



ISRAEL, IN THE CAMP OF THE UNGOVERNABLE?

HOW NETANYAHU DEFIED THE POLLS

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FOREWORD

This document is a translation of the original French text. It may contain errors; the French version is the reference text.

On election night, each camp had its own reading of the results of the vote to elect the 120 members of the Knesset. On 28 October, at 3:14 in the morning, Benjamin Netanyahu took the stage at Likud headquarters in Jerusalem and proclaimed that the Likud remained “the largest party in Israel”¹. At around 1 a.m., in Tel Aviv, Naftali Bennett for his part announced: “Netanyahu has lost, and the 7 October government is going home!”²

However, the count of votes as the night went on shifted the trend. In the Central Elections Committee's 14:32 update, the Likud passed one million votes. Our projection gives it **27 seats**, six more than Yashar!, Gadi Eisenkot's list, which the last three polls had placed first. On 23 October, no polling institute gave the Likud more than 21 seats³. In votes, its camp remains ahead, at 43.3% against 40.9% for its opponents.

Three years ago, the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 killed more than 1,200 people under his government⁴. Netanyahu campaigned with two years of war in Gaza behind him, a war against Iran at the end of the winter⁵, a corruption trial still under way⁶ and ultra-Orthodox allies who had themselves provoked a political crisis over the conscription of the ultra-Orthodox into the army⁷. Yet the Likud finished first, and by a wide margin.

¹ The Times of Israel, “Eisenkot and Netanyahu each vow to form next coalition even as exit polls predict stalemate”, 28 October 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/eisenkot-and-netanyahu-each-vow-to-form-next-coalition-even-as-exit-polls-predict-stalemate/>.

² Ynetnews, 28 October 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bjnx6sr3fx>.

³ Ynetnews, 23 October 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/s1wppltnme>. Kan 11: Kantar, 1,006 people; Channel 12: Midgam and iPanel, 1,018 people; Channel 13: 1,875 people.

⁴ Al-Monitor (AFP), “Key issues shaping Israel's election”, 26 October 2026, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/10/key-issues-shaping-israels-election>.

⁵ Insurance Journal (Reuters), 8 April 2026, <https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2026/04/08/864931.htm>. The dispatch dates the start of the war to 28 February 2026; The Times of Israel places it in March.

⁶ Al-Monitor (Reuters), April 2026, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/04/israels-president-says-he-wants-deal-reached-netanyahu-case-pardon-decision>.

⁷ The Jerusalem Post, May 2026, <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-896824>.

His bloc, for its part, fell from 64 to 53 seats and lost its majority. Shas collapsed, and Arab localities turned out in greater numbers than at any election since 2019. But his opponents, with 48 seats, are even further from 61, and they cannot govern without the Arab lists, an option they ruled out throughout the campaign. Our forecast of 24 October already pointed to a parliament with no majority, in 69% of simulations⁸, and the anti-Netanyahu bloc reached a majority in only 7% of simulations.

Thus, when we sum up the context, it is legitimate to ask how Netanyahu, whom almost every poll placed behind Eisenkot, made the Likud the largest party in Israel with a six-seat lead. Likewise, we will examine the political outcomes of this victory for the Likud, which finishes first but does not have a majority with its traditional allies.

First, we look back at the night of 27 October, when the count gave the Netanyahu camp as many as 65 seats, and at a campaign in which everything revolved around him. Second, we look at the result: the Likud on 27, Yashar! on 21, Shas on 6, the Reservists and Amcha Yisrael below 3.25%, half a million envelopes not yet opened. And turnout in Arab localities, up from 53.8% to 78.8%. Third, we travel from Bnei Brak to the working-class neighbourhoods of south Tel Aviv to see who voted for what. Then come what Netanyahu can do with his result and what the polls had missed. At the time of writing, around 84% of the expected votes have been counted. The seat figures quoted are those of our projection, and **the official results will be published on 4 November**⁹.

⁸ Le Millénaire, 2026 Israeli legislative election forecast, forecast frozen on 24 October 2026 (20,000 simulations, 67 polls from 8 institutes), <https://forecast.lemillenaire.org/israel/knesset/2026/>.

⁹ Central Elections Committee, national results page, update of 28 October 2026 at 14:32 and notice on the publication of the final results by 4 November 2026 at the latest, <https://votes26.bechirot.gov.il/nationalresults>.

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THE RESULT OF 27 OCTOBER

THE EXIT POLLS TELL THREE STORIES

Historically, the methods of polling institutes in Israel differ widely. In the run-up to the vote of 27 October, the institutes' forecasts diverged considerably. Depending on the institute, the Eisenkot coalition could be put at 62 seats or at 49 seats two days apart.

This is an important factor to take into account when analysing Israeli elections. Given Netanyahu's central place in the Israeli political landscape and in Israel's politics for several years, and all the more so since 7 October 2023, observers could rely on a very favourable or very unfavourable poll to build a narrative. That is why we immediately sought to neutralise the weight of polls in our electoral analysis.

THREE STORIES AT 22:00, THEN A SHIFT AS THE NIGHT WENT ON

At 22:00 on 27 October, polling stations close. Six channels publish their exit poll:

- ❑ **Kan 11, Channel 12 and Channel 13 put the anti-Netanyahu camp ahead, far from 61 seats.**
- ❑ **Channel 14 gives the Netanyahu camp 60 seats.**
- ❑ **i24 News and Channel 16 are in between.**

Table 1. The six exit polls, at 22:00 and in their final version

Channel	Likud, 22:00	Blocs, 22:00	Likud, final version	Blocs, final version
Kan 11	25	50 · 53 · 17	27	51 · 51 · 18
Channel 12	24	50 · 52 · 18	27	52 · 49 · 19
Channel 13	25	50 · 53 · 17	27	51 · 51 · 18
Channel 14	30	60 · 43 · 17	30	60 · 43 · 17
i24 News	27	55 · 49 · 16	27	55 · 49 · 16
Channel 16	25	53 · 51 · 16	25	53 · 51 · 16

Source: Channels' exit polls, compiled by Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory (election-night page and @ObservElections account). Blocs: Netanyahu · anti-Netanyahu · Arab lists.

What will matter is clear straight away. The Likud comes first in all six polls, with 24 to 30 seats, ahead of Yashar!, with 19 to 23¹⁰. No channel gives anyone a majority at 22:00. Then the revisions begin. Kan 11 first raises the Joint List, at around 23:00¹¹, then the Likud. Channel 12 and Channel 13 raise the Likud by two to three seats¹².

By the end of the night, the three main channels all give the Likud 27 seats. They had started at 24 or 25. Channel 14 also revised its estimate. One of its versions gave the Netanyahu camp 62 seats and Yisrael Beytenu below the threshold¹³. At 2:54, the Netanyahu camp there “came back down” to 60 seats¹⁴.

The count: 65 seats at 2%, 53 at 84%

The first results from the Central Elections Committee arrived shortly after midnight, with 15 polling stations and 2,670 votes¹⁵. Small Jewish localities report first, then the large cities of the centre, and Arab localities come last, before the outside envelopes, which are opened only once everything else has been counted.

¹⁰ Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory, @ObservElections, 27 October 2026, <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115199092276285490>.

¹¹ Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory, @ObservElections, Kan 11 revision at 23:04 (Israel time), <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115199907204108728>.

¹² Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory, @ObservElections, 28 October 2026, record of exit poll revisions (sources: Ynet, Maariv, Walla), <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115253869349421375>.

¹³ Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory, @ObservElections, 27 October 2026, Channel 14 revision (sources: Ynet, Ice), <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115228809423106166>.


¹⁴ The Times of Israel, live blog of 28 October 2026, “Netanyahu's bloc falls back to 60 seats in updated exit poll from pro-government TV channel”, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/netanyahus-bloc-falls-back-to-60-seats-in-updated-exit-poll-from-pro-government-tv-channel/.

¹⁵ Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory, @ObservElections, Committee update at 00:19 (Israel time), <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115209645199675733>.

Table 2. The raw count and the Le Millénaire projection through the night

Votes counted	Seats on counted votes only	Le Millénaire projection (bloc medians)
6%	64 · 52 · 4	54 (51 to 57) · 48 · 18
11%	64 · 52 · 4	53 (51 to 55) · 49 · 18
16%	63 · 49 · 8	53 (51 to 55) · 49 · 19
21%	63 · 49 · 8	53 (51 to 55) · 49 · 18
27%	59 · 46 · 15	52 (50 to 54) · 49 · 19
30%	59 · 46 · 15	52 (50 to 54) · 49 · 19
36%	57 · 47 · 16	52 (51 to 54) · 49 · 19
48%	55 · 49 · 16	52 (51 to 53) · 49 · 19
51%	55 · 49 · 16	52 (51 to 53) · 49 · 19
59%	56 · 48 · 16	52 (51 to 53) · 49 · 19
65%	54 · 48 · 18	52 (52 to 53) · 49 · 19
69%	54 · 47 · 19	53 (52 to 53) · 49 · 19
76%	54 · 49 · 17	53 (52 to 53) · 49 · 19
84%	53 · 48 · 19	53 (52 to 53) · 48 · 19

Source: Central Elections Committee; Le Millénaire projection (4,000 simulations per update; median and 80% interval for the Netanyahu bloc). Blocs: Netanyahu · anti-Netanyahu · Arab lists. Bloc medians do not always add up to 120: in the latest update, the sum of the list medians gives 53 · 48 · 19.



Source: Central Elections Committee, successive updates during the night of 27 to 28 October; projections published by Le Millénaire (band: 80% interval for the Netanyahu bloc).

Figure 1. Seats of the three blocs as the count progressed: Le Millénaire projection and seats calculated on votes already counted only.

At 2% of the votes, seats calculated on the count alone give the Netanyahu camp 65 seats, and Ra'am is at 2.75%, below the threshold¹⁶. At 4:47, Ra'am crosses the threshold with 3.67%¹⁷. The raw count then gradually converges on

¹⁶ Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory, @ObservElections, Committee update at 03:45 (Israel time), <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115262945286631573>.

¹⁷ Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory, @ObservElections, Committee update at 04:47 (Israel time), <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115275560624549897>.

the projection: 57 seats at 37%, 55 at the halfway mark, 54 at three quarters and 53 at 84%.

Our projection moved far less than the raw count. It compared each counted locality with its own 2022 vote, then applied the same swing to what remained to be counted. Result: 53 seats for the Netanyahu camp at 16% of the votes, still 53 at 84%.

TURNOUT HOUR BY HOUR

Turnout was higher than in 2022 at every hour of the day. At 16:00 it stood at 55.7%, unprecedented at that hour since 1973, according to the Committee as quoted by Walla¹⁸. At closing time, the Committee estimated it at 77.7%, envelopes included, the highest level since 1999¹⁹.

Table 3. National turnout hour by hour, 2026 and 2022

Time	2026	2022	Difference (points)
10:00	16.7%	15.9%	+0.8
12:00	31.5%	28.4%	+3.1
14:00	44.9%	38.9%	+6.0
16:00	55.7%	47.5%	+8.2
20:00	74.3%	66.3%	+8.0
22:00, close of polls	77.7%	70.6% (final)	+7.1

Source: Central Elections Committee, hourly figures reported by The JC (10:00), the Times of Israel (14:00), Walla (16:00), Ynetnews (20:00), Anadolu and Al Jazeera (22:00); midday update: Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory; 2022: hourly figures for 1 November 2022 reported by the press.

The gap widens in the afternoon. It is less than one point at 10:00 and eight points at 16:00. As we will see further on, it is in the Arab localities that everything is decided.

Israeli elections have a well-known bias: **the localities that count quickly tend to vote for the Netanyahu camp**. This is explained by two politico-cultural

¹⁸ Walla, 27 October 2026, citing the Central Elections Committee, <https://www.walla.co.il/news/israel/383959085>.

¹⁹ Anadolu, 27 October 2026, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/israeli-election-turnout-reaches-777-as-arab-parties-posed-for-historic-gains/4103158>; Al Jazeera, “Five key takeaways from Israel's parliamentary elections”, 28 October 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/28/five-key-takeaways-from-israels-parliamentary-elections>. For 2022: Al Jazeera, 27 October 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/27/exit-polls-following-israeli-elections-indicate-no-clear-winner>. The figure of 77.7% is the one announced by the Central Elections Committee when the polling stations closed, not an official result.

phenomena:

- The **Likud vote** is a historic, deep-rooted, family vote. We could compare it with the substitutes for the Les Républicains vote in France. Yet Israeli families traditionally vote after lunchtime;
- The **Orthodox vote** (parties allied with Netanyahu's outgoing coalition) is also historically late, for religious reasons.

However, we noted that in this election **the bias was stronger than usual**. Arab localities, which count late, had turned out in far greater numbers than in 2022, and their weight only became apparent at the end of the night. The 2 a.m. commentary about the return of a Netanyahu majority was therefore down to the order of the count.

No one had 61 seats in the 22:00 polls, and that was right. Kan 11, Channel 12 and Channel 13, on the other hand, put the Likud two to three seats too low, and the Arab lists at 17 or 18. The versions published during the night moved in the direction of the count.

WHAT IS LEFT TO COUNT? WHAT THE DOUBLE ENVELOPES WILL CHANGE

Taking the double envelopes into account

At 14:32, the Committee had counted 4,875,751 ballots in 11,168 polling stations²⁰. The final 2022 file had 12,545. Some ordinary polling stations are therefore still missing, mostly in Arab localities, as are all the double envelopes: **soldiers, diplomats, prisoners, patients, voters who voted far from home**. They are opened last.

²⁰ Central Elections Committee, national results page, update of 28 October 2026 at 14:32 and notice on the publication of the final results by 4 November 2026 at the latest, <https://votes26.bechirof.gov.il/nationalresults>.

Table 4. What is left to count, and how the model allocates it

Type of locality	Votes counted	Votes remaining (estimate)	Share already counted	Netanyahu bloc	Anti-Netanyahu bloc	Arab lists
Netanyahu camp strongholds	1,415,235	79,560	94.7%	68.7%	29.2%	0.6%
Mixed Jewish localities	1,342,510	101,601	93.0%	46.5%	51.2%	1.5%
Anti-Netanyahu camp strongholds	1,187,296	120,935	90.8%	23.5%	74.5%	1.5%
Ultra-Orthodox localities	248,651	11,675	95.5%	94.9%	1.6%	0.0%
Arab localities	654,496	89,711	87.9%	0.5%	4.0%	94.8%
Outside envelopes	0	544,906	none	46.3%	45.1%	6.9%
Total	4,848,188	948,388	83.6%	41.6%	43.7%	13.3%

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update; Le Millénaire estimate (2022 turnout by type of locality, adjusted for the observed increase; envelopes: 2022 volume multiplied by the national increase in turnout). Valid votes; excluding a few unclassified localities.

The total should be read with caution. At closing time, the Committee announced 5,695,682 voters, envelopes included²¹. **That would leave 819,931 ballots, spoilt ballots included, and not 948,388 valid votes as in our table.** Our estimate is therefore somewhat high.

In 2022, **the envelopes had given 49.6% of the votes to the Netanyahu camp, slightly more than its 48.4% nationally, and barely 5% to the Arab lists, which had won 10.7% across the country.**

Table 5. The outside envelopes in 2022

Bloc	Envelope votes	Share of envelopes	National share
Netanyahu bloc	227,294	49.6%	48.4%
Anti-Netanyahu bloc	190,521	41.5%	38.2%
Arab lists	23,156	5.0%	10.7%
Total	458,714		

Source: Central Elections Committee, results of the 25th Knesset (2022), outside envelopes line (code 9999); Le Millénaire calculation.

How many envelopes this year? **Ynet reports more than 650,000²². Elad Naveh, at the Committee's control centre, speaks of more than half a**

²¹ Central Elections Committee, national estimate at 22:00 (5,695,682 voters, outside envelopes included), reported by Le Millénaire, Observatory election night page, <https://election.lemillenaire.org/soiree/israel/legislatives/2026/>.

²² Ynetnews, article of 27 October 2026 (exit polls published at 22:08, turnout, outside envelopes), <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/skd97fc2gl>.

million²³. We estimated 544,906, by applying the increase in turnout to the 458,714 of 2022. In 2022, it was on the envelopes that United Torah Judaism lost a seat, to Yisrael Beytenu²⁴. And on election night, Israel Hayom recalled that the soldiers' vote usually lowers the final share of the Arab lists²⁵.

What are the consequences?

The rest of the count cuts both ways. The Arab localities still to be counted will lift the two Arab lists. The envelopes will lift the Netanyahu camp slightly. Overall, **our projection gives 43.3% of the votes to the Netanyahu camp, 40.9% to the anti-Netanyahu camp and 14.8% to the Arab lists**. One or two seats are therefore still in play.

Table 6. What is still to come

Date	Step
28 to 30 October 2026	Count of the outside envelopes, “until Friday morning” according to Ynet
Friday 30 October 2026	Final count expected (Al Jazeera, Avigdor Lieberman)
4 November 2026	Publication of the official results in the Official Gazette and presentation to the President of the State

Source: Ynetnews, 27 October 2026; Al Jazeera, 28 October 2026; Times of Israel, 28 October 2026; Central Elections Committee, national results page (notice of 28 October 2026).

The seats that could change hands are known: the Likud's 27th, Yashar!'s 22nd, the 12th of the Joint List and of Beyahad, the Democrats' 9th and Yisrael Beytenu's 8th. None of them tips the majority. In less than 1% of our 4,000 simulations of the remaining count does either camp reach 61 seats.

The final count will not produce a majority, but it can change the arithmetic by one seat. **Yet it is precisely by one seat that the combination of the Netanyahu bloc with Yisrael Beytenu stands or falls**, at exactly 61 seats in our projection: one seat fewer for either of the two and it no longer exists. They are therefore a decisive factor between now and Thursday 29 October 2026 with a

²³ The Media Line, 28 October 2026, citing Elad Naveh, of the Central Elections Committee's control centre, <https://themedialine.org/headlines/netanyahu-bloc-takes-lead-as-actual-vote-count-reverses-israeli-exit-poll-picture/>.
²⁴ Ynetnews, article of 27 October 2026 (exit polls published at 22:08, turnout, outside envelopes), <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/skd97fc2gl>.
²⁵ Israel Hayom, analysis by Danny Zaken, 27 October 2026, <https://www.israelhayom.com/2026/10/27/arab-parties-election-gains-complicate-eisenkots-coalition-path/>.

view to the nomination of the next party leader able to form a coalition majority in the Knesset.

In 2022, the envelopes had moved United Torah Judaism's last seat. This time, as the Netanyahu camp is slightly above its average there, one may expect them to tend to help the Likud, without knowing which seat they will tip: our model allocates them by bloc, not by list.

UNDERSTANDING THE VOTE OF 27 OCTOBER

BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, A POLITICAL GENIUS?

A Knesset that ran its full term

The 25th Knesset had been elected on 1 November 2022. **On 29 December that year, Benjamin Netanyahu formed his new government with the ultra-Orthodox parties and the far right, a government the Times of Israel describes as “the most hardline in the country's history”²⁶.**

At that point, the coalition was not destined for a stable future, even though Netanyahu already held the record for years in government in a politically and institutionally unstable country. This government combined two sources of fragility: **the aggregation of Israeli centre-right parties with far-right parties holding different views on several areas of public policy, such as security, judicial matters or the rule of law** (1) and **the partnership with the Orthodox parties (Haredim), some of which reject the Zionist project on religious grounds** (2). This second point is worth noting because it would raise one of the major issues of the campaign, namely the equal treatment of Israeli citizens with regard to compulsory military service.

Moreover, this government faced the greatest security crises in the country's history. **Nine months later, the Hamas attack of 7 October 2023 killed more than 1,200 people²⁷.** There followed two years of war in Gaza, a ceasefire on 10 October 2025, and the return, on 26 January 2026, of the remains of the last

²⁶ The Times of Israel, “Knesset election set for October 27 with government set to complete full term”, July 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-election-set-for-october-27-with-government-set-to-complete-full-term/>.

²⁷ Al-Monitor (AFP), “Key issues shaping Israel's election”, 26 October 2026, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/10/key-issues-shaping-israels-election>.

hostage held in Gaza²⁸. At the end of the winter, Israel and the United States went to war against Iran, until the ceasefire of 7 April²⁹.

Meanwhile, the Prime Minister's trial for corruption, fraud and breach of trust remained pending. Netanyahu asked President Isaac Herzog for a pardon in November 2025. On 26 April 2026, the President let it be known that he would rule only once the chances of an agreement between the parties had been exhausted³⁰.

It was the conscription of yeshiva students that led United Torah Judaism to call for dissolution. In May 2026, United Torah Judaism announced that it wanted to dissolve the Knesset, in the absence of a law enshrining their exemption. “We no longer trust Netanyahu,” said Rabbi Dov Lando, one of the authorities of Degel HaTorah³¹. The dissolution was passed during the night of 16 to 17 July, by 62 votes to 0. Aryeh Deri, the leader of Shas, had made his vote conditional on that of the opposition³². The election remained set for its statutory date, 27 October³³.

Moreover, there has never been a commission of inquiry into 7 October. The bill was passed at first reading in July, with the opposition boycotting the vote, then dropped with the dissolution. As of 10 October, no commission yet existed³⁴.

A reshaped political landscape

Between autumn 2025 and the submission of the lists, almost everything shifted. On 16 September 2025, former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot launched

²⁸ Al-Monitor, January 2026, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/01/israel-returns-remains-last-gaza-hostage-ran-gvili>.

²⁹ Insurance Journal (Reuters), 8 April 2026, <https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2026/04/08/864931.htm>. The dispatch dates the start of the war to 28 February 2026; The Times of Israel places it in March.

³⁰ Al-Monitor (Reuters), April 2026, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/04/israels-president-says-he-wants-deal-reached-netanyahu-case-pardon-decision>.

³¹ The Jerusalem Post, May 2026, <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-896824>.

³² Ynetnews, 17 July 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/h1nremv4gl>.

³³ The Times of Israel, “Knesset election set for October 27 with government set to complete full term”, July 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/knesset-election-set-for-october-27-with-government-set-to-complete-full-term/>.

³⁴ Ynetnews, October 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bj9mravsgl>.

Yashar!³⁵. On 26 April 2026, in Herzliya, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid announced a joint list led by Bennett, Beyahad. “The era of division is over,” said Bennett³⁶. On 19 August, Hadash, Ta'al and Balad, which had run on two lists in 2022, re-formed the Joint List, without Ra'am³⁷. On the right, former general Ofer Winter launched Amcha Yisrael on 25 August³⁸, and Bezalel Smotrich joined forces with Moshe Feiglin on 1 September³⁹.

Table 7. The main lists of 27 October 2026

List	Leader	Camp
Likud	Benjamin Netanyahu	Netanyahu
Otzma Yehudit	Itamar Ben Gvir	Netanyahu
Religious Zionism-Zehut	Bezalel Smotrich	Netanyahu
Shas	Aryeh Deri	Netanyahu
United Torah Judaism	Yaakov Asher	Netanyahu
Amcha Yisrael	Ofer Winter	Netanyahu
Yashar!	Gadi Eisenkot	anti-Netanyahu
Beyahad	Naftali Bennett	anti-Netanyahu
The Democrats	Yair Golan	anti-Netanyahu
Yisrael Beytenu	Avigdor Lieberman	anti-Netanyahu
Reservists-New Economic Party	Yoaz Hendel and Yaron Zelekha	anti-Netanyahu
Joint List	Yousef Jabareen	none (Arab lists)
Ra'am	Mansour Abbas	none (Arab lists)

Source: Times of Israel, 9 September 2026; Ynetnews, 19 and 25 August, 1 September 2026; JNS, September 2026. Classification by camp: Le Millénaire model.

At the close of nominations, **on 8 September at 22:00, 38 lists had been submitted**⁴⁰. Ra'am (an Arab party led by Abbas and open to Arab participation in the State of Israel) placed a Jewish candidate, Yoav Segalovitz, in second position as a sign of openness to a renewed alliance with Eisenkot's coalition. Shas and United Torah Judaism fielded no women. Degel HaTorah had

³⁵ Ynetnews, 16 September 2025, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/ryhasrloxg>.

³⁶ The Times of Israel, “Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid announce united run under Bennett in 2026 elections”, 26 April 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/naftali-bennett-and-yair-lapid-announce-united-run-under-bennett-in-2026-elections/>.

³⁷ Ynetnews, 19 August 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/um0buc3f0>.

³⁸ Ynetnews, 25 August 2026, <https://ynetnews.com/article/r1xkosjpzl>.

³⁹ Ynetnews, 1 September 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/jeo9i7xfr>.

⁴⁰ The Times of Israel, “Israel's election takes shape as 38 parties submit slates, from Likud to Joint List”, 9 September 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-election-takes-shape-as-38-parties-submit-slates-from-likud-to-joint-list/>.

sidelined Moshe Gafni and Uri Maklev, and it was Yaakov Asher who led the Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox list⁴¹.

On 23 September, the Central Elections Committee, at the Likud's request, disqualified the Joint List and Ra'am⁴², a decision the Supreme Court overturned on 2 October⁴³. On 19 October, 8 days before the vote, Benny Gantz withdrew Blue and White from the race, saying: "the responsibility is mine"⁴⁴. He gave no voting recommendation, and his list remained on the ballot papers.

Two lists can conclude what is commonly called a **"surplus- vote agreement"**, allowing each pair to pool their surplus votes when Knesset seats are allocated, thereby increasing the chances of one of the parties winning an additional seat. For surplus-vote agreements, everyone stayed within their own camp, and the Likud, which signed with Religious Zionism-Zehut, refused to do so with Otzma Yehudit⁴⁵.

Table 8. The five surplus-vote agreements

Lists	Date signed
Yashar! and The Democrats	10 September 2026
Beyahad and Yisrael Beytenu	10 September 2026
Joint List and Ra'am	12 September 2026
Likud and Religious Zionism-Zehut	6 October 2026
Shas and United Torah Judaism	11 October 2026

Source: The Jerusalem Post, 10 September 2026; Times of Israel, 12 September, 6 and 11 October 2026. The Likud refused an agreement with Otzma Yehudit (Times of Israel, 6 October 2026).

⁴¹ The Times of Israel, "Israel's election takes shape as 38 parties submit slates, from Likud to Joint List", 9 September 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-election-takes-shape-as-38-parties-submit-slates-from-likud-to-joint-list/>.
⁴² Al Jazeera, 24 September 2026, <https://aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/24/israel-moves-to-bar-both-main-arab-lists-from-october-election>.
⁴³ Ynetnews, 2 October 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/aizk67pp3>.
⁴⁴ The Times of Israel, 19 October 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/blue-and-whites-benny-gantz-pulls-out-of-race-sealing-precipitous-political-fall/>.
⁴⁵ The Times of Israel, 6 October 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/likud-and-religious-zionism-sign-surplus-vote-agreement/.

THE THEMES OF THE CAMPAIGN WERE NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD BY MOST OBSERVERS

Contrary to what was widely heard in the Western world, **the campaign debate did not focus on the handling of 7 October, or at least not in the terms in which it was framed.** We have tended to narrow this debate down to Netanyahu's personal responsibility, through the prism of the commission of inquiry and the parallel with Golda Meir in 1973. Yet this issue ranks well below other subjects that this campaign brought to the fore.

As we said in our previous report, 7 October raised above all the question of the identity of the Israeli people, and it did so for all three major components of Israeli society.

For the Orthodox (14% to 15% of the Israeli population), part of whom reject the principle of Zionism on religious grounds, 7 October changed the picture. **Even though the community, which lives apart in Israel, was not hit hard by 7 October, security fears were a factor in the vote, particularly for their children.** Indeed, in 2025, 57% of the members of this community were under 20.

For Zionist Jews (65% of the population), whether or not they vote for Netanyahu, 7 October accelerated the perception that peace with the Palestinians is impossible. Whereas in the 1990s a majority of Zionist Israelis were in favour of the creation of a Palestinian State, this has no longer been the case since 7 October. Without an atmosphere of peace, it seems impossible for Israelis to move forward on the principle of a Palestinian State. The attack of 7 October 2023 served as a reminder of this harsh reality, feeding the sense of an “impossible peace”. This is also why the Israeli Zionist opposition does not challenge the substance of the war waged by the Jewish State in Gaza, but rather the way it is conducted.

Finally, **for Israeli Arabs (20% of the population), 7 October 2023 and the war in Gaza deepened the rift with the Jewish State.** While Israeli Arabs have

historically taken little part in Israeli democracy, considering that Israel is not their State, the picture changes with the war in Gaza, as it appears that taking part in the Israeli democratic process can influence Israeli domestic politics by forming a blocking minority.

Thus, it is impossible to understand the election of 27 October 2026 without understanding its main theme, which is the question of identity. This far outweighs the security or military issue. That is why we wrote in our previous study that Israel was facing its destiny. Since 7 October, the communities have seen their historical view of their participation in the State of Israel change, since 7 October touched the DNA of Israel.

POLITICALLY, COMPLEX NEGOTIATIONS MARKED BY MANY RED LINES

First, at the end of August, the Arab lists announced a single large list, with the exception of Ra'am, whose doctrine on participation in the State of Israel differs, as we saw earlier. Although this was nothing new, it gave momentum to the Arab parties' political offer at the start of the final weeks of the campaign. On 27 September, Eisenkot, Bennett, Lapid, Golan and Lieberman signed a non-aggression pact⁴⁶. Each had also set out his conditions, and they rule out almost every majority.

⁴⁶ Al Jazeera, "Israeli elections : what are the possible outcomes ?", 25 October 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/25/israeli-elections-what-are-the-possible-outcomes>.

Table 9. The red lines set during the campaign

Leader	Position	Date
Gadi Eisenkot (Yashar!)	Mansour Abbas "will not be part of his next government"	26 September 2026
Gadi Eisenkot (Yashar!)	Refusal to serve under Netanyahu, "even in a rotation"	21 October 2026
Naftali Bennett (Beyahad)	Governing with Zionist parties only	26 April 2026
Naftali Bennett (Beyahad)	"We will not sit with him in any configuration"	11 October 2026
Avigdor Lieberman (Yisrael Beytenu)	Neither Arab parties nor ultra-Orthodox parties; no rotation with Netanyahu	September 2025 and February 2026
Mansour Abbas (Ra'am)	Ready to join a coalition if the opposition needs his seats	25 October 2026
Yousef Jabareen (Joint List)	"Safety net" without participation; "no blank cheque"	10 October 2026
Moshe Rosenthal (United Torah Judaism)	Support for anyone who passes a conscription law "that stands up before the Supreme Court"	11 October 2026

Source: *Times of Israel*, 26 September, 26 April, 11 October 2026; *JNS*, 21 October 2026; *Jerusalem Post*, 21 September 2025; *Ynetnews*, February and 10 October 2026; *Al Jazeera*, 25 October 2026.

We can thus glimpse the foundations of the political deadlock that a Knesset with no majority for either Zionist coalition could produce.

The anti-Netanyahu camp refuses to govern with the Arab parties. Avigdor Lieberman also refuses the ultra-Orthodox. That leaves only one path: 61 seats without either.

On the Arab side, Mansour Abbas said he was ready to join a coalition⁴⁷, and Yousef Jabareen offered his support from outside⁴⁸, support he announced on 28 October that he was confirming in order to try to give Eisenkot a chance to form a government.

The latest polls also forced the parties of the Eisenkot coalition to consider accepting the support of the Arab parties, or even to contemplate an agreement with them. The law prohibits the publication of polls in the days leading up to the vote. The last surveys came out on the evening of Friday 23 October⁴⁹.

⁴⁷ Al Jazeera, "Israeli elections : what are the possible outcomes ?", 25 October 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/25/israeli-elections-what-are-the-possible-outcomes>.

⁴⁸ Ynetnews, 10 October 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/6bb1zzfy7>.

⁴⁹ Arutz Sheva, 23 October 2026, <https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/435074>.

Table 10. The last published polls, 23 October 2026, in seats

List	Kan 11	Channel 12	Channel 13
Yashar!	22	23	22
Likud	20	21	19
Beyahad	14	15	14
The Democrats	8	10	10
Joint List	9	9	9
Yisrael Beytenu	8	8	8
Otzma Yehudit	8	8	8
United Torah Judaism	8	7	8
Shas	7	8	7
Religious Zionism-Zehut	7	6	8
Ra'am	5	5	7
Reservists	4	0	0
Anti-Netanyahu camp	52	56	54
Netanyahu camp	50	50	50
Arab lists	14	14	16

Source: Ynetnews, 23 October 2026. Kan 11: Kantar, 1,006 respondents; Channel 12: Midgam and iPanel, 1,018 respondents; Channel 13: 1,875 respondents. In the Kan 11 poll, the Reservists' 4 seats are not counted in either camp.

In all three surveys, Yashar! came first and the Likud second, and none gave anyone 61 seats. Kan 11 and Channel 12 had also asked about preferred Prime Minister: 44% for Eisenkot, 38% for Netanyahu⁵⁰.

Looking back over the campaign, Netanyahu is behind every issue, from 7 October to the cost of living. That is what allowed Eisenkot, Bennett, Lapid, Golan and Lieberman to sign the same pact on 27 September, even though almost everything divides them. But this pact excluded the Arab parties, and Lieberman also excluded the ultra-Orthodox. Together they accounted for more than a quarter of the seats in the new Knesset.

No poll gave them more than 56, so the question of what would happen after the vote was already being asked before polling day.

⁵⁰ Arutz Sheva, 23 October 2026, <https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/435074>.

THE RESULT OF 27 OCTOBER: ISRAEL IN THE CAMP OF THE UNGOVERNABLE?

Israel combines **a particularly unstable electoral system** (pure single-round proportional representation) and **a highly fragmented political offer**. As a reminder, there are four large blocs in Israel, themselves subdivided into the 30 parties that were running on 27 October:

- The first bloc, the nationalist right allied with the far right (Netanyahu's camp).
- The second bloc, the secular centre and the left (Eisenkot's camp).
- The third bloc, the ultra-Orthodox.
- The fourth bloc, the Arab parties.

This is the most unstable combination possible, making Israel an XXL Fourth Republic. The results of 27 October 2026 accentuated this phenomenon by plunging Israel into uncertainty over its government.

THE RESULTS BY BLOC

The Likud first, Shas in freefall

In the 14:32 update, the Likud passed one million votes. It is the largest list, far ahead of Yashar!. Our projection gives it 27 seats. It had 32. Shas falls from 11 to 6, so the two pillars of Netanyahu's governments lose 10 seats between them.

Table 11. Votes and seats by list: Committee update, Le Millénaire projection and outgoing Knesset

List	Votes counted	Share	Seats on counted votes	Projected share	Projected seats	Seats in 2022
Likud	1,006,722	20.7%	26	20.6%	27 (26 to 27)	32
Yashar!	786,107	16.2%	21	16.3%	21 (21 to 22)	new list
Joint List	446,155	9.2%	12	9.0%	12 (11 to 12)	5 (Hadash-Ta'al); Balad 0
Beyahad	436,587	9.0%	12	9.1%	11 (11 to 12)	24 (Yesh Atid)
The Democrats	316,154	6.5%	8	6.7%	8 (8 to 9)	4 (Labor); Meretz 0
Yisrael Beytenu	289,290	6.0%	7	6.1%	8 (7 to 8)	6
Otzma Yehudit	269,379	5.6%	7	5.7%	7	14 (with Religious Zionism)
United Torah Judaism	276,498	5.7%	7	5.3%	7	7
Shas	257,896	5.3%	7	5.1%	6	11
Ra'am	281,882	5.8%	7	5.7%	7	5
Religious Zionism-Zehut	231,619	4.8%	6	4.9%	6	14 (with Otzma)
Reservists	127,843	2.6%	0	2.6%	0	new list
Amcha Yisrael	78,374	1.6%	0	1.7%	0	new list

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update; Le Millénaire projection (median and 80% interval of 4,000 simulations, Bader-Ofer method and surplus-vote agreements); Committee results for 2022.

In the opposing camp, Yashar! establishes itself with 21 seats at its very first election. Beyahad has 11, whereas Yesh Atid had 24 on its own in 2022. Yair Golan's Democrats have 8: that is double Labor's 2022 tally, but Meretz had been eliminated at the time. On the Arab side, the reunited Joint List wins 12 seats and Ra'am 7. Together, the Arab lists reach 19 seats, beyond the record of 15 the Joint List set in 2020⁵¹.

There is a one-seat difference, for six lists, between the seats calculated on the votes counted alone and those of the projection. It comes down to what remains to be counted: Arab localities, which will push up the two Arab lists, and envelopes, which will weigh in the other direction.

⁵¹ Wikipedia, "Joint List", https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_List. In 2020: 15 seats and 12.67% of the vote, "a new record" for an Arab party.

Table 12. The three blocs in votes and seats, 2022 and 2026

Bloc	2022 votes, comparable localities	2026 votes counted	2026 projected votes	2022 seats	2026 projected seats
Netanyahu bloc	48.3%	43.7%	43.3%	64	53
Anti-Netanyahu bloc	37.9%	40.3%	40.9%	46	48
Arab lists	11.3%	15.0%	14.8%	10	19

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update; Le Millénaire projection (sum of list medians); Committee results for 2022, same localities. Excluding outside envelopes for votes counted.

In votes, the swing is more modest than in seats. In the localities already counted, compared with their own 2022 vote, the Netanyahu camp loses four and a half points. The anti-Netanyahu camp gains two and a half and the Arab lists nearly four, before the last Arab localities are counted. In seats, the Netanyahu camp loses 11 seats, the opposing camp gains 2 and the Arab lists 9⁵².

The 3.25% threshold eliminates two lists that counted in the polls: **Yoaz Hendel and Yaron Zelekha's Reservists, and Ofer Winter's Amcha Yisrael.**

Table 13. The lists below the 3.25% threshold

List	Votes counted	Share
Reservists	127,843	2.6%
Amcha Yisrael	78,374	1.6%
Tseva Shahor	9,502	0.2%
Haredi Public (Moti Leitner)	9,029	0.2%
Noam	7,523	0.2%
Tsomet Beit Yisrael	4,951	0.1%
Total votes without a seat (all lists below the threshold)	253,870	5.2%

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update. Threshold: 3.25% of valid votes.

The wasted votes weigh on both sides. Amcha Yisrael belongs to the Netanyahu camp, the Reservists to the opposing camp. In 2022, it was different. The elimination of Meretz had cost the anti-Netanyahu camp seats, and that of Balad had cost the Arab lists, and they had contributed to the 64-

⁵² We use the sum of the medians per list, so that the totals come to 120 seats. In our simulations, the median for the anti-Netanyahu bloc taken as a whole is 49 seats; this is the figure displayed on the Observatory's election night page, <https://election.lemillenaire.org/soiree/israel/legislatives/2026/>.

seat majority. This time, the wasted votes are spread out and do not make the difference.

Seats are allocated using **the Bader-Ofer method**, a variant of the D'Hondt method. Two lists that have signed a surplus-vote agreement pool their remainders for the last seats.

Table 14. Allocation of seats on projected shares, without and with the surplus-vote agreements

List	Without agreements	With the five agreements	Effect
Likud	27	27	0
Yashar!	21	21	0
Joint List	11	12	+1
Beyahad	12	11	-1
The Democrats	8	8	0
Yisrael Beytenu	8	8	0
Otzma Yehudit	7	7	0
United Torah Judaism	7	7	0
Shas	6	6	0
Ra'am	7	7	0
Religious Zionism-Zehut	6	6	0

Source: Le Millénaire calculation on projected shares (Bader-Ofer method, 3.25% threshold). Agreements: Yashar!-Democrats, Beyahad-Yisrael Beytenu, Joint List-Ra'am, Likud-Religious Zionism-Zehut, Shas-United Torah Judaism.

On projected shares, the five agreements move only one seat. It goes from Beyahad to the Joint List, thanks to the agreement with Ra'am. One more seat for the Arab lists, one fewer for the anti-Netanyahu camp. In the 12:32 update, it was the agreement between Shas and United Torah Judaism that moved this seat, to the benefit of the Netanyahu camp.

In votes, **the Netanyahu camp remains ahead, at 43.3% against 40.9%**. In Jewish localities, it concedes to its opponents roughly what it loses, but this brings them only two seats: the Reservists' 2.6% goes below the threshold, and it is the Arab lists, with more of their voters turning out and this time united on a list that clears the threshold, that take 9 seats. In 2022, incidentally, Balad had won 2.9% without obtaining a seat. Netanyahu is eight seats short of 61, and his opponents thirteen.

The Likud, for its part, does much better than expected: 27 seats, six more than the best polls of 23 October gave it, and more than one million votes in the 14:32 update. It loses five compared with 2022, as many as Shas, which had only 11. Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism-Zehut, which ran separately, have 13 between them, one fewer than four years ago. After 7 October, the war and a trial still under way, it is the Likud that holds up best within its camp.

TURNOUT, A KEY TO THE ELECTION

An increase everywhere, except among the ultra-Orthodox

Over the 5 elections from 2019 to 2022, **turnout in Arab-majority localities had fluctuated between 44.5% and 66%, and that in ultra-Orthodox towns between 72.7% and 76.7%**⁵³. On 27 October, for the first time over the period, Arab localities turned out in greater numbers than ultra-Orthodox towns.

This can be explained by three factors. First, as noted earlier, **7 October did not in practice affect the ultra-Orthodox population**. Having remained relatively “sheltered”, the ultra-Orthodox were less concerned by the issues at stake in the vote than Israel's other communities (1). Furthermore, **the ultra-Orthodox are a younger population (57% under 20) and therefore more inclined to abstain, compared with the other communities** (2). Finally, rabbinical mobilisation of the ultra-Orthodox is weaker than before. Even though their participation in the State of Israel is not settled, ultra-Orthodox rabbis knew how to mobilise when the interests of their community had to be represented. Yet the ultra-Orthodox community is no longer as homogeneous as some observers claim (3).

⁵³ Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory, @ObservElections, 27 October 2026, calculation based on results by locality for the five elections from 2019 to 2022, <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115111279946006948>.

Table 15. Turnout by type of locality, through the day

Type of locality	12:49	16:45	18:43	20:41	23:05 (close)	2022, final
Arab localities	24.7%	49.1%	64.2%	75.1%	78.8%	53.8%
Anti-Netanyahu camp strongholds	29.5%	51.3%	60.5%	66.7%	71.9%	66.1%
Mixed Jewish localities	29.8%	51.2%	61.1%	68.2%	69.6%	63.7%
Netanyahu camp strongholds	28.2%	48.5%	57.6%	64.7%	68.9%	64.6%
Ultra-Orthodox localities	29.0%	52.9%	63.8%	71.8%	76.2%	75.7%

Source: Central Elections Committee, official turnout updates by locality (12:49 to 20:41, Israel time: Le Millénaire calculations; 23:05: Observatory publication, @ObservElections, 27 October 2026) and national estimate at 22:00 (77.7%, envelopes included). Localities with 1,500 or more registered voters, classified by their 2022 vote.


In the morning, nothing pointed to it: in the 12:49 update, Arab localities had the lowest turnout in the country, 24.7%. By 18:43, they were already above their final 2022 turnout, and at 23:05 they reached 78.8%, 25 points more than in 2022⁵⁴. In Jewish localities, the increase was four to six points, and among the ultra-Orthodox turnout simply returned to its 2022 level

It was in the afternoon that everything was decided: between 16:45 and 18:43, Arab localities gained 15 points of turnout, then another 11 up to 20:41⁵⁵, while no comparable surge was seen in the Netanyahu camp strongholds.

⁵⁴ Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory, @ObservElections, official turnout update by locality at 23:05, <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115192569244086420>.

⁵⁵ Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory, @ObservElections, 27 October 2026, <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115131633854460195> and <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115159137877193084>.

Change in turnout between 2022 and 2026, by locality



Source: Central Elections Committee (file by locality, govmap), 2022 and 2026 results; Le Millénaire calculations. Localities with more than 300 registered voters.

Figure 2. Change in turnout between 2022 and 2026, by locality.

Record turnout among Israeli Arabs

Table 16. The twenty largest Arab localities: turnout and split between the two lists

Locality	Turnout 2022	Turnout 2026	Difference (points)	Joint List	Ra'am
Nazareth	48.3%	73.4%	+25.1	73.3%	20.9%
Rahat	60.6%	84.7%	+24.1	13.0%	85.4%
Umm al-Fahm	38.3%	79.9%	+41.6	90.3%	8.0%
Shefa-Amr	51.5%	76.7%	+25.2	59.5%	19.7%
Tayibe	57.7%	80.8%	+23.1	83.7%	13.9%
Tamra	63.5%	84.3%	+20.8	61.1%	35.6%
Sakhnin	68.4%	87.1%	+18.7	65.0%	32.4%
Baqa al-Gharbiyye	47.5%	80.1%	+32.6	72.3%	25.8%
Tira	62.3%	81.5%	+19.3	70.1%	25.6%
Arraba	56.9%	80.2%	+23.3	71.1%	27.0%
Kafr Qasim	66.9%	86.1%	+19.3	24.5%	72.7%
Kafr Kanna	52.5%	80.6%	+28.1	72.8%	23.8%
Qalansawe	54.3%	79.7%	+25.4	72.6%	21.0%
Judeide-Makr	53.6%	78.6%	+25.0	77.9%	18.7%
Arara	52.5%	79.3%	+26.9	79.9%	17.4%
Yafa an-Naseriyye	49.5%	79.0%	+29.5	73.4%	19.3%
Kafr Manda	65.2%	86.4%	+21.3	55.4%	41.9%
Kafr Qara	62.2%	82.4%	+20.2	54.5%	42.6%
Reineh	52.8%	79.2%	+26.4	65.8%	30.5%
Majd al-Krum	66.7%	85.4%	+18.7	86.6%	11.7%

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update (polling stations counted); Committee results for 2022; Le Millénaire calculations. Shares of valid votes.

The twenty largest Arab localities all rise, by 19 to 42 points. Umm al-Fahm, where turnout was 38.3% in 2022, turns out at 79.9%. In the polling stations already counted, Arab localities account for 657,819 voters. That is far more than the 450,077 of the whole 2022 election, and counting there is not yet finished.

The vote itself has barely changed in Arab localities : **the Arab lists have 94.8% of the votes there against 93.1% in 2022, and the Jewish parties lose a little ground there.** What has changed is the number of people who came out to vote.

In 2022, Balad had won 2.9% on its own and had not entered the Knesset. Reunited with Hadash and Ta'al, the Joint List this time wins 56.0% of the votes in Arab localities, barely more than the 55.1% of Hadash-Ta'al and

Balad 4 years ago. Ra'am, for its part, rises from 38.0% to 38.8%. In the 12:32 update, the Joint List was higher, but the Bedouin localities of the Negev, where Ra'am wins nearly nine votes out of ten, had not yet all been counted.

On the map, the two lists barely overlap. In the Negev, Ra'am takes 88.7% of the votes going to the Arab lists, with its Bedouin strongholds of Rahat and Tel Sheva. In the Galilee and the Triangle, it is the Joint List that wins, with one exception: Kafr Qasim, where Ra'am wins 72.7%.




Figure 3. Ra'am's share of the vote for the two Arab lists, by locality.

The rise in Arab turnout that defines this election⁵⁶: with the vote almost unchanged, it gives seats to the Arab lists and takes as many away from the two Jewish camps.

Why such a vote? The figures do not say, and the Israeli press puts forward reasons that may add up. Zvi Zarhia, in Calcalist, cites the explosion of crime in Arab society, which makes voting a form of self-defence, the fear of seeing Itamar Ben Gvir remain Minister of National Security, and the surplus-vote

⁵⁶ In Brazil, two days earlier, turnout had also been a factor: 80.8% in the second round against 78.9% in the first. See Le Millénaire, "How did Lula turn the impossible into reality?", October 2026; Superior Electoral Court, <https://resultados.tse.jus.br>.

agreement between the two lists⁵⁷. Marzouq Halabi, quoted by The New Arab, sees it as “a purely defensive vote”⁵⁸, and Mansour Abbas as a reaction to “the policy of this government”⁵⁹. The only thing the locality data allow us to say is that the increase affects Umm al-Fahm, a Joint List stronghold, just as much as Rahat, a Ra'am stronghold.

WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF THE VOTE?

Three Israels, the same map as in 2022


If we look at who comes first in each locality, the 2026 map closely resembles that of 2022. The anti-Netanyahu camp holds Tel Aviv, Haifa, their affluent suburbs and the kibbutzim of the Galilee. The Netanyahu camp keeps Jerusalem, the development towns of the South and the North, the ultra-Orthodox towns and the settlements of the West Bank. The Arab lists come first in the Galilee, in the Triangle and among the Bedouin of the Negev.

⁵⁷ Calcalist, commentary by Zvi Zarhia, 28 October 2026, https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/hkdiygjgg!; The New Arab, 27 October 2026, <https://www.newarab.com/news/israel-elections-high-arab-turnout-seeks-punish-netanyahu>.

⁵⁸ The New Arab, 27 October 2026, <https://www.newarab.com/news/israel-elections-high-arab-turnout-seeks-punish-netanyahu>.

⁵⁹ The Jerusalem Post, 28 October 2026, <https://jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-913066>.

The leading bloc in each locality



Source: Central Elections Committee (file by locality, govmap), 2022 and 2026 results; Le Millénaire calculations. 2026: votes counted.

Figure 4. *The leading bloc in each locality.*

What changes is the level. In the 901 Jewish and mixed localities with more than 200 valid votes in both 2022 and 2026, the Netanyahu bloc falls back in 61% of cases. Weighted by the number of votes, it loses 3.3 points.


Table 17. Change in the blocs since 2022 by type of locality

Type of locality	Localities	Votes counted	Netanyahu bloc	Change	Anti-Netanyahu bloc	Change	Arab lists	Change
Netanyahu camp strongholds	338	1,415,235	69.7%	-3.1	27.1%	+3.7	1.9%	+0.9
Ultra-Orthodox localities	20	248,651	93.4%	-3.3	3.0%	+0.5	0.0%	+0.0
Mixed Jewish localities	161	1,342,003	46.3%	-3.7	50.1%	+5.3	2.8%	+0.7
Anti-Netanyahu camp strongholds	522	1,187,048	22.9%	-2.9	73.1%	+4.7	3.6%	+0.5
Arab localities	121	654,496	0.6%	-1.2	3.7%	-0.7	94.8%	+1.7

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update; Committee results for 2022, same localities; Le Millénaire calculations.

The decline is the same everywhere, give or take a few tenths: a little over three points in its strongholds, in mixed localities and among its opponents. The anti-Netanyahu camp gains four to five points in mixed localities and among its own voters, slightly less in the Netanyahu camp strongholds. In Arab localities, on the other hand, both Jewish camps fall back.

Change in the Netanyahu bloc between 2022 and 2026, by Jewish or mixed locality



Source: Central Elections Committee (file by locality, govmap), 2022 and 2026 results; Le Millénaire calculations. Arab localities and localities with fewer than 200 valid votes excluded. 2022: Likud, Religious Zionism, Shas, UTJ.

Figure 5. Change in the Netanyahu bloc's share between 2022 and 2026, by Jewish or mixed locality.

The big cities: 20 declines out of 20

Table 18. The twenty largest cities: blocs and turnout, 2022 and 2026

City	Netanyahu bloc 2022	2026	Change	Anti-Netanyahu bloc 2022	2026	Change	Turnout 2022	2026
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	26.7%	22.6%	-4.0	67.3%	72.9%	+5.6	59.6%	65.4%
Jerusalem	75.4%	70.1%	-5.4	19.8%	22.5%	+2.7	61.6%	65.9%
Haifa	34.2%	30.7%	-3.5	53.9%	57.7%	+3.7	55.5%	61.9%
Rishon LeZion	47.7%	43.2%	-4.5	49.7%	56.2%	+6.5	66.2%	71.7%
Petah Tikva	55.6%	51.1%	-4.5	40.5%	47.7%	+7.2	67.8%	73.1%
Ashdod	67.1%	64.0%	-3.1	31.2%	35.0%	+3.9	64.4%	68.2%
Netanya	61.9%	59.1%	-2.8	35.4%	40.0%	+4.6	58.3%	60.7%
Holon	56.2%	52.0%	-4.3	41.3%	47.4%	+6.1	64.1%	68.7%
Beer-Sheva	66.4%	61.8%	-4.6	30.3%	35.7%	+5.4	61.3%	66.4%
Ramat Gan	34.4%	29.3%	-5.1	62.0%	69.7%	+7.7	65.2%	70.8%
Bnei Brak	97.8%	93.9%	-3.8	1.8%	2.1%	+0.3	76.5%	77.7%
Rehovot	50.4%	46.9%	-3.5	46.2%	52.0%	+5.8	68.9%	73.4%
Ashkelon	65.8%	63.0%	-2.7	31.8%	35.9%	+4.1	61.9%	68.9%
Bat Yam	57.4%	51.2%	-6.1	40.0%	47.4%	+7.5	50.8%	55.2%
Herzliya	31.1%	26.6%	-4.5	66.2%	72.8%	+6.6	65.6%	71.4%
Kfar Saba	32.6%	28.7%	-3.9	64.3%	70.7%	+6.4	69.9%	74.8%
Modiin	35.5%	33.9%	-1.6	59.7%	65.3%	+5.5	74.7%	79.1%
Beit Shemesh	90.6%	88.3%	-2.3	7.2%	7.5%	+0.3	66.1%	67.8%
Hadera	58.5%	54.1%	-4.4	38.6%	44.2%	+5.6	62.7%	69.1%
Ra'anana	36.4%	35.3%	-1.1	58.9%	63.9%	+5.0	66.6%	70.7%

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update (polling stations counted); Committee results for 2022; Le Millénaire calculations. Cities ranked by valid votes in 2022.

The country's twenty largest cities all move in the same direction. The Netanyahu bloc falls by 6.1 points in Bat Yam, 5.4 in Jerusalem and 5.1 in Ramat Gan. In Ra'anana and Modiin, on the other hand, it loses only 1.1 and 1.6 points. The anti-Netanyahu camp gains everywhere, and it is in Ramat Gan, Bat Yam and Petah Tikva that it gains the most. Turnout, for its part, rises in all the large Jewish cities. The gap with the Arab localities remains enormous, of the order of 5 points against twenty-five.

Table 19. Tel Aviv and Jerusalem: the neighbourhoods where the Netanyahu bloc falls back most

City	Neighbourhood	Netanyahu bloc 2022	2026	Change
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	Yad Eliyahu	52.9%	42.1%	-10.8
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	Tel Haim	50.8%	40.6%	-10.2
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	HaTikva	73.8%	64.1%	-9.7
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	Jaffa C and Neve Golan	49.3%	40.3%	-9.0
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	Shapira	47.7%	39.5%	-8.2
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	Neve Sharona (Gani Sharona)	12.0%	11.0%	-1.0
Jerusalem	Givat Hananya (Abu Tor)	48.8%	36.7%	-12.1
Jerusalem	Jewish Quarter	92.2%	83.0%	-9.2
Jerusalem	Homat Shmuel (Har Homa)	87.9%	79.5%	-8.4
Jerusalem	Talpiot	56.6%	49.1%	-7.5
Jerusalem	Kiryat HaYovel	68.0%	63.7%	-4.3
Jerusalem	Beit Vagan	92.1%	86.9%	-5.2

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by statistical area (govmap), 15:10 update; 2022 results mapped onto the same areas; Le Millénaire calculations. Areas with 800 or more valid votes.

In Tel Aviv, the sharpest falls are in the working-class neighbourhoods of the south and east, which voted heavily for the Netanyahu camp. In Yad Eliyahu, Tel Haim, HaTikva and Shapira, the Netanyahu bloc loses between eight and eleven points. In the affluent north, it was already very weak and barely moves. In Jerusalem, the sharpest fall is in Givat Hananya, near Abu Tor, at 12 points. It exceeds eight points in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and in Har Homa.




Figure 6. Tel Aviv and Jerusalem: change in the Netanyahu bloc by neighbourhood.

Each list's strongholds

Table 20. Each list's stronghold

List	Locality where it achieves its best score	Score	National score (counted)
Likud	Dimona	52.4%	20.7%
Yashar!	Isfiya	64.2%	16.2%
Joint List	Umm al-Fahm	90.3%	9.2%
Beyahad	Mattan	23.6%	9.0%
The Democrats	Kiryat Tivon	25.8%	6.5%
Yisrael Beytenu	Peki'in	43.5%	6.0%
Otzma Yehudit	Kfar Chabad	55.1%	5.6%
United Torah Judaism	Modiin Illit	76.6%	5.7%
Shas	Tel Zion (Kokhav Yaakov)	53.7%	5.3%
Ra'am	Abu Qureinat	96.8%	5.8%
Religious Zionism-Zehut	Talmon	74.9%	4.8%

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update; localities with 2,000 or more valid votes counted; Le Millénaire calculations.

Each list has its heartland. Likud achieves its best score in Dimona, a development town in the Negev. Yashar! achieves its best in Isfiya, a Druze locality on Mount Carmel, and Yisrael Beytenu in Peki'in, another Druze locality, in Galilee. Religious Zionism-Zehut dominates in Talmon, in the West Bank, and Otzma Yehudit in Kfar Chabad.

Between 2022 and 2026, the map changes little: 3 to 4 points, in the same direction almost everywhere. In Tel Aviv, it is in Yad Eliyahu and HaTikva that the Netanyahu camp falls back most. These are working-class neighbourhoods in the south of the city that have voted Likud since 1977. In the affluent neighbourhoods of the north, it falls back less, but it was already weak there. One caveat is needed. The count is not finished in Tel Aviv, and the comparison by neighbourhood depends on how polling stations are assigned, which may have changed since 2022.

The Committee's file by locality, published at 15:10, makes it possible to compare each locality with its 2022 vote and with its rank in the Central Bureau

of Statistics' socio-economic index⁶⁰. We are therefore talking about localities, not voters.

Social level: a sharper fall among the least well-off

Table 21. The Netanyahu bloc by socio-economic level of Jewish and mixed localities

Group (1: least well-off; 10: most affluent)	Netanyahu bloc 2022	2026	Change
1	99.1%	94.7%	-4.4
2	82.2%	77.1%	-5.1
3	70.4%	66.8%	-3.5
4	65.1%	61.6%	-3.5
5	65.5%	62.0%	-3.5
6	63.2%	61.1%	-2.1
7	45.7%	42.1%	-3.6
8	32.4%	29.5%	-2.9
9	25.1%	22.3%	-2.8
10	21.8%	19.0%	-2.8

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019 socio-economic index of localities (data.gov.il); Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update; Le Millénaire calculations.

In 2026, as in 2022, the less well-off a Jewish locality is, the more it votes for Netanyahu: above 75% in the two least well-off groups, which include most of the ultra-Orthodox towns, and below 25% in the two most affluent.

What has changed is the size of the fall by group: 4.4 points in group 1 and 5.1 in group 2, the least well-off, against less than three points in the three most affluent groups.

In each camp, one list dominates

⁶⁰ Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, socio-economic ranking of localities and local authorities (2019 index), published on the data.gov.il portal, https://data.gov.il/api/3/action/datastore_search?resource_id=7c860e04-9f8d-41c2-9f24-6249958d2081.

Table 22. The split of the vote within the two camps, by type of Jewish locality

List	Netanyahu strongholds	Mixed localities	Anti-Netanyahu strongholds	Ultra-Orthodox localities
Likud	31.8%	27.6%	14.2%	5.8%
Shas	9.1%	4.0%	1.6%	22.3%
United Torah Judaism	7.7%	1.6%	0.8%	54.6%
Otzma Yehudit	10.0%	6.3%	2.5%	5.8%
Religious Zionism-Zehut	9.0%	4.8%	2.5%	4.4%
Yashar!	10.0%	20.4%	30.6%	1.0%
Beyahad	5.8%	12.0%	16.0%	0.7%
The Democrats	2.4%	5.1%	16.8%	0.2%
Yisrael Beytenu	6.0%	8.7%	6.9%	0.6%
Reservists	2.9%	3.9%	2.8%	0.5%

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update; Le Millénaire calculations. Shares of valid votes counted.

In the anti-Netanyahu camp, Yashar! comes first everywhere. It gathers 30.6% of the vote in the anti-Netanyahu strongholds, a fifth in mixed localities and a tenth in the Netanyahu camp strongholds.

The other lists in the camp each have their own territory. The Democrats score 16.8% in the anti-Netanyahu strongholds and 2.4% among their opponents. Yisrael Beytenu is stronger in mixed localities. The Reservists peak at 3.9%, with no stronghold that could have carried them above the threshold.

In the Netanyahu camp, Likud falls back only slightly: it keeps 31.8% in its strongholds, against 32.9% in 2022. Shas, on the other hand, loses between a quarter and more than a third of its votes depending on the locality: it falls from 29.3% to 22.3% among the ultra-Orthodox and from 13.9% to 9.1% in the Netanyahu camp strongholds. United Torah Judaism holds its level among the ultra-Orthodox, at 54.6%.

The religious right splits without shrinking

In 2022, Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich ran together under the name Religious Zionism. In 2026, they ran separately, and Ofer Winter targeted the same electorate with Amcha Yisrael.

Table 23. The religious right: 2022 and 2026 in the same localities

List	Share
Religious Zionism (joint list with Otzma), 2022	11.4%
Otzma Yehudit, 2026	6.4%
Religious Zionism-Zehut, 2026	5.4%
Amcha Yisrael, 2026	1.8%
Total 2026	13.6%

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update; 2022 results; Le Millénaire calculations. Localities counted in 2026.

Together, Ben Gvir, Smotrich and Winter do better than the single list of 2022, so the religious right does not fall back, but it is split, and what Amcha Yisrael gathered is lost below the threshold. Otzma Yehudit moves ahead of Religious Zionism-Zehut in the Netanyahu camp strongholds, in mixed localities and among the ultra-Orthodox.

The ultra-Orthodox: mobilisation intact, a scattered vote

Table 24. The large ultra-Orthodox localities: turnout

Locality	Turnout 2022	Turnout 2026
Bnei Brak	76.5%	77.7%
Beit Shemesh	66.1%	67.8%
Modiin Illit	82.0%	84.1%
Beitar Illit	81.3%	80.7%
Elad	84.4%	84.6%
Rekhasim	84.2%	87.5%
Kiryat Yearim	77.8%	79.1%
Emmanuel	75.8%	77.4%
Ganei Modiin	75.2%	77.2%

Source: Central Elections Committee, results by locality (elections.govmap.gov.il), file published at 15:10 (Israel time), corresponding to the 14:32 national update (polling stations counted); Le Millénaire calculations.

In the ultra-Orthodox towns, people voted at roughly the same rate as in 2022, and yet the Netanyahu bloc falls there from 96.7% to 93.4%. The lost votes do not go to the other camp but to small ultra-Orthodox lists that remain below the threshold: Tseva Shahor with 2.1% in ultra-Orthodox localities and Moti Leitner's Haredi Public with 1.2%⁶¹.

⁶¹ Central Elections Committee, results by locality, file published on 28 October 2026 at 15:10 (Israel time), <https://elections.govmap.gov.il/>; Le Millénaire calculations for the ultra-Orthodox localities already counted.

If we add up what the localities show, we first see the erosion of Likud and above all of Shas, which is stronger in the working-class areas that formed the core of Netanyahu's electorate. Next come shifts within each camp: Yashar! takes the largest share of the anti-Netanyahu vote, and the religious right splits without losing votes. And ultra-Orthodox votes are lost below the threshold. Taken one by one, none of these deprives the outgoing camp of its 61 seats. It is their sum, together with Arab mobilisation, that does.

FORMING A GOVERNMENT: AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK?

A timetable that may run until the spring

In Israel, no result confers power by itself. The chairman of the Central Elections Committee presents the official results to the President of the State eight days after the vote. The President then consults the elected lists and tasks a member of the Knesset with forming the government⁶².

Table 25. The stages of government formation and their deadlines if every time limit is used up

Stage	Legal time limit	Deadline (Le Millénaire calculation)
Official results presented to the President	8 days after the vote	4 November 2026
Consultations and designation of a person tasked with forming the government	7 days	11 November 2026
Mandate of the first person tasked with forming the government	28 days, extendable by 14	9 December, at the latest 23 December 2026
Designation of a second person tasked with forming the government	3 days	26 December 2026
Mandate of the second person tasked with forming the government	28 days	23 January 2027
Written request by 61 members of the Knesset	21 days	13 February 2027
Mandate of the candidate of the 61 members	2 days, then 14 days	1 March 2027
Failing that	dissolution of the Knesset	early March 2027

Source: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021 timetable drawn up under the Basic Law: The Government; The Jewish Press, 22 March 2021; dates calculated by Le Millénaire.

⁶² Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expected timetable for the elections to the 24th Knesset and the formation of the government (2021), <https://embassies.gov.il/eu/NewsAndEvents/Pages/Expected-timetable-for-elections-to-the-24th-Knesset-and-forming-the-government.aspx>; The Jewish Press, 22 March 2021, <https://www.jewishpress.com/news/israel/chad-gadya-the-post-election-process-from-voting-to-new-government/2021/03/22/>. These time limits derive from the Basic Law: The Government, whose text could not be consulted on the Knesset website.

If every time limit is allowed to run its full course, we reach the very beginning of March 2027 before a possible dissolution, and throughout that time Benjamin Netanyahu would remain Prime Minister, in charge of day-to-day business⁶³.

Eight combinations, none obvious

Take Yisrael Beytenu: its 8 seats would bring the Netanyahu bloc to 61. But on 27 September Lieberman signed the anti-Netanyahu camp's pact, and he rejects the ultra-Orthodox parties, which are in that bloc. The same difficulty recurs in every row of the table.

Table 26. The possible combinations and their seats

Combination	Seats	Chances of reaching 61	Declared obstacle
Netanyahu bloc alone	53	< 1%	eight seats short
Netanyahu bloc and Yisrael Beytenu	61	50%	Lieberman rejects any rotation with Netanyahu and rules out the ultra-Orthodox
Anti-Netanyahu bloc alone	48	< 1%	thirteen seats short
Anti-Netanyahu bloc and Ra'am	55	< 1%	Eisenkot rules out Ra'am
Anti-Netanyahu bloc and the two Arab lists	67	> 99%	Eisenkot, Bennett and Lieberman rule out the Arab parties
Anti-Netanyahu bloc, Shas and United Torah Judaism	61	> 99%	conscription; Lieberman rules out the ultra-Orthodox
Likud, Yashar! and Beyahad	59	< 1%	Eisenkot and Bennett refuse to sit with Netanyahu
Likud, Yashar!, Shas and United Torah Judaism	61	not simulated	same refusal, plus conscription

Source: Le Millénaire projection at the 15:10 update (sum of median seats per list; chances: share of the 4,000 simulations); statements: Times of Israel, Ynetnews, JNS, Jerusalem Post (see table of red lines).

The combination closest to the outgoing bloc is the Netanyahu bloc with Yisrael Beytenu. It reaches exactly 61 seats in our projection, and in only one simulation out of two. Avigdor Lieberman, a former minister under Netanyahu, has nevertheless demanded that his partners rule out any rotation with him, and he rules out the ultra-Orthodox parties, which are at the heart of this

⁶³ Al Jazeera, 27 October 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/27/no-clear-mandate-projected-in-israel-election-whats-next>.

majority⁶⁴. On election night, he was moreover calling on Likud members to stage a “rebellion”⁶⁵.

On the other side, the only combination that clearly exceeds 61 seats brings together the anti-Netanyahu camp and the two Arab lists, with 67 seats. It is also the one that most of its components have ruled out. With Ra'am alone, there are only 55 seats. Danny Zaken pointed this out on election night in Israel Hayom: even with Ra'am, Eisenkot does not reach 61⁶⁶.

That leaves national unity. Likud, Yashar! and Beyahad together hold 59 seats, and 61 is reached by replacing Beyahad with Shas and United Torah Judaism. On 12 October, Ynet, citing Yashar! sources, attributed to Isaac Herzog the intention of pushing for such a union, which the presidency denied⁶⁷. Above all, Eisenkot has promised not to serve under Netanyahu, “even in a rotation”⁶⁸, and Bennett not to sit with him “in any configuration”⁶⁹.

Is a minority government a solution?

There is, however, one door: a minority government. **To be sworn in, an Israeli government does not need 61 votes, but more votes in favour than against:** in June 2021, the government of Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid was sworn in by 60 votes to 59, with one abstention⁷⁰.

With our projected seats, **a government of the anti-Netanyahu camp supported by Ra'am would win by 55 votes to 53 if the Joint List abstained, and this is the “safety net” that Yousef Jabareen proposed during the**

⁶⁴ The Jerusalem Post, 21 September 2025, <https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/politics-and-diplomacy/article-868296>; Ynetnews, February 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hkr4bazo11x>.

⁶⁵ The Times of Israel, “Eisenkot and Netanyahu each vow to form next coalition even as exit polls predict stalemate”, 28 October 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/eisenkot-and-netanyahu-each-vow-to-form-next-coalition-even-as-exit-polls-predict-stalemate/>.

⁶⁶ Israel Hayom, analysis by Danny Zaken, 27 October 2026, <https://www.israelhayom.com/2026/10/27/arab-parties-election-gains-complicate-eisenkots-coalition-path/>.

⁶⁷ Ynetnews, 12 October 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bkotdiqsmg>.

⁶⁸ JNS (in Spanish), 21 October 2026, <https://www.jns.org/es/noticias/noticias-de-israel/eisenkot-descarta-servir-bajo-netanyahu-incluso-en-un-acuerdo-de-rotacion>.

⁶⁹ The Times of Israel, 11 October 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/bennett-suggests-netanyahu-could-be-part-of-future-government-quickly-backtracks/>.

⁷⁰ Wikipedia, “Thirty-sixth government of Israel”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty-sixth_government_of_Israel. The abstention was that of a Ra'am member of the Knesset. The text of the Basic Law could not be consulted on the Knesset website.

campaign⁷¹. Eisenkot had indeed said on 12 October that he preferred an alternative government, even a minority one, to Netanyahu staying in office⁷², and Mansour Abbas stated during the night that “everyone is talking to them, not just the change bloc”⁷³.

For Netanyahu, the arithmetic is harder: facing 67 opponents, he would need at least 15 of them to abstain, for example Yisrael Beytenu and Ra'am, to win by 53 votes to 52. Lieberman rejects any rotation with him, and even though Mansour Abbas says he has been approached by both blocs⁷⁴, the Prime Minister ran his entire campaign against “a government of Mansour Abbas and Ahmad Tibi”⁷⁵.

Table 27. What the leaders said the day after the vote

Leader	Statement
Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud)	“Likud is the largest party in Israel”; “We are still waiting for the real results”
Gadi Eisenkot (Yashar!)	Netanyahu is “a transitional Prime Minister, with neither a mandate nor trust”
Yair Lapid (Beyahad)	“The task is clear: to form a Zionist government”
Naftali Bennett (Beyahad)	“Netanyahu has lost, and the 7 October government is going home!”
Avigdor Lieberman (Yisrael Beytenu)	“By Friday we will have a much clearer picture”
Mansour Abbas (Ra'am)	“Everyone is talking to us, not just the change bloc”
Yousef Jabareen (Joint List)	“We are a political force that cannot be ignored”
Aryeh Deri (Shas)	It will be necessary to “wait for the actual results”
Yaakov Asher (United Torah Judaism)	“The Torah has won”
Itamar Ben Gvir (Otzma Yehudit)	A union with Eisenkot would be “a terrible mistake”

Source: *Times of Israel*, 28 October 2026; *Mako*, 28 October 2026; *Ynetnews*, 28 October 2026. Quotations translated from English and Hebrew.

⁷¹ Ynetnews, 10 October 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/6bb1zzfy7>.

⁷² Ynetnews, 12 October 2026, <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bkotdiqsmg>.

⁷³ The Times of Israel, 28 October 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/raams-abbas-says-figures-from-both-political-blocs-have-approached-him-amid-coalition-deadlock/.

⁷⁴ The Times of Israel, 28 October 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/raams-abbas-says-figures-from-both-political-blocs-have-approached-him-amid-coalition-deadlock/.

⁷⁵ Al Jazeera, 28 October 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/28/arab-parties-could-win-18-seats-in-israeli-elections-exit-polls-suggest>.

On the morning of the 28th, no one had yet said publicly whom they would recommend to the President⁷⁶. Netanyahu was calling for a “strong, national, right-wing government”⁷⁷, Eisenkot for a “Zionist conscription government”⁷⁸. It is Isaac Herzog who will designate the person tasked with forming the government, and it is also he who must rule on Netanyahu's request for a pardon, on which he had still not decided in the spring⁷⁹.

Netanyahu starts with an advantage. **Likud is by far the largest group in the Knesset, and as long as no government is sworn in, he remains Prime Minister.** He is 8 seats short, and those who could give them to him, Lieberman with his 8 seats or Bennett and Lapid with their 11, campaigned on his departure. His opponents reach 67 with the two Arab lists, but Eisenkot and Bennett have ruled out governing with them.

The Israeli political situation is difficult to read after this election. The “third round” is thus proving decisive. However, at this stage, our most significant government formation options are:

1/ **A lasting absence of a coalition agreement, making new elections in Israel possible in the near future and leaving Netanyahu to handle day-to-day business while negotiations take place.** Such a situation could also be tied to the end of the war against Iran, with elections possibly set for a rather distant date (next spring or autumn);

2/ **A national unity or minority government led by Netanyahu, made possible by individually winning over certain members of the Knesset from the ranks of Eisenkot's coalition.** Netanyahu has a political advantage over Eisenkot: his coalition is more compact and his party more hegemonic within the coalition. He therefore has more room for manoeuvre to negotiate an

⁷⁶ Le Millénaire research in the Israeli and international press as of 28 October 2026. Before the vote, Ofer Winter had announced that he would recommend Benjamin Netanyahu (JTA, <https://www.jta.org/israel-votes-2026>), and ultra-Orthodox sources indicated that Shas and United Torah Judaism might recommend no one (The Jerusalem Post, <https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-911533>).

⁷⁷ The Times of Israel, live blog of 28 October 2026, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-october-28-2026/>.

⁷⁸ Mako, live blog of 28 October 2026 (in Hebrew), https://www.mako.co.il/news-politics/2026_q4/liveblog-f5b5a09693081a1026.htm.

⁷⁹ Al-Monitor (Reuters), April 2026, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/04/israels-president-says-he-wants-deal-reached-netanyahu-case-pardon-decision>.

enlargement of his bloc. If this proves difficult with a whole list, it can be achieved case by case to approach the 61-seat mark required. The latest counts and seat swings may reinforce this scenario. **This situation has the advantage of being desired by President Herzog and by President Trump, so as to give Israel time to finish the war against Iran.**

3/ **A minority government led by Eisenkot, made possible by support without participation from all of the Arab parties.** Although this hypothesis initially seemed ruled out because the Eisenkot + Ra'am coalition does not reach 61 seats, Eisenkot can rely on the recent statements of Yousef Jabareen, who is proposing an abstention. However, this has two electoral limits: first, will Eisenkot's voters accept their coalition being placed under the watch of the Arab parties? And will Arab voters accept an Eisenkot government that will not revolutionise the policy pursued by Israel in the West Bank or in Gaza?

We do not know how this will end. A government of the anti-Netanyahu camp sworn in thanks to Ra'am and the abstention of the Joint List, by 55 votes to 53, would require Yashar! and Beyahad to go back on their word. National unity would presuppose Likud abandoning Netanyahu, which nothing suggested on 28 October. If no one succeeds, Netanyahu remains in office until a new election, as the Knesset could be dissolved in early March 2027. The forecast predicted the absence of a majority. It could not predict what Eisenkot, Bennett, Lieberman and Abbas will do.

CONCLUSION: OUR MODEL ANTICIPATED THE RESULTS

On 23 October, the last three polls gave Likud an average of 20 seats. Our projection gives it 27. This is by far the largest gap.

Table 28. The gap between the last polls and the projection, in seats

List	Average of the three polls of 23 October	Projection	Difference
Likud	20.0	27	+7.0
Joint List	9.0	12	+3.0
Ra'am	5.7	7	+1.3
Yisrael Beytenu	8.0	8	+0.0
United Torah Judaism	7.7	7	-0.7
Otzma Yehudit	8.0	7	-1.0
Religious Zionism-Zehut	7.0	6	-1.0
Yashar!	22.3	21	-1.3
Shas	7.3	6	-1.3
Reservists	1.3	0	-1.3
The Democrats	9.3	8	-1.3
Beyahad	14.3	11	-3.3

Source: Ynetnews, 23 October 2026 (Kan 11, Channel 12, Channel 13); Le Millénaire projection at the 15:10 update.

We can see that the error on the camps is smaller than it appears. The underestimation of Likud is partly offset by the overestimation of its allies. The fact remains that the order of the two Jewish camps has been reversed: the polls put the anti-Netanyahu camp ahead, while our projection puts the Netanyahu camp ahead, by five seats. In Calcalist, Zvi Zarhia sees in this “a severe indictment of the polling institutes”⁸⁰.

Why such an error? We have nothing with which to explain it, only two observations: turnout exceeded that of 2022 by seven points, and by twenty-five in Arab localities, and the gap is concentrated on Likud, at the expense of its allies and of Beyahad. A last-minute swing, a less openly declared vote, a turnout effect: all of this remains to be verified.

⁸⁰ Calcalist, commentary by Zvi Zarhia, 28 October 2026, https://www.calcalist.co.il/local_news/article/hkdiygjpgl.

Our forecast, frozen on the evening of 24 October, gave 55 seats to the Netanyahu camp, from 45 to 67 in nine simulations out of ten, 51 to the anti-Netanyahu camp and 14 to the Arab lists. In 69% of cases, no coalition compatible with the parties' statements reached 61 seats⁸¹.

Table 29. Our forecast of 24 October against the projection

List	Forecast votes	Projected votes	Forecast seats	Forecast interval	Projected seats
Likud	18.7%	20.6%	23	14 to 38	27
Yashar!	16.9%	16.3%	21	11 to 37	21
Beyahad	9.7%	9.1%	11	5 to 22	11
Joint List	6.9%	9.0%	8	5 to 14	12
The Democrats	6.8%	6.7%	8	5 to 14	8
Shas	6.7%	5.1%	8	5 to 13	6
Otzma Yehudit	6.1%	5.7%	7	4 to 12	7
United Torah Judaism	6.0%	5.3%	7	4 to 12	7
Yisrael Beytenu	5.5%	6.1%	6	0 to 11	8
Religious Zionism-Zehut	5.1%	4.9%	6	0 to 10	6
Ra'am	4.5%	5.7%	5	0 to 9	7
Amcha Yisrael	3.0%	1.7%	0	0 to 7	0
Reservists	2.8%	2.6%	0	0 to 6	0

Source: Le Millénaire, 2026 Israeli legislative election forecast, forecast frozen on 24 October 2026 (20,000 simulations, 67 polls from 8 institutes; interval: nine simulations out of ten); Le Millénaire projection at the 15:10 update. Forecast seats are the medians per list, which do not add up to 120; the published bloc medians were 55, 51 and 14.

On the outcome, we got it right, and the two Jewish camps are within the intervals we had published. Not the Arab lists: with 19 seats, they exceed our upper bound by one seat, and this is our main error, the same as that of the polls on which the model relied.

List by list, the record is better. The eleven lists entering the Knesset are all within their interval, and six obtain exactly the number of seats we gave them. The gaps concern Likud, the Joint List, Ra'am and Yisrael Beytenu, which were underestimated, and Shas, which was overestimated.

On election night, the model that we had recalibrated on the exit polls also remained too low on the Arab lists, at 16 seats, because it found almost no pre-

⁸¹ Le Millénaire, 2026 Israeli legislative election forecast, forecast frozen on 24 October 2026 (20,000 simulations, 67 polls from 8 institutes), <https://forecast.lemillenaire.org/israel/knesset/2026/>.

election simulation giving them more than 18. The projection built on the count, locality by locality, corrected the gap from the very first percentages.

This will need to be taken into account next time. Between 2019 and 2022, turnout in Arab localities had gone from 44.5% to 66%⁸², and it reached 78.8% on 27 October: in our next Israeli models, it will have its own uncertainty.

Netanyahu campaigned three years after 7 October, with a trial under way and polls that put him behind Eisenkot. **His ability to impose a cordon sanitaire against the Arab parties made it possible to remobilise his Likud electoral bloc, but also to make coalition options difficult for Eisenkot.** Indeed, Likud finishes first with 27 seats, six ahead of Yashar!, and his camp remains ahead in votes, at 43.3% against 40.9%. What costs him his majority is the five seats lost by Shas, as by Likud, and Arab turnout, up 25 points.

His opponents are even further away. With 48 seats, the anti-Netanyahu camp gains only two on 2022, and it can govern only with the support or abstention of the Arab lists, which it excluded throughout the campaign. Netanyahu, for his part, would need the backing or abstention of parties that have demanded his departure.

On 23 October, no institute gave Likud more than 21 seats. It has 27. At 22:00, the exit polls put the Arab lists between 16 and 18. They have 19. Our forecast did indeed give a hung parliament, in 69% of simulations, but not 19 Arab seats.

On 4 November, Isaac Herzog will receive the official results. Until a government is sworn in, Netanyahu remains Prime Minister. Without a government, the Knesset would be dissolved in early March 2027. It would be the seventh election since April 2019.

Four years ago, turnout in Arab localities was 53.8%, and Balad remained below the threshold with 2.9%. Netanyahu had his majority. This time, they turned out

⁸² Le Millénaire Electoral Observatory, @ObservElections, 27 October 2026, calculation based on results by locality for the five elections from 2019 to 2022, <https://x.com/ObservElections/status/2115111279946006948>.

at 78.8%, and they took it away from him. But the man Bennett declared beaten during the night remains at the head of Israel's largest party, and at the head of the government as long as no one replaces him.

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