
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2026: DISTRICT BY DISTRICT

Le Millénaire in-depth note on the House elections of November 3, 2026

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November 1, 2026



> *This document is a translation of the original French text. It may contain errors; the French version is the reference text.*

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

KEY FINDINGS

- Democrats have a 76.7% chance of winning back the House, up from 65.5% on August 1. We expect 228 Democratic seats (90% range: 206 to 251), with the majority set at 218.
- 309 of the 435 districts are already decided: 171 are safe for the Democrats, 138 for the Republicans. No safe Republican district was won by Donald Trump by less than 12.7 points in 2024; no safe Democratic district was lost by Kamala Harris.
- The majority will be decided in 53 districts that we analyze one by one. The 218th seat, the one that makes the majority, is Virginia's 2nd district (Jen Kiggans), where we project a Democratic lead of 1.8 points.
- 22 districts won by Donald Trump in 2024 now lean Democratic: the suburbs of Philadelphia and the Lehigh Valley, Iowa, the Southwest, New York, Virginia, South Texas. In the other direction, there is only one, Brian Fitzpatrick's in Pennsylvania, won by Kamala Harris.
- Mid-decade redistricting costs the Democrats safe seats in Texas, Florida, Ohio and North Carolina. It also creates toss-up districts with large Latino populations, where we will see whether the 2024 shift holds.
- The national environment is worth about 3 points of Democratic share in every district. It is what makes the Democrats the favorites, far more than district polls, which are scarce and often partisan.

Virginia's 2nd district: Donald Trump won it by 0.3 point in 2024, and our projection gives the Democrats a lead of only 1.8 points there. That is where the 218th seat would be decided, if they won every district in which they are favored and lost all the others. Yet the Democrats' chance of winning back the House reaches 76.7% as of October 31, up from 65.5% on August 1. The *Dems* are rising despite mid-decade redistricting, which took safe seats away from them in Texas, Florida, Ohio and North Carolina.

The question we will ask is the following: in which districts will the majority be decided, and why? To answer it, we cross-reference the Le Millénaire forecast with the 2020 and 2024 presidential results recomputed on the 2026 lines. To these we add the reports filed with the Federal Election Commission and district polls, cited with their sponsor.

First comes the national picture: chances of a majority, the rating of all 435 seats, the new maps in Texas, Florida and Ohio. Second, we follow the suburbs and mid-sized cities that make the majority, from Bucks County to Hampton Roads. Third come the Democratic seats to defend and the Republican seats that have been redrawn or have no incumbent. There are also Alaska, Maine and Missouri. Figures without a footnote come from the Le Millénaire forecast, in its October 31, 2026 update, with 200,000 simulations. Vote shares are calculated on the two major parties. One point of Democratic share is worth two points of margin. Our interpretations are in the “Our analysis” sections.

A LIKELY DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY, BUT NOT A DONE DEAL

Republicans hold 218 seats, Democrats 214. The Democrats therefore need four more, net. The model gives them a **76.7% chance** of getting there. It expects **228 seats**, within a range of 206 to 251 in 90% of the simulations. A national polling error, however, would move dozens of districts in the same direction at once.




Figure 1. *House: distribution of Democratic seats across the 200,000 simulations of October 31, 2026.*

On August 1, it was a 65.5% chance and 222.8 expected seats. Since then, the Democratic lead in our generic ballot average has grown from 6.1 to 7.2 points.

The generic ballot is voting intention for a party in the House. Each point gained has moved a few districts from “Lean R” to “Toss-up.” Others have moved from “Toss-up” to “Lean D.”




Figure 2. *Chances of a Democratic majority in the House and the Senate, from August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

HOW OUR MODEL PROJECTS A DISTRICT

For each of the 435 districts, the model starts from the 2024 presidential vote, recomputed on the 2026 lines. It then adds five successive blocks:

- **the local gap**, that is, the district's tendency to vote more or less Democratic for the House than for president, measured on the 2022 and 2024 elections. This is where, in particular, the incumbency advantage is captured;

- **campaign fundraising**, which we calculate from the reports filed with the Federal Election Commission;

- **outside spending** in the district by super PACs and party committees. To this we add a small effect of economic conditions;

- **district polls**, where they exist, the model keeping only those whose fieldwork ended within the last 21 days, with one wave per pollster. Polls sponsored by a campaign, a party or a committee are kept, but corrected for their average bias measured over past cycles (3.5 points of margin taken from

the Democrat when the sponsor is Democratic, 4.4 points taken from the Republican in the opposite case), and the average is further reduced by 2.44 points, the national correction for the historical polling error in favor of the Democrats. This corrected average is finally combined with the structural projection, a single poll weighing 80% of its gap with it and two polls 89%. Tested on the elections from 2014 to 2022, the rule produces breaks when polls are scarce, since a district's projection can shift markedly on the day its only poll drops out of the window;

- **the national environment**, drawn from the generic ballot corrected for the historical polling error, which adds about 3 points of Democratic share to each district, or 6 points of margin.

With this last block, a district that Donald Trump won by about 6 points in 2024 starts out even before any local effect. It tips the suburbs that the president narrowly won in 2024. It also weighs more than everything else in the uncertainty, since with a neutral environment, instead of 3 points of share in the Democrats' favor, twenty districts now projected Democratic would go back to the Republican side.




Figure 3. *House: the 435 districts ranked by projected margin between Democrat and Republican, as of October 31, 2026.*

THE COMPETITIVE RACES, AND WHY THEY ARE COMPETITIVE

Of the 435 districts, 309 are rated “safe” by our model, with one party above a 95% chance. The 138 safe Republican districts were all won by Donald Trump in 2024 by at least 12.7 points (30.3 points at the median), and the 171 safe Democratic districts were all won by Kamala Harris, by 25.8 points at the median. To flip one of them would take an error of more than 15 points of margin, more than triple the largest generic ballot error in the last five midterm elections (4.5 points in 2022).

Table 1. Our rating of the 435 districts

Rating	Districts	2024 presidential margin (min. to max.)	2026 projected margin (min. to max.)
Safe D	171	Harris +1.5 to +78.3	D+14.8 to +84.6
Likely D	30	Trump +10.5 to Harris +12.5	D+6.2 to +14.6
Lean D	15	Trump +18.0 to Harris +2.0	D+2.4 to +5.6
Toss-up	12	Trump +11.9 to Harris +0.6	R+2.0 to D+2.0
Lean R	20	Trump +20.8 to +3.4	R+5.8 to +2.6
Likely R	49	Trump +21.5 to +5.6	R+14.4 to +6.4
Safe R	138	Trump +66.9 to +12.7	R+60.6 to +14.8

Source: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update. Safe: more than a 95% chance; Likely: 75 to 95%; Lean: 60 to 75%; Toss-up: less than 60% for each of the two parties. 2024 presidential margin on the 2026 lines (Harris minus Trump, in points).

Among the competitive races, we must first set aside the **Democratic seats close to presidential parity but held by entrenched incumbents**. Twelve districts safe for the Democrats were won by Kamala Harris by less than 8 points: California 25 (Raul Ruiz), Connecticut 2 (Joe Courtney), Georgia 2 (Sanford Bishop), Illinois 14 (Lauren Underwood), Kansas 3 (Sharice Davids), New Jersey 5 (Josh Gottheimer) and 6 (Frank Pallone), New York 6 (Grace Meng), 18 (Pat Ryan) and 22 (John Mannion), Rhode Island 2 (Seth Magaziner) and Washington 8 (Kim Schrier). In each of them, the incumbent runs ahead of their party's presidential candidate, by 0.7 to 5.8 points of share according to the “Incumbency and recent local vote” element of our model, and the national environment adds about 3 points. Kansas 3 offers the clearest example, since Kamala Harris led there by only 4.2 points while Sharice Davids won 55.6% of the two-party vote in 2024 and our model projects her at 59.6%.

The 49 **“Likely” Republican seats** were won by Donald Trump by 6 to 22 points, and the Democrats have between a 5 and 25% chance there. In a wave like 2018's, their 240th or 250th seats would come from this list, starting with Michigan 4 (Trump +5.6), Michigan 10 (+6.7), Missouri 2 (+8.0), Washington 5 (+11.1), Florida 4 (+12.0), Florida 7 (+12.6), Nebraska 1 (+13.2), Florida 13 (+13.5), Alaska (+13.7), North Carolina 3 (+13.8) and Florida 16 (+13.8).

In 26 of the 50 states, no district offers either party between a 25 and 75% chance. This is the case in Illinois or Georgia. By contrast, nine states alone account for 33 of the 53 districts analyzed here: Florida, Texas, New York, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Ohio, Iowa, Virginia and Michigan.




Figure 4. *House: Democratic chances of winning by district (2026 lines), as of October 31, 2026.*

MID-DECADE REDISTRICTING: WHAT IT GAINS, WHAT IT COSTS

Republican states redrew their districts without waiting for the 2030 census because Donald Trump asked them to. California retaliated in the opposite direction, by referendum, with Proposition 50. In all, nine states are therefore voting on new maps[1].

Table 2. Mid-decade redistricting


State	Map	Expected effect	Harris 2024 districts (2026 lines)	Expected D seats (model)
Texas (38)	signed August 29, 2025	+5 R	8	11.5
California (52)	referendum (Prop 50) of November 4, 2025	+5 D	47	47.0
North Carolina (14)	adopted October 22, 2025	+1 R	3	4.9
Ohio (15)	approved October 31, 2025	+2 R	3	4.9
Utah (4)	court ruling of November 10, 2025	+1 D	1	1.0
Florida (28)	signed May 4, 2026	+4 R	4	7.0
Tennessee (9)	signed May 7, 2026	+1 R	0	0.2
Louisiana (6)	signed May 29, 2026	+1 R	1	1.0
Alabama (7)	2023 map reinstated	+1 R	1	1.2
Missouri (8)	2025 map blocked: vote on the 2022 map	(+1 R planned)	2	2.2
Virginia (11)	referendum struck down May 8, 2026: 2021 map	(+4 D planned)	6	7.1

Sources: Ballotpedia, "Redistricting ahead of the 2026 elections," accessed October 27, 2026, https://ballotpedia.org/Redistricting_ahead_of_the_2026_elections; the Le Millénaire forecast for the last two columns. Expected effect: Ballotpedia estimate at the time of adoption.

Added up from Ballotpedia's estimates, the theoretical balance of these maps is about fifteen seats gained by the Republicans and six by the Democrats, a net Republican gain of nine seats on paper. Experts are more cautious, with Erin Covey of the Cook Political Report expecting a net gain of about three seats, and Christopher Warshaw of Georgetown University eight to ten in a neutral year[2].

[1] Associated Press, "9 states have new US House districts for the midterm elections after Trump urged changes," September 28, 2026, republished by La Nación, https://www.lanacion.com.ar/usa/9-states-have-new-us-house-districts-for-the-midterm-elections-after-trump-urged-changes-nid28092026/.
[2] Georgia Recorder (Jacob Fischler), article of October 19, 2026 republished by the Cobb County Courier, https://cobbcountycourier.com/?p=113769.

Our model makes it possible to measure what these maps actually deliver in the 2026 environment. Take a few examples. In Texas, Kamala Harris would have won only 8 of the 38 redrawn districts, whereas we expect 11.5 Democratic seats there; in Florida, she would have won only 4 of 28, for 7.0 expected seats, and in Ohio 3 of 15, for 4.9. The explanation is the same everywhere. To maximize the number of seats, Republican mapmakers stretched their advantage across as many districts as possible and thereby created districts won by Donald Trump by 9 to 12 points, which would be Republican in a neutral year but become competitive in a year when the national environment adds 6 points of margin to the Democrats, such as Texas 34 and 35, Florida 14, 22 and 25 or Ohio 9 and 15.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, update of 31 October 2026; 2024 presidential vote recomputed within the 2026 lines. Figures above the bars: number of seats.

Figure 5. *The nine redrawn states: share of districts won by Kamala Harris in 2024 and share of Democratic seats expected in 2026.*

This finding has a limit, however, which our profiles detail district by district. Most of these competitive districts have large Latino populations (the Rio Grande Valley in Texas, Miami and Tampa in Florida), precisely where the 2024 vote had swung most toward the Republicans, and our model treats that swing as a given, since it starts from the 2024 result. If it has partly faded, as some district polls suggest, the Democrats could do better than expected there; if it has held, redistricting will have achieved its aim.

THE 53 DISTRICTS THAT MAKE THE MAJORITY


We selected 53 districts for detailed analysis, those where Democratic chances stood between 20 and 80% at the time of selection, in the October 26, 2026 update, plus a few districts more favorable to one side but that draw the attention of the American press or present a particular feature (redistricting, an atypical candidate, an isolated poll). Table 3 ranks them by Democratic chances, and some forty other districts, where the minority party then had between a 10 and 20% chance, are presented more briefly in Table 4.

Table 3. The 53 competitive districts

District	Democrat	Republican	2024 presidential	Projection	D chances
TX-28	Henry Cuellar	Tano Tijerina	Trump +10.5	D+12.0	91%
NJ-09	Nellie Pou	Rosie Pino	Trump +1.2	D+7.4	80%
AZ-06	JoAnna Mendoza	Juan Ciscomani	Trump +0.8	D+5.6	73%
NY-03	Tom Suozzi	Mike LiPetri	Trump +4.3	D+5.4	73%
CO-08	Manny Rutinel	Gabe Evans	Trump +1.9	D+5.4	73%
NM-02	Gabe Vasquez	Greg Cunningham	Trump +1.8	D+5.4	73%
IA-03	Sarah Trone Garriott	Zach Nunn	Trump +4.5	D+4.6	70%
CA-22	Randy Villegas	David Valadao	Trump +1.9	D+4.2	68%
TX-34	Vicente Gonzalez	Eric Flores	Trump +10.2	D+4.0	67%
NV-03	Susie Lee	Martin O'Donnell	Trump +0.7	D+3.8	67%
IA-01	Christina Bohannan	Mariannette Miller-Meeks	Trump +8.6	D+3.4	65%
WI-03	Rebecca Cooke	Derrick Van Orden	Trump +7.5	D+3.2	64%
PA-07	Bob Brooks	Ryan Mackenzie	Trump +3.2	D+2.8	62%
NJ-07	Rebecca Bennett	Thomas Kean Jr.	Trump +1.2	D+2.6	61%
MI-07	William Lawrence	Tom Barrett	Trump +1.3	D+2.4	61%
TX-15	Bobby Pulido	Monica De La Cruz	Trump +18.0	D+2.4	60%
AZ-01	Amish Shah	Jay Feely	Trump +3.1	D+2.0	59%
VA-02	Elaine Luria	Jen Kiggans	Trump +0.3	D+1.8	58%
OH-01	Greg Landsman	Eric Conroy	Trump +2.6	D+1.6	57%
PA-08	Paige Cognetti	Rob Bresnahan	Trump +8.6	D+1.0	55%
PA-10	Janelle Stelson	Scott Perry	Trump +5.3	D+0.2	51%
NY-17	Cait Conley	Mike Lawler	Harris +0.6	D+0.0	50%
MT-01	Sam Forstag	Aaron Flint	Trump +11.9	R+0.2	49%
NC-11	Jamie Ager	Jennifer Balkcom	Trump +9.6	R+0.4	48%
CO-05	Jessica Killin	Jeff Crank	Trump +9.3	R+1.2	45%
NY-01	Chris Gallant	Nick LaLota	Trump +10.2	R+1.2	45%
OH-09	Marcy Kaptur	Derek Merrin	Trump +10.7	R+1.6	43%
PA-01	Bob Harvie	Brian Fitzpatrick	Harris +0.3	R+2.0	41%
ME-02	Matthew Dunlap	Paul LePage	Trump +9.2	R+2.6	39%

District	Democrat	Republican	2024 presidential	Projection	D chances
FL-25	Jared Moskowitz	Scott Singer	Trump +9.2	R+2.8	38%
WA-03	Marie Gluesenkamp Perez	John Braun	Trump +3.4	R+2.8	38%
IN-05	J. D. Ford	Victoria Spartz	Trump +17.1	R+2.8	38%
TX-35	Johnny Garcia	Carlos De La Cruz	Trump +10.6	R+3.0	37%
FL-14	Kathy Castor	Mike Beltran	Trump +10.6	R+3.2	36%
FL-22	Pia Dandiya	Casey Askar	Trump +10.4	R+4.0	33%
VA-01	Shannon Taylor	Rob Wittman	Trump +5.0	R+4.0	33%
VA-05	Tom Perriello	John McGuire	Trump +12.4	R+4.0	33%
IA-02	Lindsay James	Joe Mitchell	Trump +10.1	R+4.0	33%
NC-01	Don Davis	Laurie Buckhout	Trump +11.6	R+4.2	32%
WI-01	Mitchell Berman	Bryan Steil	Trump +4.6	R+4.4	32%
OH-15	Don Leonard	Mike Carey	Trump +10.1	R+4.8	29%
KY-06	Zach Dembo	Ralph Alvarado	Trump +15.3	R+5.2	28%
MN-01	Jake Johnson	Brad Finstad	Trump +12.2	R+5.2	28%
NY-21	Blake Gendebien	Anthony Constantino	Trump +20.8	R+5.8	26%
MO-02	Fred Wellman	Ann Wagner	Trump +8.0	R+6.4	24%
MI-04	Sean McCann	Bill Huizenga	Trump +5.6	R+6.4	24%
FL-13	Leela Gray	Anna Paulina Luna	Trump +13.5	R+6.6	23%
AZ-02	Jonathan Nez	Eli Crane	Trump +15.1	R+6.8	23%
FL-07	Bale Dalton	Ryan Elijah	Trump +12.6	R+6.8	22%
FL-04	LaShonda Holloway	Aaron Bean	Trump +12.0	R+7.0	21%
MI-10	Christina Hines	Mike Bouchard	Trump +6.7	R+8.0	19%
AK-00	Eric Hafner	Nick Begich III	Trump +13.7	R+10.8	11%
GA-07	Tony Kozycki	Rich McCormick	Trump +22.3	R+20.8	1%

Source: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; candidates according to the model's reference file (see the profiles for corrections). 2024 margin: presidential on the 2026 lines.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, update of 31 October 2026. Diagonal: projection equal to the 2024 presidential result.

Figure 6. *House: 2024 presidential margin and 2026 projected margin, by district (as of October 31, 2026).*

The scatter plot gives the measure of the election. Almost all districts sit above the diagonal, our projection being more Democratic than the 2024 presidential vote by 6 points of margin on average, which corresponds to the national environment. The exceptions are districts where a popular Republican incumbent or heavy Republican spending offsets that environment, such as Pennsylvania's 1st district, or redrawn districts for which the model has no local history favorable to the Democrats. The points farthest from the diagonal call for particular scrutiny, starting with New York's 21st district, which Donald Trump won by 20.8 points and where a fundraising term of 9.6 points of margin, which we consider doubtful, still brings Democrat Blake Gendebien to within 5.8 points of the Republican in our model (see his profile).




Figure 7. *House: districts where our model's favorite is not the winner of the 2024 presidential election, as of October 31, 2026.*

THE SECOND-TIER DISTRICTS

Forty-two other districts gave the minority party, in the October 26, 2026 update, between a 10 and 20% chance. On the Democratic side, these are suburban seats narrowly won by Kamala Harris and held by incumbents such as Frank Mrvan in Indiana or Emilia Sykes in Ohio, or California seats made more Democratic by Proposition 50; on the Republican side, districts won by Donald Trump by 8 to 15 points, in Florida, North Carolina, Ohio and the West. They do not decide the majority in the central scenario, but it is on this list that the scale of a wave, in one direction or the other, would be measured.

Table 4. The second-tier districts (minority party between a 10 and 20% chance as of October 26, 2026)

District	Democrat	Republican	2024 presidential	Projection	D chances
NH-02	Maggie Goodlander	Lily Tang Williams	Harris +3.6	D+14.2	95%

District	Democrat	Republican	2024 presidential	Projection	D chances
IN-01	Frank Mrvan	Barb Regnitz	Harris +0.4	D+10.8	89%
OH-13	Emilia Sykes	Carey Coleman	Harris +3.3	D+10.8	88%
CA-45	Derek Tran	Chuong Vo	Harris +4.1	D+9.8	87%
MI-08	Kristen McDonald Rivet	Thomas Smith	Trump +2.0	D+9.8	86%
NY-04	Laura Gillen	Jeanine Driscoll	Harris +1.3	D+9.6	86%
CA-13	Adam Gray	Kevin Lincoln	Harris +0.4	D+9.4	85%
CT-05	Jahana Hayes	Chris Shea	Harris +5.7	D+9.4	85%
NE-02	Denise Powell	Brinker Harding	Harris +4.7	D+9.0	84%
MI-03	Hillary Scholten	Terri DeBoer	Harris +8.0	D+8.8	84%
OR-04	Val Hoyle	Monique DeSpain	Harris +12.5	D+8.6	84%
NV-01	Dina Titus	Carrie Buck	Harris +2.3	D+8.2	82%
CA-48	Marni von Wilpert	Jim Desmond	Harris +3.5	D+6.2	76%
NH-01	Stefany Shaheen	Anthony DiLorenzo	Harris +2.0	D+4.8	70%
CO-03	Dwayne Romero	Jeff Hurd	Trump +10.0	R+2.6	39%
OH-07	Brian Poindexter	Max Miller	Trump +11.2	R+4.6	30%
OH-10	Kristina Knickerbocker	Mike Turner	Trump +7.9	R+5.4	27%
FL-09	Darren Soto	Dan Green	Trump +17.9	R+7.4	21%
NC-03	Raymond Smith Jr.	Greg Murphy	Trump +13.8	R+7.4	20%
TX-09	Leticia Gutierrez	Alex Mealer	Trump +20.0	R+7.4	20%
FL-16	Kelly Kirschner	Sydney Gruters	Trump +13.8	R+7.6	20%
NV-02	Teresa Benitez-Thompson	David Flippo	Trump +14.3	R+8.0	19%
AL-02	Shomari Figures	Rhett Marques	Trump +14.5	R+8.2	18%
AZ-08	Bernadette Greene-Placentia	Abraham Hamadeh	Trump +16.5	R+8.2	18%
NY-02	Patrick Halpin	Andrew Garbarino	Trump +14.1	R+8.8	16%
WA-05	Carmela Conroy	Michael Baumgartner	Trump +11.1	R+9.2	15%
NC-14	Lakesha Womack	Tim Moore	Trump +15.2	R+9.4	15%
NC-07	Kimberly Hardy	David Rouzer	Trump +14.0	R+9.4	14%
NE-01	Chris Backemeyer	Mike Flood	Trump +13.2	R+9.6	14%
FL-11	James Pericola	Joe Strada	Trump +15.8	R+10.0	13%
TX-23	Katy Padilla Stout	Brandon Herrera	Trump +15.0	R+10.0	13%
OH-08	Vanessa Enoch	Warren Davidson	Trump +15.8	R+10.2	13%
FL-12	Kimberly Overman	Gus Bilirakis	Trump +15.6	R+10.6	12%
NC-13	Paul Barringer	Brad Knott	Trump +16.7	R+10.6	12%
SC-02	Zyon Khalifa	Joe Wilson	Trump +14.1	R+10.8	12%
FL-08	Jennifer Jenkins	Mike Haridopolos	Trump +16.4	R+10.8	11%
CO-04	Eileen Laubacher	Lauren Boebert	Trump +18.7	R+10.8	11%
FL-18	Curtis Gibson	Scott Franklin	Trump +17.1	R+10.8	11%
NC-06	Cyril Jefferson	Addison McDowell	Trump +17.4	R+11.0	11%
MD-01	Dan Schwartz	Andy Harris	Trump +17.3	R+11.2	10%
MN-08	Trina Swanson	Pete Stauber	Trump +14.5	R+11.6	10%
NJ-02	Zack Mullock	Jeff Van Drew	Trump +12.7	R+15.6	4%

Source: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; candidates according to the model's reference file.

Our analysis

Even if they lost all the redrawn Latino districts in Texas and Florida, the Democrats would keep the advantage, since their majority is built in some twenty suburban districts that Trump had won by one to five points in 2024, provided the national environment holds; according to our “Polling errors” tool, a 2016-style error would bring them down to 73.7%, a 2020- or 2024-style error to 15.4% or 14.5%.

THE EASTERN CORRIDOR: PENNSYLVANIA, NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY AND VIRGINIA

This section and the next three cover 27 districts, that is, nineteen seats held by Republicans (two of them with no incumbent) and eight Democratic seats, which are for the most part those our model gives to the Democrats with a 50 to 80% chance and which therefore make the majority in the central scenario. As in the rest of the note, figures without a footnote come from the Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026; the projected Democratic share is the Democratic candidate's share of the vote for the two main candidates, one point of share being equivalent to two points of margin between them.

Table 5. The 27 districts of the next four sections in our model

District	Candidates (D vs. R)	2024 presidential	Projected D share	D chances	Cook (10/23)
PA-01	Harvie vs. Fitzpatrick (incumbent)	Harris +0.3	49.0%	41%	Lean R
PA-07	Brooks vs. Mackenzie (incumbent)	Trump +3.2	51.4%	62%	Lean D
PA-08	Cognetti vs. Bresnahan (incumbent)	Trump +8.6	50.5%	55%	Toss-up
PA-10	Stelson vs. Perry (incumbent)	Trump +5.3	50.1%	51%	Lean D
NY-17	Conley vs. Lawler (incumbent)	Harris +0.6	50.0%	50%	Toss-up
NY-21	Gendebien vs. Constantino (open seat)	Trump +20.8	47.1%	26%	Lean R
NJ-07	Bennett vs. Kean Jr. (incumbent)	Trump +1.2	51.3%	61%	Lean D
VA-01	Taylor vs. Wittman (incumbent)	Trump +5.0	48.0%	33%	Toss-up
VA-02	Luria vs. Kiggans (incumbent)	Trump +0.3	50.9%	58%	Lean D
IA-01	Bohannan vs. Miller-Meeks (incumbent)	Trump +8.6	51.7%	65%	Lean D
IA-03	Trone Garriott vs. Nunn (incumbent)	Trump +4.5	52.3%	70%	Lean D
MN-01	Johnson vs. Finstad (incumbent)	Trump +12.2	47.4%	28%	Lean R
WI-03	Cooke vs. Van Orden (incumbent)	Trump +7.5	51.6%	64%	Lean D
MI-07	Lawrence vs. Barrett (incumbent)	Trump +1.3	51.2%	61%	Toss-up
AZ-01	Shah vs. Feely (open seat)	Trump +3.1	51.0%	59%	Lean D
AZ-06	Mendoza vs. Ciscomani (incumbent)	Trump +0.8	52.8%	73%	Lean D
CO-08	Rutinel vs. Evans (incumbent)	Trump +1.9	52.7%	73%	Lean D
CA-22	Villegas vs. Valadao (incumbent, redrawn)	Trump +1.9	52.1%	68%	Toss-up

District	Candidates (D vs. R)	2024 presidential	Projected D share	D chances	Cook (10/23)
TX-15	Pulido vs. De La Cruz (incumbent, redrawn)	Trump +18.0	51.2%	60%	Toss-up
NC-01	Davis (incumbent, redrawn) vs. Buckhout	Trump +11.6	47.9%	32%	Toss-up
TX-28	Cuellar (incumbent, redrawn) vs. Tijerina	Trump +10.5	56.0%	91%	Likely D
OH-01	Landsman (incumbent, redrawn) vs. Conroy	Trump +2.6	50.8%	57%	Likely D
WA-03	Gluesenkamp Perez (incumbent) vs. Braun	Trump +3.4	48.6%	38%	Lean D
NY-03	Suozzi (incumbent) vs. LiPetri	Trump +4.3	52.7%	73%	Likely D
NJ-09	Pou (incumbent) vs. Pino	Trump +1.2	53.7%	80%	Likely D
NM-02	Vasquez (incumbent) vs. Cunningham	Trump +1.8	52.7%	73%	Lean D
NV-03	Lee (incumbent) vs. O'Donnell	Trump +0.7	51.9%	67%	Likely D

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; Cook Political Report, ratings of October 23, 2026, via 270toWin (https://270towin.com/2026-house-election/table/cook-political-report-2026-house-ratings). 2024 presidential: margin on the 2026 lines, calculated from Kamala Harris's share of the vote for the two main candidates.

Before turning to the districts, we need to spell out what our model does with district polls, since they are the main source of the gaps between our figures and those of the American press. In the House, it keeps all polls whose fieldwork ended within the last 21 days, with only one wave per pollster. Polls sponsored by a campaign, a party or a PAC are kept and corrected for their average bias, measured over past elections (3.5 points of margin taken from the Democratic candidate when the sponsor is Democratic, 4.4 points added to the Democrat when it is Republican), then for a pollster- and state-specific effect, and the resulting average is further reduced by 2.44 points, the historical polling error in favor of the Democrats. The model then moves the structural margin by a fraction n/(n+0.25) of its distance from that average, n being the number of polls retained (80% for one poll, 89% for two), and the Democratic share moves by half of that shift.

The rule was tested on the elections from 2014 to 2022. When polls are scarce, the projection jumps on the day a poll enters the window and on the day it leaves it. In the October 26, 2026 update, our district poll database was moreover frozen as of October 16, and several important October polls were missing from it, including the NYT/Siena Pennsylvania series (fieldwork completed October 22) and polls published after October 16 in Texas 15, Michigan 7, Texas 28, New York 21, Virginia 1, Ohio 1 and North Carolina 1. We

had redone the calculation for each with the model's formula. Table 6 gives the effect of each poll taken in isolation, all else being equal, without a new full run of the model. In the October 31, 2026 update, the polling term moved in most of these districts: in Texas 15, Texas 28, Pennsylvania 10, Virginia 1 and Ohio 1, the projection roughly matches our calculation; in Michigan 7, the polling term remains zero; in Pennsylvania 1, 7 and 8, New York 21 and North Carolina 1, the projection is more Republican than our calculation.

Table 6. October polls missing from our poll database as of October 26 (frozen as of October 16), for the 27 districts of the next four sections, and their effect according to our calculation

District	Poll (fieldwork)	Result	Projected D share: model as of October 26, then with the poll	D chances: model as of October 26, then with the poll
PA-01	NYT/Inquirer/Siena (October 16 to 22)	Harvie 48, Fitzpatrick 46	49.7 then 50.2%	47 then about 52%
PA-07	NYT/Inquirer/Siena (October 16 to 22)	Brooks 49, Mackenzie 44	51.9 then 51.9%	66% (unchanged)
PA-08	NYT/Siena (October 16 to 22) and Emerson for Poll Vault (October 12 to 14)	Cognetti 51-46 and 52-48	51.7 then 51.8%	65 then about 66%
PA-10	NYT/Siena (October 16 to 22) and Susquehanna (October 5 to 11)	48-48 and Stelson 49-46	51.8 then 50.0%	66 then about 50%
TX-15	Texas Southern University (October 13 to 16)	Pulido 51, De La Cruz 44	44.7 then 51.1%	12 then about 60%
MI-07	Emerson for Poll Vault (October 12 to 14)	Lawrence 53, Barrett 45	51.2 then 53.3%	60 then about 77%
NY-21	PPP, Democratic pollster (October 12 and 13)	Constantino 46, Gendebien 44	52.0 then 49.3%	67 then about 44%
TX-28	DCCC, Democratic internal (October 7 to 13)	Cuellar 54, Tijerina 34	50.0 then 55.8%	50 then about 90%
VA-01	PPP for House Majority PAC (October 21 and 22)	Taylor 47, Wittman 46	50.9 then 48.1%	58 then about 33%
OH-01	Quantus Insights (October 19 to 21)	Landsman 47, Conroy 42	52.5 then 50.8%	71 then about 57%
NC-01	RedBox Research (October 20 to 23), sponsor not established	Davis 45.3, Buckhout 43.5	53.1 then 51.0% (independent) or 50.0% (Democratic sponsor)	76 then about 59% or about 50%

Sources: polls, see the profiles; Le Millénaire calculation with the model's formula (21-day window as of October 26, pollster, state and sponsor corrections, national correction of 2.44 points). Chances: order of magnitude, estimated with a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 4.45 points of share calibrated on the model's outputs, not with a new simulation.

Contrary to a widespread intuition, these polls do not all push toward the Democrats. Where the district's structure and the national environment already gave the Democrat a lead of 3 to 5 points, a poll that finds the same

lead, or a smaller one once corrected, changes nothing or lowers their chances, as in Pennsylvania 10, Ohio 1, North Carolina 1 and Virginia 1, where the PPP poll commissioned by House Majority PAC is in addition corrected by 3.5 points against the Democrat. A poll only changes the projection markedly where it contradicts the structure, in Texas 15, Texas 28 and Michigan 7 in the Democratic direction, and in New York 21 in the Republican direction. As for the Christopher Newport University poll in Virginia 2 (Luria 46, Kiggans 43), sometimes cited as missing from our data, it is indeed included.

Table 7. Candidate money in 23 of the 27 districts (not available for PA-08, NJ-09, NM-02 and NV-03)

District	Democrat: raised / cash on hand	Republican: raised / cash on hand	As of	Fundraising edge
PA-01	2.90 / 0.72	7.77 / 2.39	9/30	R
PA-07	4.99 / 1.29	5.17 / 2.18	9/30	even
PA-10	6.36 / n/a	5.19 / n/a	6/30	D
NY-17	10.71 / 0.95	10.32 / 1.96	10/14	even
NY-21	7.66 / 0.36	14.46 / 2.30	10/14	R
NJ-07	4.27 / 1.45	4.89 / 3.63	6/30	R
VA-01	4.60 / 0.60	5.43 / 0.80	10/14	R
VA-02	8.04 / 0.48	7.59 / 1.29	10/14	even
IA-01	9.91 / 2.11	9.10 / 1.70	10/14	D
IA-03	8.07 / 1.15	6.12 / 0.62	10/14	D
MN-01	2.00 / 1.01	2.03 / 1.28	7/22	even
WI-03	12.68 / 0.45	9.10 / 1.17	10/14	D
MI-07	4.16 / 0.63	8.24 / 1.04	10/14	R
AZ-01	5.65 / 0.21	3.80 / 0.18	10/14	D
AZ-06	11.24 / 0.81	7.65 / 0.62	10/14	D
CO-08	9.46 / 1.00	7.25 / 1.33	10/14	D
CA-22	2.65 / 0.57	4.93 / 3.37	6/30	R
TX-15	6.21 / 1.37	6.55 / 0.80	9/30	even
NC-01	5.81 / 0.83	4.79 / 1.44	10/14	D
TX-28	2.99 / 1.05	1.78 / 0.21	9/30	D
OH-01	5.55 / 1.50	2.21 / 0.33	9/30	D
WA-03	6.29 / 2.06	2.21 / 1.27	7/15 and 8/18	D
NY-03	7.16 / 4.99	2.32 / 0.88	9/30	D

Sources: Federal Election Commission, data compiled by Wikipedia ("2026 United States House of Representatives elections in" pages followed by the name of each state, accessed October 27, 2026); for PA-10, Ballotpedia News, August 3, 2026; for MN-01, NJ-07, CA-22 and WA-03, predictionedge.com based on the FEC. In millions of dollars, cycle totals. n/a: not available in our sources.

The model's fundraising term compares only the itemized individual contributions reported to the FEC by the two candidates, based on a relationship estimated on 2010, 2014 and 2018, and it does not apply in redrawn

districts. Outside spending, entered into the calculation on October 16, makes up almost on its own the “layers” of the breakdown for the 27 districts, even though the figures file it under “incumbency, quality, redistricting.”

Nine districts stretch from Philadelphia to Hampton Roads, from affluent suburbs where the Democratic vote slipped in 2024 to working-class towns such as Scranton or York. Democrats are favored in four, with a 55 to 62% chance; Pennsylvania's 10th and New York's 17th are at 51 and 50%, and Republicans are favored in New York's 21st, Virginia's 1st and Pennsylvania's 1st, a district won by Kamala Harris.




Figure 8. *Pennsylvania: margin between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump by county in 2024 (large map), shift between 2020 and 2024, and net vote balance by county (proportional circles).*

The Pennsylvania map shows where four of these districts will be decided. Between 2020 and 2024, the east of the state shifted toward Donald Trump more sharply than the west: Bucks County went from a Joe Biden lead of 4.4

points to a Trump lead of 0.1 point, Lehigh from a 7.6- to a 2.7-point Democratic lead, Northampton from a 0.7-point Democratic lead to a 1.8-point Republican lead, Lackawanna (Scranton) from an 8.4- to a 2.8-point Democratic lead and Monroe from a 6.4-point Democratic lead to a 0.8-point Republican lead, while Luzerne (Wilkes-Barre) went from a 14.4- to a 19.2-point Republican lead. In the Harrisburg area, the movement is weaker, with Dauphin losing 2.6 points and York 0.7, while Cumberland even moved 1.1 points toward the Democrats[3]. These figures apply to whole counties, some of which are split among several districts.

Pennsylvania's early vote offers a clue at the statewide level. As of October 21, 724,599 mail ballots had been returned, roughly as many as at the same stage in 2022 (730,100), 67.0% of them by registered Democrats and 24.1% by registered Republicans, compared with 72.6% and 19.5% on the same date in 2022, and 59.9% and 30.0% in 2024[4]. The Democratic lead in the mail vote (42.9 points) is therefore smaller than in 2022 (53.1 points), but clearly larger than in 2024 (29.9 points). It should nonetheless be borne in mind that the composition of this vote also depends on the parties' guidance on how to vote, and that it does not, on its own, measure a preference.

PA-01: BOB HARVIE VS. BRIAN FITZPATRICK (INCUMBENT)

Brian Fitzpatrick would narrowly hold the seat according to our model. The incumbent has long run ahead of the Republican presidential candidate, and that premium almost entirely cancels out the national environment favorable to the Democrats.

[3] Official presidential results by county, 2020 and 2024, compiled by T. McGovern (github.com/tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.
[4] Pennsylvania Department of State, ballots returned as of October 21, 2026 (data.pa.gov), Le Millénaire compilation; for 2024: https://data.pa.gov/resource/3q5t-ddp8.json.




Figure 9. *PA-01 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

PA-01 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Harris won by 0.3 point
Bucks County, 2020 then 2024	Democratic lead of 4.4 points, then Republican lead of 0.1 point
House 2022	Fitzpatrick reelected; Ehasz at 45.1% of the two-party vote
House 2024	Fitzpatrick 56.4%, a lead of about 13 points
2025 county elections	Democrats won by about 10 points
Democratic primary	Harvie 65.1%, Simonelli 34.9%
Money as of September 30	Fitzpatrick: $7.77 million raised, $9.81 million spent, $2.39 million cash on hand; Harvie: $721,019 cash on hand
Polls in the database	GSG (D), August 5-9: Fitzpatrick 47, Harvie 43; GQR (D), August 19-23: 49-48; POS (R), September 11-14, 400 registered voters: 49-40
Poll outside the database as of October 26	NYT/Philadelphia Inquirer/Siena, October 16-22, 400 likely voters: Harvie 48, Fitzpatrick 46[5]
Projection	Democratic share 49.0%, Fitzpatrick lead of 2.0 points
Harvie's chances	41%

[5] RealClearPolling, "Pennsylvania 1st District: Harvie vs. Fitzpatrick," accessed October 27, 2026, https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/house/general/2026/pennsylvania/district-1/harvie-vs-fitzpatrick; sample size according to pollsmax, https://www.pollsmax.com/2026-us-house/pennsylvania-1/.

Indicator	Value
With the Siena poll (our calculation as of October 26)	Democratic share 50.2%, chances of about 52%
Breakdown	Effect on the expected margin, in points: national environment +7.2; district voting history +1.8; incumbency and recent local vote −7.4; fundraising +0.8; district polling −1.6; other data used −0.5; poll bias correction −2.3
Change in chances	44% (August 1), 23.3% (September 1), 33.6% (September 15), 32.2% (October 1), 46.5% (October 15), 37.4% (October 28), 40.9% (October 31)
Ratings	Cook, Sabato, Inside Elections: Lean R (October 23, 20 and 15)
Markets	Polymarket: Fitzpatrick winning at 55 to 60%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 1st district covers all of Bucks County and part of Montgomery County, north of Philadelphia[6]. Its boundaries have not changed since 2022. In 2024, Donald Trump became the first Republican to carry Bucks since the 1980s[7]. Fitzpatrick, for his part, won comfortably in a district that Harris carried. The following year, the Democrats took back the county offices.

Candidates and campaign

Bob Harvie chairs the Bucks County Board of Commissioners. He won the primary by talking about health care and the minimum wage. Brian Fitzpatrick is a former FBI agent. He voted against the “One Big Beautiful Bill” and for the SAVE Act. Donald Trump does not endorse him, a unique case among Pennsylvania's Republicans in the House (PoliticsPA). The money tilts clearly toward the incumbent, who has even spent more than he has raised.

Polls and model

The three polls in our database from August and September have dropped out of the 21-day window. The latest, Siena's, has Harvie ahead instead. **In the October 26, 2026 update, our district poll database was frozen as of October 16; this poll, conducted October 16 to 22, was not in it.** Taken in isolation, the Siena poll would have flipped the favorite according to our calculation. In the October 31, 2026 update, however, the polling term is no

[6] Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Pennsylvania,” accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Pennsylvania.
[7] PoliticsPA, “Can Bob Harvie end Brian Fitzpatrick's tenure in Congress?” March 31, 2026, https://politicspa.com/can-bob-harvie-end-brian-fitzpatricks-tenure-in-congress/146005/.

longer zero and takes 1.6 points of margin away from Harvie, whose chances fall to 41%.




Figure 10. *Pennsylvania, district 1: published polls and our model's projection (margin between Democrat and Republican), from August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

The figure shows how the window works. When the Global Strategy Group poll enters, on August 9, Harvie's chances drop: sponsored by his own side, it shows him losing, and the model corrects it by a further 3.5 points against him. They recover when it leaves. The exit of the Republican poll, on October 6, lifts them from 32% to 46%. After that, and until October 26, only the structure counts; on October 27 and 28, a polling term unfavorable to Harvie brings his chances back to 37%, and they stand at 41% as of October 31.




Figure 11. *Pennsylvania, district 1: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

This is the most telling breakdown in the chapter. The “Incumbency and recent local vote” element measures the Fitzpatrick effect in his 2022 and 2024 races, and on its own it wipes out the entire national environment. Fundraising helps Harvie a little: the model compares his individual contributions with what is expected against an incumbent.

Our analysis

Fitzpatrick is the only Republican our model favors in a district won by Kamala Harris. That status rests on a single variable, his ability to attract Democratic voters. Will this premium withstand an environment unfavorable to his party? We think so, even if the Siena poll suggests it is eroding. Harvie is 1.0 point short; with the environment unchanged, he would need the premium to fall from 3.7 to 2.7 points. On November 3, Bucks will be the place to watch. We estimate that Harvie wins if he surpasses Harris's score there, and that Fitzpatrick is reelected if he holds his opponent to around 45.1% of the two-party vote, Ehasz's level in 2022.

PA-07: BOB BROOKS VS. RYAN MACKENZIE (INCUMBENT)

The Lehigh Valley forms one of the most evenly balanced districts in the state. The national environment alone is enough to make Democratic candidate Bob Brooks our model's favorite.




Figure 12. *PA-07 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, shaded by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

PA-07 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump won by 3.2 points
Lehigh County	Democratic lead down from 7.6 to 2.7 points
Northampton County	From a 0.7-point Democratic lead to a 1.8-point Republican lead
Carbon County	Republican lead up from 32.0 to 34.8 points
House 2022	Democrat at 51.0% of the two-party vote
House 2024	Mackenzie elected with 50.5%
Democratic primary	Brooks 41.0%, Crosswell 21.3%, McClure 19.9%, Obando-Derstine 17.8%
Money as of September 30	Mackenzie: $5.17 million raised, $2.18 million cash on hand; Brooks: $4.99 million raised, $1.29 million cash on hand
Polls outside the window	Franklin & Marshall, September 9-20, 357 registered voters: Brooks 45, Mackenzie 40; GBAO (D), early July: 47-43
October poll	NYT/Siena, October 16-22: Brooks 49, Mackenzie 44[8]
Projection	Democratic share 51.4%, a 2.8-point lead
Brooks's chances	62.0% on October 31; between 64.8% (October 1) and 71.1% (September 15)
Breakdown	National environment +7.2; district voting history −1.7; incumbency and recent local vote +1.3; fundraising +1.2; district polling −1.2; other data used −1.7; poll bias correction −2.3 (in points of margin)
Ratings	Cook, Sabato: Lean D; Inside Elections: Tilt D
Markets	Polymarket: Brooks winning at 85 to 88%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 7th District takes in Lehigh, Northampton, Carbon and a small part of Monroe, within unchanged boundaries. The swing toward Trump was visible in 2024 in each of the three whole counties. Mackenzie took the seat that same year, two years after a Democratic win.

Candidates and campaign

Bob Brooks won a four-way Democratic primary. He spent 20 years as a firefighter in the city of Bethlehem and rose through the union ranks to become president of the Pennsylvania Professional Fire Fighters Association. To flip the district and win over the Hispanic vote (a quarter of residents), the Brooks campaign is betting on an "ordinary citizen" image[9]. Ryan Mackenzie is the Republican candidate seeking reelection. To maximize his chances of reelection, Mackenzie is appearing alongside party leaders who travel to the district. For example, Speaker of the House Mike Johnson came to campaign

[8] RealClearPolling, "Pennsylvania 7th District: Brooks vs. Mackenzie," accessed October 27, 2026, https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/house/general/2026/pennsylvania/district-7/brooks-vs-mackenzie.
[9] Bob Brooks. (2026). https://www.cityandstatepa.com/prediction-markets/candidates/bob-brooks

with him in August 2026[10]. Andrew Tupone, barred by a court ruling from the Green Party ballot line, is campaigning as a *write-in candidate*. On money, they are neck and neck.

Polls and model

The Franklin & Marshall poll dropped out of the projection on October 12. The October Siena poll has Brooks ahead by 5 points. **In the October 28 update, our district polling database was refreshed: a polling term now enters the projection and, as of October 31, takes 1.2 points off Brooks's lead.**




Figure 13. *Pennsylvania, District 7: decomposition of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

The breakdown is balanced. Democrats did slightly better than Harris in 2022 and 2024, hence a small boost in their favor from the recent local vote. Polls, other data used and the bias correction weigh in the other direction, and it is the national environment that makes the difference.

[10] 2026 midterm election races to watch - 2026 - Hubbard, Linton, Yilek, Walsh. CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/2026-midterm-election-races/

Our analysis

This is the simplest case in Pennsylvania. Structure, polls and ratings all point the same way. Mackenzie's only path is a better-than-expected environment for Republicans, or Democratic demobilization in Lehigh and Northampton. **On election night, watch Lehigh.** A return toward Joe Biden's 7.6-point lead in 2020 would, in our view, seal Brooks's victory. A lead limited to 2 or 3 points would reopen the race.

PA-08: PAIGE COGNETTI VS. ROB BRESNAHAN (INCUMBENT)

Of the Pennsylvania districts that Democrats are favored to win, the 8th is the most favorable to Donald Trump. Yet Paige Cognetti leads there in our model, thanks to the legacy of the former Democratic member and to the national environment.




Figure 14. *PA-08 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, shaded by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

PA-08 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump 54.0%, Harris 45.0%[11]
Lackawanna County	Democratic lead down from 8.4 to 2.8 points
House 2022	Cartwright (D) reelected with 51.2%
House 2024	Bresnahan elected with 50.7%
Contributions as of September 30	Cognetti $4.99 million, Bresnahan $1.58 million (model's FEC files)
Earlier Democratic polls	Lake Research, Impact Research, PPP: Cognetti ahead by 1 to 2 points
October poll	Emerson College for Poll Vault, October 12-14, 396 likely voters: Cognetti 52, Bresnahan 48[12]
October poll	NYT/Siena, October 16-22, 400 likely voters: Cognetti 51, Bresnahan 46[13]
Projection	Democratic share 50.5%, a 1.0-point lead
Cognetti's chances	55%; 60.0% on August 1, 54.7% on October 31
Breakdown	National environment +7.2; district voting history −7.1; incumbency and recent local vote +4.0; fundraising +1.7; district polling −2.4; other data used +0.1; poll bias correction −2.3 (in points of margin)
Markets	Polymarket: Cognetti winning at 82 or 83%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 8th District covers northeastern Pennsylvania, around the Wyoming Valley and the Poconos. Lackawanna, Scranton's county, swung sharply toward Trump in 2024.

Yet Democrat Matt Cartwright long held the seat, until his 2024 defeat to Rob Bresnahan (Ballotpedia).

Candidates and campaign

Paige Cognetti, mayor of Scranton, faces incumbent Rob Bresnahan Jr. In 2019, she made local history by becoming the first woman elected mayor of the city. Democrats accuse Bresnahan of having concealed a private helicopter. By summer 2025, 54% of voters had already heard about it in a poll commissioned

[11] Ballotpedia, "Pennsylvania's 8th Congressional District election, 2026," accessed October 27, 2026, https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania%27s_8th_Congressional_District_election,_2026.
[12] US Polling Data, "PA-08," accessed October 27, 2026, https://uspollingdata.com/races/house/pa-08/.
[13] RealClearPolling, "Pennsylvania 8th District: Cognetti vs. Bresnahan," accessed October 27, 2026, https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/house/general/2026/pennsylvania/district-8/cognetti-vs-bresnahan.

by House Majority PAC[14]. The core of his campaign is common sense versus madness. In August 2026, at a large rally in Wilkes-Barre, Bresnahan appeared alongside Speaker of the House Mike Johnson to capitalize on the backing of the party's national apparatus and to portray Democrats as his polar opposites, out of touch with economic reality[15]. Money tilts toward Cognetti, by more than three to one. Her main campaign argument, moreover, rests on her financial management. She brought Scranton out of "financially distressed" status, restoring a solid credit rating for the city while securing more than $155 million in federal funding[16].

Polls and model

The two most recent polls put Cognetti ahead. **In the October 28 update, our district polling database was refreshed: a polling term now enters the projection and, as of October 31, takes 2.4 points off Cognetti's lead.**




Figure 15. *Pennsylvania, District 8: decomposition of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

[14] House Majority PAC, press release of September 2, 2025, https://www.thehousemajoritypac.com/news/new-hmp-polling-shows-rob-bresnahan-trailing-paige-cognetti-in-pa-08.
[15] Bresnahan. (2026). https://bresnahan.house.gov/Robert Paul Bresnahan Jr.. (2026). https://www.cityandstatepa.com/prediction-markets/candidates/robert-paul-bresnahan-jr Ballotpedia. (2026). Pennsylvania's 8th Congressional District election, 2026. https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania%27s_8th_Congressional_District_election,_2026
[16] Paige Gebhardt Cognetti. (2026). https://www.cityandstatepa.com/prediction-markets/candidates/paige-gebhardt-cognetti

District voting history weighs heavily, and three contributions offset it: the national environment, the recent local vote and fundraising. Polls and the bias correction take back part of that. Polymarket is far more confident than the model (RealClearPolling).

Our analysis

Is the white working-class vote of northeastern Pennsylvania returning to the Democrats without Donald Trump on the ballot? The October polls suggest so. Yet Cognetti has never run here before. The 4.0 points of margin from the recent local vote come from Cartwright's wins, and they may not carry over to her. A Republican lead in Luzerne cut below 15 points, compared with 19.2 in 2024, would in our view be a strong signal.

PA-10: JANELLE STELSON VS. SCOTT PERRY (INCUMBENT)

Narrowly beaten in 2024, Janelle Stelson faces Scott Perry again. The October polls, now taken into account, bring the race back to a tie in the model, as our calculation anticipated.




Figure 16. *PA-10 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, shaded by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

PA-10 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump 52.0%, Harris 47.0%
County shifts in 2024	Dauphin: -2.6 points of Democratic margin; York: -0.7; Cumberland: +1.1
House 2022	Perry 53.8%, Daniels 46.2%
House 2024	Perry 50.5%, Stelson 49.3%, a margin of about 5,100 votes
Money as of June 30	Stelson $6.36 million raised, Perry $5.19 million (Ballotpedia News)
Contributions as of September 30	Stelson $5.43 million in itemized individual contributions, Perry $2.42 million (model's FEC files)
Poll in the database	Franklin & Marshall, September 24, 390 registered voters: Stelson 47, Perry 44
October polls	Susquehanna, October 5-11, 300 likely voters: Stelson 49, Perry 46; NYT/Siena, October 16-22, 404 likely voters: tied at 48%[17]
Projection	Democratic share 50.1%, with the October polls
Stelson's chances	51%, with the October polls
Change in chances	58%, then 68% when the poll dropped out on October 12; 63% on October 16
Breakdown	National environment +7.2; district voting history −3.8; incumbency and recent local vote +2.3; fundraising +1.1; district polling −3.6; other data used −0.8; poll bias correction −2.3 (in points of margin)
Ratings	Cook, Sabato: Lean D; Inside Elections: Toss-up

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 10th District, around Harrisburg and York, lies in the south-central part of the state[18]. In 2024, Dauphin, Harrisburg's county, and York swung toward Trump. Cumberland went the other way. Perry, for his part, held the seat by a very thin margin against Stelson (Ballotpedia).

Candidates and campaign

Their only debate took place on October 14 on WHTM ABC27. Stelson called Perry an "architect" of January 6. Perry responded that this was "a flat-out lie"[19]. On October 19, a Perry ad claimed that Stelson had exposed herself to a

[17] 270toWin, "Pennsylvania District 10 polls," accessed October 27, 2026, https://www.270towin.com/2026-house-polls/pennsylvania/district-10; RealClearPolling, https://www.realclearpolling.com/polls/house/general/2026/pennsylvania/district-10/stelson-vs-perry.

[18] Ballotpedia, "Pennsylvania's 10th Congressional District election, 2026," accessed October 27, 2026, https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania%27s_10th_Congressional_District_election,_2026.

[19] Perry and Stelson face each other again, this time with an independent as well, Isabelle Harman. Stelson worked for more than 30 years as a journalist and star news anchor on the local station WGAL-TV. That career gives her enormous name recognition and a high level of trust among residents of central Pennsylvania. Her political path is also unusual: she is a former moderate Republican turned Democrat. Scott Perry is the Republican incumbent. He served for 39 years in the Pennsylvania Army National Guard and is an Iraq War veteran. City & State Pennsylvania, "PA-10 debate night: Scott Perry and Janelle Stelson spar over economy, Iran war and elections," October 2026, https://www.cityandstatepa.com/politics/2026/10/pa-10-debate-night-scott-perry-and-janelle-stelson-spar-over-economy-iran-war-and-elections/416604/.

neighbor's granddaughter. The Philadelphia Inquirer found no evidence, and some Republicans also criticized the spot. Stelson is considering a defamation suit[20].

Polls and model

Until October 26, only one poll had counted. Its exit from the window pushed Stelson's chances up, then third-quarter filings and outside spending brought them back down. The two October polls, since added to the database, have pulled the race toward a tie.




Figure 17. *Pennsylvania, District 10: decomposition of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

In 2024, Stelson had done better than Harris, with 49.4% of the two-party vote, so the recent local vote works in her favor. So does fundraising. In our reading, the tie found by Siena indicates that the national environment is not playing out fully here, or that Perry retains a base that his past races do not capture.

[20] Philadelphia Inquirer, October 22, 2026, https://www.inquirer.com/politics/pennsylvania/scott-perry-attack-ad-congress-stelson-20261022.html.




Figure 18. *Pennsylvania, District 10: Democratic chances in our model, from August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

Our analysis

With the Susquehanna and NYT/Siena polls, the race has become a toss-up again. On election night, Cumberland will give the signal. It is the only county in the area that moved toward the Democrats in 2024, and the October 19 ad may cost Perry moderate Republicans there. If Stelson improves on her 2024 showing there, she wins.

NY-17: CAIT CONLEY VS. MIKE LAWLER (INCUMBENT)

Kamala Harris won New York's 17th District. The projection rests on that starting point and on the national environment, but a polling term now brings it back to a tie. With Mike Lawler's personal premium, Cait Conley is no longer the favorite: the race is a toss-up.




Figure 19. *NY-17 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, shaded by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

NY-17 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Harris ahead by 0.6 point
Incumbent	Mike Lawler (Republican), one of only three Republicans in the 119th Congress elected in a Harris district[21]
House 2022 and 2024	Lawler narrowly defeats Sean Patrick Maloney in 2022[22], then is reelected with 52.2% in 2024, about 6 points better than the presidential margin
2020-2024 swing by county	Rockland from a 1.7-point Democratic lead to an 11.8-point Republican lead; Putnam from a 7.9- to a 13.7-point Republican lead; Westchester loses 10 points of Democratic margin
Democratic primary	Conley 49.6%, Davidson 31.8%, Phillips-Staley 15.3%
Total spending in the race	more than $32.7 million according to Punchbowl News[23]
Money raised as of October 14	Conley $10.71 million, Lawler $10.32 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Lawler $1.96 million, Conley $0.95 million

[21] Sabato's Crystal Ball, January 16, 2025, https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/the-2024-crossover-house-seats-overall-number-remains-low-with-few-harris-district-republicans/, cited by Wikipedia.
[22] Newsweek, October 14, 2026, https://www.newsweek.com/how-midterm-forecast-maps-compare-previous-elections-12565502.
[23] Punchbowl News, October 6, 2026, https://punchbowl.news/article/campaigns/blockbuster-house-races/, cited by Wikipedia.

Indicator	Value
Emerson College (September 27-29, 400 likely voters)	Conley 48, Lawler 46
McLaughlin & Associates, Republican (September 28-30)	Lawler 50, Conley 47[24]
July polls	co/efficient (Republican): Lawler ahead by 5 points; FM3 for House Majority PAC (Democratic): Conley ahead by 6
Conley's chances	50%, projected Democratic share 50.0%, Conley ahead by less than 0.1 point
Breakdown	national environment plus 7.2; district voting history plus 2.1; incumbency and recent local vote minus 1.4; fundraising plus 0.9; district polling minus 4.8; other data used minus 1.6; poll bias correction minus 2.3 (in points of margin)
Change in chances	From 74.8% to 62.7% when the late-September polls entered; polling term at zero from about October 21 to 27; 49.8% on October 28; 50.1% on October 31
Ratings	Cook, Sabato and Inside Elections: Toss-up
Kalshi	Conley winning at 61%[25]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 17th District occupies the lower Hudson Valley, with all of Rockland and Putnam counties, northern Westchester County and a small part of Dutchess[26]. Few Republicans have been elected in a district won by Harris. Lawler is one of them.

[24] Emerson College Polling, October 1, 2026, https://emersoncollegepolling.com/ny-17-2026-poll/; New York Post, October 2, 2026, https://nypost.com/2026/10/02/us-news/gop-rep-mike-lawler-leads-dem-cait-conley-in-battleground-ny-house-district-new-internal-poll/.
[25] predictionedge.com, "New York District 17," accessed October 27, 2026, https://www.predictionedge.com/elections/us-house/new-york-district-17-race-winner-by-party/.
[26] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in New York," 17th District section, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_New_York.




Figure 20. *New York: margin between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump by county in 2024 (large map), shift between 2020 and 2024, and net vote margin by county (proportional circles).*

The 2024 swing was severe in Rockland, more modest in Putnam. Lawler, for his part, ran well ahead of Trump that same year.

Candidates and campaign

A former adviser at the federal cybersecurity agency (CISA), Cait Conley defeated Beth Davidson, a Rockland County legislator, in the primary. The two candidates debated on September 28 on News 12 Hudson Valley. Fundraising is evenly matched. Lawler, however, has twice as much cash on hand.

Polls and model

The two late-September polls, one independent and the other from a Republican pollster, pushed Conley down in the model. They left the window around October 21. Since October 28, a polling term again weighs on the projection, worth 4.8 points of margin in Lawler's favor as of October 31.




Figure 21. *New York, District 17: decomposition of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

The recent local vote takes off only 1.4 points, despite Lawler's overperformance in 2024. The model measures it over a series of elections, and the 2022 district is not comparable: New York redrew its map between 2022 and 2024. The national environment accounts for most of the rest, but polls and the bias correction cancel it out.

Our analysis

We believe our projection is somewhat optimistic for Conley. The local margin probably underestimates Lawler's premium; he ran 6 points ahead of Trump in 2024. The two late-September polls point the same way. Everything hinges on Rockland.

NY-21: BLAKE GENDEBIEN VS. ANTHONY CONSTANTINO (OPEN SEAT)

In a district Donald Trump won comfortably, the model now gives the edge to Republican Anthony Constantino. The Siena poll, which had carried Democrat Blake Gendebien, dropped out of the 21-day window on October 28. The projection remains fragile: it still hinges on a fundraising term whose underlying data need to be verified.




Figure 22. *NY-21 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, shaded by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

NY-21 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump ahead by 20.8 points; Harris share used by the model 39.6%
Open seat	Elise Stefanik, reelected with 62.1% in 2024, is not running again
2024 swing by county	Clinton from a 5.2-point Democratic lead to a 2.2-point Republican lead; St. Lawrence from an 11.7- to an 18.0-point Republican lead; Warren from 0.2 to 4.2; Herkimer from 30.5 to 36.4
Republican primary	Constantino 59.2%, Smullen 40.3%
Democratic primary	Gendebien 64.6% against Stuart Amoriell
Money raised as of October 14	Constantino $14.46 million, Gendebien $7.66 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Constantino $2.30 million, Gendebien $364,012
Itemized individual contributions (model's FEC file)	Gendebien $2.74 million, Constantino none
Gendebien's chances	26%, projected Democratic share 47.1%, trailing by about 6 points
Breakdown	national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 19.3; incumbency and recent local vote minus 0.5; fundraising plus 9.6; district polling minus 0.2; other data used minus 0.2; poll bias correction minus 2.3 (in points of margin)
Siena poll in the model, until October 28	Raw lead of 4 points, 8.75 after state and pollster adjustments, 6.31 after the national adjustment; structure alone had Constantino ahead by 6.0

Indicator	Value
Change in chances	16.2% on October 1; 45% before Impact Research dropped out, 66.9% on October 26, 25.5% on October 28, 25.8% on October 31
With the October 12-13 PPP poll	Democratic share 49.3%, chances of about 44% (our calculation)
Without Siena, after October 28	About 47% Democratic share, chances on the order of 25%
Ratings	Cook, Sabato and Inside Elections: Lean R
Kalshi	Constantino winning at 67%[27]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 21st District covers the North Country and the Adirondacks, along with part of the Mohawk Valley and the Capital Region: Glens Falls, Lake George, Plattsburgh, Potsdam, Herkimer and Rome. It is a district of rural areas and small towns. Trump gained ground everywhere in 2024, to the point of flipping Clinton County.

Candidates and campaign

Anthony Constantino, head of the company Sticker Mule, was a candidate in the 2025 special election, which was canceled[28]. He defeated the establishment candidate, State Assemblyman Robert Smullen, in the primary. A dairy farmer, Blake Gendebien was the Democratic candidate in that same special election.

Money is flowing overwhelmingly to the Republicans. The model nonetheless reads it the opposite way, since the FEC file it uses records no itemized individual contributions for Constantino. Self-funding, unitemized funds or a matching error in our file? We were unable to verify. In any case, a term of this size in such a Republican district should be read with caution.

Polls and model

The 21st District is one of the most heavily polled on the map, with eight polls published since late May, gathered in Table 8.

[27] predictionedge.com, “New York District 21,” accessed October 27, 2026, https://www.predictionedge.com/elections/us-house/new-york-district-21-race-winner-by-party/.
[28] WNYT, November 24, 2025, https://wnyt.com/top-stories/sticker-mule-ceo-anthony-constantino-launches-bid-for-ny-21-seat/, cited by Wikipedia.


Table 8. New York, District 21: polls since May 2026

Pollster (sponsor)	Fieldwork	Sample	Constantino	Gendebien	In our database
PPP (Democratic)	Oct. 12-13	613 LV	46	44	no
Siena	Sept. 30-Oct. 6	496 LV	42	46	yes, dropped out Oct. 28
Impact Research (Democratic)	Sept. 29-Oct. 4	500 LV	48	45	yes, dropped out Oct. 26
PPP (Democratic)	Sept. 9-10	557 RV	48	43	yes, outside the window
Impact Research (Democratic)	Aug. 30-Sept. 2	500 LV	47	44	yes, outside the window
J.L. Partners	Aug. 15-17	500 LV	50	40	yes, outside the window
SurveyUSA	Aug. 4-8	612 LV	39	43	yes, outside the window
Impact Research (Democratic)	May 26-31	500 LV	45	44	no (earlier)

Source: Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in New York," accessed October 27, 2026, and the primary sources cited (Times Union, Watertown Daily Times, Politico, SurveyUSA, J.L. Partners). "In our database": poll included in the model's data as of October 31.


Constantino leads in six of the eight polls, including all five sponsored by Democrats. Gendebien pulls ahead only twice: with SurveyUSA in August, then with Siena in early October[29]. Yet as of October 26, only that Siena poll still counted. The exit of Impact Research had been enough to make Gendebien jump in a single update, and Siena's exit, on October 28, brought him back down to 25.5%. The October 12-13 PPP poll, shared on X on October 21[30], **was not in our district polling database as of October 26**. In any case, Gendebien has lost his position as favorite.

[29] Times Union, October 9, 2026, https://www.timesunion.com/state/article/constantino-gendebien-poll-data-22469290.php, cited by Wikipedia.
[30] Post on X of October 21, 2026, https://x.com/cjwarnke/status/2112877284684341727, cited by Wikipedia; not verified against the primary source.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Polls: polls cited in the note, one dot per poll at its field end date. Forecast: recomputed day by day with the polls completed by each date. House: margin between the two main parties; only polls completed in the previous 21 days enter the model (internal polls corrected for their bias), hence the breaks in the forecast.

Figure 23. *New York, District 21: published polls and our model's projection (margin between Democrat and Republican), from August 1 to October 31, 2026.*



Source: Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update. D (or I) − R margin in points; each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin (breakdown published on the website). The total is the forecast margin.

Figure 24. *New York, District 21: decomposition of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

The Siena poll, now outside the window, no longer counts. Fundraising (plus 9.6 points of margin) only partly offsets district voting history (minus 19.3), and the structure puts Constantino back in front.

Since October 28, with no new poll, the projection has fallen back on the structure, still including the fundraising points we doubt. The model, the ratings and the market now all see Constantino winning.

Our analysis

Gendebien is not the favorite in our view, and has no longer been the favorite in the model since the Siena poll dropped out. He still keeps nearly 10 points of margin there from fundraising, drawn from data that are probably incomplete. Six of the eight polls have Constantino ahead, including those from Gendebien's own side. The open seat and Gendebien's profile as a dairy farmer make the race more open than Trump's score would suggest. We expect instead a Republican win by a few points.

NJ-07: REBECCA BENNETT VS. THOMAS KEAN JR. (INCUMBENT)

New Jersey's 7th District ranks 214th in our ranking, four places from the seat that would decide the majority if Democrats won every district where they are more favored and lost all the others. Rebecca Bennett starts as a slight favorite there.




Figure 25. *NJ-07 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, shaded by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

NJ-07 in numbers

Indicator	Value
Rank in our ranking	214th seat; the majority seat, the 218th, is Virginia's 2nd District
Incumbent	Thomas Kean Jr. (Republican)
2024 presidential	Trump ahead by 1.2 points
House 2024	Kean reelected with 51.8% to 46.4%
Counties in 2024	Sussex from a 19.5- to a 24.9-point Republican lead; Passaic loses 19.4 points of Democratic margin, Bergen 13.0
Money raised as of June 30	Kean $4.89 million, Bennett $4.27 million
Cash on hand as of June 30	Kean $3.63 million, Bennett $1.45 million
Itemized individual contributions used by the model	Bennett $3.27 million, Kean $1.73 million (June 30); Bennett reports $5.96 million as of September 30
StimSight Research (September 8-12)	Bennett 47, Kean 42; not in the projection
Bennett's chances	61%, projected Democratic share 51.3%, a 2.6-point lead
Breakdown	national environment plus 7.1; district voting history plus 0.3; incumbency and recent local vote minus 2.4; fundraising plus 1.6; district polling zero; other data used minus 1.8; poll bias correction minus 2.3 (in points of margin)
Change in chances	58.0% on October 16, 61.2% on October 31
Ratings	Cook and Sabato: Lean D
Kalshi	Bennett winning at 92%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 7th District covers northwestern and central New Jersey, including Sussex County[31], the most Republican part of the district. Kean ran ahead of Trump in 2024, hence a local margin that works against Bennett.

Candidates and campaign

On Rebecca Bennett's campaign, our sources say only one thing: Donald Trump endorsed Kean at the start of early voting. Kean did not file a third-quarter report. The model therefore sticks to itemized contributions as of June 30, even though Bennett reported far more at the end of September.

[31] predictionedge.com, "New Jersey District 7," accessed October 27, 2026, https://www.predictionedge.com/elections/us-house/new-jersey-district-7-primary/.

Polls and model

No poll enters the projection, not even the StimSight Research poll, which had Bennett ahead in September.




Figure 26. *New Jersey, District 7: decomposition of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

The national environment outweighs the recent local vote, other data used and the poll bias correction. Bennett's chances dipped in mid-October, then rose again.

Our analysis

Kalshi and the ratings see Bennett as the favorite, far more clearly than our model does. The difference lies mainly in Kean's local premium and in the other data used by the model. There is also 2024: Passaic and Bergen swung sharply to the right. If that swing is reversed, Bennett wins comfortably. If it holds, Kean can hang on.

VA-01: SHANNON TAYLOR VS. ROB WITTMAN (INCUMBENT)

The Richmond suburbs moved toward the Democrats in 2024. The other data used by the model also work in Shannon Taylor's favor, worth 4.1 points of margin. The polls, which take more than 5 points off her, nonetheless make the incumbent the favorite in Le Millénaire's model.




Figure 27. *VA-01 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, shaded by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

VA-01 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump ahead by 5.0 points
Incumbent	Rob Wittman (Republican), in office since the 2007 special election, reelected in 2024 with 56.3%
Governor 2025	Abigail Spanberger carries the district
Suburban counties in 2024	Chesterfield from a 6.7- to a 9.0-point Democratic lead; James City from 4.8 to 6.2; Hanover from a 26.8- to a 25.8-point Republican lead; Henrico stable, at a 29-point Democratic lead
Rural counties in 2024	Westmoreland (Colonial Beach) from an 8.2- to a 14.3-point Republican lead
Democratic primary	Taylor 52.8% in a seven-candidate field, Salaam Bhatti 19.9%
Money raised as of October 14	Wittman $5.43 million, Taylor $4.60 million
DCCC, Democratic internal	Wittman 47, Taylor 46; adjusted by 3.5 points against Taylor; dropped out October 9
Washington Post and Schar School (609 likely voters)	Taylor 50, Wittman 46[32]; dropped out October 20
PPP for House Majority PAC (October 21-22)	Taylor 47, Wittman 46[33]; now in the database, it brings her chances down to about 33%
Taylor's chances	33%, projected Democratic share 48.0%, trailing by 4.0 points
Breakdown	national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 3.5; incumbency and recent local vote minus 4.4; fundraising plus 0.9; district polling minus 5.8; other data used plus 4.1; poll bias correction minus 2.3 (in points of margin)
Change in chances	34.4% on August 1; from 42% to 53% when the DCCC poll dropped out; 32.8% on October 31
Ratings	Cook and Sabato: Toss-up (Sabato previously Lean R); Inside Elections: Lean R

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 1st District stretches along the western shore of the Chesapeake Bay and into the Richmond suburbs: western Henrico and Chesterfield counties, Mechanicsville, Williamsburg and Colonial Beach[34]. It begins in York County[35]. It keeps its 2022 boundaries. The Supreme Court of Virginia struck down, on May 8, 2026, the map adopted by referendum[36].

[32] Washington Post, October 1, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/documents/c5cba6fd-7edb-4550-93c3-0580e8084bfb.pdf, cited by Wikipedia; Political Wire, October 1, 2026, https://politicalwire.com/2026/10/01/two-virginia-districts-shift-left/.
[33] Post on X of October 23, 2026, https://x.com/cjwarnke/status/2113633843999605102, cited by Wikipedia; predictionedge.com, https://www.predictionedge.com/elections/us-house/virginia-district-1-race-winner-by-party/.
[34] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Virginia," 1st District section, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Virginia.
[35] WTVR, October 4, 2026, https://www.wtvr.com/news/virginia-politics/virginia-1st-congressional-district-wittman-faces-toughest-reelection-battle-oct-4-2026.
[36] KPBS/NPR, May 8, 2026, https://www.kpbs.org/news/politics/2026/05/08/court-rejects-virginia-redistricting-in-a-blow-to-democrats-counter-to-trump-gop.

It is one of the few districts in this note where the suburbs swung toward the Democrats in 2024. The rural counties moved to the right, and Trump still won the district. Abigail Spanberger's victory in the 2025 governor's race made Rob Wittman a target for the first time.


Candidates and campaign

Shannon Taylor has been Henrico County's Commonwealth's Attorney since 2012. She was the first woman elected to the post. The campaign turned harsher in October, and the station WAVY fact-checked attacks from both camps. It deems unverifiable the claim that Wittman's wealth grew fortyfold. It does, however, rate as accurate the charge that he reported stock trades in 2023 past the STOCK Act's 30-day deadline. The criticism aimed at Taylor is accurate as well: in 2020 she cofounded a group of progressive prosecutors that favored cutting police budgets, a group she in fact left over that issue[37].

Polls and model


The DCCC internal poll, once adjusted, weighed against its own side's candidate. Its exit from the window on October 9 put Taylor ahead in the model. **As of October 28, our district polling database was refreshed; the PPP poll, released on October 23, is now included.** Commissioned by House Majority PAC, it is adjusted against Taylor and pushed her down sharply: Wittman is back ahead in the model.

[37] WAVY, "Truth Tracker: 1st District congressional race," October 2, 2026, https://www.wavy.com/news/politics/truth-tracker/truth-tracker-1st-district-congressional-race/amp/.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Polls: polls cited in the note, one dot per poll at its field end date. Field end inferred from the date the poll left the 21-day window: DCCC, Washington Post/Schar School. Forecast: recomputed day by day with the polls completed by each date. House: margin between the two main parties; only polls completed in the previous 21 days enter the model (internal polls corrected for their bias), hence the breaks in the forecast.

Figure 28. *Virginia, District 1: published polls and our model's projection (margin between Democrat and Republican), from August 1 to October 31, 2026.*



Source: Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update. D (or I) − R margin in points; each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin (breakdown published on the website). The total is the forecast margin.

Figure 29. *Virginia, District 1: decomposition of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

The recent local vote reflects Wittman's track record; he runs far ahead of Republican presidential candidates. The other data used nearly offset it. Third-quarter filings show a clear Democratic advantage, surpassed in this chapter only by Minnesota's 1st. The ratings had moved in the same direction as the model, except Inside Elections.

Our analysis

The race looks to us like a true toss-up. The last two polls give Taylor only a thin lead, and Wittman keeps his local premium. Taylor needs Chesterfield and western Henrico to continue their 2024 swing. Wittman is counting on the rural counties. **On election night, Chesterfield is the first place to watch.**

VA-02: ELAINE LURIA VS. JEN KIGGANS (INCUMBENT)

The Christopher Newport University poll has Elaine Luria ahead by 3 points. It is indeed in our data. Yet it lowers her chances instead of raising them. The model remains on her side, narrowly, against Jen Kiggans.




Figure 30. *VA-02 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, shaded by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

VA-02 in numbers

Indicator	Value
Boundaries and Cook index	Unchanged since 2022; partisan index EVEN (Wikipedia, Virginia page)

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump narrowly, with Tim Kaine winning the Senate race the same day
Democratic lead in Virginia Beach	5.4 points in 2020, 2.7 in 2024
Democratic lead in Chesapeake	6.4 points in 2020, 3.8 in 2024
House 2022 and 2024	Kiggans defeats Luria in 2022, then reelected with 50.7%
Democratic primary	Luria 80.3%
Money raised as of October 14	Luria $8.04 million, Kiggans $7.59 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Kiggans $1.29 million, Luria $0.48 million
Wason Center, Christopher Newport University (October 1-10, 702 likely voters)	Luria 46%, Kiggans 43%, undecided 10%; 19% have already voted
Concerns and approval (same poll)	Cost of living 24%, democracy 20%, immigration 11%; Trump approved by 33%[38]
Tulchin Research for House Majority PAC (July)	Tied at 47%
Luria's chances	58%; 65% before October 10, 56% on that day
Projected Democratic share	50.9%, Luria ahead by 1.8 points
Breakdown	national environment plus 7.2; district voting history plus 1.2; incumbency and recent local vote minus 2.1; fundraising plus 0.7; district polling minus 2.8; other data used near zero; poll bias correction minus 2.3 (in points of margin)
Without polls	Structure alone 52.3%, a 4.6-point lead; after November 1, about 52% and a 70% chance
Ratings	Cook and Sabato: Lean D; Inside Elections: Toss-up

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 2nd District covers Hampton Roads, with the cities of Chesapeake, Franklin, Suffolk and Virginia Beach, and the Eastern Shore. Voters there readily split their tickets. In 2025, Abigail Spanberger and Ghazala Hashmi won there at the same time as Republican Attorney General Jason Miyares. Yet the two big cities swung to the right over four years.

Candidates and campaign

Luria represented the district from 2019 to 2023 and faces Kiggans again in a rematch. In May 2026, on the radio, Kiggans agreed with a host who accused Hakeem Jeffries of wanting to redraw Virginia's districts. He told Jeffries to "get your cotton-picking hands off of Virginia." She later apologized, distancing


[38] WHRO, October 15, 2026, https://www.whro.org/elections/2026-10-15/new-poll-in-virginias-2nd-district-luria-leads-kiggans-by-3-points.

herself from the reference to slavery[39]. In September, Luria went to court to have independent candidate Bishop Staten removed from the ballot, challenging 18 additional signatures[40]. Staten is still among the candidates in our reference file.

Luria has raised slightly more. The incumbent, however, has far more cash on hand.

Polls and model

The Wason Center poll is in our database.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Polls: polls cited in the note, one dot per poll at its field end date. Field end day not given, dot placed mid-month or at the end of the stated month: Tulchin Research (July). Forecast: recomputed day by day with the polls completed by each date. House: margin between the two main parties; only polls completed in the previous 21 days enter the model (internal polls corrected for their bias), hence the breaks in the forecast.

Figure 31. *Virginia, District 2: published polls and our model's projection (margin between Democrat and Republican), from August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

[39] USA Today, May 12, 2026, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2026/05/12/rep-jen-kiggans-virginia-radio-remarks/90042789007/, cited by Wikipedia.
[40] Virginia Scope, September 4, 2026, https://www.virginiascope.com/luria-files-lawsuit-against-department-of-elections-questioning-validity-of-independent-candidates-signatures/, cited by Wikipedia.




Figure 32. *Virginia, District 2: decomposition of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*


The breakdown resolves the paradox. Without polls, the district's structure and the national environment place Luria higher than the Wason poll does. Adjusted for historical error, that poll leaves her a lead of only 1.0 point. The model moves toward it, and the Democrat's chances fell on the very day it entered the database. It will drop out of the window on November 1. Without a new poll, the projection would then rise again.

Our analysis

We see the 2nd District as the most classic race in the chapter: a rematch between two well-known officeholders, in a ticket-splitting district. The incumbent has the cash advantage, the challenger that of the national environment. We consider the race a toss-up, with a slight edge for Luria. On election night, everything will be decided in Virginia Beach. Luria needs to get back to a lead close to Spanberger's in 2025. If Kiggans wins there, she will be reelected.

THE MIDWEST: IOWA, MINNESOTA, WISCONSIN AND MICHIGAN

The five Midwestern districts resemble one another: each combines one or two Democratic-voting college or government towns (Iowa City, Des Moines, Rochester, Eau Claire, La Crosse, Lansing) with rural counties and small towns that kept swinging toward Donald Trump in 2024, and the Republican incumbents all won narrowly there in 2024, with the exception of Brad Finstad in Minnesota. Our model makes the Democrats favorites in four of them, with chances of 61 to 70%, and gives the Democrat only a 28% chance in Minnesota's 1st District.



Source: official county results compiled by T. McGovern (github.com/tonmcg), 2020 and 2024 presidential elections; calculations and mapping by Le Millénaire. Circles proportional to the vote margin between Harris and Trump. Gray: unmatched county.

Figure 33. *Iowa: margin between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump by county in 2024 (large map), shift between 2020 and 2024, and net vote margin by county (proportional circles).*

Iowa illustrates the 2024 shift well. Scott County (Davenport), the most populous in the 1st District, went from a 3.5-point Democratic lead to a 3.9-point Republican lead, while Johnson County (Iowa City) remained overwhelmingly Democratic, though with a lead reduced from 43.2 to 38.1 points; in the 3rd District, Polk County (Des Moines) lost 4.4 points of Democratic margin (from 15.2 to 10.9). In Minnesota, Olmsted County (Rochester) is the only one in the region that did not move (a 10.7-point Democratic lead in both 2020 and 2024), while Blue Earth (Mankato) lost 5.7 points and Winona 5.3. In Wisconsin, Eau Claire held steady (a 10.6-point Democratic lead) while La Crosse lost 4.1 points, and in Michigan, Ingham County (Lansing) lost 2.5 points and Livingston County 1.3[41]. In 2026, the outcome in these districts will therefore depend both on turnout in the college towns and on how far the rural counties return to their pre-2024 voting patterns.

Iowa's early vote does not, at this stage, point to exceptional Democratic mobilization. As of October 23, 207,858 absentee ballots had been received, compared with 167,105 at the same point in 2022. But 50.9% came from registered Democrats and 32.0% from registered Republicans. In 2022, the Democratic share was higher, at 55.2%, with a nearly identical Republican share, at 31.4%[42].

Iowa: the model gives Democrat Rob Sand a 65.8% chance in the governor's race. If Republican Zach Lahn won, the Democrats' chances of a House majority would fall from 76.7% to 54.5%. A Sand victory would raise them to 88.0%. In Michigan, a John James victory would bring them down to 40.7%. In Minnesota, a Lisa Demuth victory would bring them down to 28.6%. In Wisconsin, a Tom Tiffany victory would bring them down to 57.4%. We do not claim that one result causes the other. Such a Democratic defeat would rather signal a less favorable national environment than expected. And that environment would also cost the Democrats the districts in this section.

[41] Official presidential results by county, 2020 and 2024, compiled by T. McGovern (github.com/tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.
[42] Iowa Secretary of State, absentee ballots received as of October 23, 2026, compiled by Le Millénaire.

IA-01: CHRISTINA BOHANNAN VS. MARIANNETTE MILLER-MEEKS (INCUMBENT)

This is the third matchup between Christina Bohannan and Mariannette Miller-Meeks. This time Bohannan starts as the favorite. The district tends to vote more Democratic for the House than for president. That tendency, added to the national environment, is enough to put her ahead.




Figure 34. *IA-01 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, shaded by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

IA-01 in numbers

Indicator	Value
Boundaries	Unchanged
2024 presidential	Trump ahead by 8.6 points
House 2022	Bohannan 46.6% of the two-party vote
House 2024	Miller-Meeks reelected with 50.0%, the narrowest win among Republican incumbents (Wikipedia); Bohannan 49.9% of the two-party vote
Primaries	Miller-Meeks 71.5%, David Pautsch 28.4%; Bohannan 81.5%

Indicator	Value
Money raised as of October 14	Bohannan $9.91 million, Miller-Meeks $9.10 million, Bridgford $0.34 million (FEC, via Wikipedia)
Cash on hand as of October 14	Bohannan $2.11 million, Miller-Meeks $1.70 million
Itemized individual contributions (model's FEC files)	Bohannan $6.25 million, Miller-Meeks $2.73 million
Wavefield Research (September 29-October 2, 297 likely voters, not in the model)	Bohannan 45%, Miller-Meeks 29%, Bridgford 18%[43]
Bullfinch Group for the Independent Center (July)	40%, 35% and 11%
Bohannan's chances	65%
Projected Democratic share	51.7%, Bohannan ahead by 3.4 points
Breakdown	national environment plus 7.1; district voting history minus 7.1; incumbency and recent local vote plus 4.8; fundraising plus 1.1; district polling zero; other data used minus 0.3; poll bias correction minus 2.3 (in points of margin)
Change in chances	Between 60.1% and 66.5% on the reference dates since August
Ratings	Cook: Lean D since October 9, Toss-up before[44]; Sabato: Lean D; Inside Elections: Tilt D
Prediction market	Kalshi: Bohannan winning at 92%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 1st District covers southeastern Iowa, including Davenport and Iowa City[45]. Trump won it easily in 2024, and yet the incumbent held her seat there by a whisker. Bohannan has gained ground from one election to the next. That explains one of the largest local margins in the chapter.

Candidates and campaign

Bohannan is a former member of the Iowa House of Representatives. An independent muddies the two-way contest: financial adviser Michael Bridgford, backed by Joe Manchin and the Forward Party. He was excluded from the only debate, held on October 20 by St. Ambrose University and the stations KWQC, KCRG and KTIV, for not having raised a million dollars.

[43] River Cities' Reader, press release of October 5, 2026, https://www.rcreader.com/news-releases/new-poll-independent-michael-bridgford-surges-18-three-way-iowa-01-race-posts-highest, cited by Wikipedia.
[44] Karmactive, October 10, 2026, https://www.karmactive.com/cook-political-report-18-house-race-ratings-democrats/.
[45] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Iowa," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Iowa.

The Republican candidate is Mariannette Miller-Meeks, who is seeking reelection. The incumbent has been endorsed by Donald Trump, Mike Johnson, Scott Bessent, Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Brooke Rollins and the Chamber of Commerce. Miller-Meeks's strategy is to play on her longevity in politics as a token of credibility, but also to defend Trump's record, arguing in particular that the tax cuts (2025 *One Big Beautiful Bill Act*) have helped Iowa's manufacturing workers[46]. Bohannan has been endorsed by Giffords and by former members Dave Loebsack and Abby Finkenauer. The two women have raised similar amounts.

Polls and model

No poll enters the projection. The most recent one, released through a press statement favorable to Bridgford, is not in our data and would in any case have dropped out of the 21-day window. Wikipedia also lists two Marist polls from September and October under this district. They are in fact statewide generic ballot results.




Figure 35. *Iowa, District 1: decomposition of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

[46] Opshal, R. (2026). U.S. Rep. Miller-Meeks says 2025 GOP tax cuts help Iowa manufacturing workers. Iowa Capital Dispatch. https://iowacapitaldispatch.com/2026/08/28/u-s-rep-miller-meeks-says-2025-gop-tax-cuts-help-iowa-manufacturing-workers/Balotpedia. (2026). Mariannette Miller-Meeks. https://ballotpedia.org/Mariannette_Miller-Meeks

The recent local vote and the national environment offset district voting history. Fundraising adds to that: in itemized individual contributions, Bohannan outpaces the incumbent by more than two to one. The ratings and Kalshi also see her ahead.

Our analysis

In our reading, Bohannan has the advantage of being a candidate voters already know. She came close to winning in 2024, in an environment that was unfavorable. Bridgford remains the unknown. The model reasons only about the two main candidates, whereas an independent at 10% or more could take votes unevenly from both sides. On election night, Scott County will serve as the bellwether: Bohannan needs to pull ahead there again, as Joe Biden did in 2020. She will also need a lead close to 40 points in Johnson County, home of Iowa City.

IA-03: SARAH TRONE GARRIOTT VS. ZACH NUNN (INCUMBENT)

Donald Trump won this district. Yet here Sarah Trone Garriott's financial advantage adds to the national climate, and the model makes her the favorite against Zach Nunn.




Figure 36. *IA-03 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

IA-03 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump ahead by 4.5 points
Polk County (Des Moines), Democratic lead	15.2 points for Biden in 2020, 10.9 for Harris in 2024
House 2022 and 2024	Democrat 49.6% then 48.1% of the two-party vote; Nunn reelected with 51.8% in 2024
Primaries	Unopposed, after Jennifer Konfrst withdrew
Money raised as of October 14	Trone Garriott $8.07 million, Nunn $6.12 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Trone Garriott $1.15 million, Nunn $0.62 million
Itemized individual contributions used by the model (June 30)	Trone Garriott $3.83 million, Nunn $0.88 million; $5.51 million reported by the Democrat as of September 30
Ragnar Research, Republican pollster (March)	Nunn 48%, Trone Garriott 42%[47]
Trone Garriott's chances	70%
Projected Democratic share	52.3%, Trone Garriott ahead by 4.6 points
Breakdown (margin, in points)	National climate +7.2; district history −3.0; incumbency and recent local vote +0.4; campaign money +2.8; district polls 0.0; other retained data −0.5; poll bias correction −2.3
Change in chances	Between 63.8% and 69.9% on the reference dates since August
Ratings	Cook: Lean Democratic since October 9, Toss-up before (Karmactive); Sabato: Lean Democratic; Inside Elections: Tilt Democratic

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 3rd District covers southwestern Iowa and Des Moines. Its center of gravity is Polk County. Nunn has no personal bonus there: the local margin is almost nil.

The candidates and the campaign

Sarah Trone Garriott has been a state senator since 2021. Nunn is endorsed by Donald Trump, J. D. Vance, Pete Hegseth and Chuck Grassley. Trone Garriott, for her part, has Pete Buttigieg, Tim Walz, Elissa Slotkin and Teamsters Local 238. On money, the Democrat leads.

The polls and the model

The only published poll dates back to March and comes from a Republican pollster. No poll enters the projection.

[47] Ragnar Research Partners, April 2026, https://punchbowl.news/wp-content/uploads/CFA_IA-CD-3_Benchmark_Analysis_v1.0_260323.pdf, cited by Wikipedia.




Figure 37. *Iowa, District 3: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

Here, fundraising produces the largest effect in this section. There is a reason for this: Nunn's third-quarter report is missing. The model therefore relies on itemized contributions as of June 30, whereas the Democrat was already reporting far more at the end of September. Her chances, for their part, have remained stable since the summer.

Our analysis

We read this district as a suburban district. Its core, Des Moines and its suburbs, swung less in 2024 than rural Iowa. Trone Garriott has a clear financial advantage there against an incumbent with no measurable personal bonus. Her risk lies in the complete absence of any independent poll: nothing makes it possible to check that the national climate is really carrying over here. On election night, Polk will be decisive. A Democratic lead back to about 15 points, the 2020 level, would ensure her victory.

MN-01: JAKE JOHNSON VS. BRAD FINSTAD (INCUMBENT)

Brad Finstad would hold the seat, with a lead of only 5.2 points, even though Donald Trump won this district handily (by 12.2 points in 2024). This is the most

surprising estimate in this section. It rests on massive Democratic outside spending and on an advantage for Jake Johnson in individual contributions.




Figure 38. *MN-01 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

MN-01 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump ahead by 12.2 points
House 2024	Finstad reelected with 58.5%, a lead of about 17 points
Urban counties in 2024	Olmsted (Rochester): Democratic lead of 10.7 points; Blue Earth (Mankato): lost by Harris by 1.2 points
Farm counties, Republican lead	Freeborn (Albert Lea) from 16.0 to 21.3 points; Nobles (Worthington) from 30.6 to 35.6; Mower (Austin) from 5.8 to 10.5
August 11 primary	KTTC's ten counties: Johnson about 1,500 votes ahead, DFL 53% of primary voters (48% in 2024); whole district: Finstad about 3,200 votes ahead[48]
Money raised as of July 22	About $2 million each (predictionedge, based on FEC data)
Itemized individual contributions as of September 30	Johnson $1.85 million, Finstad $0.83 million

[48] KTTC, August 18, 2026, https://www.kttc.com/2026/08/18/southeast-minnesota-primary-results-show-shift-toward-dfl-1st-district/.

Indicator	Value
SurveyUSA (October 4-9, 565 likely voters)	Johnson 46, Finstad 44
GBAO for the Democratic campaign (September 18-21, outside the window)	Johnson 47, Finstad 46
Older polls	PPP, Democratic (February): Johnson 44, Finstad 41[49]; Ragnar, Republican (March): Finstad 52, Johnson 42
Johnson's chances	18.2% on August 1; 26.3% on October 1; 41.4% on October 9; 48.9% on October 26; 36.3% on October 28; 28.0% on October 31
Projected Democratic share	47.4%, Finstad ahead by 5.2 points
Breakdown (margin, in points)	National climate +7.2; district history −10.7; incumbency and recent local vote −2.7; campaign money +2.0; district polls −3.1; other retained data +4.5; poll bias correction −2.3
Projection without its supports	Without polls or outside spending: about 46.5%; after October 31 with no new poll: about 48.9% and a 40% chance
Ratings and market	Cook, Sabato and Inside Elections: Lean Republican (Cook: Likely Republican in June); Kalshi: Finstad winning at 67%
Simulator, Minnesota	Klobuchar 93.7% for governor, Flanagan 80.4% for the Senate

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 1st District covers all of southern Minnesota, from the South Dakota border to the Wisconsin border. It includes Rochester, Mankato, Winona, Austin, Owatonna, Albert Lea, New Ulm and Worthington[50]. This farm district has been Republican since 2018. Its last Democratic member was Tim Walz, elected in 2006. Rochester and Mankato, however, are growing and voting increasingly to the left[51]. The county map shows the contrast: the cities are holding, but the countryside is sliding to the right.

The candidates and the campaign

Jake Johnson teaches math at a Rochester high school and is running for the first time. He is part of the DCCC's (Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee) "Red to Blue" program, the Democratic campaign committee. A former Finstad adviser, Gerald Woodley, has announced that he will vote for him. Finstad has the backing of Donald Trump. The debate centers on the cost of farm inputs, tariffs and the trade war with Canada, the war in Iran and


[49] Dickinson Press/Forum, February 2026, https://www.dglobe.com/news/local/new-poll-fundraising-shows-jake-johnson-within-striking-distance-of-brad-finstad.
[50] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Minnesota," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Minnesota.
[51] MPR News, September 3, 2026, https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/09/03/jake-johnson-hopes-hustle-political-conditions-add-up-to-upset-over-republican-brad-finstad.

biofuels. The defense of SNAP (the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program is a federal program that provides food assistance but is administered at the state level), Medicaid and Pell Grants comes on top of that (MPR News).

The August primary sent a signal. In the ten counties covered by the KTTC station, Johnson finished ahead of Finstad and the DFL turned out more voters than in 2024. Across the district as a whole, the incumbent remained ahead.

The polls and the model

As of October 26, our data included two polls. The GBAO poll had left the window. So it was the SurveyUSA poll that counted. Its entry had sent Johnson's chances soaring. As of October 28, the district polls term turned against him, and his chances fell back to 36.3%. As of October 31, that term had deepened further, and they are down to just 28.0%. The February and March polls contradicted each other.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Polls: polls cited in the note, one dot per poll at its field end date. Forecast: recomputed day by day with the polls completed by each date. House: margin between the two main parties; only polls completed in the previous 21 days enter the model (internal polls corrected for their bias), hence the breaks in the forecast.

Figure 39. *Minnesota, District 1: published polls and our model's projection (margin between Democrat and Republican), from August 1 to October 31, 2026.*




Figure 40. *Minnesota, District 1: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

The starting point is low, the adjustments enormous. The other retained data weigh more here than in any other of our 27 districts. Remove them, and Finstad widens the gap considerably. And the SurveyUSA poll was due to leave the window on October 31, and Johnson has indeed slipped.

Our analysis

The model has since clearly revised Johnson downward. One of his supports remains provisional: the effect of outside spending. It is estimated from the reported amounts, with no way of knowing whether they produce as many votes in a rural district. Yet the race seems to us genuinely open. The primary signal and the SurveyUSA poll point in the same direction. The simulator also reminds us that this district follows the statewide climate, where the projection clearly favors Amy Klobuchar and Peggy Flanagan. On election night, watch Olmsted, where Johnson must clearly exceed Harris's lead. Then Blue Earth, Mankato's county: winning it would allow Johnson to prevail.

WI-03: REBECCA COOKE VS. DERRICK VAN ORDEN (INCUMBENT)

Rebecca Cooke had already outperformed Kamala Harris in her first attempt. For this rematch, the model makes her the favorite against Derrick Van Orden.




Figure 41. *WI-03 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

WI-03 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump wins by 7.5 points; Harris share used by the model 46.2%
Key cities in 2024	Eau Claire: Democratic lead of 10.6 points; La Crosse: down 4.1 points
House 2022	Democrat 48.2% of the two-party vote
House 2024	Van Orden reelected with 51.4%; Cooke 48.6% of the two-party vote
Incumbent	Derrick Van Orden
Primaries	Cooke 60.5%, Emily Berge 39.5%; Van Orden 99%

Indicator	Value
Total spending	More than $31.6 million, according to Punchbowl News[52]
Money raised as of October 14	Cooke $12.68 million, Van Orden $9.10 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Cooke $0.45 million, Van Orden $1.17 million
FM3 Research for House Majority PAC (June 20-25)	Cooke 50, Van Orden 46
Impact Research for Cooke	50 to 46 in May; 49 to 48 in February
Cooke's chances	63.6% on October 31, compared with 56.7% on August 1
Projected Democratic share	51.6%, Cooke ahead by 3.2 points
Breakdown (margin, in points)	National climate +7.2; district history −6.0; incumbency and recent local vote +2.8; campaign money +1.3; district polls 0.0; other retained data +0.2; poll bias correction −2.3
Ratings	Cook (October 23) and Sabato (October 20): Lean Democratic; Inside Elections: Toss-up; Decision Desk HQ: Likely Democratic (October 8)
Crossover effect, governor	David Crowley 59.1% chance; Democratic House majority at 89.9% if he wins

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 3rd District covers the Driftless Area, in southwestern Wisconsin, with Eau Claire and La Crosse[53]. The two cities resisted the 2024 swing unevenly. Cooke had run ahead of the 2022 candidate there, hence a favorable local margin.

The candidates and the campaign

Rebecca Cooke served on the board of the Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation. She easily defeated Emily Berge, former president of the Eau Claire City Council. Her fundraising ranks among the strongest of our 27 districts. Yet she has spent almost all of it, and it is Van Orden who keeps the larger reserves. He is notably a former Navy SEAL. He completed five combat deployments and many other missions, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Horn of Africa, Asia, Europe and Iraq.

The polls and the model

All the published polls were commissioned by Democrats. The latest dates back to June, and none enters the projection.

[52] Punchbowl News, October 6, 2026, https://punchbowl.news/article/campaigns/blockbuster-house-races/, cited by Wikipedia.
[53] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Wisconsin," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Wisconsin.




Figure 42. *Wisconsin, District 3: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

Most of the rise comes from the national climate. Cooke's chances have improved since the summer.

Our analysis

Cooke starts with personal capital: she ran 2.4 points of share ahead of Harris in 2024. If she keeps that edge and the national climate is indeed the one we assume, she will win, in our view. The risk lies in the absence of any independent poll since the spring. The simulator also links this district to the governor's race, which the model sees as a toss-up. On election night, Eau Claire and La Crosse will, in our view, need to give Cooke a lead of more than 12 points each.

MI-07: WILLIAM LAWRENCE VS. TOM BARRETT (INCUMBENT)

The only independent poll in October puts William Lawrence clearly ahead. It is not in our data, and the model remains more cautious against Tom Barrett.




Figure 43. *MI-07 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

MI-07 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump wins by 1.3 points; Harris share used by the model 49.4%
Key counties in 2024	Ingham: Harris +29.7 points (148,012 voters); Livingston: Trump +24.0 points (132,402 voters)
House 2022	Democratic win, 52.8% of the two-party vote
House 2024	Barrett takes the seat with 50.3%
Incumbent	Tom Barrett, endorsed by Donald Trump, Mike Johnson, AIPAC and Americans for Prosperity
Democratic primary	Lawrence 43.7%, Bridget Brink 28.8%, Matt Maasdam 27.6%[54]
Total spending	More than $51.5 million, the second most expensive House race in the country[55]
Money raised as of October 14	Barrett $8.24 million, Lawrence $4.16 million
Itemized individual contributions used	As of June 30: Barrett $1.66 million, Lawrence $0.70 million; Barrett $2.42 million as of September 30

[54] The Detroit News, August 26, 2025, https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2025/08/26/progressive-climate-housing-activist-william-lawrence-sunrise-movement-michigan-congress-tom-barrett/85833342007/, cited by Wikipedia.
[55] WKAR, October 8, 2026, https://www.wkar.org/election-2026/2026-10-08/51-5-million-later-michigans-7th-is-the-nations-second-most-expensive-house-race.

Indicator	Value
Emerson College for Poll Vault (October 12-14, 314 likely voters)	Lawrence 53, Barrett 45; released October 21, not in the database[56]
Global Strategy Group for House Majority PAC (August 11-13)	Lawrence 49, Barrett 47; adjusted by 3.5 points against the Democrat
Data for Progress for Lawrence (June)	Lawrence 48, Barrett 46
Lawrence's chances	61% on October 31; fell from 57% to 38% on August 13; about 77% with the Emerson poll
Projected Democratic share	51.2%, Lawrence ahead by 2.4 points; 53.3% with the Emerson poll
Breakdown (margin, in points)	National climate +7.2; district history +0.2; incumbency and recent local vote −1.4; campaign money −0.7; district polls 0.0; other retained data −0.4; poll bias correction −2.3
Ratings	Cook, Sabato and Inside Elections: Toss-up; Decision Desk HQ: Likely Democratic (October 20)
Crossover effects	Jocelyn Benson 84.4% chance for governor; Abdul El-Sayed 65.4% for the Senate

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 7th District is centered on the Lansing and East Lansing area. It also includes Livingston County and a small part of Oakland County[57]. Two opposing blocs of comparable size face off there.

The candidates and the campaign

William Lawrence co-founded the Sunrise Movement, a climate activist organization. It is one of the most influential climate justice organizations in the United States, and it actively popularized the Green New Deal environmental bill alongside elected officials such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Rooted in Mid-Michigan's community organizations, Lawrence made a name for himself working for the Michigan Rent Is Too Damn High coalition and the Mid-Michigan Tenant Resource Center, helping families threatened with eviction. Consequently, for the 2026 midterm elections he is running a very left-wing campaign. He proposes a 12-month federal moratorium on the construction of hyperscale data centers in order to assess their impact on energy, the environment and local jobs, an issue that unites voters across the political spectrum. He campaigns for a universal health coverage system decoupled from employment status, a universal right to unionize, rent caps

[56] Poll Vault, "Levee math," October 21, 2026, https://pollvault.substack.com/p/levee-math, cited by Wikipedia.
[57] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Michigan," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Michigan.

and massive funding for childcare and elder care infrastructure. To win in November, Lawrence is counting on the motivated and highly mobilized activists of the party's left wing. In addition, his campaign relies on the official endorsement of figures such as Senator Bernie Sanders, but also of powerful unions with deep roots in Michigan, such as the United Auto Workers (UAW) and the state chapter of the AFL-CIO[58].

In the primary, he defeated Bridget Brink, former US ambassador to Ukraine, who was backed notably by Jennifer Granholm. The Republican candidate, Tom Barrett, served for 22 years in the US Army, with several deployments abroad, including in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay. The October 6 debate focused mainly on the war in Iran, tariffs and data centers[59]. On money raised, Barrett leads by nearly two to one.

The polls and the model

The August poll carried a lot of weight as long as it was within the window, until September 4. The Emerson poll, the only independent one this fall, puts Lawrence clearly ahead. **Our district poll database was updated on October 31; this poll, released on October 21, is still not in it.**

[58] William Lawrence for Congress. (2026). https://wewill2026.com/William Lawrence (Michigan). (2026). Ballotpedia. https://ballotpedia.org/William_Lawrence_(Michigan) Kamisar, B. (2026). Progressive activist wins Democratic primary in one of the country's biggest House races. NBC News. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/progressive-activist-wins-democratic-primary-one-nations-biggest-house-rcna590892 NBC News. (2026). William Lawrence wins Democratic primary in Michigan House race, NBC News projects. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOO9EkEvGyk CBS News. (2026). AI fears are fueling progressive Democrat's campaign in Michigan's 7th Congressional District. https://www.cbsnews.com/detroit/news/ai-fears-fueling-progressive-democrats-campaign-michigan-battleground-district/

[59] Michigan Advance, October 6, 2026, https://michiganadvance.com/2026/10/06/iran-war-trump-tariffs-and-michigan-data-centers-dominate-questions-during-barrett-lawrence-debate/, cited by Wikipedia.




Figure 44. *Michigan, District 7: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*


The fundraising term is negative for a simple reason: there is no third-quarter report for Lawrence. The model therefore falls back on itemized individual contributions as of June 30, when Barrett led by a wide margin.

Our analysis

In our reading, Lawrence is a slightly stronger favorite than the projection says. The Emerson poll gives him a clear lead, beyond what the structure predicts. His activist profile remains a risk in a district where Livingston, heavily Republican, weighs almost as much as Lansing. The simulator also links this district to the state's two major races. On election night, Livingston is the county to watch. If Barrett's lead there falls below 20 points, Lawrence wins. If it stays at 24 points, everything will depend on turnout in East Lansing.

THE SOUTHWEST, CALIFORNIA AND THE RIO GRANDE VALLEY

The five districts in this section measure what remains of the 2024 Latino and suburban swing. In the suburbs of Phoenix, Tucson, Denver and California, Donald Trump won by 0.8 to 3.1 points. In the Rio Grande Valley, he carried Texas's 15th District by 18 points, after a redistricting drawn for him. The model makes the Democrats favorites in all five, including Texas's 15th District, where Bobby Pulido has moved ahead of Monica De La Cruz since a recent poll was added. We explain why in their profiles.



Source: official county results compiled by T. McGovern (github.com/tonmcg), 2020 and 2024 presidential elections; calculations and mapping by Le Millénaire. Circles proportional to the vote margin between Harris and Trump. Gray: unmatched county.

Figure 45. *Arizona: margin between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump by county in 2024 (large map), shift between 2020 and 2024, and net vote margin by county (proportional circles).*

The 2024 swing was across the board in the Southwest, though its size varied greatly. In Arizona, Maricopa County, which contains the suburbs of the 1st District, went from a 2.2-point Democratic lead to a 3.5-point Republican lead. Pima, the heart of the 6th District, went from an 18.7-point to a 15.2-point Democratic lead. In Colorado, Adams County (Thornton, Brighton), in the 8th District, lost 7.3 points of Democratic margin. Weld County (Greeley) lost 3.0. In the Rio Grande Valley, the scale is different. Hidalgo went from a 17.1-point Democratic lead to a 2.9-point Republican lead, a shift of 19.9 points. Webb (Laredo) went from a 23.3-point Democratic lead to a 2.2-point Republican lead[60].

Colorado is the only state in this section where early voting by party affiliation is available. As of October 22, 730,614 ballots had been returned, compared with 442,889 at the same stage in 2022. Registered Democrats had returned 32.8% of them, Republicans 24.6%, and unaffiliated voters 41.5%. The gap between Democrats and Republicans was 3.2 points on the same date in 2022 and 2.6 points in 2024. It reaches 8.2 points in 2026[61]. Statewide, this is a sign of Democratic turnout higher than in 2022.

Finally, the simulator highlights the link between the districts in this section and the Arizona governor's race, where the model gives Katie Hobbs an 84.5% chance. A win by Andy Biggs would bring the Democrats' chances of a House majority down from 76.7% to 39.9%. It would indeed mean that the 2024 swing had been confirmed in Arizona, and the state's two districts would then be the first affected. In Colorado, Phil Weiser has a 64% chance of becoming governor. A Republican win there would bring the same majority chances down to 65.5%.

AZ-01: AMISH SHAH VS. JAY FEELY (OPEN SEAT)

The seat is open, in a district that voted for Democratic Senator Ruben Gallego in 2024. It should lean toward Amish Shah. But fundraising and outside

[60] Official presidential results by county, 2020 and 2024, compiled by T. McGovern (github.com/tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.
[61] Colorado Secretary of State, ballots returned as of October 22, 2026, compiled by Le Millénaire; for 2024: https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/newsRoom/pressReleases/2024/20241024GeneralElectionActivity.xlsx.

spending work in the Republicans' favor and bring the race back to a tie against Jay Feely.




Figure 46. *AZ-01 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

AZ-01 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump wins by 3.1 points; Harris share used by the model 48.4%
Registered voters	About 62% non-Republican
House 2022	Democrat 49.6% of the two-party vote
House 2024	Schweikert defeats Shah, 51.9% to 48.1%[62]
Incumbent	Open seat: David Schweikert is running for governor
Republican primary	Feely about 49%, ahead of Joseph Chaplik and John Trobough
Democratic primary	Shah 40.5% (provisional), Marlene Galán-Woods 33.6%
Money raised as of October 14	Shah $5.65 million, Feely $3.80 million; about $0.2 million cash on hand each
Itemized individual contributions used	As of June 30: Feely $1.25 million, Shah $0.98 million
FirstStrategic (October 1, 400 likely voters, sponsor unknown)	Shah 44, Feely 42; dropped out of the database on October 23[63]
Shah's chances	58.8% on October 31; 51.2% on August 1, 48.8% on September 1, 55.5% on September 15, 49.7% on October 1
Projected Democratic share	51.0%, Shah ahead by 2.0 points
Breakdown (margin, in points)	National climate +7.2; district history −1.6; incumbency and recent local vote −0.1; campaign money −1.4; district polls +1.3; other retained data −1.0; poll bias correction −2.3
Ratings	Cook and Sabato: Lean Democratic; Inside Elections: Tilt Democratic
Prediction market	Kalshi: Shah winning at 80%[64]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 1st District covers Phoenix's northeastern suburbs: Scottsdale, north Phoenix, Cave Creek, Fountain Hills and Paradise Valley. In 2024, it voted at once for David Schweikert, for Donald Trump and for Ruben Gallego for the Senate[65].

Schweikert had initially announced that he was running for reelection. In September 2025, he withdrew to run for governor[66]. The seat is therefore open.

[62] KTAR, July 22-24, 2026, https://ktar.com/?p=5891196.
[63] Post on X, October 5, 2026, https://x.com/Garrett_Archer/status/2107166943052808575, cited by Wikipedia; US Polling Data, https://uspollingdata.com/candidates/jay-feely/.
[64] predictionedge.com, "Arizona District 1," accessed October 27, 2026, https://www.predictionedge.com/elections/us-house/arizona-district-1-race-winner-by-party/.
[65] KJZZ, July 21 and 22, 2026, https://www.kjzz.org/elections/2026-07-21/jay-feely-wins-republican-primary-in-arizona-cd1-amish-shah-leads-for-democrats.
[66] The Arizona Republic, September 30, 2025, https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2025/09/30/david-schweikert-announces-run-for-arizona-governor/86426620007/, cited by Wikipedia.

The candidates and the campaign

Jay Feely is a former NFL kicker who played for the Arizona Cardinals and the New York Jets. A CBS Sports analyst, he is close to Donald Trump, who endorses him. To win the district, Feely plays on this fame as a former star NFL kicker and on his career as a sports analyst on CBS Sports, because it allows him to transcend the usual political divides among less politically engaged voters[67]. Amish Shah, an emergency physician, served in the Arizona House and won a four-way Democratic primary. The two men know each other: Shah was the Jets' sideline physician when Feely played there[68]. Feely says he will stand up to the White House if necessary. Amish Shah's platform is calibrated to appeal to centrist and independent voters. The focus is on health care: he makes lowering drug prices, defending access to Medicaid and fighting abusive price targeting by drug companies his priorities. Unlike his party's left wing, Shah takes a firm stance in the debates. He supports allocating additional resources to secure Arizona's border while championing common-sense reforms to modernize the immigration system.

The polls and the model

Only one poll has been published, and it has already dropped out of the database.

[67] Iversen, D. (2026). Ex-NFL kicker Jay Feely, 2 GOP rivals debate for CD1 as early voting opens. KTL News. https://ktar.com/arizona-politics-news/election/jay-feely-cd1-primary-debate Yanora, M. (2026). Jay Feely defeats Joseph Chaplik and John Trobough in the Republican primary for Arizona's 1st Congressional District. Ballotpedia News. https://news.ballotpedia.org/2026/07/24/jay-feely-defeats-joseph-chaplik-and-john-trobough-in-the-republican-primary-for-arizonas-1st-congressional-district/Jay Feely for Congress. (2026). https://www.jayfeelyforcongress.com/

[68] ABC7 New York, July 23, 2026, https://abc7ny.com/post/former-jets-colleagues-feely-shah-face-off-arizona-election/19564045/.




Figure 47. *Arizona, District 1: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

The breakdown explains why the model is more cautious than the ratings. In the absence of a third-quarter report for both candidates, the fundraising term relies on itemized contributions from June, when Feely led. The other retained data weigh in the same direction, and Shah's chances hovered around 50% from August to late October, before rising to 58.8% on October 31.

Our analysis

Where does the gap between the model and the other sources come from? In our reading, from money. The fundraising term rests on incomplete FEC reports. Yet Shah has raised more over the whole cycle, according to the October 14 figures. If the third-quarter data confirm his advantage, the projection will rise. The district is also one of ticket splitters: it voted for Gallego and Trump on the same day. These are the voters Feely is counting on, a well-known former athlete who promises independence. On election night, look first at Scottsdale.

AZ-06: JOANNA MENDOZA VS. JUAN CISCOMANI (INCUMBENT)

A balanced district, an incumbent with no measurable personal bonus, a better-funded challenger: our model makes JoAnna Mendoza the favorite against Juan Ciscomani.




Figure 48. *AZ-06 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

AZ-06 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump wins by 0.8 points; Harris share used by the model 49.6%
Pima County in 2020	Democratic lead of 18.7 points
House 2022	Democrat 49.3% of the two-party vote
House 2024	Ciscomani reelected with 50.0%; Democrat 48.7% of the two-party vote
Incumbent	Juan Ciscomani
Primaries	Mendoza and Ciscomani the only candidates
Other candidates	Jereme Peters (Libertarian), a Green write-in candidate
Money raised as of October 14	Mendoza $11.24 million, Ciscomani $7.65 million
Ragnar Research, Republican pollster (March)	Mendoza 47, Ciscomani 44[69]
Normington Petts, for the Democrats (June)	Mendoza 47, Ciscomani 45
Mendoza's chances	73% on October 31, after 50% on October 28; between 67.4% and 73.3% from August to October 26
Projected Democratic share	52.8%, Mendoza ahead by 5.6 points
Breakdown (margin, in points)	National climate +7.2; district history +0.7; incumbency and recent local vote −1.0; campaign money +1.4; district polls 0.0; other retained data −0.4; poll bias correction −2.3
Ratings	Cook and Sabato: Lean Democratic; Inside Elections: Toss-up (2025 rating); Decision Desk HQ: Likely Democratic

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 6th District covers a large part of southeastern Arizona, though most of its population lives in northern Tucson and its suburbs[70]. Ciscomani narrowly held his seat there in 2024.

The candidates and the campaign

JoAnna Mendoza handled veterans' affairs for Democratic Congressman Tom O'Halleran. She has raised considerably more than the incumbent.

The polls and the model

As of October 28, the district polls entered the projection and pulled it toward Ciscomani, by 5.4 points; as of October 31, they no longer count in it. Even the Republican pollster had Mendoza ahead in the spring.

[69] Punchbowl News, April 29, 2026, https://punchbowl.news/article/campaigns/bad-gop-polls/, cited by Wikipedia.
[70] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Arizona," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Arizona.




Figure 49. *Arizona, District 6: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

Fundraising roughly offsets Mendoza's slight local handicap. The national climate does the rest: her chances, stable since the summer and down to 50% on October 28 under the effect of the polls term, rose back to 73% on October 31.

Our analysis

An incumbent with no personal bonus, in a presidentially balanced district, facing a better-funded challenger: this is, in our view, the most unfavorable configuration for a Republican in a year with a Democratic national climate. Yet the polls that entered the projection had for a time brought him back to a tie. Only one thing could save Ciscomani: confirmation in southern Arizona of the 2024 Latino swing. On election night, Pima County will set the trend. A Democratic lead there back at the 2020 level would ensure Mendoza's victory.

CO-08: MANNY RUTINEL VS. GABE EVANS (INCUMBENT)

Gabe Evans took the seat in 2024 with less than 50% of the vote, in a district that Donald Trump won only narrowly. The model makes Manny Rutinel the favorite to take it back from him.




Figure 50. *CO-08 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

CO-08 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump ahead by 1.9 points; Harris share 49.1%
House 2022	Democrat 50.4% of the two-party vote
House 2024	Evans elected with 49.0%; Democrat 49.6% of the two-party vote
Democratic primary	Rutinel 62.8%, Shannon Bird 32.5%; Evans alone on the Republican side
Money raised as of October 14	Rutinel $9.46 million, Evans $7.25 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Evans $1.33 million, Rutinel $1.00 million (Wikipedia)
McLaughlin & Associates (Republican, September 16 and 17, 400 likely voters)	Evans 48, Rutinel 46[71]; dropped out of the database in early October
Rutinel's chances	73% on October 31; between 68.8% and 74.5% on the reference dates since August
Projected Democratic share	52.7%, a lead of 5.4 points
Breakdown (margin, in points)	National climate +7.2; district history −0.4; incumbency and recent local vote +0.7; campaign money +1.2; district polls 0.0; other retained data −0.9; poll bias correction −2.3
Ratings	Cook, Sabato: Lean Democratic; Inside Elections: Toss-up (March 2025)
Adams County in 2024	7.3 points of margin lost by the Democrats

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 8th District covers the cities of the northern Front Range and Denver's northern suburbs, from Thornton and Brighton to Johnstown and Greeley[72]. The Democrat ran slightly ahead of Kamala Harris there in 2024.

The candidates and the campaign

Manny Rutinel is a former member of the Colorado House. He is outraising Evans, who keeps more cash on hand. To win the district, Manny Rutinel relies on a progressive image. A former environmental lawyer for *Earthjustice*, an economist, and a member of the Colorado House of Representatives, he resigned his state seat in September 2026 to devote himself exclusively to this *midterm* battle. Rutinel sharply attacks Gabe Evans's votes to cut funding for the *Affordable Care Act* and *Medicaid*. Instead, he advocates expanding food assistance (*food stamps*) and strictly protecting *Social Security*. On immigration, Rutinel maintains a firm line of scrutiny toward abuses by ICE, demanding more transparency and respect for civil rights, while seeking to

[71] The Colorado Sun, September 23, 2026, https://coloradosun.com/2026/09/23/gabe-evans-manny-rutinel-poll/.
[72] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Colorado," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Colorado.

address local safety concerns. To protect families' purchasing power and avoid alienating the district's energy sector, he defends an "all-of-the-above" energy strategy combining clean and fossil energy. The district is nearly 40% Hispanic, a key demographic group that had drifted slightly away from the Democrats in the 2024 election. Rutinel, himself of Dominican immigrant background, is strongly backed by major Latino political action committees. He is betting on targeted, bilingual field campaigns to rebuild ties with and mobilize this base[73]. To hold Colorado's 8th District in the November 2026 midterm elections, incumbent Republican Representative Gabe Evans relies on his status as a moderate incumbent combined with a strong hands-on profile (former police officer and military pilot). Public safety is Evans's priority: he attacks Democratic criminal justice policies that he considers too lax and has made fighting the fentanyl scourge one of his priorities in Congress. Evans advocates strict control of the southern border. On the legislative front, however, he cosponsored the *Dignity Act*, a major bipartisan reform that would allocate security funding while offering paid, vetted work permits to long-established immigrants with no criminal record. District 8 is home to significant energy activity (oil and gas in Weld County). Evans firmly defends the fossil fuel industry as well as investment in clean manufacturing, accusing the left of wanting to destroy these industrial jobs. To win, Gabe Evans appears alongside members of the Trump administration visiting Colorado, thereby consolidating maximum mobilization of his Republican base[74].

The polls and the model

The only published poll comes from a Republican firm. It puts Evans ahead by two points and no longer counts in the projection.

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[73] Toomer, L. (2026). Manny Rutinel wins Democratic primary in Colorado's 8th Congressional District. Colorado Newsline. https://coloradonewsline.com/2026/06/30/manny-rutinel-democratic-primary-in-colorado-8th-district/ Howard, A. (2026). Progressive Manny Rutinel wins primary in battleground Colorado House district. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2026/06/30/rutinel-wins-colorado-house-primary-00983300 Birkeland, B. (2026). Manny Rutinel resigns from Colorado legislature to focus on pivotal congressional race. The Colorado Sun. https://coloradosun.com/2026/09/07/manny-rutinel-resigns-from-colorado-legislature/Manny for Colorado. https://www.mannyforcolorado.com/

[74] Paul, J. (2026). Gabe Evans isn't shying away from Trump as he runs for reelection in Colorado's most competitive congressional district. The Colorado Sun. https://coloradosun.com/2026/08/19/gabe-evans-donald-trump-colorado-8th-district/Denver7. (2026). CD8 race in 2026: Where Gabe Evans stands on the issues. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TEguQYkN6to&t=1348s Elect Gab Evans. https://www.electgabeevans.com/




Figure 51. *Colorado, District 8: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

Most of Rutinel's lead comes from the national climate. His money helps him a little. The other retained data take back almost as much. His chances have moved little since the summer.

Our analysis

The 2024 Democratic decline was clear in the suburban part of the district, especially in Adams County. Colorado's early vote, on the other hand, is markedly more Democratic than in 2022 statewide, and it works in Rutinel's favor. On election night, Adams will be decisive. In our reading, Rutinel needs to get back to a lead of close to 15 points there.

CA-22: RANDY VILLEGAS VS. DAVID VALADAO (INCUMBENT, REDRAWN)

Proposition 50 redrew the 22nd District to favor Democrats, and it can hardly be compared with past elections. The model relies almost exclusively on the recalculated presidential vote and on the national climate. It makes Randy Villegas the favorite against David Valadao.




Figure 52. *CA-22 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

CA-22 in numbers

Indicator	Value
Boundaries	redrawn by Proposition 50, approved by referendum on November 4, 2025
2024 presidential (new boundaries)	Trump ahead by 1.9 points; Harris share 49.1%
House 2022 and 2024	Valadao's results measured on different boundaries
June nonpartisan primary	Valadao 40.7%, Villegas 32.4%[75]
Money raised as of June 30	Valadao $4.93 million, Villegas $2.65 million
Cash on hand as of June 30	Valadao $3.37 million, Villegas $0.57 million (predictionedge, FEC)
Tulchin Research (June, sponsor unknown)	Villegas 48, Valadao 44; not in the projection
Villegas's chances	62.2% on August 1, 67.9% on October 31
Projected Democratic share	52.1%, a lead of 4.2 points
Breakdown (margin, in points)	National climate +7.2; district history −0.4; incumbency and recent local vote −0.3; campaign money 0.0; district polls 0.0; other retained data 0.0; poll bias correction −2.3
Ratings	Cook, Inside Elections: Toss-up; Sabato: Lean Democratic
Kalshi market	Villegas winning at 91%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

All we know is that Proposition 50 redrew the 22nd District in a direction favorable to Democrats[76]. The details of the areas added and removed are not known to us.

The candidates and the campaign

Republican David Valadao dominated the June primary as well as fundraising. The fall campaign is not documented in our sources. To hold the district, he highlights his work in Congress, notably on water supply in a desert area of California. Democratic candidate Randy Villegas has emphasized his experience as an educator and member of the Visalia school board, and he accuses Valadao of having allowed the construction of data centers in the valley[77].

[75] The Daily Signal, September 18, 2026, https://www.dailysignal.com/2026/09/18/can-valadao-beat-leftist-villegas/.
[76] predictionedge.com, "California District 22," accessed October 27, 2026, https://www.predictionedge.com/elections/us-house/california-district-22-race-winner-by-party/.
[77] Torrea, A. David Valadao and Randy Villegas spar over economy, immigration and water in District 22 debate. ABC 30. https://abc30.com/post/david-valadao-randy-villegas-spar-economy-immigration-water-district-22-debate/19916209/

The polls and the model

The only known poll dates from June and puts Villegas ahead. It does not enter the projection.




Figure 53. *California, District 22: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

This is the barest breakdown in this chapter. The model applies neither fundraising nor outside spending to redrawn districts. All that remains, essentially, is district history, the national climate and the poll bias correction. The ratings are hesitant. The market, much less so.

Our analysis

The projection ignores Valadao's main strength, namely his personal roots as an incumbent and a former farmer, measured within other boundaries, as well as his financial advantage. On that score, it is probably too favorable to Villegas. It also ignores the specific effect of the new map, designed to make Republicans lose. We therefore see a closer race than the market suggests, with a slight Democratic edge.

TX-15: BOBBY PULIDO VS. MONICA DE LA CRUZ (INCUMBENT, REDRAWN)

Bobby Pulido has a 60% chance in the model. **This figure is due to the addition to our data of the latest independent poll, which puts Pulido ahead by 7 points; without it, as of October 26, Pulido had only a 12% chance.**




Figure 54. *TX-15 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

TX-15 in numbers

Indicator	Value
Hispanic population	about 81%[78]
2016 and 2020 presidential (new boundaries)	Clinton 55%; Trump 50.7%
2024 presidential	Trump 58.5%; Harris share 41.0%, a gap of 18.0 points
Senate	O'Rourke 55.4%, then Cruz 53.5% six years later (Wikipedia)
House 2024 (old boundaries)	De La Cruz 57.1%, Michelle Vallejo 42.9%
March 3 Democratic primary	Pulido 67.5% against Ada Cuellar; De La Cruz alone on the Republican side
Money raised as of September 30	De La Cruz $6.55 million, Pulido $6.21 million
Cash on hand as of September 30	Pulido $1.37 million, De La Cruz $0.80 million (Wikipedia)
Hidalgo	Biden ahead by 17.1 points in 2020, Trump by 2.9 in 2024
Rural counties (Republican lead, 2020 then 2024)	Bee 28.9 then 39.9; San Patricio 29.1 then 36.4; Jim Wells 9.8 then 15.5; Brooks, Democratic lead of 19.0 then 9.6
Pulido's chances	60% on October 31, with the October 21 poll; 12% on October 26, without it
Projected Democratic share	51.2%, a lead of 2.4 points; 44.7% on October 26, without the October 21 poll
Breakdown (margin, in points)	National climate +7.2; district history −16.5; incumbency and recent local vote +1.3; campaign money 0.0; district polls +12.7; other retained data 0.0; poll bias correction −2.3
Ratings and market	Cook, Sabato, Inside Elections: Toss-up; Kalshi: Pulido winning at 89%[79]
Crossover effect, Senate	Talarico 50.9% chance; Democratic chances of a House majority of 87.4% if he wins

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The new 15th District starts in Hidalgo County, in the Rio Grande Valley, with Edinburg and Weslaco. It then stretches northeast into rural counties located between Corpus Christi, San Antonio and Victoria, with Falfurrias, Alice, Sinton, Beeville, Cuero and Gonzales[80]. The map signed by Greg Abbott on August 29, 2025, reduced its border portion. It added more conservative counties east of San Antonio. The district remains overwhelmingly Hispanic.

Its electoral history tracks the Latino swing step by step. Democratic in 2016, it gave Trump an 18-point lead in 2024. Ted Cruz won there six years after being beaten there by Beto O'Rourke (Wikipedia).

[78] Texas Standard, October 21, 2026, https://texasstandard.org/stories/new-poll-shows-tejano-star-bobby-pulido-is-poised-to-flip-tx-15-in-battle-for-border-voters/; Texas Public Radio, October 11, 2026, https://www.tpr.org/government-politics/2026-10-11/bobby-pulidos-challenge-to-monica-de-la-cruz-tests-republicans-gains-in-south-texas.
[79] predictionedge.com, "Texas District 15," accessed October 27, 2026, https://www.predictionedge.com/elections/us-house/texas-district-15-race-winner-by-party/.
[80] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Texas," 15th District section, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Texas.




Figure 55. *Texas: margin between Kamala Harris and Donald Trump by county in 2024 (large map), shift between 2020 and 2024, and net vote margin by county (proportional circles).*

The county map shows the scale of the shift. Hidalgo, by far the most populous, moved from Biden's camp to Trump's. The rural counties that were added were already Republican and have become more so. Even Brooks, which remained Democratic, saw its lead cut in half.

The candidates and the campaign

Monica De La Cruz, elected in 2022 and reelected in 2024, is seeking a third term. Facing her, Bobby Pulido, a Latin Grammy-winning Tejano music singer, is running for the first time, as a Democrat who is conservative on social issues (Texas Public Radio). The NRCC and the RNC are attacking him over a 2016 interview in which he defended a violent music video by singer Gerardo Ortiz. His campaign says his remarks were distorted[81]. The two candidates have

[81] Fox News, August 2026, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/pop-star-turned-dem-candidates-defense-graphic-murder-resurfaces-key-house-race; NRCC, October 9, 2026, https://nrcc.org/2026/10/09/creepy-bobby-pulido-the-filth-scandal-and-excuses/.

raised similar sums. Early voting took place from October 19 to 30, according to Texas Public Radio.


The polls and the model

The five 2026 polls all put Pulido ahead, by 2 to 13 points.

Table 9. Texas, District 15: polls and our model's projection

Pollster (sponsor)	Fieldwork	Pulido	De La Cruz	In our model
Texas Southern University	Oct. 13-16	51	44	entered 10/27 (from 12 to 60%)
Normington Petts (House Majority PAC)	Sept. 24-28	54	41	entered 9/28 (from 9 to 65%), left 10/20 (from 65 to 11%)
Texas Southern University	Aug. 18-22	50	45	entered 8/22 (from 9 to 50%), left 9/13 (from 50 to 9%)
Normington Petts (House Majority PAC)	July 23-27	51	45	before the period
Applecart (WelcomePAC)	May 18-25	48	46	before the period
PPP (Democratic)	Sept. 10 and 11, 2025	38	41	before the period

Sources: Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Texas," accessed October 27, 2026, and primary sources cited (San Antonio Express-News, Texas Southern University, House Majority PAC, WelcomePAC); the Le Millénaire forecast (Pulido's chances on the day the poll enters or leaves the 21-day window).



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Polls: polls cited in the note, one dot per poll at its field end date. Forecast: recomputed day by day with the polls completed by each date. House: margin between the two main parties; only polls completed in the previous 21 days enter the model (internal polls corrected for their bias), hence the breaks in the forecast.

Figure 56. *Texas, District 15: published polls and our model's projection (margin between Democrat and Republican), from August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

Without polls, the structural projection puts De La Cruz ahead by about 10 points. It jumps toward a tie as soon as a poll favorable to Pulido enters the 21-day window, and falls back when it leaves. The Normington Petts poll remains favorable to Pulido even after a 3.5-point adjustment for its Democratic

sponsor. Its exit, on October 20, brings the projection back down to a 10.8% chance.

In the meantime, Texas Southern University had conducted a new wave for the San Antonio Express-News, El País and the Puente News Collaborative. Pulido leads among Latino voters, 57 to 40, and among independents, 55 to 33. And 57% of respondents disapprove of Donald Trump's handling of the economy (Texas Standard). **This poll, released on October 21, entered our district poll database on October 27.** Had it been included earlier, the October 20 drop would not have occurred. By our calculation, its 7-point margin falls to 5.4 after adjustment, and the projection now puts Pulido ahead by 2.4 points.




Figure 57. *Texas, District 15: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

The current breakdown thus pits two terms against each other: district history, heavily Republican, and the latest poll, which largely offsets it. Because it was redrawn, the district receives no campaign money term. The model ignores Pulido's unusual candidacy and, of the five polls that put him ahead, retains only the most recent. The ratings consider the race undecided. The market sees Pulido as a strong favorite.

Our analysis

The 12% figure of October 26 was not to be read as our judgment on the race. It resulted from a methodological rule, tested on past elections, that discards polls more than three weeks old, and from the database being frozen on October 16. With a 60% chance as of October 31, the model now matches our reading: we consider Pulido a slight favorite. All the 2026 polls, including two independent ones, put him ahead. He is also the type of candidate, well known, Latino, conservative on social issues, capable of winning back part of the 2024 vote. Yet the district's structure remains formidable. District polls have historically overestimated Democrats, which is what the national correction of 2.33 points tries to measure. The simulator also links this race to James Talarico's Senate race. On election night, Hidalgo will be decisive: if Pulido gets back to a lead there close to Biden's in 2020, he will win. Bee, San Patricio and DeWitt will tell whether Abbott's map achieved its goal.

DEMOCRATIC SEATS TO DEFEND

To win back the House, Democrats must also hold their own vulnerable seats, chief among them the eight districts in this section. North Carolina's 1st district, Texas's 28th and Ohio's 1st were redrawn against their incumbents in 2025, and while the other five were unchanged, all of them were won by Donald Trump in 2024, by 0.7 to 4.3 points. Our model has the Democrat favored in six of them, with chances of 57 to 91%, and the Republican favored in North Carolina's 1st district and Washington's 3rd.

In the five districts that were not redrawn, the incumbents run ahead of Kamala Harris, by margins ranging from 2.0 points (Susie Lee) to 6.5 points (Tom Suozzi), which, combined with the national environment, is enough to make four of them favorites, but not Marie Gluesenkamp Perez. The three redrawn districts pose a different problem, since our model applies neither the fundraising term nor the other data used there, for lack of a 2024 result within the same boundaries, and the projection therefore depends heavily on polls. Yet this is precisely where our polling data are weakest: North Carolina's 1st district now rests on a single adjusted poll from a Republican pollster, and Texas's 28th and Ohio's 1st each on a single October poll.

North Carolina's early vote is the most favorable to Democrats of all the states for which we have data. As of October 23, 1,453,516 ballots had been accepted, compared with 1,063,702 at the same point in 2022; 41.5% came from registered Democrats, 24.0% from Republicans and 34.3% from unaffiliated voters, whereas the Democratic and Republican shares were 39.1% and 31.3% in 2022, and in 2024, at the same distance from election day, Republicans were ahead of Democrats (34.5% to 33.2%)[82]. These figures say nothing about the 1st district in particular, but they show no sign of Democratic demobilization.

[82] North Carolina State Board of Elections, ballots accepted as of October 23, 2026, compiled by Le Millénaire; for 2024: NCSBE, Daily Absentee Stats Report, October 26, 2024, https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/Press/2024%20General/NC%20Absentee%20Stats%20for%202024%20General/2024-10-26%20Daily%20Absentee%20Stats%20Report%20-%202024%20General.pdf.

NC-01: DON DAVIS (INCUMBENT, REDRAWN) VS. LAURIE BUCKHOUT

The district was redrawn so that Donald Trump would have won it by 11.6 points. Don Davis is no longer the favorite in our model. His projection rested almost entirely on two polls from Republican pollsters, which the model adjusts in the Democrat's favor. The first dropped out of the window on October 28; the second on October 30. A more recent poll, not in our data, is less favorable to Davis.




Figure 58. *NC-01 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the entire state.*

NC-01 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
Map	adopted October 22, 2025
Counties added and removed	added from the 3rd district: Beaufort, Carteret, Craven, Dare, Hyde, Pamlico; removed: Greene, Lenoir, Wayne, Wilson
2024 presidential	Trump 55% (51% within the old boundaries), a lead of about 12 points versus about 3; Harris share 44.2%

Indicator	Value
2024 House (old boundaries)	Davis reelected with 49.5%, a lead of under 2 points
Democratic counties in the northeast	Harris ahead by 13 to 27 points; decline of 3.5 to 7 points since 2020; Hertford from 34.0 to 26.8
Coastal counties added (Trump 2024 lead)	Carteret 43.1, Beaufort 31.1, Craven 20.5, Dare 18.8[83]
Republican primary	Buckhout 39.5%, Asa Buck 34.5%, Bobby Hanig 16.2%[84]
Spending in the race	more than $38.8 million[85]
Money as of October 14	raised: Davis $5.81 million, Buckhout $4.79 million; cash on hand: Buckhout $1.44 million, Davis $0.83 million
Davis's chances	33.1% on August 1, 30.9% on September 1, 50.4% on September 15, 48.9% on October 1, 69.0% on October 15, 32.0% on October 31
Projected Democratic share	47.9%, trailing by 4.2 points
Breakdown (effect on the margin, in points)	national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 10.1; incumbency and recent local vote plus 2.8; fundraising 0.0; district polling minus 1.7; other data used 0.0; poll bias correction minus 2.3
With the RedBox poll	as independent: 51.0% Democratic share, about a 59% chance; as Democratic: 50.0%, about 50%
With no poll after October 30	about 48.7% Democratic share, a chance on the order of 39%
Ratings and market	Cook: Toss-up, tilting Democratic; Sabato: Lean Democratic; Inside Elections: Toss-up; Kalshi: Davis wins at 81%
Cross-effect, Senate	Cooper 85.9% chance; Democratic chances of a House majority 48.4% if Whatley wins

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The new map targeted 11 Republican seats out of 14, and Don Davis's district was its target[86]. It took six coastal counties from the 3rd district and removed four others. Davis's home, in Snow Hill, is now in the 3rd district. Democrats denounce a dilution of the Black vote in the northeast of the state (ABC11). Judges nevertheless allowed the map to be used[87].

The district now combines two worlds. To the north, the Democratic counties of the northeast, Edgecombe, Halifax, Hertford, Bertie, Vance and Warren, have all slipped since 2020. To the south and along the coast, the added counties are very Republican.

[83] Official presidential results by county, 2020 and 2024, compiled by T. McGovern (github.com/tonmcg); Le Millénaire calculations.
[84] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in North Carolina," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_North_Carolina.
[85] Punchbowl News, October 6, 2026, https://punchbowl.news/article/campaigns/blockbuster-house-races/, cited by Wikipedia.
[86] Roll Call, October 21, 2025, https://rollcall.com/2025/10/21/north-carolina-republicans-map-don-davis/; ABC11, October 22, 2025, https://abc11.com/post/north-carolina-house-passes-new-congressional-map/18055836/.
[87] theGrio, November 26, 2025, https://thegrio.com/2025/11/26/judges-allow-north-carolina-map-drawn-to-give-republicans-us-house-seat/.

Candidates and campaign

A former acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy (2025), Laurie Buckhout was already the Republican nominee in 2024. She won a five-way primary ahead of Carteret County Sheriff Asa Buck and State Senator Bobby Hanig. Buckhout champions a typically Trumpist agenda; at the Republican convention in September 2026, she defended Trump's Working *Families Tax Cuts Act*[88]. To win, she is relying on the backing of Donald Trump, who released a video reiterating his full support for Buckhout, calling her a "decorated commander" capable of protecting the country. This maximizes turnout among conservative voters on the coast[89]. One particular feature of the 2026 elections is that North Carolinians will have to vote on an amendment to permanently enshrine a photo ID requirement in the state constitution. This measure, championed by the Republican majority, serves as a mobilization lever: the Republican camp uses it to galvanize its base on the theme of election security, while Democrats use it to mobilize African American voters by denouncing an attempt at voter suppression[90]. A Libertarian, Tom Bailey, is also running. Davis raises more, Buckhout keeps more cash on hand. First elected in 2022 and reelected in 2024, he is considered one of the most vulnerable Democratic incumbents in Congress because of aggressive redistricting (*gerrymandering*) carried out in late 2025. Politically, he advocates industrial predictability and opposes aggressive international trade policies that hurt local farmers. He pushes for massive federal funding to maintain access to emergency care and lower drug prices. Unlike most of his party, he displays unwavering support for capitalism, firmly backs law enforcement budgets and has voted with Republicans on several strict bills concerning illegal immigration or control over education (notably restrictions related to transgender minors). As a result, Don Davis is campaigning on his independence from the national Democratic Party. His strategy is to remind voters that he regularly votes with Republicans when it serves his district, readily supporting measures championed by the right on border security in

[88] Battaglia, D. (2026). NC's Laurie Buckhout takes the stage at RNC, promoting Trump's tax policy. News Observer. https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article317200472.html#storylink=cpy
[89] Laurie Buckhout for Congress. (2026). https://www.lauriebuckhoutforcongress.com/
[90] Hennie, M. Michels, S. (2026). What's Up With All These North Carolina Ballot Questions in 2026?. Citiview. https://www.cityviewnc.com/stories/whats-up-with-all-these-north-carolina-ballot-questions-in-2026/

order to win over independent and Trump-leaning voters[91].

Polls and model

The 1st district is heavily polled, almost always by pollsters tied to one side.


Table 10. North Carolina, district 1: polls since September 2026

Pollster (leaning)	Fieldwork	Davis	Buckhout	In our model as of Oct. 31
RedBox Research	Oct. 20 to 23	45.3	43.5	not in our database (closed Oct. 16)
co/efficient (Republican)	Oct. 6 to 8	42	43	dropped out Oct. 30
Neighborhood Research (Republican)	Oct. 1 to 6	51	41	dropped out Oct. 28
GQR (Democratic)	Sept. 29 to Oct. 4	47	39	dropped out Oct. 26
GBAO (Democratic)	Sept. 8 to 11	50	43	outside the window

Sources: Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in North Carolina," accessed October 27, 2026, which flags the partisan leaning of pollsters; predictionedge.com for RedBox, https://www.predictionedge.com/elections/us-house/north-carolina-district-1-race-winner-by-party/.

As of October 26, the two polls that count come from pollsters flagged as Republican. The model adds 4.4 points of margin in Davis's favor to them, the average correction for a Republican poll, followed by pollster and state corrections. Their adjusted average puts Davis ahead by 9.8 points, brought down to 7.3 after the national correction. Neighborhood Research weighs heavily in this calculation. Yet Wikipedia names a sponsor for neither of them. The correction assumes Republican internal polls, which remains to be verified. The departure of the GQR poll, a Democratic poll and therefore adjusted downward, further raised Davis's chances on October 26. The departure of the Neighborhood Research poll brought them down to 37.0% on October 28.

[91] Diaz, A. (2026). In Redrawn District, a Democrat in North Carolina Trumpets His Centrist Record. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/19/us/politics/democrat-north-carolina-don-davis-redistricting.html Vote Don Davis. (2026). https://www.votedondavis.com/



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Polls: polls cited in the note, one dot per poll at its field end date. Forecast: recomputed day by day with the polls completed by each date. House: margin between the two main parties; only polls completed in the previous 21 days enter the model (internal polls corrected for their bias), hence the breaks in the forecast.

Figure 59. *North Carolina, district 1: published polls and our model's projection (margin between Democrat and Republican), August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

That leaves the RedBox poll, the most recent and the closest. **Our district polling database stops at October 16; this poll is not in it.** Its sponsor has not been established, and this pollster has previously worked elsewhere for a progressive super PAC. Had it been included, it would have clearly lowered Davis's chances as of October 26, even more so had it been treated as Democratic. There is also the question of the window. Since the Neighborhood Research poll dropped out, the projection has fallen back on the structure, and Davis has slipped below a 50% chance.




Figure 60. *North Carolina, district 1: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one component of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

The “incumbency and recent local vote” term reflects Davis's premium measured within the old boundaries. Because it was redrawn, the district receives neither a fundraising term nor any other data used. Davis's chances have tracked the polls, from about one in three in August to three in four on October 26, before falling back to 37% on October 28, then to 32% on October 31.

Our analysis

We believe Davis has a slight advantage, even though the projection now gives him only a 32% chance. Every fall poll except co/efficient's puts him ahead. That is a real signal in a district drawn to be 12 points for Trump. Yet the projection depends on partisan corrections applied to polls whose sponsor has not been established, and the latest poll is the closest. The simulator also links this district to the Senate: a win by Michael Whatley over Roy Cooper would clearly lower Democratic chances of a House majority. On election night, watch turnout in Edgecombe, Halifax and Hertford. A return of the margins there to 2020 levels would secure Davis's victory. Also watch the Republican margin in Craven and Carteret, the two largest added counties.

TX-28: HENRY CUELLAR (INCUMBENT, REDRAWN) VS. TANO TIJERINA

The model now gives Henry Cuellar a clear advantage over Tano Tijerina, with a 91% chance. Until October 26, it saw a dead heat: that is what an experienced Democrat yields in a redrawn district favorable to Donald Trump, with no poll in the window. The inclusion of a DCCC internal poll, released in October, changed that picture considerably.




Figure 61. *TX-28 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the entire state.*

TX-28 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2016 presidential	Clinton 66.4% (Wikipedia)
2020 presidential	Biden 54.3%
2024 presidential	Trump 54.8%; Trump ahead by 10.5 points within the new boundaries; Harris share used 44.8%
2024 Senate	Ted Cruz ahead by 228 votes
2024 House, old boundaries	Cuellar ahead by nearly 6 points, Trump by 7 points (Texas Tribune)

Indicator	Value
Webb County (Laredo)	Democratic lead of 23.3 points in 2020, Republican lead of 2.2 points in 2024
Maverick County	Democratic lead of 9.5 points in 2020, Republican lead of 18.5 points in 2024
Hispanic voting-age population	nearly 87%, versus about 69% within the old boundaries
Primaries	Cuellar 58.1%, Ricardo Villarreal 37.0%; Tijerina 74.3%
Money raised as of September 30	Cuellar $2.99 million, Tijerina $1.78 million
Cash on hand as of September 30	Cuellar $1.05 million, Tijerina $0.21 million
Pulse Decision Science, for Republicans (June)	Tijerina 46, Cuellar 38
Texas Southern University (August 18-22, 600 likely voters)	Cuellar 45, Tijerina 34
DCCC (October 7-13, 536 likely voters, released October 19)	Cuellar 54, Tijerina 34[92]
Cuellar's chances and projected Democratic share	91%; 56.0%
Change in chances	from 41% to 78% when the Texas Southern poll entered on August 22, then dropped out on September 13; from 50% to 91% on October 27
Breakdown (effect on the margin, in points)	national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 9.0; incumbency and recent local vote plus 4.2; fundraising 0.0; district polling plus 11.9; other data used 0.0; poll bias correction minus 2.3
With the DCCC poll (our calculation)	3.5-point correction for the sponsor, Cuellar ahead by 14.5 points, Democratic share 55.8%, about a 90% chance
Ratings	Cook: Likely Democratic; Sabato: Lean Democratic; Inside Elections: Tilt Democratic
Market	Kalshi: Cuellar wins at 93%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The new 28th district is centered on Laredo. It reaches down to McAllen, in the Rio Grande Valley, and up to Atascosa County, on the outskirts of San Antonio (Wikipedia, Texas page). The 2025 Republican map made it more favorable to Donald Trump[93].

Nowhere was the Latino shift as dramatic. Cuellar nevertheless held firm in 2024, running 13 points ahead of the presidential margin. The model's “incumbency and recent local vote” term captures only part of this personal premium.


[92] DCCC, memo of October 19, 2026, https://dccc.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/TX-28-Polling-Memo.pdf, cited by Wikipedia.
[93] Texas Tribune, September 9, 2026, https://www.texastribune.org/?p=242242.

Candidates and campaign

Indicted in May 2024 for bribery and money laundering, Henry Cuellar was pardoned by Donald Trump in December 2025[94]. His opponent, Tano Tijerina, is the Webb County judge. A former Democrat, he joined the Republicans in December 2024 (Daily Signal). Green Party candidate Marlón Durán rounds out the ballot. The fight is mainly over the ability to "deliver": Cuellar claims credit for the federal funding that Tijerina touts in his ads (Texas Tribune). The money tilts clearly toward the incumbent.

Polls and model

An earlier Texas Southern wave, in late July, is reported by some aggregators with the same figures. It may be a duplicate; we were unable to verify. **This poll, released on October 19, has been included in our model since October 27.** Even after adjusting for its sponsor's bias, it puts Cuellar well ahead.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Polls: polls cited in the note, one dot per poll at its field end date. Forecast: recomputed day by day with the polls completed by each date. House: margin between the two main parties; only polls completed in the previous 21 days enter the model (internal polls corrected for their bias), hence the breaks in the forecast.

Figure 62. *Texas, district 28: published polls and our model's projection (margin between Democrat and Republican), August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

[94] The Daily Signal, September 17, 2026, https://www.dailysignal.com/2026/09/17/texas-28-cuellar-tijerina-congressional-race/.




Figure 63. *Texas, district 28: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one component of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

Since the district was redrawn, the model applies neither fundraising nor other data. What remains is district voting history, incumbency and recent local vote, the national environment and, now, the DCCC poll.

Our analysis

We consider Cuellar the favorite, as the model now does. Yet it only partly captures his resilience against the 2024 Latino wave. The risk comes from redistricting, which pushed the district further into the Rio Grande Valley, where the vote had shifted the most (Texas Tribune). On election night, everything will come down to Webb County, Tijerina's county. A double-digit lead for Cuellar there would amount to victory.

OH-01: GREG LANDSMAN (INCUMBENT, REDRAWN) VS. ERIC CONROY

Redistricting made Greg Landsman's district more Republican, without going far enough to offset the national environment. An October poll, which entered our data on October 27, puts him ahead. Yet it lowered his chances, from 71% to 57%.




Figure 64. *OH-01 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the entire state.*

OH-01 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential, new boundaries	Trump ahead by about 3 points (Wikipedia, Ohio page); 2.6 points used by the model; Harris share 48.7%
County shifts, 2020-2024	Hamilton minus 1.0 point of Democratic margin; Warren and Clinton 0.7 and 2.1 points more toward Trump
2024 House, old boundaries	Landsman reelected with 54.6%
Primaries	Landsman 67.9% against Damon Lynch IV; Conroy 71.9%[95]
Money raised as of September 30	Landsman $5.55 million, Conroy $2.21 million
Cash on hand as of September 30	Landsman $1.50 million, Conroy $0.33 million
Quantus Insights (August 21-24, 509 likely voters)	Landsman 47, Conroy 43; outside the window since September 15
Torchlight Strategies, for Republicans (September 29-October 2)	Landsman 46, Conroy 44
Quantus Insights (October 19-21, 561 likely voters, released October 24)	Landsman 47, Conroy 42[96]
Landsman's chances and projected Democratic share	57%; 50.8%, a 1.5-point lead
Change in chances	66.2% on August 1, 51.1% on September 1, 56.8% on October 31
Breakdown (effect on the margin, in points)	national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 1.1; incumbency and recent local vote plus 1.4; fundraising 0.0; district polling minus 3.6; other data used 0.0; poll bias correction minus 2.3
With the October Quantus poll (our calculation)	Democratic share 50.8%; chances of about 57%; adjusted lead of about 0.7 point
Ratings	Cook and Sabato: Likely Democratic; Inside Elections: Tilt Democratic
Cross-effect, Senate	Sherrod Brown 21.4% chance; Democratic House majority at 94.1% if he wins

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The map approved on October 31, 2025 was meant to shift Ohio's theoretical split from 10 Republican seats and 5 Democratic seats to 12 and 3[97]. The 1st district lost Blue Ash, Evendale, Sharonville, Wyoming and Mount Healthy to the 8th. It gained all of Clinton County and suburbs in western Hamilton County, while keeping Cincinnati and Warren County[98]. Political scientist David Niven, quoted by WCPO, calls it “pale pink” and notes that Republicans did not recruit a well-known candidate there.

[95] Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Ohio,” accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Ohio.
[96] Quantus Insights, October 24, 2026, https://quantusinsights.org/f/ohio-1st-district-poll-landsman-brown-and-acton-all-lead, cited by Wikipedia.
[97] WCPO, May 5, 2026, https://www.wcpo.com/news/government/local-politics/experts-discuss-how-ohios-new-congressional-map-could-impact-the-2026-midterms.
[98] Cincinnati Enquirer, republished by AOL, https://www.aol.com/articles/cincinnati-congressional-district-redrawn-more-171650256.html.

Candidates and campaign

Eric Conroy served in the Air Force and then the CIA. He has the backing of Donald Trump and J. D. Vance. Landsman retains a financial advantage of more than two to one.

Polls and model

This poll, released on October 24, has been included in our model since October 27. Why did a favorable poll lower Landsman's chances? Two corrections follow one another. First the Ohio correction, where polls have historically overstated Democrats according to our parameters, then the national correction. His lead barely survives them.




Figure 65. *Ohio, district 1: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one component of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

Since the district was redrawn, the model leaves aside fundraising and other data. The September dip corresponds to the first Quantus poll entering the window.

Our analysis

We see Landsman as the favorite. Two independent polls put him ahead, he has more money and his opponent is a newcomer. Our historical correction of

Ohio polls nevertheless makes the race closer than it looks. The simulator also links this district to the rest of the state, and a Sherrod Brown win in the Senate race would clearly strengthen Democrats in the House. On election night, Landsman will need to do more in Hamilton County than Republicans do in Warren and Clinton.

WA-03: MARIE GLUESENKAMP PEREZ (INCUMBENT) VS. JOHN BRAUN

Setting redistricting aside, no Democratic seat is more threatened than Marie Gluesenkamp Perez's. Her personal premium is more than wiped out by fundraising and Republican outside money, and an unfavorable polling term now puts her behind.




Figure 66. *WA-03 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the entire state.*

WA-03 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
Presidential elections	Trump won three times, each time by single digits[99]; by 3.4 points in 2024; Harris share 48.3%
Clark County (Vancouver)	Democratic lead grew from 5.1 to 7.0 points between 2020 and 2024
Cowlitz County	Republican lead grew from 17.4 to 19.9 points
2022 House	Gluesenkamp Perez beats Joe Kent by fewer than 3,000 votes; 50.4% of the two-party vote
2024 House	Gluesenkamp Perez beats Joe Kent again, 52.0% (Newsweek, October 14, 2026)
Money raised	incumbent $6.29 million as of July 15; Braun $2.21 million as of August 18
Cash on hand	incumbent $2.06 million; Braun $1.27 million (predictionedge, based on the FEC)
Individual contributions as of June 30, used by the model	incumbent $2.16 million, Braun $1.31 million
Outside spending as of October 1	No Going Back PAC Inc. $1.7 million; Democratic groups $354,000
DHM Research for OPB (543 likely voters)	Braun 46, Gluesenkamp Perez 44; 48 to 47 with leaners pushed
Northwest Progressive Institute (July)	Braun 45, Gluesenkamp Perez 44
co/efficient for the NRCC (April)	Braun 41, Gluesenkamp Perez 34
Chances and projected Democratic share	38%; 48.6%, trailing by 2.7 points
Change in chances	from 65% to 44% when the DHM poll entered; from 43% to 57% when it dropped out on October 23; 38% on October 31
Breakdown (effect on the margin, in points)	national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 1.9; incumbency and recent local vote plus 4.2; fundraising minus 2.3; district polling minus 4.7; other data used minus 2.8; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings	Cook and Sabato: Lean Democratic; Inside Elections: Toss-up
Market	Kalshi: incumbent wins at 92%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 3rd district covers southwest Washington State. A rural territory of farming, industry and manual trades sits alongside Vancouver, a fast-growing city. Clark County is one of the few in this note to have shifted toward Democrats between 2020 and 2024. The incumbent's two narrow wins over Joe Kent are the basis for the “incumbency and recent local vote” term the model grants her.


[99] Washington State Standard/OPB, October 1, 2026, https://washingtonstatestandard.com/2026/10/01/poll-shows-gluesenkamp-perez-and-braun-neck-and-neck-in-race-for-southwest-wa-swing-district/.

Candidates and campaign

A state senator, John Braun leads the Republican minority in the state Senate and has received Donald Trump's endorsement. Gluesenkamp Perez champions small businesses and rural health care, and calls for an end to the war in Iran. Braun responds with taxes, policing and energy. The pro-Trump super PAC is outspending Democratic groups by nearly five to one (Washington State Standard/OPB).

Polls and model

The DHM poll appears in our data with fieldwork ending on October 1. The press gives fieldwork dates of September 17 to 27. With that date, it would have dropped out of the window as early as October 19, without changing the October 31 projection.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Polls: polls cited in the note, one dot per poll at its field end date. Field end day not given, dot placed mid-month or at the end of the stated month: Northwest Progressive Institute (July). Forecast: recomputed day by day with the polls completed by each date. House: margin between the two main parties; only polls completed in the previous 21 days enter the model (internal polls corrected for their bias), hence the breaks in the forecast.

Figure 67. *Washington, district 3: published polls and our model's projection (margin between Democrat and Republican), August 1 to October 31, 2026.*




Figure 68. *Washington, district 3: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one component of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

Why does fundraising penalize a well-funded incumbent? Lacking a third-quarter report, the model relies on her itemized individual contributions as of June 30, a low amount for a sitting member. The super PAC money then costs her a little more.

Our analysis

Kalshi, Cook and Sabato see a protected incumbent. Our projection and the DHM poll describe a close race, and our reading aligns with the model's. Braun is a better-established opponent than Joe Kent, and outside money leans his way. On election night, Gluesenkamp Perez will need to clearly exceed Harris's 7-point lead in Clark County. That is the condition for offsetting Cowlitz and the rural counties.

NY-03: TOM SUOZZI (INCUMBENT) VS. MIKE LIPETRI

Tom Suozzi owes his status as favorite to the strongest personal premium in this section. His chances were nonetheless significantly eroded in mid-October, when the model took Republican outside spending into account.




Figure 69. *NY-03 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the entire state.*

NY-03 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump ahead by 4.3 points; Harris share 47.8%
Nassau County	from a Democratic lead of 9.5 points to a Republican lead of 4.2 points
Queens	20.6 points of Democratic margin lost
2022 House	open seat won by George Santos (Newsweek, October 14, 2026)
2024 House	Suozzi 51.8% against Mike LiPetri (Wikipedia)
Primaries	LiPetri 81.9% against Greg Hach; Suozzi 79.3%
Money raised as of September 30	Suozzi $7.16 million, LiPetri $2.32 million
Cash on hand as of September 30	Suozzi $4.99 million, LiPetri $0.88 million
Polls	no published polls
Suozzi's chances and projected Democratic share	73%; 52.7%, a 5.4-point lead
Change	outside spending entered on October 16: share from 54.3% to 52.3%, chances from 83% to 70%
Breakdown (effect on the margin, in points)	national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 2.8; incumbency and recent local vote plus 6.5; fundraising plus 0.8; district polling 0.0; other data used minus 3.9; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings	Cook: Likely Democratic (October 9); Sabato and Inside Elections: Lean Democratic
Market	Kalshi: Suozzi wins at 90%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 3rd district runs along the North Shore of Nassau County, with Glen Cove, North Hempstead, and parts of Oyster Bay and Hempstead. It also takes in northeast Queens: Whitestone, Beechhurst, Little Neck and Douglaston[100]. Both counties shifted sharply to the right in the presidential race. Suozzi nevertheless won back George Santos's former seat in 2024, and the model draws its local margin from that.

Candidates and campaign

It is a rematch. A former State Assembly member, LiPetri defeated Greg Hach, backed by Rudy Giuliani, in the primary. Donald Trump supports him, as does Bruce Blakeman, Nassau County Executive and himself the Republican candidate for governor[101]. Suozzi counts on AIPAC, Democratic Majority for

[100] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in New York," 3rd district section, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_New_York.
[101] NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/trump-endorses-bruce-blakeman-new-york-governor-race-elise-stefanik-dr-rcna250275.

Israel, the League of Conservation Voters and labor unions (Wikipedia). He has raised about three times as much as his opponent.

Polls and model




Figure 70. *New York, district 3: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one component of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

With no polls, the projection rests on the Harris share, the incumbency premium and the national environment. The only notable movement came from outside spending.




Figure 71. *New York, district 3: Democratic chances in our model, August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

Our analysis

Suozzi starts as the favorite, with a personal premium of more than 6 points of margin and five times as much cash on hand as LiPetri. Two caveats, however. Republican outside money has already eaten into his share. And Bruce Blakeman, who runs Nassau County, is himself a candidate for governor. On election night, watch the margin in the Nassau part of the district, where Trump wiped out a 9.5-point Democratic lead in 2024.

NJ-09: NELLIE POU (INCUMBENT) VS. ROSIE PINO

In New Jersey's 9th district, Nellie Pou starts as the favorite in the model. Beyond the model and the ratings, our sources do not document the race.




Figure 72. *NJ-09 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the entire state.*

NJ-09 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump +1.2 points
2022 House	Democrat 55.8% of the two-party vote
2024 House	Pou 50.8%, versus 45.9%
Boundaries	Unchanged
Incumbent	Nellie Pou (Democrat)
Polls	No published polls
Pou's chances	80%
Projected Democratic share	53.7%, a 7.4-point lead
2024 Harris share	49.4%
National environment (effect on the margin)	+7.2 points
District voting history	+0.3 point
Incumbency and recent local vote	+3.6 points
Fundraising	+0.3 point
District polling	0.0 points
Other data used	−1.6 points
Poll bias correction	−2.3 points
Change in chances since August	Between 76.1% and 83.7%
Ratings	Cook and Sabato: Likely Democratic; Inside Elections: not competitive

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Trump won here in 2024, and yet Pou held the seat that same year. The boundaries have not changed.

Candidates and campaign

The model's reference file, drawn from Wikipedia as of September 21, lists Rosie Pino as the Republican candidate. It also mentions an independent, Terrisa Bukovinac. No other source confirms either name.

Polls and model

With no polls, the projection comes down to the district's structure and the national environment.




Figure 73. *New Jersey, district 9: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one component of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

Our analysis

Pou held on in 2024 in a district Trump was winning. In 2026, the national wind is at her back. Nothing else sheds light on the race: no polls, no coverage. Her chances therefore rest on structure alone. Rosie Pino would win only on the back of a large national error in the Republicans' favor.

NM-02: GABE VASQUEZ (INCUMBENT) VS. GREG CUNNINGHAM

Gabe Vasquez is favored to hold New Mexico's 2nd district. The October Research & Polling poll, once adjusted, lands almost exactly on the district's structure.




Figure 74. *NM-02 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the entire state.*

NM-02 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump +1.8 points
2022 House	Vasquez 50.4% of the two-party vote
2024 House	Vasquez 52.1%, versus 47.9%
Boundaries	Unchanged
SurveyUSA poll (August 28 to September 2)	Vasquez 46, Cunningham 43
Research & Polling poll (October 1 to 9, 383 likely voters)	Vasquez 48, Cunningham 44; dropped out of the calculation on October 31
Vasquez's chances	73%
Projected Democratic share	52.7%, a 5.4-point lead
2024 Harris share	49.1%
National environment (effect on the margin)	+7.2 points
District voting history	−0.3 point
Incumbency and recent local vote	+3.5 points
Fundraising	−1.6 points
District polling	0.0 points
Other data used	−1.0 point

Indicator	Value
Poll bias correction	−2.3 points
Change in chances since August	Between 65.9% and 75.3%
Ratings	Cook and Sabato: Lean Democratic; Inside Elections: Tilt Democratic
Simulator cross-effect	Greggory Hull wins the governorship: Democratic majority at 37.6%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Trump won the district in 2024, and Vasquez held it all the same. The boundaries are the same. The sources do not detail its geography.

Candidates and campaign

Republican Greg Cunningham received the endorsement of Speaker of the House Mike Johnson, who came to campaign for him in Albuquerque in August[102]. Beyond that, nothing: neither the campaign nor the fundraising is documented.

Polls and model

The Research & Polling poll still counted as of October 28. It moved almost nothing, since its adjusted version stuck closely to the lead predicted by the structure. It dropped out of the calculation on October 31 with no notable effect.

[102] Source NM, August 24, 2026, https://sourcenm.com/2026/08/24/us-house-speaker-mike-johnson-to-campaign-in-albuquerque-for-gop-congressional-challenger-cunningham/.




Figure 75. *New Mexico, district 2: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one component of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

Our analysis

Structure and polling say the same thing: Vasquez ahead by about 5 points. His chances have barely moved since August. The district remains linked to the governor's race, where Deb Haaland has an 90.3% chance. The simulator shows what a Haaland setback would cost Democrats in the House.

NV-03: SUSIE LEE (INCUMBENT) VS. MARTIN O'DONNELL

Susie Lee remains favored to keep her seat. Outside the model's data, the sources say almost nothing about the race.




Figure 76. *NV-03 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the entire state.*

NV-03 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2024 presidential	Trump +0.7 point
2022 House	Lee 52.0% of the two-party vote
2024 House	Lee 51.4%, versus 48.6%
Incumbent	Susie Lee (Democrat)
Polls	No published polls
Lee's chances	67%
Projected Democratic share	51.9%, a 3.8-point lead
2024 Harris share	49.6%
National environment (effect on the margin)	+7.2 points
District voting history	+0.8 point
Incumbency and recent local vote	+2.0 points
Fundraising	0.0 points (candidates not matched in the FEC files)
District polling	−3.8 points
Other data used	0.0 points
Poll bias correction	−2.3 points
Change in chances	75.8% on August 1, 66.7% on October 31

Indicator	Value
Ratings	Cook and Sabato: Likely Democratic; Inside Elections: Lean Democratic
Cook, October 9	Seat shifted toward Democrats[103]
Simulator cross-effect	Aaron Ford wins the governorship: Democratic majority at 93.5%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district and the campaign

Trump narrowly won Nevada's 3rd district in 2024, and Lee held it that same year. According to the model's reference file, Martin O'Donnell is the Republican standard-bearer. Three independents or minor candidates round out the field, with no way to verify them elsewhere.

Polls and model

Until October 27, with no polls, the projection rested on the structure and the national environment; on October 28, a polling term of −3.8 points of margin entered it. The model was unable to factor in money: it cannot find the candidates in our FEC files.




Figure 77. *Nevada, district 3: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one component of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

[103] political.org, October 9, 2026, https://political.org/2026/10/09/cook-political-report-shifts-18-house-races-toward-democrats-as-gop-midterm-outlook-darkens/.

Our analysis

Lee is the favorite. In the same state, however, Republican Governor Joe Lombardo is the favorite too: Aaron Ford has only a 38.1% chance in the model. If Ford pulled off an upset, a Democratic House majority would become all but certain in the simulator, and this district would no longer be contested.

SEATS REPUBLICANS DEFEND ON A REDRAWN OR OPEN MAP

The profiles that follow cover 26 competitive districts: seventeen Republican-held seats (excluding Missouri 2), six Democratic seats weakened by redistricting and three special cases (Alaska, Maine, Missouri). Figures without a footnote come from the Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026, and the projected Democratic share is the Democratic candidate's share of the vote for the top two candidates. In Alaska, our model places under the Democratic label the candidate registered as such, who is not the real challenger (see the profile devoted to this district).

Table 11. The 26 districts in this chapter in our model

District	Candidates (D vs. R)	Harris 2024	Projected D share	D chances	Cook
MT-01	Forstag vs. Flint	44.0%	49.9%	49%	Toss-up (Oct. 16)
NC-11	Ager vs. Balkcom	45.2%	49.8%	48%	Lean D (Oct. 23)
CO-05	Killin vs. Crank (incumbent)	45.3%	49.4%	45%	Lean R (Sept. 25)
NY-01	Gallant vs. LaLota (incumbent)	44.9%	49.4%	45%	Solid R (Feb. 6, 2025)
IN-05	Ford vs. Spartz (incumbent)	41.4%	48.6%	38%	Likely R (Oct. 9)
IA-02	James vs. Mitchell	44.9%	48.0%	33%	Toss-up (Oct. 16)
VA-05	Perriello vs. McGuire (incumbent)	43.8%	48.0%	33%	Likely R (Sept. 25)
WI-01	Berman vs. Steil (incumbent)	47.7%	47.8%	32%	Lean R (Sept. 25)
OH-15	Leonard vs. Carey (incumbent)	44.9%	47.6%	29%	Lean R (Oct. 16)
KY-06	Dembo vs. Alvarado	42.3%	47.4%	28%	Toss-up (Oct. 23)
MI-04	McCann vs. Huizenga (incumbent)	47.2%	46.8%	24%	Toss-up (Oct. 9)
FL-13	Gray vs. Luna (incumbent)	43.3%	46.7%	23%	Lean R (Sept. 25)
AZ-02	Nez vs. Crane (incumbent)	42.4%	46.6%	23%	Lean R (Oct. 23)
FL-07	Dalton vs. Elijah	43.7%	46.6%	22%	Likely R (Aug. 13)
FL-04	Holloway vs. Bean (incumbent)	44.0%	46.5%	21%	Solid R (Feb. 6, 2025)
MI-10	Hines vs. Bouchard Jr.	46.7%	46.0%	19%	Toss-up (Aug. 25)
GA-07	Kozycki vs. McCormick (incumbent)	38.9%	39.6%	1%	Solid R (Feb. 6, 2025)
TX-34	Gonzalez (incumbent) vs. Flores	44.9%	52.0%	67%	Lean D (Oct. 23)
OH-09	Kaptur (incumbent) vs. Merrin	44.7%	49.2%	43%	Toss-up (Jan. 15)
FL-25	Moskowitz (incumbent from FL-23) vs. Singer	45.4%	48.6%	38%	Lean D (Oct. 16)

District	Candidates (D vs. R)	Harris 2024	Projected D share	D chances	Cook
TX-35	Garcia vs. De La Cruz	44.7%	48.5%	37%	Toss-up (Oct. 23)
FL-14	Castor (incumbent) vs. Beltran	44.7%	48.4%	36%	Toss-up (Aug. 25)
FL-22	Dandiya vs. Askar	44.8%	48.0%	33%	Toss-up (Sept. 25)
AK-00	Begich (incumbent) vs. Hill (independent)	43.2%	44.6%	11%	Lean R (Oct. 23)
ME-02	Dunlap vs. LePage	45.4%	48.7%	39%	Lean R (Oct. 9)
MO-02	Wellman vs. Wagner (incumbent)	46.0%	46.8%	24%	Likely R (Sept. 11)

Source: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; Cook Political Report ratings as of the date shown, according to the Wikipedia "Predictions" tables accessed October 27, 2026 (an old date only means that Wikipedia reports no change). Harris 2024: share of the vote for the top two candidates, within the 2026 boundaries.

This first section includes seventeen Republican seats, excluding Missouri 2. No Democrat is favored in any of them. Chances range from 1% in Georgia 7 to 49% in Montana 1. Added up, they yield about five expected Democratic wins out of seventeen. But errors are correlated from one district to the next. If the national environment exceeds the 7.2-point Democratic margin we derive from the generic ballot, some ten seats could fall together. If it falls short, almost none fall.

Six seats have no incumbent. Montana 1: Ryan Zinke is retiring. Florida 7: Cory Mills lost his primary. Iowa 2: Ashley Hinson is running for the Senate, as is Andy Barr in Kentucky 6. North Carolina 11: Chuck Edwards withdrew in August. Michigan 10: John James is running for governor. Incumbents from the suburbs and midsize cities of the Midwest and the West also hold Michigan 4, Wisconsin 1, Ohio 15, Colorado 5, Indiana 5 and New York 1. That leaves Georgia 7, Arizona 2, Virginia 5 and two Florida districts, the 4th and the 13th. There, deeply Republican seats have opened up thanks to an atypical Democratic candidacy or internal polls.

North Carolina 11, Montana 1, Iowa 2: the model is markedly more cautious there than the American analysts' ratings, except now in Montana 1, which it puts at a 49% chance. In all three, Donald Trump led Kamala Harris by 4.5 to 22 points in 2024. And nearly all of the published polls are Democratic internal polls. Yet in the House, the model only uses district polls completed within the last 21 days, one wave per pollster. A poll sponsored by a campaign, a party, a committee or a PAC is also adjusted. Democratic sponsor: it loses 3.5 points of

Democratic margin. Republican sponsor: it gains 4.4. Pollster and state effects come next, where they exist. The adjusted average moves the projected margin by a fraction n/(n+0.25) of its distance from the structure, n being the number of polls used: 80% for one poll, 89% for two. The Democratic share moves by half of that shift. Tested on the 2014 to 2022 elections, the rule creates breaks where polls are scarce. An independent poll carries heavy weight for three weeks. Then it disappears from the calculation. As of October 31, ten of the seventeen districts in this section have a nonzero polling term: Michigan 10 and 4, Kentucky 6, North Carolina 11, Ohio 15, Colorado 5, Florida 13 and 7, Indiana 5 and Montana 1. Elsewhere, the projection rests on the structure, the local margin, money, the layers and the national environment.

Table 12. Money in the six open Republican seats

District	Candidate	Raised	Cash on hand	Reading
MT-01	Sam Forstag (D)	4,312,110	726,126	D advantage
MT-01	Aaron Flint (R)	2,856,139	408,153	D advantage
FL-07	Bale Dalton (D)	2,334,664	202,254	D fundraising advantage
FL-07	Ryan Elijah (R)	818,460	173,006	D fundraising advantage
IA-02	Lindsay James (D)	3,917,994	265,953	R cash advantage
IA-02	Joe Mitchell (R)	2,916,069	545,534	R cash advantage
NC-11	Jamie Ager (D)	5,869,453	620,158	1-to-15 gap
NC-11	Jennifer Balkcom (R)	399,492	294,818	1-to-15 gap
KY-06	Zach Dembo (D)	3,205,462	620,330	D advantage
KY-06	Ralph Alvarado (R)	2,307,369	180,812	D advantage
MI-10	Christina Hines (D)	4,159,692	1,007,627	R cash advantage
MI-10	Michael Bouchard Jr. (R)	2,884,259	1,573,469	R cash advantage

Source: Federal Election Commission, data compiled by Wikipedia (pages "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in" followed by each state's name), accessed October 27, 2026. Cycle-to-date totals, in dollars. Pre-general report closed as of October 14, 2026.

NY-01: CHRIS GALLANT VS. NICK LALOTA (INCUMBENT)

On the eastern end of Long Island, Nick LaLota would narrowly hold his seat. Chris Gallant nonetheless keeps a real chance, which makes New York's 1st one of the Republican seats in this chapter most favorable to the Democrats in the model. No recent poll backs this up.




Figure 78. *NY-01 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

NY-01 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential	Trump 50%, Biden 48%
2024 presidential	Trump 54%, Harris 44%[104]
2022 House	LaLota 55.5%, Bridget Fleming 44.5%
2024 House	LaLota 55.2%, John Avlon 44.8%
Money as of September 30	LaLota: $4.40 million raised, $2.73 million cash on hand; Gallant: $1.58 million raised, $609,773 cash on hand[105]
Only published poll	PPP for House Majority PAC, December 10 and 11, 2025, 579 voters: LaLota 41%, Gallant 38%[106]
Gallant's chances	45%
Projected Democratic share	49.4%, trailing by 1.2 points
Harris 2024 share	44.9%
Breakdown	effects on the projected margin, in points: national environment +7.2; district voting history −8.7; incumbency and recent local vote +3.0; fundraising −0.1; district polling none; other data used −0.2; poll bias correction −2.3
Trend in chances	39.6% (August 1), 37.3% (September 1), 43.8% (September 15), 41.4% (October 1), 42% (October 15), 44.7% (October 31)
Ratings	Cook (February 6, 2025) and Inside Elections: Safe R; Sabato: Likely R; Decision Desk HQ: Lean R (July 14, 2026)[107]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

New York's 1st District covers eastern Long Island, in Suffolk County. It runs from the Hamptons and the North Fork to Riverhead, Port Jefferson, Smithtown, Shelter Island, Huntington and northern Brookhaven. It is the fifth-wealthiest district in the state: 28.9% of households earn more than $200,000 a year[108].

Between 2020 and 2024, it shifted markedly to the right. In 2024, Democrat Avlon ran almost exactly even with Harris. The incumbent therefore has no visible personal edge.

[104] Wikipedia, “New York's 1st congressional district,” presidential results by district compiled from Dave's Redistricting and The Downballot, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York%27s_1st_congressional_district.
[105] Federal Election Commission, third-quarter report covering the period through September 30, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/NY/01/2026/.
[106] House Majority PAC, press release of January 8, 2026, https://www.thehousemajoritypac.com/news/new-hmp-polling-shows-nick-lalota-vulnerable-in-november.
[107] Ratings taken from the “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in New York,” accessed October 27, 2026; Wikipedia reports no recent update, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_New_York.
[108] Wikipedia, “New York's 1st congressional district,” accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_York%27s_1st_congressional_district.

The candidates and the campaign

Democrat Chris Gallant, an air traffic controller, is taking on incumbent Nick LaLota, who is endorsed by Donald Trump[109]. Chris Gallant, who is openly gay, has seen his fundraising soar since he acknowledged that sexually explicit photos, taken several years ago, showed him[110].

The money tilts heavily toward LaLota. Our sources document no outside spending, no debate and no district-specific issue.

Polls and the model

The only poll, commissioned by the super PAC tied to Hakeem Jeffries, dates from the winter. It does not count: the model only uses polls completed within the last 21 days.




Figure 79. *New York, District 1: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

[109] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in New York," 1st District section, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_New_York.
[110] McLogan, J. (2026). Lack of debates in 1st Congressional District race on Long Island exposes new political reality. CBS News. https://www.cbsnews.com/newyork/news/1st-congressional-district-race-nick-lalota-chris-gallant-long-island/

The “incumbency and recent local vote” term measures whether the district votes more or less Democratic for the House than for president: it adds 3.0 points of margin for Gallant. Together with the national environment (+7.2), it offsets district voting history (−8.7) and the poll bias correction (−2.3). Money carries almost no weight (−0.1), even though LaLota has four times as much cash. Yet the 2024 election does not explain this positive local contribution. The ratings may not have moved in a long time. Lacking race-specific information, the projection has followed the national environment.

Our analysis

In our reading, the model overrates this district for the Democrats. Gallant needs about 5 points more than Kamala Harris, roughly the entire 2024 swing toward Trump. On election night, a Gallant near 45% will mean LaLota is reelected. If he approaches 50%, the Democratic wave will reach well beyond the suburbs of Pennsylvania and Arizona.

MI-10: CHRISTINA HINES VS. MICHAEL BOUCHARD JR. (OPEN SEAT)

The departure of John James, who is running for governor, opened one of Michigan's most evenly balanced districts. The model sees Michael Bouchard Jr. comfortably holding the Republican seat against Christina Hines.




Figure 80. *MI-10 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

MI-10 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential	Trump 50%, Biden 49%
2024 presidential	Trump 52%, Harris 46%
Harris share used by the model	46.7%
2022 House	James 48.8%, Carl Marlinga 48.3%
2024 House	James 51.1%, Democrat 45.0%[111]
Incumbent	none: John James is running for governor
Money raised as of October 14	Hines $4.16 million, Bouchard $2.88 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Bouchard $1.57 million, Hines $1.01 million[112]
RedBox Research for A Fight Worth Having (October 20-23, 889 likely voters)	Bouchard 47%, Hines 42%[113]

[111] Wikipedia, “Michigan's 10th congressional district,” 2022 and 2024 results, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan%27s_10th_congressional_district.
[112] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering the period through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/MI/10/2026/.
[113] A Fight Worth Having, “MI-10,” October 2026, https://afightworthhaving.com/polling/2026/mi-10, cited by Wikipedia.

Indicator	Value
Global Strategy Group for House Majority PAC (August 10-13)	tied at 45%[114]
PPP for the Hines campaign (January)	Hines 44%, Bouchard 42%
Hines's chances	18.7% on October 31; 36.2% on August 1, 27.2% on September 1, 40.3% on September 15, 38% on October 1, 38.5% on October 15
Projected Democratic share	46.0%, Bouchard ahead by 8.0 points
Breakdown	effects on the projected margin, in points: national environment +7.1; district voting history −5.2; incumbency and recent local vote +0.1; fundraising −0.6; district polling −6.6; other data used −0.5; poll bias correction −2.3
With the RedBox poll (Table 6 method)	Democratic share around 46.0%, Hines's chances around 19%
Ratings	Cook and Sabato: Toss-up; Inside Elections: Lean R; Decision Desk HQ (October 20): Lean D[115]
Statewide races (model)	Benson 84.4% for governor, El-Sayed 65.4% for Senate
Simulator: Democratic House majority	83.3% if Benson wins; 40.7% if James wins, 44.3% if he wins by 5 points or less

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Michigan's 10th District covers southern Macomb County, including Warren and Sterling Heights, as well as Rochester and Rochester Hills in Oakland County[116]. Its boundaries have not changed since 2022. It is a working-class and middle-class suburb north of Detroit, where the vote has shifted toward the Republicans.

Yet the seat has never been safe for them. In 2022, a good year for his party, John James won it by only half a point.

The candidates and the campaign

Republican **Michael “Mike” Bouchard Jr.** is a National Guard captain and the son of Oakland County Sheriff Mike Bouchard. Our candidate database lists him as “Mike Bouchard,” but he is not the sheriff[117]. He is officially endorsed by

[114] National Journal, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Michigan,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Michigan.
[115] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Michigan,” accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Michigan.
[116] Wikipedia, “Michigan's 10th congressional district,” accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan%27s_10th_congressional_district.
[117] Detroit Free Press, November 6, 2025, https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2025/11/06/mike-bouchard-congress-michigan-house-army/87122295007/, cited by Wikipedia.

Donald Trump. To win the district, Michael Bouchard is playing up his record of service to the nation, notably his ten years in uniform and his *Bronze Star*. The legacy of a powerful family name is another card he is counting on. Being the son of Michael Bouchard Sr., Oakland County sheriff since 1999 and a respected Republican figure in the region, is an asset. It gives him instant name recognition and natural credibility on public safety in a Detroit suburb sensitive to crime[118].

Christina Hines is a prosecutor[119]. Hines highlights her background as a prosecutor, a profession seen as nonpartisan, to argue that she knows how to work across party lines (bipartisanship). She is directly targeting moderate or undecided voters who may have voted for Trump but feel betrayed by unkept economic promises[120]. Three other names are on the ballot: Libertarian Mike Saliba, Andrea Kirby and Kwabena Nkromo. Hines has the backing of EMILY's List, Giffords and the League of Conservation Voters. She has raised more. He has more cash on hand, and the model derives a slight Republican advantage from this.

Polls and the model

The most recent poll is also the worst for Hines. A notable detail: A Fight Worth Having, a progressive super PAC, released it even though it shows the Democrat trailing.

[118] Michael Bouchard. (2026). Ballotpedia. https://ballotpedia.org/Michael_Bouchard_(Michigan_congressional_candidate) Bouchard for Congress. (2026). https://www.bouchardforcongress.com/
[119] Politico, April 7, 2025, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Michigan,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Michigan.
[120] Schwab, C. (2026). Christina Hines wins Democratic congressional primary in Macomb County. The Detroit News. https://eu.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/08/04/michigan-10th-congressional-district-election-results/91149898007/Christina Hines. (2026). Ballotpedia. https://ballotpedia.org/Christina_Hines Wu, N. (2026). Democrat Christina Hines launches congressional bid in Detroit suburbs. Politico. https://www.politico.com/news/2025/04/07/christina-hines-launch-congressional-bid-john-james-030931




Figure 81. *Michigan, District 10: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

The RedBox poll is now included in the October 31 projection; the August poll is more than 21 days old. With the adjustment applied to a poll commissioned by a Democratic super PAC, it takes 6.6 points of margin away from Hines. The "incumbency and recent local vote" term is close to zero: James's strong 2024 showing offsets his narrow 2022 win. As our October 26 calculation foreshadowed, Hines loses most of her chances.




Figure 82. *Michigan, District 10: Democratic chances in our model, August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

Her chances have fluctuated since the summer, with a dip in early September, before falling on October 27 when the RedBox poll entered the model. The

ratings are split between a slight Republican lean and a slight Democratic lean.

The district is tied to the state's two major races. John James, its former representative, faces Jocelyn Benson for governor, and Abdul El-Sayed is running for the Senate. In the simulator, the outcome of the Benson vs. James contest weighs heavily on the House majority.

Our analysis

To flip the seat, Hines must at least match Carl Marlinga's 48.3% in 2022. Yet the RedBox poll puts her at 42%, and she cannot run against an incumbent. On election night, watch Warren and Sterling Heights, in Macomb County, where most of the electorate is concentrated. If Hines stays below Harris's 46.7%, Bouchard wins. Above 49%, the race will come down to the last ballots.

MI-04: SEAN MCCANN VS. BILL HUIZENGA (INCUMBENT)

Bill Huizenga runs ahead of his party, in a district that is nonetheless among the least Republican in this chapter. It is this premium, along with the latest poll, that would allow him, in the model, to hold the seat against Sean McCann.




Figure 83. *MI-04 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

MI-04 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential	Trump 51%, Biden 47%
2024 presidential	Trump 52%, Harris 46% (Trump +5.6 points)
Harris share used by the model	47.2%
2022 House	Huizenga 54.3%, Joseph Alfonso 42.4%
2024 House	Huizenga 55.1%, Jessica Swartz 43.4% (about 44% of the two-party vote)
Incumbent	Bill Huizenga (Republican)
Money raised as of October 14	Huizenga $5.56 million, McCann $4.70 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	McCann $1.03 million, Huizenga $394,221[121]
Outside spending	not quantified by our sources
RedBox Research for A Fight Worth Having (October 20-23, 787 likely voters, 6.6-point margin of error)	Huizenga 47%, McCann 44%[122]

[121] Federal Election Commission, "pre-general" report covering the period through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/MI/04/2026/.
[122] A Fight Worth Having, "MI-04," October 2026, https://afightworthhaving.com/polling/2026/mi-04, cited by Wikipedia.

Indicator	Value
GBAO for the McCann campaign (September 13-16)	McCann 47%, Huizenga 46% (shared on X, unverified)
GBAO for the McCann campaign (late May)	McCann 48%, Huizenga 45%[123]
Ragnar Research, group tied to the Republican Study Committee (March)	Huizenga 48%, McCann 42%
McCann's chances	23.6% on October 31; 41.3% on September 15, 32.5% on October 1
Projected Democratic share	46.8%, Huizenga ahead by 6 points
Breakdown	effects on the projected margin, in points: national environment +7.1; district voting history −4.1; incumbency and recent local vote −3.5; fundraising +1.1; district polling −4.6; other data used −0.1; poll bias correction −2.3
With the RedBox poll (Table 6 method)	Democratic share around 46.8%, McCann's chances around 24%
Ratings	Cook (October 9) and Sabato (September 16): Toss-up; Inside Elections (October 1) and Decision Desk HQ: Lean R[124]
Simulator: Democratic House majority	85.9% if El-Sayed wins the Senate seat, 59.6% if Mike Rogers wins it

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

From Kalamazoo to Holland, Michigan's 4th District covers the southwestern part of the state. It includes all of Allegan and Van Buren counties. Added to these are parts of Ottawa, Kalamazoo, Calhoun and Berrien counties[125]. Here too, the boundaries have not changed.

Huizenga runs well ahead of Trump there. In 2024, his Democratic opponent finished about 3 points below Harris, and it is this incumbency premium that the model translates into a negative “incumbency and recent local vote” term.

The candidates and the campaign

Sean McCann, a state senator (19th District), is term-limited[126]. Governor Gretchen Whitmer, the League of Conservation Voters and the Sierra Club back

[123] Semafor, June 8, 2026, https://www.semafor.com/article/06/08/2026/democrat-mccann-pulls-ahead-in-key-house-race, cited by Wikipedia.
[124] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Michigan,” accessed October 27, 2026.
[125] Wikipedia, “Michigan's 4th congressional district,” accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michigan%27s_4th_congressional_district.
[126] Michigan Advance, July 14, 2025, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Michigan,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Michigan.

him. Huizenga has Donald Trump and AIPAC on his side. Shafina Che Barnett is the Green candidate.

Money is the incumbent's weak spot. He has raised more than McCann, but he has very little cash left three weeks before the vote. The model derives a small Democratic advantage from this.

Polls and the model

The most recent poll, paid for by a progressive super PAC, nonetheless gives the edge to the Republican. McCann's internal polls had him ahead in the spring and again in September.





Figure 84. *Michigan, District 4: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

The RedBox poll now counts in the October 31 projection; the September GBAO poll is more than 21 days old. Factored in with the adjustment applied to a Democratic sponsor, it takes 4.6 points of margin away from McCann, who loses nearly half of his chances.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Recomputed day by day after the fact, with the polls completed by each date.

Figure 85. *Michigan, District 4: Democratic chances in our model, August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

After a dip in early October, his chances had returned to their mid-September level, before falling on October 27 when the RedBox poll entered the model. The ratings waver between Toss-up and a slight Republican lean. As in the 10th District, the Senate race matters: the simulator closely ties the fate of the House to the El-Sayed vs. Rogers contest.

Our analysis

McCann needs to do about 6 points better than the Democrats of 2022 and 2024. In our breakdown, the national environment gives him 7.1 points of margin and money 1.1. The RedBox poll, for its part, shows the incumbent's electorate holding firm. On election night, compare two areas: the part of the district in Kalamazoo County, where McCann needs strong turnout, and Allegan and Ottawa counties, where he needs a Republican decline. No public source currently measures either shift.

KY-06: ZACH DEMBO VS. RALPH ALVARADO (OPEN SEAT)

Trump won this district by 15 points. Yet a steady stream of Democratic polls has made Kentucky's 6th one of the races in this chapter where the projection has moved the most since the summer. Ralph Alvarado remains ahead in the model, but Zach Dembo has closed in.




Figure 86. *KY-06 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

KY-06 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
Registered voters as of January 1, 2026	550,815, of whom 44.01% Republicans and 43.80% Democrats[127]
2020 presidential	Trump 54%, Biden 44%
2024 presidential	Trump 57%, Harris 42%
Harris share used by the model	42.3%
2022 and 2024 House	Barr 62.7% then 63.0%, against 37.0% for Randy Cravens in 2024[128]
Incumbent	none: Andy Barr is running for Senate
Money raised as of October 14	Dembo $3.21 million, Alvarado $2.31 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Dembo $620,330, Alvarado $180,812[129]
GQR for the Dembo campaign (September 25-30, 401 likely voters)	Dembo 42%, Alvarado 37%; 46% to 43% with leaners[130]

[127] Wikipedia, “Kentucky's 6th congressional district,” registration data as of January 1, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kentucky%27s_6th_congressional_district.
[128] Wikipedia, “Kentucky's 6th congressional district,” 2022 and 2024 results.
[129] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering the period through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/KY/06/2026/.
[130] Kentucky Lantern, October 2, 2026, https://kentuckylantern.com/2026/10/02/internal-poll-shows-democrat-dembo-leads-gops-alvarado-in-central-kentucky-house-race/.

Indicator	Value
Change Research for Kentuckians Not Corruption (September 29-October 5, 524 likely voters)	Dembo 47%, Alvarado 38%[131]
Lake Research for House Majority PAC (September 30-October 4)	Dembo 47%, Alvarado 40% (shared on X, unverified)
DCCC (October 2-5, 606 likely voters)	Dembo 46%, Alvarado 40%, Bowman 5%, Lynch 1%[132]
PPP for House Majority PAC (October 19-20)	Dembo 47%, Alvarado 41% (shared on X, unverified)
Summer	DCCC in late July: tied at 47%; GQR in late June: Alvarado +3 points
Dembo's chances	28.2% on October 31; 8.7% on August 1, 13.9% on September 1, 10.6% on September 15, 20.9% on October 1, 33.8% on October 15
Projected Democratic share	47.4%, Alvarado ahead by 5 points
Breakdown	effects on the projected margin, in points: national environment +7.2; district voting history −13.8; incumbency and recent local vote −1.9; fundraising +0.2; district polling +5.9; other data used −0.3; poll bias correction −2.3
Adjusted average of the two polls used as of October 26	Alvarado +2.1 points
Ratings	Cook (October 23): Toss-up; Inside Elections (October 15), Sabato (September 29) and Decision Desk HQ (October 20): Lean R[133]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Kentucky's 6th District covers the center of the state, from Lexington, in Fayette County, to Richmond, Georgetown, Winchester, Berea and Lawrenceburg. Its registered voters are split almost evenly between the two parties, in sharp contrast with the presidential results. This suggests that some registered Democrats vote Republican in federal elections. Democrats have not won the seat since 2010[134]. The boundaries, for their part, have not changed.

The candidates and the campaign

With Andy Barr running for Senate, the Republicans are fielding Ralph Alvarado. A physician, he has been a state senator (2015-2023), Tennessee health commissioner (2023-2025) and a candidate for lieutenant governor in

[131] Decision Desk HQ, October 8, 2026, https://data.ddhq.io/polls/2026/10/08/Change-Research/Kentuckians-Not-Corruption-Kentucky--6-2026-09-29-2026-10-05.
[132] DCCC, memo of October 14, 2026, https://dccc.org/dccc-polling-memo-zach-dembo-continues-to-lead-in-ky-06/.
[133] "Predictions" table in Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Kentucky," accessed October 27, 2026.
[134] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Kentucky," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Kentucky.

2019[135]. Zach Dembo is a former federal prosecutor. Jay Bowman, an independent, and Pete Lynch, of the Kentucky Party, round out the ballot.

Trump, Mike Johnson and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce back Alvarado. Dembo has the support of Governor Andy Beshear, VoteVets, the With Honor Fund and the Blue Dog Coalition. In early October, the Lexington Herald-Leader noted the influx of ads paid for by outside super PACs, whose amounts are not disclosed[136]. Alvarado is nearly out of money three weeks before the election.

Polls and the model

After Alaska, it is the most heavily polled district in this chapter. With one major caveat: everything published comes from the Democratic side. Since late September, Dembo has led by 3 to 9 points. The summer had been much tighter.




Figure 87. *Kentucky, District 6: polls (Democratic minus Republican margin, by end date of fieldwork) and the Le Millénaire projection, with its 90% range.*

Kentucky's 6th is one of the districts in this chapter where polls weigh on the projection. As of October 26, two were included, Change Research and the

[135] Kentucky Lantern, July 17, 2025, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Kentucky.”
[136] Lexington Herald-Leader, October 1, 2026, https://www.kentucky.com/news/politics-government/election/article317439116.html, cited by Wikipedia.

DCCC, both completed on October 5. Each was adjusted by 3.5 points in the Republican's favor, then for pollster and state effects, and their average lost another 2.44 points to the national correction. With two polls, the projected margin covered 89% of the distance between this average and the structural baseline. The result: a series showing Dembo ahead by 6 points on average left Alvarado in the lead. Both polls dropped out of the 21-day window on October 27. As of October 31, district polling still adds 5.9 points of margin for Dembo, and Alvarado remains ahead by 5 points.




Figure 88. *Kentucky, District 6: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*




Figure 89. *Kentucky, District 6: Democratic chances in our model, August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

The curve tracks the campaign. Low until mid-September, Dembo's chances jump in October as the polls come in, then fall back on October 27, when the two polls used drop out of the window. The ratings have moved in the same direction, Cook all the way to Toss-up.

Our analysis

Dembo can rely on five consistent polls, an opponent short on money and his past as a federal prosecutor. Alvarado is defending a district no Democrat has won since 2010. Above all, no independent poll confirms the Democratic numbers, and no Republican poll has been released either. In our reading, the race is closer than the projection, without Dembo being the favorite: he still needs about 8 points more than Kamala Harris. On election night, Fayette County, that is, Lexington, will set his baseline. The rural counties around Richmond, Winchester and Georgetown will show whether the Republican decline extends beyond the city. If Dembo tops 47% of the total vote, the race will come down to a few thousand votes.

NC-11: JAMIE AGER VS. JENNIFER BALKCOM (OPEN SEAT)

The withdrawal of incumbent Chuck Edwards in the middle of the campaign made North Carolina's 11th District one of those where the Le Millénaire forecast diverged most from American analysts. Cook and Sabato see it leaning Democratic. Our model, which now treats it as a Toss-up, remains a little more cautious about Jamie Ager.




Figure 90. *NC-11 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

NC-11 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential	Trump 55%, Biden 44%
2024 presidential	Trump 54%, Harris 45%[137]
2022 House	Edwards 53.8%, Beach-Ferrara 44.5%
2024 House	Edwards 56.8%, Rudow 43.2%
Seat	Open: Edwards withdrew on August 5, 2026
Money raised as of October 14	Ager $5.87 million, Balkcom $399,492
Cash on hand as of October 14	Ager $620,158, Balkcom $294,818; Edwards still holds $398,402[138]
PPP poll for The Bench (September 10-11, 531 registered voters)	Ager 47%, Balkcom 44%; generic ballot 50% Republican, 46% Democratic (unverified)
Poll attributed to Emerson (October 12-14, 388 likely voters)	Ager 56%, Balkcom 43%[139]

[137] Wikipedia, "North Carolina's 11th congressional district," presidential results compiled from Dave's Redistricting and The Downballot, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Carolina%27s_11th_congressional_district.
[138] Federal Election Commission, "pre-general" report covering the period through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/NC/11/2026/.
[139] Poll Vault, "Levee Math," October 21, 2026, https://pollvault.substack.com/p/levee-math, cited by Wikipedia. The sponsor and methodology of this series of polls have not been verified.

Indicator	Value
Ager's chances	48%
Projected Democratic share	49.8%, Balkcom ahead by 0.4 points
Breakdown	Harris share 45.2%; effects on the projected margin, in points: national environment +7.2; district voting history −8.1; incumbency and recent local vote −0.7; fundraising none; district polling +3.5; other data used none; poll bias correction −2.3
Trend in chances	27.4% on August 1, 25.4% on September 1, 33.9% on September 15, 32.5% on October 1, 29.5% on October 15, 47.8% on October 31
Ratings	Cook (October 23) and Sabato (October 20): Lean D; Inside Elections (October 15) and Decision Desk HQ: Toss-up[140]
Early voting, statewide, as of October 23	1,453,516 ballots (1,063,702 in 2022); Democrats 41.5%, Republicans 24.0%, unaffiliated 34.3% (39.1% and 31.3% in 2022)[141]
Senate cross-effect	Cooper at 85.9%; Democratic House majority at 81.2% if he wins, 67.5% if he wins by 5 points or less

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Mountainous western North Carolina, with Asheville in Buncombe County, Henderson, Haywood and a dozen other rural counties, plus part of Polk[142]. Law SB 249 of October 2025 targeted the 1st and 3rd districts, and our sources report no change here[143]. Our database nonetheless lists the 11th among the modified geographies. This classification switches off the fundraising and outside spending terms.

A rare occurrence in this chapter: Harris did better than Biden.

The candidates and the campaign

Edwards threw in the towel after the House Ethics Committee recommended censure[144]. Our sources do not detail the facts, and we do not characterize them. A state Republican Party committee replaced him with Jennifer Balkcom, who represents the 117th District in the state House[145]. Ager farms Hickory Nut Gap Farm. He is the grandson of former Representative Jamie

[140] "Predictions" table in Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in North Carolina," accessed October 27, 2026.
[141] North Carolina State Board of Elections, early voting statistics as of October 23, 2026.
[142] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in North Carolina," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_North_Carolina.
[143] North Carolina General Assembly, SB 249, https://www.ncleg.gov/BillLookup/2025/S249, cited by Wikipedia.
[144] Axios, August 5, 2026, https://www.axios.com/2026/08/05/chuck-edwards-reelection-censure-harassment, cited by Wikipedia.
[145] NBC News, August 11, 2026, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/north-carolina-gop-committee-jennifer-balkcom-replace-chuck-edwards-rcna591827.

Clarke[146]. Travis Groo is running as the Libertarian.

Trump backs Balkcom. Ager has the support of 314 Action, the New Democrat Coalition, Planned Parenthood and the Sierra Club. On money, this is the widest gap in the chapter: nearly fifteen to one.

Polls and the model

The PPP poll was commissioned by a group favorable to Ager, and its numbers only circulated on X. The Poll Vault one is out of proportion with everything seen elsewhere. It should be kept at arm's length.




Figure 91. *North Carolina, District 11: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

The projection is no longer purely structural. Fundraising carries zero weight despite the funding gap, because of the modified-geography classification. PPP is more than 21 days old and drops out of the calculation. The Poll Vault poll, on the other hand, has been part of the projection since October 28 and adds 3.5 points of margin for Ager. His chances, nearly frozen since August while the American ratings were much more generous, have therefore jumped.

[146] Asheville Citizen-Times, July 15, 2025, cited by Wikipedia.

Early voting data are only available statewide. Their composition does not predict that of Election Day.

Our analysis

In our reading, the model underestimated Ager until October 26: it saw only a Trump +9 district. It still ignores Edwards's exit under threat of censure and an opponent chosen in August, with no resources. Ager still needs to do nearly 5 points better than Harris. On election night, Buncombe will set the level of Democratic mobilization. Henderson and Haywood will show whether he breaks out of his stronghold. If he approaches 50% in the rural counties of the west, the seat flips.

VA-05: TOM PERRIELLO VS. JOHN MCGUIRE (INCUMBENT)

Tom Perriello, a former representative of the district, has the money and genuine name recognition. Yet the only independent poll puts incumbent John McGuire ahead, and the model follows.




Figure 92. *VA-05 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

VA-05 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential	Trump 53%, Biden 45%
2024 presidential	Trump 55%, Harris 43%
2024 House	McGuire beats Good in the primary, then Witt with 57.3%[147]
Incumbent	John McGuire (Republican)
Money raised as of October 14	Perriello $3.76 million, McGuire $2.42 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Perriello $684,166, McGuire $382,053[148]
Washington Post and Schar School (September 23-28, 600 likely voters)	McGuire 51%, Perriello 45%[149]
Expedition Strategies for Perriello (September 21-24)	McGuire 46%, Perriello 45%, Harvey 6%; generic ballot 48% Democratic, 46% Republican
Expedition Strategies for Perriello (late July)	McGuire 47%, Perriello 44%[150]
Perriello's chances	33%
Projected Democratic share	48.0%, McGuire ahead by 4.0 points
Breakdown	Harris share 43.8%; effects on the projected margin, in points: national environment +7.1; district voting history −10.9; incumbency and recent local vote −1.5; fundraising +2.5; district polling none; other data used +1.0; poll bias correction −2.3
Trend in chances	17.8% on August 1, 27% on September 15, 19.6% on October 1, 20.4% on October 15, 32.7% on October 31
Ratings	Cook (September 25) and Inside Elections (October 1): Likely R; Sabato (September 29) and Decision Desk HQ (October 20): Lean R[151]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Rural Southside, from Charlottesville to Lynchburg and Danville, up to the outskirts of Richmond. The 2021 Special Masters map still stands. The April 2026 referendum was meant to pave the way for a map with 10 Democratic seats out of 11. The Supreme Court of Virginia struck it down on May 8, by 4 to 3, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the appeal on May 15[152]. Perriello returned to the 5th District right afterward[153].

[147] Wikipedia, “Virginia's 5th congressional district,” accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia%27s_5th_congressional_district.
[148] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering the period through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/VA/05/2026/.
[149] Washington Post and Schar School, September 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/documents/c5cba6fd-7edb-4550-93c3-0580e8084bfb.pdf.
[150] Punchbowl News, Expedition Strategies memo, https://punchbowl.news/va05_polling_memo_vfin/.
[151] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Virginia,” accessed October 27, 2026.
[152] VPM, May 8, 2026, https://www.vpm.org/generalassembly/2026-05-08/scova-redistricting-referendum-scott-mcdougle-kelsey; SCOTUSblog, May 2026, https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/05/court-denies-virginias-request-to-reinstate-congressional-map-that-would-benefit-democrats/.
[153] WSLS, May 8, 2026, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Virginia,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Virginia.

The candidates and the campaign

Perriello represented this district from 2009 to 2011, before becoming U.S. special envoy for Sudan[154]. Cooke Harvey is trying his luck as an independent. Kaine, Warner, Governor Spanberger and Ocasio-Cortez are behind Perriello. McGuire has Trump, Youngkin and AIPAC.

The tone escalated quickly. McGuire refuses any debate until Perriello has "apologized on national television" for having, he says, accused him of insider trading[155]. The DCCC (Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee) has put the seat on its target list[156]. As early as July, Perriello had nearly three times as much cash as his opponent[157].

Polls and the model

Even Perriello's internal surveys put him behind. His September memo nonetheless shows a generic ballot favorable to the Democrats.




Figure 93. *Virginia, District 5: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

[154] WVIR, December 9, 2025, cited by Wikipedia.
[155] WSET, August 27, 2026, https://wset.com/news/local/rep-john-mcguire-says-an-apology-is-needed-before-he-debates-politics-august-2026-perriello.
[156] Cardinal News, August 21, 2026, https://cardinalnews.org/2026/08/21/notes-from-the-square-dccc-triples-down-on-its-push-to-flip-the-5th-congressional-district/.
[157] Cardinal News, July 17, 2026, cited by Wikipedia.

Perriello's financial advantage is the only candidate-specific contribution. The “other data used” in our figures combine outside spending and the overall climate.




Figure 94. *Virginia, District 5: Democratic chances in our model, August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

The drop on October 1 follows the Post poll. The rebound on October 26 is mechanical. The Post poll, completed on September 28, left the 21-day window on October 20, and the latest Expedition poll had already dropped out. The ratings, for their part, have not moved.

Our analysis

In our reading, the 33% of October 31 is a ceiling. Something closer to 20% describes the race. No poll puts Perriello ahead, despite his war chest and his past as a representative. Refusing to debate does not seem to have cost McGuire. Perriello needs to gain about 6 points on Harris, in rural Southside as much as in Charlottesville. Two cities to watch on election night: Lynchburg and Danville. A clear Republican decline there would be enough to open up the race.

IA-02: LINDSAY JAMES VS. JOE MITCHELL (OPEN SEAT)

Iowa's 2nd District opened up with Ashley Hinson's run for the Senate. Its fate is therefore closely tied to the state's two major races. The model sees Joe Mitchell holding the Republican seat.




Figure 95. *IA-02 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

IA-02 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential	Trump 51%, Biden 47%
2024 presidential	Trump 54%, Harris 44%
2022 and 2024 House	Hinson 54.1% then 57.1%
Seat	Open: Hinson is running for Senate
Money raised as of October 14	James $3.92 million, Mitchell $2.92 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	James $265,953, Mitchell $545,534[158]
Poll attributed to Emerson (October 12-14, 344 likely voters)	James 50%, Mitchell 47%
Global Strategy Group for House Majority PAC (July 14-19)	46% to 45%
PPP for the James campaign (April)	36% to 33%[159]
James's chances	33%

[158] Federal Election Commission, "pre-general" report covering the period through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/IA/02/2026/.
[159] Poll Vault, "Levee Math," October 21, 2026, https://pollvault.substack.com/p/levee-math (sponsor and methodology not verified); House Majority PAC, https://static.notus.org/27/58/c93f2d1946c0814f583fa25c7a31/hmp-ia-02-poll.pdf, cited by Wikipedia.

Indicator	Value
Projected Democratic share	48.0%, Mitchell ahead by 4.0 points
Breakdown	Harris share 44.9%; effects on the projected margin, in points: national environment +7.1; district voting history −8.6; incumbency and recent local vote −1.0; fundraising +0.2; district polling none; other data used +0.6; poll bias correction −2.3
Trend in chances	Between 21 and 27% until mid-October, 32.6% on October 31
Ratings	Cook (October 16), Inside Elections (October 15) and Decision Desk HQ: Toss-up; Sabato (October 20): Lean D[160]
Absentee ballots, statewide, as of October 23	207,858 (167,105 in 2022); Democrats 50.9%, Republicans 32.0%, no party 16.8% (55.2% and 31.4% in 2022)[161]
Senate and governor	Turek 29.3% against Hinson; Sand 65.8%
Simulator cross-effect	Democratic House majority: 91.9% if Turek wins, 70.3% otherwise; 88.0% with Sand as governor, 54.5% if he loses

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Northeastern Iowa, from Cedar Rapids (Linn County) and Waterloo (Black Hawk County) to Dubuque, Mason City, Waverly and Grinnell[162]. No redistricting.

In four years, Trump's lead grew by 6 points in this working-class region. James needs some Trump voters to return to the Democrats in 2026, without Trump on the ballot.

The candidates and the campaign

Mitchell served in the state House from 2019 to 2023, then was a regional official in the Trump administration[163]. James represents the 71st state House District[164]. Dave Bushaw is running as an independent. Trump, Mike Johnson, Anna Paulina Luna and the Chamber of Commerce back Mitchell. James has EMILY's List. Two debates have taken place, on October 1 on Iowa's News Now and on October 8 on Iowa PBS[165].

[160] "Predictions" table in Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Iowa," accessed October 27, 2026.
[161] Iowa Secretary of State, absentee ballot statistics as of October 23, 2026.
[162] Wikipedia, "Iowa's 2nd congressional district," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iowa%27s_2nd_congressional_district.
[163] KJAN, September 8, 2025, cited by Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Iowa," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Iowa.
[164] The Gazette, August 19, 2025, cited by Wikipedia.
[165] Iowa PBS, "Iowa Press Debates: 2nd Congressional District," https://www.iowapbs.org/shows/iowapress/special/14525/iowa-press-debates-2nd-congressional-district.

James has raised more but has spent almost all of it. Mitchell has twice as much cash on hand. In the model, money carries almost no weight.

Polls and the model

None of the three published polls enters the model.




Figure 96. *Iowa, District 2: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

The analysts are more favorable to James than we are. Mail voting can only be read at the state level: it is up in volume, but the Democratic share is down compared with 2022.

The district also depends on the top of the ticket. A Turek win for Senate or a Sand win for governor clearly changes, in the simulator, the probability of a Democratic House majority.

Our analysis

James needs to do about 5 points better than Harris and win back some of the working-class voters who moved to Trump in 2024. On election night, Cedar Rapids and Waterloo will set the Democratic baseline. Then comes Dubuque, our bellwether county. If James clearly beats Harris's showing there, she can

win the district. A Rob Sand score well above 50% in all three counties would point the same way.

WI-01: MITCHELL BERMAN VS. BRYAN STEIL (INCUMBENT)

Harris posted her best score among this chapter's Republican seats in Wisconsin's 1st District. Yet incumbent Bryan Steil runs ahead of his party there, and Mitchell Berman remains well behind in the model.




Figure 97. *WI-01 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

WI-01 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential	Trump 50%, Biden 48%
2024 presidential	Trump 51%, Harris 47%
2024 House	Steil reelected with 54.0%, about 4 points better than Trump
Incumbent	Bryan Steil (Republican), endorsed by Donald Trump
Money raised as of October 14	Steil $6.39 million, Berman $1.98 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Steil $2.24 million, Berman $351,558[166]
Impact Research for House Majority PAC (September 28-October 1, 500 likely voters)	Berman 48%, Steil 47%; generic ballot Democrats +1[167]
DCCC (September 21-23)	48% each
Impact for the Berman campaign (August)	Steil 49%, Berman 48%
Ragnar Research, group tied to the Republican Study Committee (March)	Steil 50%, Berman 41%
Berman's chances	31.6% on October 31 (36.3% on September 15, 24.7% on October 1)
Projected Democratic share	47.8%, Steil ahead by 4.4 points
Breakdown	Harris share 47.7%; effects on the projected margin, in points: national environment +7.2; district voting history −3.1; incumbency and recent local vote −3.3; fundraising −0.3; district polling none; other data used −2.5; poll bias correction −2.3
Ratings	Cook (September 25), Sabato (October 8) and Decision Desk HQ: Lean R; Inside Elections: Likely R[168]
Cross-effect, governor	Crowley 59.1% chance; Democratic majority at 89.9% if he wins, 57.4% if Tiffany wins

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The district covers southeastern Wisconsin, namely Kenosha and Racine counties, most of Walworth County and parts of Rock and Milwaukee counties, with Beloit, Janesville, Kenosha, Racine, Franklin, Oak Creek and Whitewater as its main cities[169]. A judicial panel rejected a challenge to the map on March 31, 2026[170]. The boundaries are unchanged.

[166] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering the period through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/WI/01/2026/.
[167] The Downballot, Bluesky, October 3, 2026, https://bsky.app/profile/the-downballot.com/post/3mwyouhbwg22k, cited by Wikipedia.
[168] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Wisconsin,” accessed October 27, 2026.
[169] Wikipedia, “Wisconsin's 1st congressional district,” accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wisconsin%27s_1st_congressional_district.
[170] The Hill, https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/5809613-wisconsin-congressional-map-challenge/, cited by Wikipedia.

The candidates and the campaign

Mitchell Berman is a nurse[171]. The Blue Dog Coalition and the New Dem Action Fund support him. The money tilts toward the incumbent, by more than three to one.

Polls and the model

The Democratic polls describe a tie. Only Ragnar's, in March, saw Steil far ahead.




Figure 98. *Wisconsin, District 1: polls (Democratic minus Republican margin, by end date of fieldwork) and the Le Millénaire projection, with its 90% range.*

The September and October 1 surveys are more than 21 days old. They therefore drop out of the projection. The national environment offsets Steil's personal premium there, and no more.

Our analysis

Steil has three times as much money in a district that Trump won by only 4 points. On election night, Kenosha and Racine will be decisive. If Berman outperforms Harris there and also does well in Janesville and Beloit, in Rock County, Steil will probably have lost.

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[171] WisPolitics, August 12, 2025, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Wisconsin,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Wisconsin.

OH-15: DON LEONARD VS. MIKE CAREY (INCUMBENT, REDRAWN)

The 2025 redistricting barely touched Ohio's 15th District. House Majority PAC polls put it on the map of competitive races, but the model leaves Mike Carey well ahead of Don Leonard.




Figure 99. *OH-15 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

OH-15 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential	Trump 53%, Biden 46% (old and new boundaries)
2024 presidential	Trump 54% to 45% (old boundaries), 55% to 45% (new)[172]
2022 and 2024 House	Carey 57.0% then 56.5% (old boundaries)
Incumbent	Mike Carey (Republican), endorsed by Donald Trump and the Chamber of Commerce

[172] Wikipedia, "Ohio's 15th congressional district," based on Dave's Redistricting, https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::db6559b0-8923-471b-b219-152ba0decd9b.

Indicator	Value
Money raised as of June 30	Carey $3.30 million, Leonard $606,657
Cash on hand as of June 30	Carey $2.06 million, Leonard $252,401[173]
Hart for House Majority PAC (October 9-12)	Leonard 48%, Carey 45% (shared on X, unverified)
Hart for House Majority PAC (September 22-24)	Leonard 46%, Carey 45% (shared on X, unverified)
Hart for House Majority PAC (June 23-25)	Carey 45%, Leonard 40%[174]
Hart for the Leonard campaign (August 6-9)	Carey 41%, Leonard 37%, Barrington 10%[175]
Leonard's chances	29.3% on October 31 (between 20 and 26% from August to October 26)
Projected Democratic share	47.6%, Carey ahead by 4.8 points
Breakdown	Harris share 44.9%; effects on the projected margin, in points: national environment +7.2; district voting history −8.6; incumbency and recent local vote −1.7; fundraising none; district polling +0.6; other data used none; poll bias correction −2.3
Ratings	Cook: Lean R (October 16); Inside Elections, Sabato, Decision Desk HQ: Likely R[176]
Cross-effect, Senate	Brown 21.4% chance; Democratic majority at 94.1% if he wins, 71.9% if Husted wins
Governor	Acton 27.8% chance

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 15th District covers the southwestern part of the Columbus metro area, with Dublin, Hilliard and Grove City. It stretches toward Dayton and toward the rural areas south of Columbus, including Clark and Fayette counties[177].

The Ohio Redistricting Commission adopted the map in October 2025, following a bipartisan agreement. The Republicans had initially aimed for 13 seats out of 15. The agreement made the 1st and 9th districts tougher and protected the 13th[178]. The 15th barely moved.

[173] Federal Election Commission, report covering the period through June 30, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/OH/15/2026/.
[174] House Majority PAC, July 6, 2026, https://www.thehousemajoritypac.com/news/hmp-poll-don-leonard-within-striking-distance-of-mike-carey-in-oh-15.
[175] Politico, Weekly Score, August 17, 2026, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-score/2026/08/17/is-it-dans-sullivan-or-dan-sullivans-01038900.
[176] "Predictions" table in Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Ohio," accessed October 27, 2026.
[177] Wikipedia, "Ohio's 15th congressional district," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohio%27s_15th_congressional_district.
[178] Politico, October 31, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/10/31/ohio-redistricting-gerrymander-new-map-00631254.

The candidates and the campaign

Don Leonard is a teacher[179]. Brennan Barrington is running as the Libertarian. Our sources stop at the June financial reports: the fall reports are missing.

Polls and the model

Hart Research conducted all the polls, for the Democratic side.




Figure 100. *Ohio, District 15: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

The projection therefore remains almost structural. The September poll is more than 21 days old, and the October poll, which entered our database, adds only 0.6 points of margin for Leonard. It is mainly the national environment that brings him closer.

Our analysis

Hart measured gains for Leonard between June and October, but only for the Democratic side. Leonard still needs to gain about 5 points on Harris, with one fifth as much money in June. In our reading, the seat only flips on a night when Brown wins Ohio. On election night, Dublin, Hilliard and Grove City, in Franklin

[179] WCMH-NBC4, October 26, 2025, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Ohio,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Ohio.

County, will show whether the Columbus suburbs follow the national trend. The rural counties in the south, such as Fayette, will show whether Carey holds his base.

CO-05: JESSICA KILLIN VS. JEFF CRANK (INCUMBENT)

Jessica Killin has raised almost twice as much money as incumbent Jeff Crank. Yet the district remains anchored on the right, and the model has her as a slight underdog.




Figure 101. *CO-05 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our win probabilities as of October 31, 2026; inset: the entire state.*

CO-05 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
Profile	about 17% Hispanic; Cook Partisan Voting Index (PVI) Republican +5[180]
2020 presidential election	Trump 53%, Biden 43%
2024 presidential election	Trump 53%, Harris 44%
2022 House	Lamborn 56.0%, against 40.3%
2024 House	Crank 54.7%, against 40.9%
Raised through September 30	Killin $4.97 million, Crank $2.78 million
Cash on hand as of September 30	Crank $1.01 million, Killin $702,475[181]
PPP for House Majority PAC (October 19-20)	47% each (posted on X, unverified)
Global Strategy Group for the Killin campaign (October 14-18, 500 likely voters)	Killin 43%, Crank 38%, Mitchell 4%, Elworth 3%; 46% to 44% head-to-head[182]
Killin's chances	45.0% on October 31 (34.2% on September 15, 32.6% on October 15)
Projected Democratic share	49.4%, Crank ahead by 1.2 points
Breakdown	in points of margin: national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 7.8; incumbency and recent local vote minus 2.9; fundraising plus 2.6; district polling plus 4.4; other data used minus 2.2; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings	Cook (September 25), Sabato (September 16): Lean Republican; Inside Elections (September 17): Tilt Republican; Decision Desk HQ: Likely Republican[183]
Ballots returned statewide as of October 22	730,614, compared with 442,889 in 2022; Democrats 32.8%, Republicans 24.6%, unaffiliated 41.5% (2022: 33.0%, 29.8%, 36.2%)[184]
Cross-race effect, governor	Weiser 64% chance; Democratic House chances of 82.9% if he wins

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Colorado's 5th District lies within El Paso County: Colorado Springs and its suburbs, including Cimarron Hills and Fort Carson. It was not redrawn.

Candidates and campaign

Jessica Killin was chief of staff to Second Gentleman Doug Emhoff[185]. Mark Elworth, a Libertarian, and Christopher Mitchell, of the American Constitution Party, are also running. Killin has won the backing of Senators Michael Bennet

[180] Wikipedia, “Colorado's 5th congressional district”, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colorado%27s_5th_congressional_district.
[181] Federal Election Commission, third-quarter report covering through September 30, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/CO/05/2026/.
[182] Global Strategy Group, October 2026 memo, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iF5NKlbiwGQmlEOEd8AaZz_Pe2vu8-De/view, cited by Wikipedia.
[183] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Colorado”, accessed October 27, 2026.
[184] Colorado Secretary of State, ballot return statistics as of October 22, 2026.
[185] Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Colorado”, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Colorado.

and John Hickenlooper, EMILY's List, VoteVets and the New Dem Action Fund. Crank relies on Donald Trump and AIPAC. Killin raises more; Crank keeps more cash on hand.

Polls and model

All three published polls are Democratic. In July, Global Strategy Group still had Crank ahead by one point. None was in the database as of October 26; as of October 31, district polling adds 4.4 points to the projection.




Figure 102. *Colorado, District 5: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

Crank and Lamborn ran ahead of Trump, which costs Killin a local margin. Her financial edge gives almost as much back. The national environment and district polling do the rest, without quite being enough. Her chances have risen markedly since mid-October.

Colorado votes almost entirely by mail. The turnout figures apply to the whole state, not to the district alone. Registered Republicans account for a smaller share than in 2022, unaffiliated voters for a larger one.

Our analysis

Killin has more money, and her internal polls put her ahead. Yet Trump carried the district by 9 points in 2024. In our view, the race will be decided by unaffiliated voters in Colorado Springs. On election night, Killin's result should be read against Harris's share. Crank will be in danger if she tops 49%.

FL-13: LEELA GRAY VS. ANNA PAULINA LUNA (INCUMBENT, REDRAWN)

Florida's new map has made Anna Paulina Luna's district more Republican. The polls favorable to Leela Gray all come from the Democratic side. The model gives the Democrat nearly a one-in-four chance.




Figure 103. *FL-13 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our win probabilities as of October 31, 2026; inset: the entire state.*

FL-13 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
New boundaries	southern Pinellas removed, about 62,000 residents added in Pasco County[186]
2020 presidential election (new boundaries)	Trump 53%, Biden 45%
2024 presidential election (new boundaries)	Trump 56%, Harris 43%
Trump's 2024 lead, old then new boundaries	11.8 then 13.3 points[187]
2022 House (old boundaries)	Luna 53.1%, Eric Lynn 45.1%
2024 House (old boundaries)	Luna 54.8%, Whitney Fox 45.2%
Incumbent	Anna Paulina Luna, Republican; Tony D'Arrigo running as an independent
Money as of September 30	Luna: $4.09 million raised, $1.08 million on hand; Gray: $2.57 million raised, $600,502 on hand[188]
PPP for House Majority PAC, October 14-15	Gray 47%, Luna 46% (603 likely voters)[189]
Hart Research for House Majority PAC, August 25-27	Gray 51%, Luna 46%; with D'Arrigo: Gray 44%, Luna 43%, D'Arrigo 7%[190]
August campaign polls	Fabrizio Lee for Luna: Luna 49%, Gray 41%; GQR for Gray: Luna 47%, Gray 44%
Gray's chances	23%
Projected Democratic share	46.7%, Luna ahead by 6.6 points
Projection breakdown	in points of margin: national environment +7.2 points; district voting history −12.0 points; incumbency and recent local vote +1.2 points; fundraising zero; district polling −0.6 point; other data used zero; poll bias correction −2.3 points
Gray's chances since August	between 20.6% and 24.0% on the reference dates
Ratings	Lean Republican for Cook (September 25) and Inside Elections (October 1); Likely Republican for Sabato and Decision Desk HQ[191]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Before 2026, the 13th District lay entirely within Pinellas County, on the west coast, Clearwater included. The new boundaries push it north into Pasco and widen Trump's lead. The Harris share used by the model matches the recalculated results.

[186] WUSF, “A breakdown of the changes for Florida's new congressional map”, May 6, 2026, https://wusf.org/text/politics-issues/2026-05-06/breakdown-changes-for-florida-new-congressional-map.
[187] Wikipedia, “2026 Florida redistricting”, based on Dave's Redistricting, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Florida_redistricting.
[188] Federal Election Commission, third-quarter report covering through September 30, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/FL/13/2026/.
[189] Florida Politics, October 21, 2026, https://floridapolitics.com/archives/826223-hakeem-jeffries-affiliated-super-pac-says-leela-gray-is-polling-ahead-of-anna-paulina-luna/.
[190] Florida Politics, September 1, 2026, https://floridapolitics.com/archives/817972-democratic-poll-shows-leela-gray-winning-majority-over-anna-paulina-luna-in-cd-13/.
[191] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Florida”, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Florida.

Ron DeSantis proposed the map on April 27, 2026. His aide Jason Poreda acknowledged at a hearing that he had drawn it and had consulted partisan data. The Legislature passed it on April 29, DeSantis signed it on May 4, and the Florida Supreme Court upheld it on June 10. The stated goal: to go from 20 Republican seats out of 28 to 24[192].

Candidates and campaign

Leela Gray is a retired Army brigadier general[193]. She has the support of Senator Mark Kelly, Virginia Governor Abigail Spanberger, EMILY's List, VoteVets, the Blue Dog Coalition and the AFL-CIO. The money, however, remains on Luna's side.

Polls and model

House Majority PAC has released two polls that put Gray ahead. The August surveys commissioned by the campaigns said the opposite.




Figure 104. *Florida, District 13: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

[192] NBC News, April 29, 2026, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/florida-legislature-passes-redistricting-plan-creating-four-additional-rcna342656; AP, April 29, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/florida-ron-desantis-donald-trump-redistricting-13e14f95a8d2b6afbc7e3e698f5f9256.
[193] Tampa Bay Times, February 3, 2026, https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida-politics/2026/02/03/anna-paulina-luna-congress-democrats-election-leela-gray-us-house/.

As of October 26, no poll entered the projection. The August polls were more than 21 days old. The October one was not in our database. The model therefore relied on the district's structure and the national environment, and Gray's chances had barely moved since the summer. As of October 31, district polling takes 0.6 point away from her, and her chances slip slightly, to 23.2%.

Our analysis

Gray needs to gain nearly 7 points on Harris, in a district that the addition of Pasco has made tougher. Since September, only one poll has shown her ahead, PPP's for House Majority PAC. We see her as a second-tier target. On election night, watch the new part of Pasco County. If Luna runs behind Trump's 2024 result there, the race will be open.

IN-05: J. D. FORD VS. VICTORIA SPARTZ (INCUMBENT)

Victoria Spartz keeps the advantage in Indiana's 5th District. Yet J. D. Ford's chances nearly tripled on October 16, when outside spending entered the calculation.




Figure 105. *IN-05 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our win probabilities as of October 31, 2026; inset: the entire state.*

IN-05 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
Voting-age population	84% white, 8% Black (APM Research Lab, 2019 data)[194]
Map	unchanged, after redistricting failed in the Indiana Senate in late 2025[195]
2020 and 2024 presidential elections	Trump 57%, against 41% for the Democrat, both times
2022 House	Spartz reelected with 61.1%
2024 House	Spartz 56.6%, Deborah Pickett 38.0%
Money as of October 14	Spartz: $2.19 million raised, $514,922 on hand; Ford: $1.41 million raised, $324,529 on hand[196]
Expedition Strategies for House Majority PAC, September 30-October 4	Spartz 48%, Ford 47% (600 likely voters); posted on X only, unverified
Impact Research for the Ford campaign, July 16-20	Spartz 48%, Ford 46%
Ford's chances	38%
Projected Democratic share	48.6%, Spartz ahead by 2.8 points
Projection breakdown	in points of margin: national environment +7.2; district voting history −15.6; incumbency and recent local vote −1.4; fundraising +0.7; district polling +3.4; other data used (outside spending and economic conditions) +5.3; poll bias correction −2.3
Change in chances	between 6.6% and 9% through October 15 (8.3% that day); 21.6% on October 16; 37.6% on October 31
Projected margin	cut from 12.4 to 2.8 points
Ratings	Likely Republican for Cook (October 9), Inside Elections (October 15), Sabato (October 20) and Decision Desk HQ[197]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The district covers Hamilton, Madison, Delaware, Grant and Tipton counties, and most of Howard County. It combines Indianapolis's northern suburbs (Carmel, Fishers, Noblesville) with midsize industrial cities: Muncie, Anderson, Marion, Kokomo. It is the wealthiest district in the state. Donald Trump wanted Indiana redistricted. He did not get his way, and the map did not change.

[194] Wikipedia, “Indiana's 5th congressional district”, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana%27s_5th_congressional_district.
[195] Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Indiana”, section “Failed redistricting attempt”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Indiana.
[196] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/IN/05/2026/.
[197] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Indiana”, accessed October 27, 2026.

Candidates and campaign

J. D. Ford has served in the State Senate since 2018, representing the 29th District[198]. The AFL-CIO backs him. Spartz has raised more and keeps more cash on hand.

Polls and model

The only two known polls are Democratic. Neither was in our database as of October 26; as of October 31, district polling adds 3.4 points to the projection. The Expedition Strategies poll circulated only on X, and we were unable to verify it.




Figure 106. *Indiana, District 5: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

Everything hinges on other data used, plus 5.3 points in the breakdown. It mostly measures the money that super PACs and committees spend in the district, with a small economic-conditions effect. Nowhere else in this chapter is this term so large. It entered the model on October 16, with the third-quarter filings.

[198] WISH-TV, January 14, 2026, https://www.wishtv.com/news/ford-vs-spartz-indiana-5th/.




Figure 107. *Indiana, District 5: Democratic chances in our model, August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

That day, Ford's chances jumped and the projected margin shrank by nearly half. The analysts did not follow. Their ratings remain unanimous.

Our analysis

No poll has confirmed the effect of outside spending. The only recent one, from Expedition Strategies, was commissioned by House Majority PAC. We therefore treat the district as a Likely Republican seat, not as a race with a 38% Democratic chance. To win, Ford would need a sharp Republican decline in the affluent suburbs of Hamilton County. On election night, Carmel and Fishers will serve as bellwether communities. Muncie and Anderson will then show whether the industrial cities follow.

GA-07: ANTHONY “TONY” KOZYCKI VS. RICH MCCORMICK (INCUMBENT)

In Georgia's 7th District, Trump won by 22 points. The model now gives Tony Kozycki only about a one-in-a-hundred chance against incumbent Rich McCormick: the only poll that propped him up, commissioned by the Democratic candidate himself, no longer carries weight in the projection.




Figure 108. *GA-07 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our win probabilities as of October 31, 2026; inset: the entire state.*

GA-07 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential election	Trump 59%, Biden 40%
2024 presidential election	Trump 60%, Harris 38%
Harris share used by the model	38.9%, the lowest in the chapter
2022 House	no comparison possible, as Georgia was redistricted
2024 House	McCormick 64.9%, Bob Christian 35.1%
Money as of October 14	McCormick: $2.25 million raised, $1.34 million on hand; Kozycki: $922,117 raised, $492,432 on hand[199]
20/20 Insight for Kozycki, October 6-9	Kozycki 47%, McCormick 45% (457 likely voters)[200]
20/20 Insight for Kozycki, August 20-26	McCormick 46%, Kozycki 43%[201]
Kozycki's chances	1%
Projected Democratic share	39.6%, McCormick ahead by 20.8 points
Projection breakdown	in points of margin: national environment +7.2; district voting history minus 20.8 points; incumbency and recent local vote minus 4.2 points; fundraising minus 0.6; district polling zero; other data used minus 0.1; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Correction of the poll used	3.5 points in the Republican's favor; this poll no longer carries weight in the October 31 projection
Change in chances	0.6% on August 1; 10.9% on September 1; 0.7% on October 1; 22.1% on October 15; 1.0% on October 31
Ratings	Safe Republican for Cook, Inside Elections and Sabato; Likely Republican for Decision Desk HQ, on October 4[202]
Cross-race effect in the simulator	Ossoff has a 95% chance in the Senate race; if he loses, the Democrats' chances of a House majority fall to 45.4%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The district combines Atlanta's northern suburbs (Alpharetta, Cumming, Johns Creek, Milton, Roswell, Sandy Springs) with rural Piedmont areas around Dahlonega and Dawsonville. It includes all of Dawson, Forsyth and Lumpkin counties, and parts of Cherokee, Fulton and Hall counties[203]. Under the new map, McCormick can only be compared with his own 2024 result.

[199] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/GA/07/2026/.
[200] Kozycki campaign press release, https://kozyckiforcongress.com/docs/releases/rel-255316a80123.pdf, cited by Wikipedia.
[201] DocumentCloud, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28606087-ga-07-2020-insight-for-tony-kozycki-aug-2026/.
[202] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Georgia”, accessed October 27, 2026.
[203] Wikipedia, “Georgia's 7th congressional district”, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia%27s_7th_congressional_district.

Candidates and campaign

The Democratic candidate, a lawyer, is officially named Anthony. His campaign claims the support of Senator Jon Ossoff (press release of October 12, 2026)[204]. McCormick has Donald Trump, AIPAC and the Chamber of Commerce on his side. He has also raised more than twice as much as his opponent.

Polls and model

The two published polls come from the same pollster, 20/20 Insight, for the same campaign. They contradict each other.




Figure 109. *Georgia, District 7: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

As of October 31, the polling term is zero. The local margin works against Kozycki, as McCormick ran ahead of Trump. The October poll, completed on the 9th and corrected in the Republican's favor, has left the 21-day window: the projection now relies on the district's structure and the national environment.

[204] Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Georgia”, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Georgia.




Figure 110. *Georgia, District 7: Democratic chances in our model, August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

The curve tracks the polls closely. The August poll lifts Kozycki. It drops out of the 21-day window and his chances fall back almost to zero. The October poll revives them, before dropping out in turn. The analysts, for their part, see no race.

Our analysis

In our reading, the model clearly overestimated Kozycki: his chances rested on a single poll, commissioned by his campaign, in a Trump plus 22 district. The district matters mostly as a test for the affluent suburbs north of Atlanta. On election night, Johns Creek, Alpharetta and Sandy Springs, in Fulton County, will show whether Republican erosion continues there. Finally, the simulator is a reminder of the Senate's weight: an Ossoff defeat would lower the Democrats' House chances.

FL-07: BALE DALTON VS. RYAN ELIJAH (NO INCUMBENT)

Florida's 7th District is a seat without an incumbent of an unusual kind: Cory Mills was defeated in the primary there. Bale Dalton remains well behind Ryan Elijah in the model.




Figure 111. *FL-07 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our win probabilities as of October 31, 2026; inset: the entire state.*

FL-07 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential election	Trump 52%, Biden 47%
2024 presidential election	Trump 56%, Harris 43%; Trump's lead 12.5 points in the model, 12.4 according to Dave's Redistricting
2022 House	Cory Mills elected with 58.5%
2024 House	Cory Mills reelected with 56.5%
Incumbent	None: Mills defeated in the primary on August 18, 2026
Republican primary	Elijah 47.3%, Mills 34.1%, or 31,558 votes to 22,753[205]
Democratic primary	Dalton 45.5%, Marialana Kinter 35.6%, Alan Grayson 18.9%
Raised through October 14	Dalton $2.33 million, Elijah $818,460
Cash on hand as of October 14	Dalton $202,254, Elijah $173,006[206]
DCCC (October 17-19, 414 likely voters)	Dalton 45%, Elijah 45%; generic ballot Republican 47%, Democrat 44%[207]
Dalton's chances	22% on October 31; between 17.7% and 22.4% since August
Projected Democratic share	46.6%, Elijah ahead by 6.8 points
Breakdown	in points of margin: national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 11.1; incumbency and recent local vote minus 0.1; fundraising zero (disabled); district polling minus 0.5; other data used zero; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings (mid-August)	Cook, Inside Elections and Sabato: Likely Republican; Decision Desk HQ: Lean Republican[208]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

It covers all of Seminole County and the southern half of Volusia County, with Deltona, DeBary, Port Orange, New Smyrna Beach and Edgewater[209]. The new 2026 map leaves districts 1 through 7 intact[210]. Our database nevertheless classifies it among the changed geographies, which disables the fundraising and outside spending terms. The rest is unchanged.

Candidates and campaign

A former WOFL (Fox 35) journalist, Ryan Elijah ousted Mills even though Trump and AIPAC backed the incumbent. Trump and DeSantis are now behind him.

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[205] Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Florida”, primary results, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Florida.
[206] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/FL/07/2026/.
[207] Florida Politics, October 20, 2026, https://floridapolitics.com/archives/825889-dccc-poll-shows-ryan-elijah-bale-dalton-tied-in-cd-7-with-donald-trump-deep-underwater/.
[208] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Florida”, accessed October 27, 2026.
[209] Wikipedia, “Florida's 7th congressional district”, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida%27s_7th_congressional_district.
[210] WUSF, May 6, 2026, https://wusf.org/text/politics-issues/2026-05-06/breakdown-changes-for-florida-new-congressional-map.

Our sources say nothing about the reasons for that defeat. On the other side, Bale Dalton was chief of staff at NASA. He finished ahead of former Representative Alan Grayson and has the backing of 314 Action, the Blue Dog Coalition, VoteVets and Giffords. Libertarian Christopher Dennison rounds out the ballot. Dalton has raised almost three times as much as Elijah.

Polls and model

A single public poll, commissioned by the DCCC, shows the two men tied. Yet the generic ballot in the same sample leans Republican: if the survey is right, Dalton would be running ahead of his party. It was not in our database as of October 26.




Figure 112. *Florida, District 7: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

The projection therefore remains almost purely structural: district polling weighs only minus 0.5 point in it as of October 31. With the fundraising term disabled, Dalton's money advantage does not count.

Our analysis

An ousted incumbent, a better-funded opponent: Dalton has two assets. In our reading, they do not make up for a district that Trump carried by 12.5 points.

Seminole County, entirely within the district, will serve as the indicator on election night. If Dalton runs ahead of Elijah there, the race will be decided in southern Volusia.

MT-01: SAM FORSTAG VS. AARON FLINT (OPEN SEAT)

In Montana's 1st District, the polls, including a university one, describe a tie. Our model now finds it too: Aaron Flint leads Sam Forstag by only 0.2 point.




Figure 113. *MT-01 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our win probabilities as of October 31, 2026; inset: the entire state.*

MT-01 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential election	Trump 52%, Biden 45%
2024 presidential election	Trump 54%, Harris 43%; Harris share used by the model 44.0%
2022 House	Zinke 49.6%, Tranel 46.5%, Libertarian 3.9%
2024 House	Zinke 52.3% against 44.6%
Incumbent	None: Ryan Zinke is retiring
Raised through October 14	Forstag $4.31 million, Flint $2.86 million

Indicator	Value
Cash on hand as of October 14	Forstag $726,126, Flint $408,153[211]
Rutgers-Eagleton for Montana Free Press (August 27-September 7, 375 registered voters, margin of error of 6 points)	Flint 42%, Forstag 41%[212]
American Pulse for NonStop Local (September 19-24, 314 likely voters)	Flint 46%, Forstag 45%, Sheedy 5%[213]
Impact Research for the Forstag campaign (September 20-23)	Forstag 47%, Flint 44%[214]
PPP for House Majority PAC (October 12-14)	Forstag 48%, Flint 45% (posted on X, unverified)
Emerson, according to Poll Vault	Forstag 50%, Flint 46%
Forstag's chances	49.1% on October 31 (27.2% on October 15)
Projected Democratic share	49.9%, Flint ahead by 0.2 point (5.4 on October 15)
Breakdown	in points of margin: national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 10.4; incumbency and recent local vote plus 0.7; fundraising minus 0.5; district polling plus 6.4; other data used minus 1.3; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings	Cook: Toss-up since October 16; Inside Elections: Tilt Republican since October 15; Sabato (September 29) and Decision Desk HQ: Lean Republican[215]
Cross-race effect, Senate	Seth Bodnar 19.0% chance; Democratic House majority at 80.9% if he wins, 75.7% if Kurt Alme wins

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Re-created in 2022 and unchanged since, it covers the western part of the state, with Missoula, Bozeman, Butte and Kalispell[216]. Ryan Zinke narrowly defeated Monica Tranel in 2022, then won more comfortably in 2024[217].

[211] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/MT/01/2026/.
[212] Montana Free Press, September 14, 2026, https://montanafreepress.org/2026/09/14/flint-forstag-in-dead-heat-for-house-seat/.
[213] Montana Right Now, September 28, 2026, https://www.montanarightnow.com/elections/aaron-flint-sam-forstag-nearly-tied-for-montana-congressional-district-1/article_96a2f7e1-334a-46c7-9a92-84ccc4c44171.html.
[214] Impact Research, memo of September 28, 2026, https://mcusercontent.com/c8d0fc607b9ebc333152f806f/files/c5866ca1-08c1-fb4a-effd-deb8bff0ea04/IMPACT_MT_01_PRESS_MEMO_SEPT_2026.01.pdf.
[215] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Montana”, accessed October 27, 2026.
[216] Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Montana”, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Montana.
[217] Wikipedia, “Montana's 1st congressional district”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montana%27s_1st_congressional_district.

Candidates and campaign

Zinke announced his retirement on March 2, 2026[218]. Democrats are fielding Sam Forstag, a smokejumper and union leader[219]. Facing him, Aaron Flint, a veteran, hosts a conservative radio show[220]. Libertarian Nick Sheedy and independent Kimberly Persico are also running. Our database, incidentally, spells the name “Sheehy.”

Trump, Mike Johnson, Governor Greg Gianforte and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce support Flint. Forstag has former Senator Jon Tester, the Blue Dog Coalition, Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez on his side. He has also raised more.

Polls and model

The September and October surveys form a consistent series. The two nonpartisan pollsters see Flint ahead by one point. The Democratic polls put Forstag in the lead.




Figure 114. *Montana, District 1: polls (Democratic minus Republican margin, at the end of fieldwork) and the Le Millénaire projection, with its 90% interval.*

[218] KULR8, March 2, 2026, https://www.kulr8.com/elections/montana-congressman-ryan-zinke-to-retire-will-not-seek-reelection/article_ef317ebf-4a81-588a-975c-18e7515b9cbc.html.
[219] CBS News, January 5, 2026, cited by Wikipedia.
[220] NonStop Local, March 2, 2026, cited by Wikipedia.

None entered the October 26 projection. Those in our database, all completed in September, were more than 21 days old, and the October ones were not included. As of October 31, district polling instead adds 6.4 points for Forstag. The model even subtracts a little under fundraising, although Forstag has raised more than Flint. Where does the decline after October 15 come from? The next day, the American Pulse poll dropped out of the 21-day window, and outside spending entered the model. The ratings, for their part, moved in the other direction.

Our analysis

The two nonpartisan pollsters have Flint ahead by one point. The race therefore seems to us close to a tie, as the projection now suggests. On election night, Missoula and Bozeman should carry the Democratic vote. Kalispell and the rural counties will then show whether that is enough for Forstag.

AZ-02: JONATHAN NEZ VS. ELI CRANE (INCUMBENT)

A former president of the Navajo Nation, Jonathan Nez ran ahead of Kamala Harris against Eli Crane in 2024. He will need to gain further ground to beat the incumbent, whom our model places clearly in the lead.




Figure 115. *AZ-02 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our win probabilities as of October 31, 2026; inset: the entire state.*

AZ-02 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential election	Trump 53%, Biden 45%
2024 presidential election	Trump 57%, Harris 42%; Harris share used by the model 42.4%
2022 House	Crane defeats Democratic incumbent Tom O'Halleran, 53.9% to 46.1%
2024 House	Crane 54.5%, Nez 45.5%, or 221,413 votes to 184,963
Incumbent	Eli Crane, member of the Freedom Caucus, backed by the NRA
Raised through September 30	Crane $11.55 million, Nez $5.36 million
Cash on hand as of September 30	Crane $2.36 million, Nez $1.19 million[221]
Emerson, according to Poll Vault (October 12-14, 345 likely voters)	Nez 50%, Crane 48%
GBAO for Nez (August)	Crane 46%, Nez 44%[222]
Peak Insights for Crane (August)	Crane 53%, Nez 42% (posted on X, unverified)
GBAO (June)	Crane 44%, Nez 41%, Goodwin 7%
Nez's chances	23% on October 31; between 18% and 23% since August
Projected Democratic share	46.6%, Crane ahead by 6.8 points

[221] Federal Election Commission, third-quarter report covering through September 30, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/AZ/02/2026/.
[222] Politico, September 2, 2026, https://www.politico.com/f/?id=000001a0-5f6e-d286-a1b8-ff7eb4c70000.

Indicator	Value
Breakdown	in points of margin: national environment plus 7.1; district voting history minus 13.6; incumbency and recent local vote plus 3.6; fundraising minus 0.9; district polling zero; other data used minus 0.6; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings	Cook: Lean Republican since October 23; Inside Elections, Sabato, Decision Desk HQ and Silver Bulletin: Likely Republican[223]
Cross-race effect, governor	Katie Hobbs 84.5% chance; Democratic House majority at 39.9% if Andy Biggs wins

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

It covers northeastern Arizona: all of Apache, Coconino, Gila, Navajo and Yavapai counties, and parts of Graham, Maricopa, Mohave and Pinal counties. Flagstaff is its largest city, ahead of Prescott. It is home to twelve Indian reservations, and 22% of its citizens are Native American[224]. The map drawn in 2022 by the independent commission remains in effect.

In 2024, Nez outperformed Harris's result in the district. The model translates this overperformance into a favorable local margin.

Candidates and campaign

Jonathan Nez was president of the Navajo Nation from 2019 to 2023[225]. Libertarian Curtis Goodwin is also on the ballot. Crane has raised more than twice as much as his opponent.

Polls and model

The only October poll, attributed to Emerson by Poll Vault, has Nez ahead. In August, however, the campaign polls put Crane in the lead, narrowly in GBAO's, widely in Peak Insights'.

[223] "Predictions" table in Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Arizona", accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Arizona.
[224] Wikipedia, "Arizona's 2nd congressional district", based on the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arizona%27s_2nd_congressional_district.
[225] Navajo Times, July 22, 2025, https://navajotimes.com/reznews/jonathan-nez-launches-second-bid-to-unseat-eli-crane-in-arizonas-2nd-congressional-district/.




Figure 116. *Arizona, District 2: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

No poll weighs on the projection. The August ones are more than 21 days old, and the one attributed to Emerson is missing from our database. Nez's chances have therefore moved little since August. Cook nonetheless shifted its rating of the seat on October 23.

Our analysis

Nez needs to gain about 4 points on his 2024 result, against a far better-funded opponent. In our reading, turnout on the twelve Indian reservations will be decisive. Cook's rating change is not based on any verified poll showing movement. On election night, Apache and Navajo counties will gauge Native American mobilization. Yavapai County, around Prescott, will show whether the Republican base holds.

FL-04: LASHONDA “L.J.” HOLLOWAY VS. AARON BEAN (INCUMBENT)

Aaron Bean is the clear favorite against LaShonda Holloway, whom he has already beaten twice. Here there is neither a poll nor a fundraising term, only the structure of the district and the national environment.




Figure 117. *FL-04 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our win probabilities as of October 31, 2026; inset: the entire state.*

FL-04 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential election	Trump 53%, Biden 46%
2024 presidential election	Trump 55%, Harris 44%; Trump's lead 11.8 points, Harris share used by the model 44.0%
2022 House	Bean 60.5%, Holloway 39.6%
2024 House	Bean 57.3% (222,364 votes), Holloway 42.7%
Incumbent	Aaron Bean, backed by Donald Trump and AIPAC
Democratic primary	Holloway 57.3% (29,772 votes), Michael Kirwan 30.4%, Brit Robinson 12.2%[226]
Raised through July 29	Bean $2.16 million, Holloway $27,348
Cash on hand as of July 29	Bean $1.63 million, Holloway $23,633[227]
Polls	none published for the general election
Holloway's chances	21% on October 31; between 15.7% and 21.4% since August
Projected Democratic share	46.5%, Bean ahead by 7.0 points
Breakdown	in points of margin: national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 10.5; incumbency and recent local vote minus 1.4; fundraising zero (disabled); district polling zero; other data used zero; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings	Cook, Inside Elections and Sabato: Safe Republican; Decision Desk HQ: Likely Republican[228]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

It covers northeastern Florida: Nassau and Clay counties and the part of Duval County west of the St. Johns River, downtown Jacksonville included[229]. Nothing changed in 2026: Dave's Redistricting gives the same Trump lead on the old and new maps[230]. Our database nevertheless classifies the district among the changed geographies, which disables the fundraising and outside spending terms. It does, however, use the same figure.

Candidates and campaign

Already the nominee in 2022 and 2024, Holloway won the Democratic primary comfortably. Mike Sell, of the Florida Forward Party, and independent Todd

[226] Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Florida”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Florida.
[227] Federal Election Commission, “pre-primary” report covering through July 29, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/FL/04/2026/.
[228] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Florida”, accessed October 27, 2026.
[229] Wikipedia, “Florida's 4th congressional district”, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida%27s_4th_congressional_district.
[230] WUSF, May 6, 2026, https://wusf.org/text/politics-issues/2026-05-06/breakdown-changes-for-florida-new-congressional-map; Wikipedia, “2026 Florida redistricting”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Florida_redistricting.

Schaefer are also on the ballot. The latest financial report in our sources dates from July 29. Holloway had raised a negligible sum compared with Bean.

Polls and model




Figure 118. *Florida, District 4: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

The fundraising term is zero, even though Bean had seventy times as much cash on hand as his rival in July. This is the effect of the district's classification among the changed geographies.

Our analysis

With no polls and almost no money on the Democratic side, Holloway's chances correspond to a Trump plus 12 district in an environment that favors Democrats by 3 points, with the usual uncertainty. We therefore rate the seat Safe Republican. On election night, her result in Duval County will mostly serve to measure the change in the Democratic vote in Jacksonville.

DEMOCRATIC SEATS WEAKENED BY REDISTRICTING

Texas, Florida, Ohio: three states that redrew their maps for 2026, each time targeting Democratic seats. In Texas, the Legislature passed the map in August 2025 at the White House's request, by 88 votes to 52 in the House and 18 to 8 in the Senate. Governor Greg Abbott signed it. On November 18, 2025, however, a federal court blocked it, seeing a likely racial gerrymander. The Supreme Court allowed it to be used on December 4, 2025[231]. In Florida, the map came from Ron DeSantis. Passed in late April 2026, it was meant to bring the delegation from 20 to 24 Republicans out of 28. Four Democrats were targeted, including Kathy Castor and Lois Frankel[232]. Ohio opted for a compromise, adopted by its commission in October 2025. Marcy Kaptur's 9th District nonetheless comes out of it more Republican[233].

Table 13 measures the effect of these maps on the six districts in this part, won narrowly by Harris or by Trump under the old boundaries and turned into districts Trump carried by 9 to 11 points in 2024, like the Republican seats in the previous part. Kaptur, Gonzalez, Castor and Moskowitz have often run ahead of their party there. In Texas and South Florida, on the other hand, the Latino electorate swung sharply toward Trump in 2024, judging by the 14-point shifts measured in the 25th and 34th districts.

[231] NBC News, December 2025, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/supreme-court-allows-texas-use-new-congressional-district-map-drawn-fa-rcna244696, cited by Wikipedia, “2025 Texas redistricting”.
[232] Politico, April 27, 2026, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 Florida redistricting”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Florida_redistricting.
[233] Politico, October 31, 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/10/31/ohio-redistricting-gerrymander-new-map-00631254.

Table 13. The effect of redistricting on the districts in this part

District	Old boundaries (2024)	New boundaries (2024)	Our model (Trump lead)
OH-09	Trump 53-46	Trump 55-44	10.6
TX-34	Trump plus 4.4	Trump plus 10.1	10.1
FL-25	Harris plus 5.3	Trump plus 9.1	9.1
TX-35	Harris plus 33.5	Trump plus 10.4	10.5
FL-14	Harris plus 7.6	Trump plus 10.5	10.5
FL-22	Harris plus 5.6	Trump plus 10.5	10.3
FL-13 (Republican)	Trump plus 11.8	Trump plus 13.3	13.3
OH-15 (Republican)	Trump 54-45	Trump 55-45	10.0

Source: Dave's Redistricting, figures cited by Wikipedia (pages "2026 Florida redistricting," "2025 Texas redistricting" and district pages), accessed October 27, 2026; WUSF, May 6, 2026, for Florida; the Le Millénaire forecast for the last column. Trump minus Harris margin in 2024, in points; for Ohio, results rounded to whole numbers.

In this group of six districts, Democratic chances range from 33% (Florida 22) to 67% (Texas 34), or about 2.5 expected Democratic wins out of six. According to our model, redistricting costs Democrats between three and four seats in this group alone, and it is the factor that weighs most on their majority. Cook sees Texas 34 and Florida 25 leaning Democratic. The forecast now agrees on Texas 34, but gives Florida 25 narrowly to the Republican. The difference lies in the starting point. We start from Harris's 2024 share within the new boundaries, which already incorporates the Latino swing. The ratings, by contrast, give more weight to the quality of the incumbents.

OH-09: MARCY KAPTUR (INCUMBENT, REDRAWN) VS. DEREK MERRIN

The closest district in this chapter once again pits Marcy Kaptur against Derek Merrin. She beat him in 2024, but the map has been redrawn against her, and the model now gives the Republican a slight edge.




Figure 119. *OH-09 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our win probabilities as of October 31, 2026; inset: the entire state.*

OH-09 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential election	Trump 51%, Biden 48% under the old boundaries; Trump 52%, Biden 46% under the new ones
2024 presidential election	Trump 53%, Harris 46% under the old boundaries; Trump 55%, Harris 44% under the new ones[234]
Harris share used by the model	44.7%, Trump's lead 10.6 points
2024 House (old boundaries)	Kaptur 48.3%, Merrin 47.6% (about 50.4% of the two-party vote)
Incumbent	Marcy Kaptur (Democrat), one of the thirteen Democrats elected in a district carried by Trump[235]
Raised through October 14	Kaptur $5.91 million, Merrin $2.22 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Kaptur $697,508, Merrin $449,466[236]
DCCC (September 22-23, 481 likely voters)	tied at 48%[237]
McLaughlin for the NRCC (April)	Merrin 47%, Kaptur 43%[238]
Kaptur's chances	43.4% on October 31; 41.2% on August 1, 45.4% on September 15, 21.8% on October 1, 43.6% on October 15
Projected Democratic share	49.2%, Merrin ahead by 1.6 points
Breakdown	in points of margin: national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 9.2; incumbency and recent local vote plus 3.7; fundraising and other data used zero; district polling minus 0.9; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings	Cook, Inside Elections and Sabato: Toss-up; Decision Desk HQ (July 14): Lean Democratic[239]
Statewide races (model)	Sherrod Brown 21.4% for the Senate (special election), Amy Acton 27.8% for governor
Simulator: Democratic House majority	94.1% if Brown wins; 71.9% if Jon Husted wins, 85.6% if he wins by 5 points or less; 95.6% if Acton wins; overall forecast 76.7%

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 9th District covers northwestern Ohio, around Toledo (Lucas County) and the western shore of Lake Erie. Under the 2023-2027 boundaries, it included Defiance, Williams, Fulton, Lucas, Ottawa, Sandusky and Erie counties, as well as part of Wood County[240]. The 2025 map redrew it to tilt it to the right. Our sources do not detail the areas added and removed. The effect, however, can be measured: Trump's lead goes from about 7 to about 11 points.

[234] Wikipedia, “Ohio's 9th congressional district”, based on Dave's Redistricting, https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::db6559b0-8923-471b-b219-152ba0decd9b.
[235] Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Ohio”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Ohio.
[236] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/OH/09/2026/.
[237] DCCC, memo of September 29, 2026, https://dccc.org/dccc-polling-memo-oh-09-is-a-dead-heat/.
[238] National Journal, May 15, 2026, cited by Wikipedia.
[239] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Ohio”, accessed October 27, 2026.
[240] Wikipedia, “Ohio's 9th congressional district”, accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohio%27s_9th_congressional_district.

Kaptur beat Merrin in 2024 while running nearly 4 points ahead of Harris in the same district.

Candidates and campaign

Derek Merrin served in the Ohio House of Representatives from 2016 to 2025[241]. Matthew Althaus is the Libertarian candidate. Trump and the Chamber of Commerce support Merrin. Kaptur has the backing of EMILY's List (Elect Democratic Women program), the League of Conservation Voters and Planned Parenthood.

She also has a clear financial advantage. The model, however, does not take it into account here, as in all the redrawn districts in this chapter.

Polls and model

Only two polls, and none since October 1. The DCCC's shows a tie; the NRCC's, in the spring, had Merrin ahead.




Figure 120. *Ohio, District 9: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

[241] WTOL, June 23, 2025, cited by Wikipedia.

The local margin carries over roughly half of Kaptur's 2024 overperformance, transposed to the new boundaries. The DCCC poll, completed on September 23, is more than 21 days old and no longer enters the projection. As of October 31, district polling nevertheless takes 0.9 point off.




Figure 121. *Ohio, District 9: Democratic chances in our model, August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

Kaptur's chances have remained stable since August, with one exception. The dip on October 1, for a projected margin of 6.9 points, corresponds to the DCCC poll entering the window, corrected by 3.5 points against her. It drops out on October 15. Almost all the ratings see a toss-up.

The race is also tied to the state's two statewide elections. In the simulator, a Brown or Acton victory would lift the Democrats' chances of a House majority well above our overall forecast. Even a narrow Brown defeat would leave them there.

Our analysis

Under the new boundaries, Kaptur needs to run about 5 points ahead of Harris, as in 2024. The national environment gives her 3. The rest has to come from Toledo and from her money. Yet the areas added by the 2025 map know her less well. In our reading, she will therefore need to build a bigger lead in Lucas County than in 2024 to offset the rural areas. On election night, a Brown result close to a tie in northwestern Ohio would be a good sign for her.

TX-34: VICENTE GONZALEZ (INCUMBENT, REDRAWN) VS. ERIC FLORES

The only independent poll puts Vicente Gonzalez in the lead. Our model, long cautious about him, now gives him the edge over Eric Flores.




Figure 122. *TX-34 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our win probabilities as of October 31, 2026; inset: the entire state.*

TX-34 by the numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential election (new boundaries)	Biden 51%, Trump 48%
2024 presidential election (new boundaries)	Trump 55%, Harris 44%
Trump's 2024 lead, old then new boundaries	4.4 then 10.1 points
Senate in the district	Cruz 49.7% in 2024; O'Rourke 55% in 2018[242]

[242] Wikipedia, “Texas's 34th congressional district” and “2025 Texas redistricting”, based on Dave's Redistricting, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas%27s_34th_congressional_district.

Indicator	Value
2024 House (old boundaries)	Gonzalez 51.3%, against Mayra Flores
Total spending in the race	more than $30.8 million[243]
Money as of September 30	Gonzalez: $4.96 million raised, $1.83 million on hand; Flores: $3.83 million raised, $285,096 on hand[244]
Washington Post and Schar School, October 14-19	Gonzalez 50%, Flores 43%, Espinoza 2%, Royal 1% (626 likely voters, margin of 5.4 points)[245]
Public Policy Research for Texas Southern University, August 18-22	Gonzalez 45%, Flores 42% (700 likely voters)[246]
Republican spring polls	co/efficient for the NRCC (April): Flores +1; Ragnar for Flores (June): Flores +3
Gonzalez's chances	67%
Projected Democratic share	52.0%, Gonzalez ahead by 4.0 points
Projection breakdown	in points of margin: national environment +7.2 points; district voting history −8.7 points; incumbency and recent local vote +2.4 points; fundraising and other data used zero; district polling +5.6 points; poll bias correction −2.3 points
With the Washington Post poll (estimate)	Gonzalez's lead corrected to 5.4 points; Democratic share 52.0%; chances 67%
Chances since August	37.2% on August 1, 51.3% on September 1, then between 39% and 43% through October 26; 67.5% on October 31
Ratings	Lean Democratic for Cook (October 23), Sabato (September 10), Decision Desk HQ and Silver Bulletin; Toss-up for Inside Elections (2025)[247]
Cross-race effect in the simulator	Democratic House majority: 87.4% if Talarico wins the Senate race, 65.6% if Paxton prevails

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Brownsville, then most of Corpus Christi: the new 34th District follows the Gulf of Mexico coast. It takes in all of Cameron, Willacy, Kenedy and Kleberg counties, and most of Nueces County. It is almost the old 27th District (1983-2011) re-created[248].

The 2024 Latino swing shows up very clearly here, with a 14-point shift in four years. But the district votes further to the right for president than for the Senate.

[243] Punchbowl News, October 6, 2026, https://punchbowl.news/article/campaigns/blockbuster-house-races/, cited by Wikipedia.
[244] Federal Election Commission, third-quarter report covering through September 30, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/TX/34/2026/.
[245] Washington Post, October 23, 2026, link above.
[246] Texas Southern University, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/67aa7aa3e284b002cd6a420e/t/6a8debe648e3721adb0534b6/1787685864204/SouthTexasCDs2026.pdf.
[247] "Predictions" table in Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Texas", accessed October 27, 2026.
[248] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Texas", accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Texas.

Candidates and campaign

Eric Flores, not to be confused with Mayra Flores, who lost in the primary, is a former federal prosecutor, an Army veteran and the son of former State Representative Ismael Flores[249]. Chris Royal (Libertarian) and Eddie Espinoza (Green) round out the ballot. Vicente Gonzalez has the backing of the Blue Dog Coalition.

The race is among the most expensive in the country. Flores has spent almost everything. The Washington Post describes a close race in a district that the Republican Party "had counted" on winning[250].

Polls and model

Both independent surveys put Gonzalez ahead. In the spring, the Republican polls said the opposite.




Figure 123. *Texas, District 34: breakdown of the October 31, 2026 projection. Each bar is the effect of one model component on the expected margin, in points.*

The local margin reflects the incumbency bonus and a Democratic vote stronger than in the presidential race. As of October 26, no poll entered the

[249] Texas Tribune, July 21, 2025, cited by Wikipedia.
[250] Washington Post, October 23, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/10/23/two-texas-districts-gop-had-counted-now-feature-tight-house-races/.

projection. The August one was too old, and the Washington Post's was not in our database. We had calculated its effect using the method of Table 6, and it made Gonzalez the favorite. That is what the October 31 update shows: district polling adds 5.6 points for Gonzalez.




Figure 124. *Texas, District 34: Democratic chances in our model, August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

Gonzalez had been the favorite only briefly, in early September, before becoming so again on October 27. The model now aligns with the ratings, which had been more favorable to him. In the Senate race, James Talarico and Ken Paxton are vying for the same Latino electorate in the Rio Grande Valley, hence the close link between the two races.

Our analysis

Cruz weaker than Trump, Gonzalez seven points ahead in the Washington Post poll: the two signals point the same way. The Latino vote is attached to Trump more than to the Republican Party. Yet the model starts from the presidential race and assumes the opposite. In our reading, Gonzalez is therefore the favorite, as the model now says. On election night, Cameron County (Brownsville) will provide the measure. If he runs more than 5 points ahead of Harris there, he will be reelected. The rest will be decided in Nueces County (Corpus Christi), which is more mixed.

FL-25: JARED MOSKOWITZ (INCUMBENT FROM FL-23) VS. SCOTT SINGER (REDRAWN)

DeSantis's map pushed Jared Moskowitz out of his old 23rd district and into a new, more Republican 25th. The race is one of the most expensive in the country. Our model gives Scott Singer a slight edge.




Figure 125. *FL-25 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

FL-25 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential (new boundaries)	Biden 52%, Trump 47%
2024 presidential (new boundaries)	Trump 54%, Harris 45%
2024 margin, old then new lines	Harris +5.3 points, then Trump +9.1 points[251]
Incumbent	Jared Moskowitz, elected in the 23rd district in 2022 and 2024
Total race spending	more than $42.2 million[252]
Money as of October 14	Moskowitz: $5.71 million raised, $1.21 million cash on hand; Singer: $3.26 million raised, $466,625 cash on hand[253]
National Research Inc. for the NRCC and Singer, October 12-15	Singer 49%, Moskowitz 42% (400 likely voters)[254]
PPP for House Majority PAC, October 21-22	Moskowitz 47%, Singer 42% (592 likely voters; shared on X, unverified)
Beacon Insights for Moskowitz, May	Moskowitz 43%, Singer 33%[255]
Moskowitz's chances	38%
Projected Democratic share	48.6%, Singer ahead by 2.8 points
Breakdown of the projection	in margin points: national environment +7.2; district voting history −7.7; incumbency and recent local vote +1.3; fundraising zero; district polling −1.1; poll bias correction −2.3
Chances since August	34.7% on September 1, 42.4% on October 26, 38.4% on October 28, 38.0% on October 31
Ratings	Lean D for Cook (October 16), Sabato (October 8) and Decision Desk HQ (September 25); Toss-up for Inside Elections (August 20)[256]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The old 25th district lay entirely within Broward County (Hollywood, Miramar, Pembroke Pines, Dania Beach, Weston). It was the seat of Debbie Wasserman Schultz, who is now running in the 20th[257]. The new 25th is a coastal strip running from Palm Beach County to Miami-Dade County, with parts of Delray Beach, Pompano Beach, Hallandale and Miami Beach[258]. The new lines flip the seat from one party to the other.

[251] Wikipedia, “2026 Florida redistricting,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Florida_redistricting.
[252] Punchbowl News, October 6, 2026, https://punchbowl.news/article/campaigns/blockbuster-house-races/, cited by Wikipedia.
[253] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/FL/25/2026/.
[254] Florida Politics, October 21, 2026, https://floridapolitics.com/archives/826146-internal-poll-gives-scott-singer-7-point-lead-over-incumbent-jared-moskowitz-in-cd-25/.
[255] Florida Politics, May 4, 2026, https://floridapolitics.com/archives/794555-poll-scott-singer-unpopular-in-boca-raton-even-as-jared-moskowitz-over-performs-in-new-cd-25/.
[256] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Florida,” accessed October 27, 2026.
[257] Florida Politics, https://floridapolitics.com/archives/797851-debbie-wasserman-schultz-decides-to-run-in-cd-20-joining-crowded-democratic-primary/, cited by Wikipedia.
[258] WUSF, May 6, 2026, https://wusf.org/text/politics-issues/2026-05-06/breakdown-changes-for-florida-new-congressional-map.

Candidates and campaign

Scott Singer, mayor of Boca Raton from 2018 to 2026, initially set his sights on the 23rd district[259]. Peter Jassenoff is the Libertarian candidate. Singer is endorsed by Donald Trump, Ron DeSantis, Ben Shapiro and the Chamber of Commerce. Moskowitz is endorsed by AIPAC, Planned Parenthood, Giffords and the League of Conservation Voters. Here, AIPAC is backing a Democrat with a centrist profile.

It is unclear how the money spent breaks down between the candidates and outside groups. On the campaign side, Moskowitz has raised far more.

Polls and model

The two camps are releasing conflicting polls. For the NRCC poll, Wikipedia adds 24% undecided, which brings the total to 115%: there is an error somewhere. The May poll pointed to Singer's unpopularity in Boca Raton. None of them was in our database as of October 26; the October 31 update incorporates district polling, which takes 1.1 points of margin away from Moskowitz.

[259] Florida Politics, April 30, 2026, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Florida,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Florida.




Figure 126. *Florida, District 25: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

The model puts Moskowitz about 3 points above Harris's share, thanks to the national environment and his local roots, partly offset by the poll bias correction and district polling. The ratings see him higher than we do.

Our analysis

Two polls, two camps, and 12 points between them. Moskowitz has the money and support beyond his party, including AIPAC. Singer has a weighty asset: a district Trump won comfortably. We consider the race a genuine toss-up. On election night, Miami Beach, at the southern tip, then Pompano Beach and Hallandale, in Broward County, will show Moskowitz's level of support. The Palm Beach portion, Singer's home turf, will tell whether he can close the gap.

TX-35: JOHNNY GARCIA VS. CARLOS DE LA CRUZ (REDRAWN, OPEN SEAT)

Texas's 35th district carries the same number as a very safe Democratic seat. Yet it is a new district, drawn for Republicans to win. The model puts Carlos De La Cruz ahead.




Figure 127. *TX-35 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

TX-35 in numbers

Indicator	Value
Voting-age population	Hispanic 53.7%, white 34.6% (Wikipedia, no source specified)
2020 presidential (new boundaries)	Trump 50%, Biden 48%
2024 presidential (new boundaries)	Trump 55%, Harris 44%
2024 margin, old then new lines	Harris +33.5 points, then Trump +10.4 points
2024 Senate in the district	Cruz 50.6%[260]
2022 and 2024 House (old district)	Greg Casar 72.5% then 67.4%
Seat	open, Casar redistricted into the 37th district
Money as of September 30	Garcia: $1.92 million raised, $509,758 cash on hand; De La Cruz: $1.89 million raised, $476,496 cash on hand[261]
Washington Post and Schar School, October 14-19	De La Cruz 48%, Garcia 47% (606 likely voters, 6.2-point margin of error)
Normington Petts for House Majority PAC, October 12-14	Garcia 47%, De La Cruz 45% (shared on X, unverified)
Emerson, via Poll Vault	Garcia 51%, De La Cruz 49%

[260] Wikipedia, “Texas's 35th congressional district” and “2025 Texas redistricting,” based on Dave's Redistricting, https://davesredistricting.org/maps#viewmap::1ea6b752-99fa-4bbb-8c4e-3110234ac5e6.
[261] Federal Election Commission, third-quarter report covering through September 30, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/TX/35/2026/.

Indicator	Value
Normington Petts, late August	De La Cruz 45%, Garcia 44%[262]
Garcia's chances	37%
Projected Democratic share	48.5%, De La Cruz ahead by 3.0 points
Breakdown of the projection	in margin points: national environment +7.2; district voting history −9.1; incumbency and recent local vote +1.1; fundraising zero; district polling +0.1; poll bias correction −2.3
With the October polls (estimate)	Washington Post alone: 48.6%; with Normington Petts (adjusted by 3.5 points): 48.4%, chances of about 36%
Chances since August	30.7% on August 1, 23.2% on September 1, 32.4% on October 1, 35.7% on October 26, 36.6% on October 28, 36.8% on October 31
Ratings	Toss-up for Cook (October 23), Sabato (October 20) and Decision Desk HQ (October 8); Lean R for Inside Elections and Silver Bulletin (August and September)[263]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The old 35th linked eastern San Antonio to southeastern Austin along Interstate 35. The new one lies elsewhere. It covers southern and northeastern San Antonio (Live Oak, Converse, Elmendorf) as well as Guadalupe (Seguin, Schertz), Wilson and Karnes counties[264]. Casar's results therefore tell us nothing about it. The model starts from the presidential vote on the new map.

Candidates and campaign

Johnny Garcia is the Democratic candidate and a Bexar County sheriff's deputy[265]. To win over Republican voters, he draws on his twenty years of law enforcement experience to counter the traditional Republican message on crime and Democratic leniency[266]. Carlos De La Cruz, a gym owner, is the brother of Representative Monica De La Cruz[267]. He is also a US Air Force veteran, deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq and the border with Mexico. To win, Carlos is leveraging his profile as a veteran and business owner, as well as a recent redistricting that strongly favors Republicans. He presents himself as a

[262] National Journal, September 2, 2026, cited by Wikipedia.
[263] "Predictions" table in Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Texas," accessed October 27, 2026.
[264] Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Texas," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Texas.
[265] San Antonio Report, October 9, 2025, cited by Wikipedia.
[266] Altimari, D. (2026). Texas Democrats see opportunity in potential GOP-drawn 'dummymander'. Roll Call. https://rollcall.com/2026/09/15/texas-democrats-see-opportunity-in-potential-gop-drawn-dummymander/Drusch, A. (2026). How Johnny Garcia rose from sheriff's deputy to a high-profile congressional candidate. San Antonio Report. https://sanantonioreport.org/johnny-garcia-political-rise-tx35-congressional-race/
[267] Politico Playbook, October 2, 2025, cited by Wikipedia.

steadfast constitutional conservative, ready to advance the “America First” agenda. De La Cruz has won the endorsement of Donald Trump and Mike Johnson[268].

The Democratic primary runoff was marked by the remarks of Maureen Galindo, who had finished first in the first round. NBC News described them as antisemitic. She wanted to turn an ICE detention center into a “prison for American Zionists” and called for Garcia to be tried for treason. Jeffries, Ocasio-Cortez, DelBene, Talarico and Hinojosa were among those who condemned her remarks[269]. Garcia won the runoff. According to the Washington Post, the Republican maps in Texas “threaten to backfire”[270]. On money, the two candidates are neck and neck.

Polls and model

The three mid-October polls all describe a race within one or two points.




Figure 128. *Texas, District 35: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

[268] San Antonio Report Staff. (2026). Carlos De La Cruz | 2026 candidate for Texas’ 35th Congressional District. https://sanantonioreport.org/profile/carlos-de-la-cruz-2026-candidate-for-texas-35th-congressional-district/
[269] NBC News, May 19, 2026, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/house-democratic-texas-candidate-maureen-galindo-antisemitic-comments-rcna346022; San Antonio Current and JTA, May 15, 2026, cited by Wikipedia.
[270] Washington Post, October 23, 2026, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/10/23/two-texas-districts-gop-had-counted-now-feature-tight-house-races/.

None of them was included in the October 26 projection: the August poll is too old, and the October polls were missing from our database. The October 31 projection incorporates district polling, for an effect of only +0.1 point of margin. We ran them through the method of Table 6, with the pollster, state, sponsor and national adjustments. The result: almost nothing moves. Once adjusted, they give De La Cruz roughly the lead that the structure already gives him. Garcia's chances fell in September before recovering. The ratings are more optimistic about him than the model is.

Our analysis

Garcia needs to win the Bexar County portion (Live Oak, Converse, Elmendorf) by a clear margin and limit his deficit in Guadalupe, Wilson and Karnes counties. The October polls show no trace of the Galindo affair. On election night, Guadalupe County (Seguin, Schertz) will serve as the bellwether. If De La Cruz does worse there than Trump, Garcia can win. A Talarico victory in the Senate race would also make his plausible, as it would Gonzalez's in the 34th district.

FL-14: KATHY CASTOR (INCUMBENT, REDRAWN) VS. MIKE BELTRAN

Kathy Castor, who represents Tampa, has seen her district shifted toward neighborhoods that Trump won by a wide margin. The model therefore puts Mike Beltran ahead.




Figure 129. *FL-14 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

FL-14 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential (new boundaries)	Trump 51%, Biden 48%
2024 presidential (new boundaries)	Trump 55%, Harris 44%
2024 margin, old then new lines	Harris +7.6 points, then Trump +10.5 points[271]
2022 and 2024 House (old lines)	Castor 56.9% then 57.0%
Incumbent	Kathy Castor, Democrat; Brian Lambert, Libertarian candidate
Money as of October 14	Castor: $4.93 million raised, $577,435 cash on hand; Beltran: $2.73 million raised, $1.73 million cash on hand[272]
St. Pete Polls for Florida Politics, July 14-15	Castor 46%, Beltran 38% (469 likely voters)[273]
Emerson, via Poll Vault, October 12-14	Castor 48%, Beltran 43% (315 likely voters)
Castor's chances	36%
Projected Democratic share	48.4%, Beltran ahead by 3.2 points
Breakdown of the projection	in margin points: national environment +7.2; district voting history −9.1; incumbency and recent local vote +1.1; fundraising zero; district polling zero; poll bias correction −2.3
Chances since August	28.3% on September 1, 35.4% on October 26, 26.8% on October 28, 36.1% on October 31
Ratings	Toss-up for Cook, Inside Elections and Sabato; Lean D for Decision Desk HQ (August 28)[274]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Before 2026, the 14th district combined southeastern St. Petersburg, in Pinellas County, with central Hillsborough County, that is, Tampa. The new map pushes it south and west and places it entirely within Hillsborough[275]. On the old lines, Castor won easily. The new ones tip toward Trump.

Candidates and campaign

Mike Beltran served as a state representative, in the 70th district, from 2018 to 2024. He put $2 million of his own money into his campaign[276]. Donald Trump, Ron DeSantis, the Club for Growth and the House Freedom Fund are backing him. Castor agreed to two debates, on October 2 on WMNF radio and on October 16 at the Tiger Bay Club, held at Tampa's Cuban Club. Beltran wanted

[271] Wikipedia, “2026 Florida redistricting,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Florida_redistricting.
[272] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/FL/14/2026/.
[273] St. Pete Polls, July 2026, http://stpetepolls.org/files/StPetePolls_2026_CD14_July15_R6B43DK.pdf.
[274] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Florida,” accessed October 27, 2026.
[275] WUSF, May 6, 2026, https://wusf.org/text/politics-issues/2026-05-06/breakdown-changes-for-florida-new-congressional-map.
[276] Florida Politics, May 18, 2026, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Florida,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Florida.

more[277].

Castor has raised far more, but she has spent almost all of it. Beltran enters the home stretch with three times as much cash on hand as the incumbent.

Polls and model

Both public polls show Castor ahead. The first is too old to count, and the second was not in our database as of October 26. The October 28 update nonetheless incorporated district polling, which took 2.2 points of margin away from Castor; the October 31 update uses none.




Figure 130. *Florida, District 14: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

Without polling, the model relies on the district's structure and the national environment. The ratings, for their part, see a much more open race.

Our analysis

Castor is well known in Tampa. Yet the map puts into her district neighborhoods that, in our view, have never elected her. The two polls showing

[277] Florida Politics, September 21, 2026, https://floridapolitics.com/archives/821051-kathy-castor-agrees-to-2-debates-mike-beltran-wants-more/.

her ahead carry little weight: one dates from July, and the other is known only through Poll Vault. The race looks closer to a tie to us than the model suggests, without making Castor the favorite. On election night, the part of Tampa she already represented will show her level of support. The southern Hillsborough County neighborhoods added by the new map will decide the outcome.

FL-22: PIA DANDIYA VS. CASEY ASKAR (REDRAWN, OPEN SEAT)

The map was drawn to take down Lois Frankel, who has moved to the new 23rd district. On this new terrain, the model gives the edge to Republican Casey Askar over Democrat Pia Dandiya.




Figure 131. *FL-22 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

FL-22 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential	Biden 51%, Trump 48%
2024 presidential	Trump 55%, Harris 44%
Old and new lines (Dave's Redistricting)	Harris plus 5.6 points on the old, Trump plus 10.5 points on the new[278]
Harris share used by the model	44.8%, Trump lead of 10.3 points
2022 and 2024 House (old lines)	Frankel 55.1% then 55.0%, not transferable
Incumbent	none: Frankel running in the 23rd
Republican primary	Askar beats Michael Carbonara ($6.3 million raised, including $3.8 million of his own money) and Belinda Keiser
Money raised as of October 14	Askar $7.42 million, Dandiya $4.62 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	Askar $1.89 million, Dandiya $735,105[279]
Tavern Research (August 10-12, 551 likely voters)	Dandiya 50%, Askar 50%[280]
Tulchin Research for House Majority PAC (August 24-31)	Dandiya 46%, Askar 44%[281]
Dandiya's chances	33% on October 31 (27.7% on August 1)
Projected Democratic share	48.0%, Askar ahead by 4 points
Breakdown	in margin points: national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 8.9; incumbency and recent local vote plus 0.1; fundraising zero; district polling zero; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings	Cook (September 25), Sabato (October 8), Decision Desk HQ (October 13): Toss-up; Inside Elections (August 20): Lean R[282]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The old 22nd covered the urban part of Palm Beach County, from West Palm Beach to the coast, including Lantana, Delray Beach and Boynton Beach, out to Wellington. The new one shifts west, around Wellington and Parkland, straddling Palm Beach and Broward. It also takes in rural Hendry County and southern Collier County, including Marco Island[283]. Politico writes that taking down Frankel was an explicit goal of the map[284].

[278] Wikipedia, “2026 Florida redistricting,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Florida_redistricting.
[279] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/FL/22/2026/.
[280] Tavern Research, August 2026, https://242750075.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na2.net/hubfs/242750075/FL-22%20General%20Toplines%20%E2%80%94%20Aug%2019_NEW.pdf.
[281] House Majority PAC, September 9, 2026, https://www.thehousemajoritypac.com/news/hmp-poll-pia-dandiya-leads-casey-askar-in-fl-22.
[282] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Florida,” accessed October 27, 2026.
[283] WUSF, May 6, 2026, https://wusf.org/text/politics-issues/2026-05-06/breakdown-changes-for-florida-new-congressional-map.
[284] Politico, April 27, 2026, cited by Wikipedia.

Candidates and campaign

Lois Frankel is now running in the new 23rd district[285]. Pia Dandiya, an Apple executive in the Strategic Innovations Group, initially set her sights on the 21st. Casey Askar, a businessman and veteran, had tried his luck in the 19th in 2020. He put $2.5 million of his own money into the campaign[286] before winning the primary. Lev Parnas, a former associate of Rudy Giuliani, had declared as an independent candidate, then withdrew.

Trump and Ron DeSantis are backing Askar. Pia Dandiya has the support of EMILY's List and the League of Conservation Voters. Her campaign strategy plays up her approachability as a former teacher against her opponent's multimillionaire profile[287]. On money, Askar keeps a clear lead thanks to his personal fortune[288].

Polls and model

Nothing has been released since October 1. In August, two Democratic polls described a close race.

[285] Florida Politics, May 7, 2026, https://floridapolitics.com/archives/795175-redistricting-shuffle-lois-frankel-officially-shifts-candidacy-to-new-cd-23/.
[286] The Floridian, May 19, 2026, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Florida,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Florida.
[287] Piya Dandiya for Congress. (2026). https://piaforcongress.com/priorities
[288] NBC News. (2026). https://www.nbcnews.com/video/shorts/how-rising-costs-may-impact-the-midterms-270111813908 Casey Askar for Congress. (2026). https://www.caseyaskar.com/




Figure 132. *Florida, District 22: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

They are more than 21 days old and drop out of the calculation. The October 28 update nonetheless incorporated district polling, which took 2.5 points of margin away from Dandiya; the October 31 update uses none, and the projection rests on Harris's share and the national environment. Dandiya's chances, which had risen slowly since August on the strength of the national climate, fell back to 23.5% on October 28, rebound to 33.1% on October 31. The ratings are more generous than the model.

Our analysis

With no incumbent, Dandiya needs to run about 6 points ahead of Harris, before voters many of whom have never voted for Frankel. Like the model, we see the race leaning toward the Republican. On election night, watch Wellington and Parkland, affluent suburbs between Palm Beach and Broward. Hendry and Collier will supply the Republican reserve.

SPECIAL CASES: ALASKA, MAINE, MISSOURI

Alaska and Maine use ranked-choice voting. Voters rank the candidates, and if no one wins a majority in the first round, the ballots of the last-place candidates are redistributed; the most useful polls there are those that publish a result after redistribution. Missouri is voting on its 2022 lines, reinstated by the courts in place of the map adopted by its Republican majority, and that 2025 map is being put to voters in a referendum on the same day.

In Alaska, our database files Eric Hafner under the Democratic label, though he is not the real challenger. In Maine, the Democratic seat is open, and Republican Paul LePage, a former governor, already won the district in 2022. In Missouri, our database contains a Remington Research Group poll that our research sources cannot find.

Our model gives the Democrats (or the candidate treated as one) an 11% chance in Alaska, 39% in Maine and 24% in Missouri. In our view, the Maine figure may underestimate the Democrats' chances.

AK-00: BILL HILL (INDEPENDENT) VS. NICK BEGICH III (INCUMBENT)

Our model gives the non-Republican candidate an 11% chance in Alaska. This figure should be read with caution. Our candidate file names Democrat Eric Hafner, held in a federal prison, as the opponent, whereas the real challenger is independent Bill Hill. And every poll shows Nick Begich ahead.




Figure 133. *AK-00 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

AK-00 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential	Trump 53%, Biden 43%
2024 presidential	Trump 55%, Harris 41%[289]; Harris share used by the model 43.2%
2022 House	Mary Peltola elected by ranked-choice voting over Sarah Palin and Nick Begich
2024 House	Begich beats Peltola with 51.2%[290]
Incumbent	Nick Begich, Republican
August 18 primary	Matt Schultz, Democrat, third, later withdrew
Money raised as of September 30	Begich $6.32 million, Hill $2.35 million
Cash on hand as of September 30	Begich $2.39 million, Hill $190,431[291]
New York Times / Siena (504 likely voters)	first round Begich 47%, Hill 35%, Hafner 8%, McDermott 5%; final 53 to 47[292]
Data for Progress (694 likely voters)	first round 48 to 42; final 50 to 49
Non-Republican chances	11.3% on October 31; 40.7% on August 1, 5.2% on September 15, 3.8% on October 1, 4.7% on October 15, 46.1% on October 26
Projected non-Republican share	44.6%, Begich ahead by 10.8 points (15.9 points in early October)
Breakdown	in margin points: national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 12.2; incumbency and recent local vote plus 6.6; fundraising zero; district polling minus 10.1; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings	Cook: Lean R since October 23; Inside Elections, Sabato, Decision Desk HQ and Silver Bulletin: Likely R[293]
Cross-race effect, Senate	Peltola has an 18.5% chance against Dan Sullivan; Democratic House majority at 94.2% if she wins, 72.7% otherwise

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

Alaska elects a single representative for the whole state, so there is no redistricting. The terrain is Republican, and yet Mary Peltola, a Democrat, won in 2022, two years after a presidential election in which Biden took only 43%. Defeated by Nick Begich in 2024, she is running for the Senate this year.

Candidates and campaign

Voters will rank four names: Nick Begich (Republican, incumbent), Bill Hill (independent), Eric Hafner (Democrat) and Jim McDermott (Libertarian)[294].

[289] Wikipedia, “Alaska's at-large congressional district,” accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alaska%27s_at-large_congressional_district.
[290] New York Times, November 20, 2024; AP, November 21, 2024, cited by Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives election in Alaska,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_election_in_Alaska.
[291] Federal Election Commission, third-quarter report covering through September 30, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/AK/00/2026/.
[292] New York Times, October 3, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/10/03/polls/times-siena-alaska-poll-toplines.html.
[293] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives election in Alaska,” accessed October 27, 2026.
[294] Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives election in Alaska,” accessed October 27, 2026.

Hafner, a perennial candidate, does not live in Alaska and is serving a sentence in a federal prison[295]. He alone carries the Democratic label. Matt Schultz withdrew after the primary along with other candidates, and John Williams did the same after discussions with Hill and the Alaska Democratic Party.

Bill Hill is a commercial fisherman and former superintendent of the Bristol Bay School District[296]. The Blue Dog Coalition and Planned Parenthood are backing him. Begich has the support of Donald Trump, J. D. Vance, Senator Dan Sullivan, Mike Johnson, Vivek Ramaswamy, the Club for Growth and the NRA. According to Data for Progress, seven in ten Alaska voters are worried about the cost of gas and food[297]. The money clearly favors the incumbent.

Polls and model

The eight polls released since late July all put Begich ahead in the first round, by 1 to 14 points. He remains the winner in those that publish the final count.


Table 14. Alaska: House race polls since August 2026

Pollster (sponsor)	Fieldwork	Begich	Hill	Hafner	Final
Data for Progress (D)	Oct. 8-16	48	42	5	50 to 49
PPP (D), X	Oct. 14-15	45	44	5	not released
Alaska Survey Research, X	Oct. 1-3	50	40	7	53 to 47
New York Times / Siena	Sept. 24-Oct. 1	47	35	8	53 to 47
Fabrizio Ward (R) and Impact (D), for AARP	Sept. 8-11	45	31	n/a	57 to 43
Bullfinch (Independent Leadership Council)	Sept. 1-6	44	37	n/a	50 to 47
GBAO (D), for the Hill campaign	Aug. 3-5	46	42	n/a	not released
Data for Progress (D), 605 LV	July 28-Aug. 4	47	37	n/a	not released

Source: Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives election in Alaska," accessed October 27, 2026, and the primary sources cited (Data for Progress, New York Times, AARP, Punchbowl News). Rows marked "X" come from unverified posts on X. First round in %, then the final result after redistribution when published (Begich vs. Hill).

[295] Alaska Beacon, August 31, 2026, https://alaskabeacon.com/2026/08/31/in-alaskas-u-s-house-race-two-of-the-final-candidates-dont-live-in-alaska-and-one-is-in-prison/.
[296] Anchorage Daily News, January 21, 2026, https://www.adn.com/politics/2026/01/21/bill-hill-bristol-bay-fisherman-and-educator-enters-alaska-us-house-race-as-independent/.
[297] Data for Progress, October 20, 2026, https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2026/10/20/every-statewide-race-in-alaska-is-close-as-7-in-10-voters-worry-about-affording-gas-and-food.


The Times and Siena provide the most solid poll. The most recent, from Data for Progress, is also the closest: it finds most Hafner voters transferring to Hill, which we also expect on November 3.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Polls: polls cited in the note, one dot per poll at its field end date. Forecast: recomputed day by day with the polls completed by each date. House: margin between the two main parties; only polls completed in the previous 21 days enter the model (internal polls corrected for their bias), hence the breaks in the forecast.

Figure 134. *Alaska, at-large district: polls (margin between the non-Republican candidate and Begich, first round, by end date of fieldwork) and Le Millénaire's projection, with its 90% interval.*

The October 26 projection included none of these: those in our database were more than 21 days old, and the October polls from Data for Progress and PPP were not in it. The October 31 projection once again incorporates district polling, which takes 10.1 points of margin away from the non-Republican candidate. What remains is the local margin, drawn from Peltola's results, which the model carries over to a little-known independent. Fundraising plays no role, even though Begich has twelve times as much cash on hand as Hill.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Recomputed day by day after the fact, with the polls completed by each date.

Figure 135. *Alaska, at-large district: non-Republican chances in our model, from August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

The curve collapses with the first polls in August, rebounds at the end of the month, falls back in September, then jumps at the end of October before falling again on the 27th. What happened? The Times poll, completed on October 1, left the 21-day window on the 23rd. The Alaska Survey Research poll followed on the 25th. On top of that comes the misrecorded candidate, who inherits Peltola's local margin. We did not accept this 46% figure, and the October 31 update brings it back down to 11%, with polls back in the calculation. Cook did reclassify the race on October 23, but the other ratings remain more cautious.

The state's two races are linked. A Peltola win in the Senate race would also make a Hill win possible.

Our analysis

In our reading, Begich is the clear favorite, as the model now indicates. With polls back in the calculation, the projection has him winning by more than 10 points. Hill wins only with a massive transfer of Hafner and McDermott votes, and only Data for Progress measures a transfer of that size. On November 3, if Begich tops 50% in the first round, he is reelected without redistribution. If he stays below 47%, the seat could flip.

ME-02: MATTHEW DUNLAP VS. PAUL LEPAGE (OPEN SEAT)

Paul LePage, a former governor, has already won this district. The model sees him taking this open seat back from the Democrats. Yet the only university poll puts Matthew Dunlap ahead, and the projection has swung widely as polls entered and left the calculation.




Figure 136. *ME-02 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

ME-02 in numbers

Indicator	Value
Profile	92% of the state's territory; 72% rural, 90.9% non-Hispanic white; Cook PVI, Republican plus 4[298]
2020 presidential	Trump 52%, Biden 45%
2024 presidential	Trump 54%, Harris 44%, a 9.5-point lead[299]; the model uses 45.4% and 9.1 points
2022 House	Golden 48.4% in the first round; final 53.1% to 46.9% for Bruce Poliquin
2024 House	Golden 50.4%, Austin Theriault 49.6% in the final count
2022 governor	LePage wins the district by about 2 points, loses the state by 13 points[300]
Democratic primary	Dunlap 52.5%, Joe Baldacci 47.5% in the final round[301]
Money raised as of October 14	LePage $3.30 million, Dunlap $2.96 million
Cash on hand as of October 14	LePage $848,224, Dunlap $443,968[302]
Earlier polls	UNH, February: LePage 47%, Dunlap 46%; co/efficient for the NRCC, April: LePage 50%, Dunlap 40%[303]
Dunlap's chances	38.7% on October 31; 28.5% on August 1, 19.7% on September 15, 32.1% on October 1, 29.2% on October 15
Projected Democratic share	48.7%, LePage ahead by 2.6 points
Breakdown	in margin points: national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 7.7; incumbency and recent local vote plus 1.8; fundraising minus 1.5; district polling and other data near zero; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings	Cook (October 9), Inside Elections (October 15), Sabato (September 29): Lean R; Decision Desk HQ (October 20): Toss-up[304]
Cross-race effect, Senate	Troy Jackson has a 45.2% chance against Susan Collins; Democratic House majority at 87.9% if he wins, 67.4% otherwise

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

The 2nd district covers central and northern Maine, including Lewiston, Auburn, Bangor, Augusta and Presque Isle. It is the largest district east of the Mississippi, and it was not redrawn.

Trump wins it comfortably. Yet Democrat Jared Golden won it twice, the second time narrowly. LePage himself beat Janet Mills there in 2022, the year he lost the state.

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[298] Wikipedia, “Maine's 2nd congressional district,” accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maine%27s_2nd_congressional_district.
[299] Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Maine,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Maine.
[300] Maine Secretary of State, 2022 results, cited by Wikipedia.
[301] Maine Public, June 10, 2026, cited by Wikipedia.
[302] Federal Election Commission, “pre-general” report covering through October 14, 2026, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/ME/02/2026/.
[303] NRCC, May 2026, https://www.nrcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/NRCC-ME-02-Survey-Memo-1.pdf.
[304] “Predictions” table in Wikipedia, “2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Maine,” accessed October 27, 2026.

Candidates and campaign

Golden withdrew in November 2025. Matthew Dunlap, the state auditor, won the Democratic primary by ranked-choice voting. Paul LePage governed Maine from 2011 to 2019. He has faced criticism over his residency: he rents an apartment in Augusta from Shawn Moody[305]. Trump and Mike Johnson are backing him; Planned Parenthood and the Sierra Club support Dunlap. The money tilts slightly toward LePage, which the model translates into a slight Republican advantage.

Polls and model


Table 15. Maine, District 2: polls since August 2026

Pollster (sponsor)	Fieldwork	Dunlap	LePage	Sample
Tulchin (D), for the Dunlap campaign	Oct. 12-14	50	46	500 LV
Tulchin (D), for the Dunlap campaign	Sept. 27-30	50	48	500 LV
University of New Hampshire	Sept. 17-21	51	45	627 LV
Impact (D), for House Majority PAC	Sept. 8-12	49	49	500 LV
DCCC	Aug. 11-13	48	49	621 LV

Source: Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Maine," accessed October 27, 2026, and the primary sources cited (Tulchin memos published by the New York Times, UNH Survey Center, DCCC, NRCC).

The only nonpartisan poll of the fall, from the University of New Hampshire, puts Dunlap clearly ahead[306]. The Democratic polls describe a tighter race[307]. Since the spring, the trend has favored Dunlap.


[305] Portland Press Herald, March 26, 2026, https://www.pressherald.com/2026/03/26/paul-lepage-is-using-an-augusta-apartment-for-his-political-comeback/.
[306] UNH Survey Center, September 2026, https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2006&context=survey_center_polls.
[307] Tulchin memos published by the New York Times, https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/0cdb44a57dfd2687/fddf7303-full.pdf and https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/becbcf38fb98ac79/b81aab79-full.pdf; DCCC, https://dccc.org/%F0%9F%9A%A8-new-polls-dead-heat-in-me-02-as-matt-dunlap-gains-momentum/.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Polls: polls cited in the note, one dot per poll at its field end date. Forecast: recomputed day by day with the polls completed by each date. House: margin between the two main parties; only polls completed in the previous 21 days enter the model (internal polls corrected for their bias), hence the breaks in the forecast.

Figure 137. *Maine, District 2: polls (Democratic minus Republican margin, by end date of fieldwork) and Le Millénaire's projection, with its 90% interval.*

The projected margin narrowed sharply after the University of New Hampshire poll in late September, then oscillated in October. As of October 31, the polls carry almost no weight. The UNH poll left the calculation on October 13, the last Tulchin poll in our database on the 22nd, and the October one is not in it. The positive local margin is Golden's legacy.



Source: Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update. D (or I) − R margin in points; each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin (breakdown published on the website). The total is the forecast margin.

Figure 138. *Maine, District 2: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

Dunlap's chances fell in August, rose with the September poll, then climbed further at the end of October. Almost all the ratings see the seat leaning right.

A Troy Jackson win in the Senate race would very likely require a strong showing in the 2nd district.

Our analysis

The terrain is Republican, and LePage has already won it. But the only nonpartisan pollster of the fall puts Dunlap ahead. In our reading, the race is closer to a tie than the model suggests. We keep a slight edge for LePage as long as no independent October poll confirms the September one. If neither candidate reaches 50% in the first round, ranked-choice voting will decide. On election night, Lewiston, Auburn and Bangor will show Dunlap's level of support. The rural northern counties will tell whether LePage matches his 2022 score.

MO-02: FRED WELLMAN VS. ANN WAGNER (INCUMBENT, 2022 LINES)

The race is being fought on the 2022 map. The new Republican map remains suspended until the referendum held the same day. On that basis, the model puts incumbent Ann Wagner ahead of Fred Wellman.




Figure 139. *MO-02 (yellow outline) and neighboring districts, colored by our chances of winning as of October 31, 2026; inset, the whole state.*

MO-02 in numbers

Indicator	Value
2020 presidential (2022 lines)	Trump 53%, Biden 45%
2024 presidential (2022 lines)	Trump 53%, Harris 45%; the model uses 46.0% and 7.9 points
2025 map, not in effect	Trump lead raised from 8 to 11 points according to Inside Elections[308]
2022 House	Wagner 54.9%, Trish Gunby 43.1%
2024 House	Wagner 54.5%, Ray Hartmann 42.5%
Incumbent	Ann Wagner, backed by Trump and AIPAC
Cash on hand	Wagner $4.23 million as of July 15, Wellman $246,602 as of March 31[309]
Remington Research Group (R), completed September 15, 565 likely voters	Wagner 43%, Wellman 42% (no primary source found)
Wellman's chances	23.7% on October 31; 24.9% on September 1, 45.4% on September 15, 43.9% on October 1, 28.9% on October 15
Projected Democratic share	46.8%, Wagner ahead by 6.4 points
Breakdown	in margin points: national environment plus 7.2; district voting history minus 6.5; incumbency and recent local vote minus 2.4; fundraising and other data zero; district polling minus 2.2; poll bias correction minus 2.3
Ratings	Cook (September 11) and Decision Desk HQ: Likely R; Sabato (September 29): Lean R; Inside Elections: Safe R, 2025 rating[310]

Sources: the Le Millénaire forecast, October 31, 2026 update; results and FEC data cited in the profile.

The district

It covers the southern and western suburbs of St. Louis: Wildwood, Chesterfield, Ballwin, Kirkwood, Town and Country, Arnold and Oakville. Added to these are Franklin County and parts of St. Charles and Warren counties[311].

The Republican map signed by Governor Mike Kehoe on September 28, 2025, dismantled the Democratic 5th district in Kansas City and pushed the 2nd toward the south of the state. It is not in effect. The Missouri Supreme Court ordered a referendum, Proposition A, and the use of the 2022 maps. The US Supreme Court declined to stay that decision on September 8, 2026, then stayed a conflicting federal injunction on September 10 and September 25[312].

[308] Inside Elections, September 29, 2025, https://www.insideelections.com/news/article/a-detailed-analysis-of-missouris-new-congressional-map.
[309] Federal Election Commission, https://www.fec.gov/data/elections/house/MO/02/2026/.
[310] "Predictions" table in Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Missouri," accessed October 27, 2026.
[311] Wikipedia, "Missouri's 2nd congressional district," accessed October 27, 2026, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missouri%27s_2nd_congressional_district.
[312] CNN, September 8, 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/08/politics/supreme-court-missouri-redistricting-loss-for-republicans; Reuters, September 10, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-supreme-court-blocks-republican-drawn-congressional-map-missouri-2026-09-10/; NPR, September 25, 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/09/25/nx-s1-5978875/midterms-redistricting-trump-missouri.

The model therefore uses the 2022 boundaries. Its Harris share matches the Inside Elections figure.

Candidates and campaign

Fred Wellman, a veteran and podcast host, is endorsed by VoteVets[313]. Brandon Daugherty is running as the Libertarian. The money data are old, and the model derives no fundraising term from them.

Polls and model

One point worth flagging. Our research sources list no general election poll. Yet the model's database contains one, from Remington, a Republican pollster, whose primary source we have not been able to find.





Figure 140. *Missouri, District 2: breakdown of the projection as of October 31, 2026. Each bar is the effect of one element of the model on the expected margin, in points.*

The effect of incumbency and recent local vote is negative (minus 2.4 points of margin): Wagner runs ahead of Trump. The national environment partly offsets it.

[313] St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 1, 2025, cited by Wikipedia, "2026 United States House of Representatives elections in Missouri," https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections_in_Missouri.



Source: Le Millénaire forecast, updated October 31, 2026. Recomputed day by day after the fact, with the polls completed by each date.

Figure 141. *Missouri, District 2: Democratic chances in our model, from August 1 to October 31, 2026.*

Wellman's chances jump on the day Remington's fieldwork ends, hold in early October, then fall back when the poll leaves the calculation, and slip further on October 31, with district polling taking 2.2 points of margin away from Wellman. The ratings remain more cautious than the model.

Our analysis

Wagner was reelected twice without difficulty and keeps a sizable war chest. Trump did not gain ground here between 2020 and 2024. Wellman needs to gain about 4 points on Harris, and we consider the model's 24% generous. On election night, Chesterfield, Kirkwood and Town and Country will tell whether the Republican slide in affluent suburbs also reaches Missouri. Franklin County will gauge how well Wagner's base holds. Then there is Proposition A, on the same ballot: its outcome will set the 2028 map, and with it this district's boundaries.

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