insee, Focus no. 378; Eurostat	Extrapolated and cross-checked
2.8 million deceased voters	Insee, Focus no. 378	Extrapolated
1.38 million additional registered voters	Insee	Calculated from published figures
67.2% turnout among 18-29 year-olds in 2022; 82.1% in 2007	Insee Première no. 1929	Published
58% turnout among 18-24 year-olds in 2022	Ipsos-Sopra Steria (polling-day survey)	Published
Vote by municipality size, by decile, regressions	Ministry of the Interior, Insee	Calculated
2,792 municipalities where he came first in 2022, 3,396 in 2017	Ministry of the Interior	Calculated
69% ruling out a vote for him; potential of 22.5%	Cluster17 for Politico, October 2026	Published
32% in the second round against Marine Le Pen	Ifop-Fiducial, October 2026	Published
69% of Muslim voters in 2022	Ifop for La Croix	Published
21.9% unemployment among under-25s	Eurostat, September 2026	Published
3.2 million TikTok followers	Favikon, 26 October 2026	Published
Scenarios A to D	Le Millénaire	Calculated

Full references are given in the footnotes.

APPENDIX 3: THE AUTUMN 2026 POLLS

Table 55. *The eighteen first-round polls published between 1 October and 13 November 2026*

Pollster	Fieldwork	Registered voters surveyed	Hypotheses	Mélenchon (range)	Mélenchon (average)	Glucksmann (average)	RN candidate (average)
Odoxa	24 September-7 October	12,005	2	18.0 to 18.5%	18.2%	10.0%	37.5%
Toluna Harris Interactive	5-8 October	2,004	5	18.0 to 19.0%	18.2%	10.3%	36.0%
OpinionWay	13-14 October	1,043	4	14.0 to 15.0%	14.8%	14.2%	35.5%
Ifop	12-14 October	1,390	4	16.0 to 17.0%	16.2%	13.8%	34.2%
YouGov	12-15 October	1,094	5	13.0 to 16.0%	14.8%	12.8%	36.2%
Cluster17	14-15 October	1,263	5	18.0 to 20.5%	19.7%	13.7%	34.4%
Elabe	14-16 October	1,701	6	15.0 to 16.0%	15.5%	15.8%	32.4%
Ifop	17-19 October	1,928	8	15.0 to 20.0%	16.6%	13.8%	36.2%
Toluna Harris Interactive	19-21 October	2,094	5	17.0 to 19.0%	17.4%	12.8%	34.2%
Cluster17	19-22 October	2,817	3	18.5 to 19.5%	19.2%	13.5%	32.0%
OpinionWay	21-22 October	973	1	16.0 to 16.0%	16.0%	13.0%	36.0%
Ipsos	21-22 October	1,500	4	17.0 to 17.0%	17.0%	13.9%	33.1%
Ifop	27-29 October	1,501	4	17.5 to 18.0%	17.6%	11.4%	36.0%
Toluna Harris Interactive	3-5 November	2,101	5	18.0 to 19.0%	18.8%	11.8%	35.4%
Cluster17	9-10 November	1,164	3	19.0 to 20.5%	19.8%	9.7%	29.3%
OpinionWay	9-10 November	982	3	16.0 to 17.0%	16.3%	12.0%	34.0%
OpinionWay	10-12 November	964	2	16.0 to 16.0%	16.0%	10.5%	31.5%

Pollster	Fieldwork	Registered voters surveyed	Hypotheses	Mélenchon (range)	Mélenchon (average)	Glucksmann (average)	RN candidate (average)
Elabe	12-13 November	1,500	6	17.0 to 18.5%	17.5%	13.1%	32.4%

Source: pollsters' notices filed with the Commission des sondages (Polling Commission), as listed in Wikipedia's list of polls; Le Millénaire calculations. The date used is the end of fieldwork.

APPENDIX 4: THE SECOND-ROUND HYPOTHESES

The eight readings of the second round apply transfer rates to the first round projected by the Forecast of 25 November 2026 in the "Philippe alone" hypothesis: Marine Le Pen 30.5%, Jean-Luc Mélenchon 24.3%, Édouard Philippe 19.6%, Raphaël Glucksmann 6.7%, David Lisnard 6.8%, Bruno Retailleau 3.7%, Éric Zemmour 3.3%, Nicolas Dupont-Aignan 2.4%, other left-wing candidates 2.8%. Jean-Luc Mélenchon's score is calculated on second-round votes cast.

Table 56. *Transfer rates used (to Mélenchon, to Le Pen, abstention or blank)*

First-round electorate	Low hypothesis	Central hypothesis	High hypothesis	Reference
Jean-Luc Mélenchon	95 / 1 / 4	95 / 1 / 4	95 / 1 / 4	Convention
Marine Le Pen	1 / 96 / 3	1 / 96 / 3	1 / 96 / 3	Convention
Raphaël Glucksmann	45 / 20 / 35	65 / 8 / 27	80 / 4 / 16	Jadot to Macron in 2022: 65 / 6 / 29 (Ipsos)
Other left-wing candidates	60 / 10 / 30	80 / 5 / 15	88 / 3 / 9	Le Millénaire hypothesis
Édouard Philippe (central bloc)	30 / 25 / 45	43 / 19 / 38	55 / 13 / 32	Ensemble, LFI-RN run-off in 2024: 43 / 19 / 38 (Ipsos-Talan)
Bruno Retailleau, David Lisnard	15 / 50 / 35	26 / 38 / 36	35 / 30 / 35	LR-DVD, LFI-RN run-off in 2024: 26 / 38 / 36 (Ipsos-Talan)
Éric Zemmour	3 / 85 / 12	3 / 85 / 12	3 / 85 / 12	Zemmour to Le Pen in 2022: 73% (Ipsos)
Nicolas Dupont-Aignan	8 / 70 / 22	8 / 70 / 22	8 / 70 / 22	Le Millénaire hypothesis

Le Millénaire calculations. How to read: in the central hypothesis, 65% of Raphaël Glucksmann's voters vote for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, 8% for Marine Le Pen and 27% abstain or cast a blank ballot. Scenario E increases the number of Jean-Luc Mélenchon's voters by 10%. The calculation code is available from Le Millénaire.

These calculations differ from the Forecast on two points. They use only the transfers observed in recent elections, whereas the Forecast combines them

with the voting intentions declared in second-round polls. And they are deterministic: they do not simulate uncertainty. They serve to identify the conditions for a victory, not to measure its probability, which remains that of the Forecast.

Le Millénaire is a think tank specialising in public policy. It brings together around a hundred contributors from a wide range of backgrounds (private-sector executives, civil servants, researchers, business leaders), each an expert in their field.

President: William THAY
Director General: Matthieu HOCQUE
Vice-Presidents: Gilles BÖSIGER and Olivier BODO

Director of Studies: Clément PERRIN
Deputy Directors of Studies: Pierre CLAIRE and Florian GERARD-MERCIER

Communication: communication@lemillenaire.org
Press: presse@lemillenaire.org

To follow all the news from Le Millénaire:
http://lemillenaire.org

***Legal notice**: this report is subject to French and international legislation on copyright and intellectual property. All reproduction rights are reserved to the association « Le Millénaire ». Reproduction of all or part of this report on any medium whatsoever is strictly prohibited without the express permission of the President of the association.*